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IN TRO D U C TIO N
1. A study in international monetary economics
The field of the present work is international monetary economics, and its 
analytical focus is the adjustment of payments among economies participating in an 
integrated international system. This choice has been made in the belief that multilaterality 
and interdependence are essential features of "open” economies that cannot be studied 
properly from the usual individual-economy standpoint. Moreover, this work is 
concerned with the adjustment of overall payments, that is to say more precisely, with the 
interrelations between trade payments and financial payments at the level of the individual 
economy and of the world economy as a whole. As far as the adjustment of payments is 
concerned, two different theories have been propounded since the early days of 
international economics. The one theory maintains that financial payments can only 
"compensate" for trade payments -these latter being regarded as the true independent 
variable; this may well be defined as the "classical" view. The other theory states that it is 
instead trade payments that are adjusted to autonomous and independent financial 
payments; this being the main feature of the so-called "transfer theories". The analysis of 
world payments adjustments in this vein has recently regained momentum (see the useful 
overview by Dombusch (1987a)) under the pressure of the dramatic financial transfers 
that have dominated the world scenario in the last decade, and will dominate it in the 
future, such as the world capital overflow towards the United States, the related debt 
transfer problem of the United States which will soon fall due combined with the 
analogous problem of developing countries, the incipient huge demand for capitals of 
Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. The study presented here aims at 
developing and generalizing the analytical contributions drawn from transfer theories as 
an approach to the international movements of real and financial resources and the 
adjustment processes of the related payments.
To introduce to the motivations and implications of this proposed approach, it 
should be said at the outset that the essential difference with the classical view lies not
2only in the idea that financial transactions are able to determine the extent of trade 
balances, but more importantly this idea is traced back to a reconsideration of the theory 
of the monetary economy.
International monetary economics has been largely involved in the past two 
decade's programme of reduction of all branches of economics to the first (Walrasian) 
principles of value and exchange -the so-called "microfoundations". The severe 
requirements of microfoundations have brought about some valuable theoretical results; 
one of the most important is that we can now see more clearly where our branch is not 
fully reducible to the theory of value and exchange, and where the straightforward 
application of those principles to international monetary matters may hide pitfalls.
Let us begin with the motivation itself for the theory of international payments, 
to which this study hopes to contribute. Traditionally, the key issue for both theory and 
policy is under what conditions, and with what consequences, each national economy 
brings its worldwide autonomous transactions in goods and assets into balance. 
However, according to first principles, all sorts of transactions stem from independent, 
decentralized decisions led by signals and constraints perceivable by agents whose 
ultimate end is the satisfaction of their needs through consumption. The fact that 
transactions are mediated by money, as Frank Hahn has repeatedly stressed, finds no 
room in the theory of value and exchange (1982); to a greater extent, the same applies to 
the coexistence of different monetary conventions, and to the importance we all usually 
attach to the distinction between "national" and "international" transactions as well as to 
that accounting sheet called "the balance of payments". If in, and among, markets 
exchanges happen to take place through means of payment, the former must be matched 
by the circulation of the latter, and we obtain nothing but a circular flow of deliveries 
against monetary payments. It is the existence of sovereign states and currency 
sovereignty that has long legitimated a specific concern with "external" transactions and 
payments; for currency sovereignty generally entails responsibility over limited means of 
international settlement. Furthermore, concern with official reserves leads to their 
hoarding as store value -another piece which haidly fits into the exchange economy of
3pure theory. Finally, monetary authorities are the only agents who directly perceive the 
"external constraint", whereas private indvidual agents may face it only to the extent that 
monetary authorities are able to enforce it
If we attach economic importance to international monetary relationships and 
dignity to the study of them, we are also attributing money with a status it cannot have in 
the theory of value and exchange. Therefore, the first part of this work sets out to search 
monetary foundations consistent with the role that money plays on the international stage; 
a search which should dispense with today's rephrasing of the old classical dichotomy 
between the "real" (Walrasian) economy of pure exchange and its "monetary veil". 
Current research on monetary foundations is still far from this goal, but it has been able 
to open a promising track by looking into the key concepts of tim e (in particular 
sequential time) and uncertainty (in the meaning of incomplete information). In Pan 
One these concepts are used to characterize the open financial economy as a 
sequential-time economy in which production and consumption decisions are made over a 
limited time horizon, are not pre-reconciled by tatonnement devices, but are instead co­
ordinated through time (but also across markets) by means of "wealth carriers’' (financial 
instruments). A particular instrument working as general means of payment and store 
of value can plausibly emerge only if uncertainty, in the form of incomplete information 
on all possible future states, and hence lack of contingent contracts, is introduced as a 
corollary to time.
This road leads us out of the Walrasian world. As recent studies in decision 
theory have shown, incomplete information gives way to precautionary behaviour 
(or "flexibility") in alternative to expected utility maximization; whereas the expected 
utility maximizer spreads his claims to future consumption over the whole set of possible 
contingencies, the cautious agents seeks to minimize the consequences of forecast errors 
with positive probability. One way of doing this is by accumulating financial assets. 
Money can survive among alternative assets thanks to a particular form of precautionary 
behaviour, otherwise known as liquidity preference; in fact the service money 
renders is to minimize, or nullify, the probability of nominal losses in the transfer of
4wealth across markets and through time.
Generally speaking, we move to a situation of monetary and financial non- 
neutrality. Non-neutrality is a general consequence of the fact that decisions entailing 
commitments to specified future states, when such commitments can be modified only at 
an uncertain cost (namely production and investment), are conditioned by the financial 
position that can back them up. In fact, actual financial instruments, unlike Anow-Debreu 
pure securities, are tailored precisely to avoid binding specification of future state- 
dependent commitments and to minimize the liquidation cost of no-longer desired 
positions (where money bears zero liquidation cost). International payments theory draws 
significance not from the assumption of worldwide pure exchange, but from the non­
neutral distribution and circulation of monetary and financial instruments. There is also a 
specific implication of non-neutrality which should be mentioned introductorily. As is 
well known from information theory, incomplete information (or an asset vector of lesser 
order than all future possible states) constrains the economy to less-than-optimal market 
allocations. Hence, it seems that when money is "essential" it is also non-neutral on the 
achievements of the economy, and in particular, the Two Fundamental Theorems of 
Welfare Economics, which crown both classical and modem dichotomized monetary 
theories alike, can no longer be taken for granted. No doubt, however, things could even 
be worse in an uncertain financial economy without money.
Once we recognize that money may be a token of informational imperfection, 
and hence it may be associated with market failures, another seemingly happy marriage 
runs into troubles, namely that between money and rational expectations. As is discussed 
in some detail in the first chapter, if all the informational axioms of rational expectations 
held, so that stochastic realizations of the predictions of the pure theory of exchange 
occured, then money would be driven out of the economy. A more promising marriage 
would then seem the one between money and imperfect-information expectations. 
Unfortunately, research in this field is still in its infancy and we do not have a box of 
tools ready for use; however some basic principles and methods are presented in the first 
chapter, which are then recalled in some expectational issues encountered in the analytical
5development of the work.
Part One also assembles the building blocks of an open-economy model with 
monetary and financial non-neutrality in the light of the above- mentioned monetary 
foundations and of recent macroeconomic advances in this direction. The 
macroeconomics of the financial economy in this work will be a coordination problem 
among decision units which are distinguishable not only in terms of their objective 
functions, but also in terms of their positions in the time sequence of the economy and, 
consequently, their financial structure (basically net spending and net saving units). 
Sequential time imposes to specify the financing of current production; here the market 
for working capital is the money market, which should thus be kept distinct from the 
market for money as an asset. Assets span from money deposits to variable-retum assets, 
obtaining results in the spirit of, though not identical to, portfolio theory. Under well 
specified conditions, consumption and investment decisions turn out to preserve 
essential Keynesian (or perhaps "New Keynesian") characteristics, while production and 
pricing fail to conform to perfect competition; hence, macreconomic equilibrium will have 
Keynesian characteristics too.
2. International payments theory and the transfer-theory approach
For the reasons expounded above, money and finance have always been in an 
uncomfortable position in international economics. The classical theory of international 
payments was (is) the academic application of the principle of "monetary veil" and its 
associated money-prices quantity mechanism. This theory has constantly been developed 
and applied despite the fact, mentioned previously, that the "external constraint" and all 
that it entails do not have clear foundation in the (supposedly) underlying pure exchange 
economy. More coherently, classical fathers maintained that international payments were 
not a true problem, that money could only follow goods, and that there was no economic 
rationale for international capital movements when these could entirely be replaced by 
goods movements. In this picture, non-trade autonomous payments (due to special 
circumstances like the payment of tributes, war debts, military expenditures, etc.) only
6give rise to temporary disturbances, which are automatically corrected and which exert no 
permanent influence over the determinants of international trade. In connection with these 
disturbances, however, it was recognized that the adjustment mechanism of payments 
could reverse its direction, that is, goods could follow money. This was called the 
transfer mechanism to signify that unilateral money transfers were followed by goods 
transfer by the same amount thus leaving overall payments in balance. Almost all 
handbooks of international monetary economics have a section on the transfer mechanism 
in this ancillary position inherited from the classics.
Following the development of neo-Keynesian macroeconomics during the 
1950s and 1960s, non-trade, financial payments were recognized as a stable and essential 
feature of the international system, one able to impose substantial modifications on 
previous analyses and prescriptions. The Mundellian framework provided the new basis 
for studying international monetary relations. The fundamental innovation was that 
establishing the open-economy macroeconomic equilibrium involves the markets 
for goods, for money and for assets simultaneously. Hence, movements of funds across 
domestic and foreign asset markets alike were "endogenized" as a function of differentials 
in asset returns, as yielded by nominal interest rates, current and expected asset prices 
and expected changes in exchange rates. More recently, another important advance has 
been made thanks to the principle of stock equilibrium  (steady state). This has 
been added in order to correct the implict result in Mundellian "internal-external 
equilibria" of boundless willingness of asset holders in one country to finance the foreign 
deficit of another, while theoretically full equilibrium is not established until stocks are 
invariant. As a consequence, whereas international payments theory has traditionally 
focused on the balance between trade and capital account, current analyses have 
completely centred on steady state conditions where trade balances (or current accounts) 
are zero and there are no capital movements worldwide.
The extreme importance attached to the financial component in modern 
international economics has not, however, brought any substantial change in its classical 
function as the dependent or compensatory component in international payments with
7respect to the real one. Even in common parlance capital movements are usually referred 
to as "compensating" or "financing" trade imbalances. This view emerges clearly from 
Mundell-Fleming original models and is also apparent, with some important 
qualifications, in their later developments that I have just mentioned. In a system where 
the equilibria of the financial and real markets are determined simultaneously, it seems 
that the former can have no autonomy whatsoever the equilibrium of the financial market 
is entirely coincident with the equilibrium of the real sector (which signals the so-called 
"fundamentals”) and can only be upset by real shocks or by shocks of fiscal and 
monetary policy. It is true that in the portfolio approach, in a system of flexible exchange 
rates, the adjustment of asset markets has a direct effect on the trade balance. But this is 
the case only in "the short run", while, over "the long run", financial flows assume again 
the role of compensating for trade disequilibria until their complete exhaustion.
Such a conventional view is not completely suitable for the study of the 
adjustment of international payments in the system as a whole (and consequently in the 
individual country too). The first and most apparent reason is that a large amount of 
financial payments remains unmodelled -as was remarked by Machlup several years ago 
(1965). Financial payments do not stem from portfolio adjustments only; direct 
investments, governments transfers due to international commitments, capital and labour 
incomes paid internationally or payments imbalances ("indirect transfers") due to shocks 
to terms of trade, phenomena which mostly concerned old transfer theories, have by no 
means disappeared; actually, they are all means by which financial resources are moved 
from one economy to another in the world.
Also, there is a more fundamental reason for dissatisfaction. Although decisions 
to transfer capital may admittedly be due to some "shock" in some part of the world, in 
view of the fact that there are n countries but only n-1 independent balances of payments, 
capital transfers in at least one country cannot be endogenously determined in relation to 
the desired trade imbalance. In fact the opposite must happen; in at least one country it is 
capital transfers that represent the exogenous variable, a transfer problem, given the 
ex ante desired trade imbalances of the rest of the world.
8As Kindleberger shrewdly pointed out, the relation between financial and trade 
payments appears a typical "chicken and egg" problem (1968). What we actually 
observe is nothing but a circular flow of monetary means. Attribution of cause and 
effect can only derive from some theory of production and consumption in a monetary, 
or I would say a financial, economy. Hence we realize that subscribing to a theory of 
financial non- neutrality as explained previously in par.l, as an alternative to neutrality 
theories, cannot be without consequences upon international payments theory either. 
Indeed, if all goods-market decisions of agents dispersed in the world are found to be 
conditioned by agents' financial resources, the natural consequence at the international 
level should be that the acquisition of real resources by each individual country (and 
ultimately by the overall system) cannot be determined independently of the level and 
distribution of financial resources. In aggregate terms, the international transfer problem 
is by no means different from the closed-economy problem of transferring capitals from 
savers to investors (and there is no presumption that this problem is exclusively due to 
the public sector). In other words we should reverse the classical view and say that 
"fundamentally" goods follow money.
The theoretical development of this principle is the subject matter of Part Two. 
The task will be accomplished on two interrelated grounds: first, the static-comparative 
study of the properties, both in analytical and historical perspective, of different patterns 
of world transfers of financial and real resources; second, the analysis of transfer models 
of world payments adjustments, which is of paramount importance for understanding 
how a particular network of payments is established, how it determines the economic 
performance of individual economies, and how the whole system can (or cannot) achieve 
the scenarios previously described. Notice that saying that "fundamentally" goods follow 
money should be interpreted as a result of so-called "fundamental analysis", not as a 
claim of deterministic laws governing the world cconomy in all times and circumstances.
The resulting picture not only reverses the traditional priority of the determinants 
of trade over those of finance in the world economy, but also shifts the analytical focus 
from today's almost exclusive conditions of stock equilibrium (stationary state) back to
9conditions of flow equilibrium. The logical necessity of stock equilibrium is by no means 
neglected; rather, it is carefully discussed in its implications and relevance (e.g. for the 
sustainability of world flow equilibria) within a framework where international economic 
adjustments as capitals are flowing, instead of world stationarity, matter the most
3. T ransfer theories. An overview
The development of the analysis of the "transfer mechanism" of resources 
should begin by recovering those "lost ideas" that have fallen by the wayside during the 
long progress of international payments theory. Johnson (1956), who gave an extremely 
useful systematization of the transfer theory, emphasized that the real root of the transfer 
problem is the pattern of financing in the transfer country (T), and of utilizing in the 
recipient country (R), the financial transfer. The source, or the outlet, of the financial 
transfer may be the existing stock of assets (including official reserves), or the current 
flow of expenditure, or both of them in some proportion. In this framework the whole 
array of transfer mechanisms that have been envisaged since the Napoleonic Wars can 
find a place.
At the one extreme we shall first examine the classics' idea that the transfer 
problem is essentially a currency problem; that is to say, non-trade payments are 
unilateral shifts of "gold” such that their source and outlet are official reserve stocks. The 
economic variable which is usually associated with this kind of transfer mechanism is the 
real exchange rate; T excess demand for R currency gives rise to real depreciation in T, 
and consequently, to net positive exports from T to R. Among the most representative 
advocates of this approach we find Mill (1848), Taussig (1919,1928), Viner (1933) and 
Keynes (1929,1930); however, it is apparent that almost everyone who is now thinking 
of the future U.S. transfer problem of external debt is applying quite the same model 
(e.g. Branson (1985), Krugman (1985)). Variations across currency transfer-models 
concern the links between the foreign cuiTency market and the real exchange rate. In the 
strict classical transfer model, where the nominal exchange rate is fixed, a monetary 
transmission between the currency stocks and relative prices in the two countries is
10
necessary. Obviously, changes in the nominal exchange rate can partly or totally take 
over the adjustment of relative prices. In any case, an important result is that variations in 
real exchange rates (and, if the case, in nominal ones too) are explained as a necessary 
step in the world transfer process, rather than as an undesirable departure from 
stationarity due exclusively to uncoordinated policies as in current views.
It is certainly true that any form of international financial transfer has to go 
through markets for foreign exchanges, however such a simple definition of the problem 
overlooks a number of other economic variables that may get involved in the financing* 
utilization problem of the transfer. Generally speaking, financial transfers involve 
decisions of other agents, in addition to central banks, as to their possible sources and 
uses. According to the taxonomy outlined above, a purely financial transfer model 
will be analyzed such that the source and outlets of financial means are the stocks of 
assets in the two countries. In this kind of transfer model, the main transmission 
mechanism is therefore the vector of asset return rates through financial non-neutrality 
effects on real expenditure and income across countries. We are thus led into the realm of 
current portfolio models, which, as noted previously, can claim to cover only a part of 
the phenomenology of international payments. On the other hand, we shall also have to 
consider the possibility that financial transfers impinge directly on current expenditures 
(such a pattern is in fact likely for important classes of international payments such as tax- 
paid government transfers, direct investments or indirect transfers due to shifts in terms 
of trade). In this case we shall be able to synthetize a wide array of transfer theories based 
on pure expenditure models, which historically have been introduced as the 
alternative to the classical price-specie-flow mechanism since the early insights by
«*>
Ricardo (1809) and then by Ohlin (1929,1933) and by proponents of the Keynesian 
international trade models (e.g. Machlup (1965, pan V)).
It goes without saying that, under the floating regime, the nominal exchange rate 
adds to the factors capable of linking goods transfers to financial ones. The models 
examined here will confirm the general presumption that appreciation of R-economies' 
currencies may be regarded as a fundamental result of international portfolio adjustments:
11
on the one hand R-currency nominal appreciation contributes to world asset markets 
adjustment, while on the other it fosters goods transfers from T to R. Notice, then, that 
the conclusion of the classics is still valid: (real) exchange-rates dynamics is dictated by 
world transfer processes, quite independently of policy mismanagement. In the last few 
years, such a world-transfer view, albeit not with full acknowledgment, has gained 
consensus among leading scholars (e.g. Dombusch (1987a)).
Differences and similarities between my main results and traditional as well as 
current views will be discussed rather extensively, especially with regard to adjustments 
of portfolios in T-economies in favour of R-economies' assets, and their effects on real 
expenditures, incomes and payments in the world economy. It is worth anticipating that a 
general presumption will emerge against the case that the world transfer process leaves 
real income unaffected, and in favour of the case that T economies experience a real loss 
if they wish to preserve external balance, no matter what the exchange rate regime is. 
Exchange-rate dynamics, too, will deserve accurate comparison between current views 
and the results of the approach proposed here. Assuming perfect real and asset markets, it 
is usually concluded that the fluctuation of the exchange rate will enable optimal transfers 
of resources in that it eliminates payments imbalances and therefore intervention by 
central banks. In fact, taking R asset supply as given, there exists an equilibrium vector 
of exchange and asset-retums rates such that T is ready to offer the desired transfer of 
capitals and goods to R. This new, optimistic version of the transfer problem -one closely 
linked to the experience of the United States during the period 1980-85 - begs a number 
of questions which instead put under trial the assumption of efficient foreign exchange 
market and the achievements of the floating regime.
4. Plan of the work
The aim of Part One is to give a consistent characterization of an economy which 
makes use of monetary and financial instruments (called the financial economy) 
starting from the principle that such an economy cannot consistently retain the usual 
Walrasian properties. Chapter I is concerned with the foundations of the uses of
12
monetary and financial instruments; it moves from recent theoretical research on 
sequential time, uncertainty and the uses of money to show in what respects the financial 
economy departs from the Walrasian economy (sec.l). The key to understanding the 
financial economy is seen in imperfect information, specifically incomplete information 
and lack of complete contingent markets; general principles of imperfect information, 
uncertainty and market inefficiency are expounded in section 2. Section 3 introduces 
precautionary behaviour, as opposed to expected utility maximization, to explain asset 
holding. By applying the same methodology, liquidity preference is deduced from 
precautionary behaviour to explain money holding. Finally in section 4 it is also shown 
how international monetary economics draws significance from the above monetary 
foundations.
Sequential time, uncertainty and the uses of money as considered above have 
distinct macroeconomic implications that are developed in chapter II. Section 1 sets forth 
the basic elements of macroeconomic analysis in terms of interaction and coordination 
among decision units that are defined according to their objectives, their information 
endowments and their financial position. Section 2 defines the criteria and methodological 
instruments of macroeconomic equilibrium.
Chapter III builds up a macromodel of the open financial economy on the 
foundations laid down in ch.I; its results, though not all systematically, will be available 
to use in the various analytical contexts of transfer models. Two sections (1 and 2) are 
devoted to analyzing the money market in stationary state and then in the expanding 
economy (where investment, saving, the public budget and the balance of payments are 
not nil); the sequential methodology introduces the important distinction between the 
market for monetary working capital (where the banking system and production units 
interact to set the discount rate, or the the basic money interest rate) and the market for 
money as an asset (money deposits). Section 3 adds the asset market, with assets ranging 
from money deposits to variable-retum assets. The method of precautionary behaviour 
and liquidity preference is here applied to obtain asset prices. Stock equilibrium with 
foreign assets, under fixed and floating exchange rate, is analyzed in detail. The goods
13
market is considered in section 4, where decisions of consumption, investment, 
production and pricing are examined. Consumption and investment decisions, under well 
specified conditions of precautionary behaviour, display Keynesian features with 
important qualifications related to the explicit role played by the agent's financial position. 
Production and pricing, being framed in a sequential setting, are analyzed as producers' 
forward-looking decisions; as a result of the conditions of imperfect information, price 
making turns out to be imperfectly competitive. Section 4 ends with the determination of 
macroeconomic equilibrium.
Part Two develops the methodological, historical and analytical elements in the 
proposed transfer approach to the adjustment of payments among open financial 
economies. Chapter IV begins with taxonomy, methodology and lessons from history; 
the latter two (sections 2 and 3) are closely related since they show how the transfer 
approach can be used as an ordering principle for theoretical as well as historical world 
scenarios. The analysis of transfer models will show and discuss a number of 
explanations of the capability of financial transfers to induce goods transfers across 
integrated economies while leaving the world economy in flow equilibrium. The 
treatment is organized according to the different definitions of the transfer problem to be 
found in the literature, while it places them into a wider interpretative framework based 
on the so-called financing*utilization pattern.
Chapter V starts with the transfer problem as a currency problem. In its classical 
version (section 1), the currency transfer problem is essentially based on shifts of "gold" 
from T to R-economies which involve the adjustment of the real exchange rate. Section 2 
revises the assumptions and the predictions of the classical transfer model in the light of 
some stylized facts. Three important modifications on the classical body of the model are 
considered: an alternative monetary mechanism based on the discount rate, the distinction 
between tradable and non-tradable goods, and the flexible exchange rate.
Those parts of the classical theory that prove to be unsatisfactory are mainly due 
to the restrictive specification of the transfer problem and to the assumptions of the 
macroeconomic model; hence chapter VI (section 1) introduces wider possible
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specifications of the financing-utilization pattern, on the one hand, and adopts the 
macroeconomic model of the open financial economy of chapter III, on the other. 
Therefore chapter VI encompasses models based on pure financial effects as well as 
models based on pure expenditure effects, under the fixed and the floating exchange rate 
regime (section 1 and 2).
Finally chapter VII addresses some issues in exchange rate dynamics in the light 
of the proposed transfer approach, and in comparison with current theories. Section 1 
defines the so-called "fundamentals" of exchange rate dynamics in this approach, and 
stresses that the latter entails a major change of focus relative to early asset-market 
theories. Then the transfer models previously elaborated are used to establish in what 
respects exchange rate dynamics in the world transfer process may differ from the 
representation in conventional models; this is done with regard to the path(s) towards 
world flow equilibrium as well as to the long-run evolution of the world economy. 
Having thus defined the fundamentals, section 2 raises the question of how well the 
exchange rate may be expected to work, that is to say, to reflect fundamentals efficiently. 
The foundations of Part One play an important role in the answer, since they lead to the 
imperfect information hypothesis in the analysis of the issue of exchange-rate efficiency.
PART ONE 
THE OPEN FINANCIAL ECONOMY

CHAPTER ONE
TIM E, UNCERTAINTY AND THE FINANCIAL ECONOMY
Introduction
The theoretical framework of monetary economics that has emerged as dominant 
from the fierce clash between Keynesians and Monetarists is a highly sophisticated, 
updated version of the older "dichotomy" between the Walrasian "real" economy and its 
monetary "veil". The anchor of the latter to the former is ensured by the assumptions of 
market general efficiency and rational expectations. Thus the popular idea is still that an 
economy which uses money and securities can naturally be analyzed within the Walrasian 
apparatus and by means of Walrasian tools. However, such an idea is sharply in contrast 
with the well-known finding of fundamental "inessentiality" of the use of monetary 
instruments in a Walrasian economy (Hahn (1973, 1982, 1988). Roughly speaking, 
"inessentiality" means that in such an economy there is nothing that cannot be done 
without money, and in particular there exist non-monetary general equilibria. If this 
finding is correct, current monetary economics seems to suffer from a serious 
misunderstanding of its own subject matter. The aim of this chapter is to identify the 
basic elements for a consistent characterization of the subject matter of the monetary 
economist.
In the first place this chapter concentrates on time and uncertainty as keys to 
understanding the uses of money in the market economy (sec.l). After having recalled 
basic principles of market general efficiency, a shift of focus is proposed from the 
traditional exchange economy to the more general financial economy. A financial 
economy belongs to the class of "timesequence economies", in which production 
and consumption decisions are made over a limited time horizon and are linked from one 
period to the next by means of stores of value (financial instrum ents). To recall 
Radner’s famous statement, an economy which uses money must be a sequence economy 
(1968), but sequence time may not be sufficient. After a brief survey of major 
"innessential" attempts to graft money onto a Walrasian economy, the chapter draws on
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recent developments in monetary theory (e.g. Hahn (1988)) which relate the use of an 
instrument working as general means of payment and store of value to the lack of 
information on all possible states of the economy and to the absence of contingent 
markets (secs.2-3). Throughout the present work, uncertainty will indicate these latter 
characteristics of agents' decision framework.
This road leads us out of the Walrasian world. The first reason is that, as market 
efficiency theory has proved, an economy in which the price space is of lesser order than 
that of possible states is constrained to inefficient allocations. The second reason is that 
uncertainty as due to incomplete information and lack of contingent contracts conflicts 
with the orthodox theory of economic behaviour. The risk-averter expected utility 
maximizer is in the conditions to place himself in the most preferred position for any 
possibile future contingency; by contrast, the uncertain agent has to cope with the 
consequences of unforeseen (or uninsurable) contingencies. Hence human fallibility in 
forward-looking activities is quite binding whereas it plays little or no role in economic 
theory. Recent research in this field has revived interest in the idea of precautionary 
behaviour, in alternative to expected utility maximization, as a rational conduct of 
fallible individuals in the face of uncertainty (the Appendix traces a line of thought which 
goes from Knight's (1921) early emphasis on human fallibility in economic decision­
making, to Hicks's (1979) and other decision theorists' (Jones-Ostroy (1984)) 
reformulation of Keynes’s "precautionary motive" in terms of "flexibility", up to the 
"New Keynesian" revival of the issue by Greenwald-Stiglitz (1987, 1988)). This paper 
devises a simple model of precautionary behaviour, based on the minimization of a finite 
and positive probability of error (see the Appendix for details), to investigate into the role 
of money and securities in the financial economy.
Section 3 shows that under uncertainty asset holding can be related to 
precautionary behaviour, e.g. to the consumer’s objective to minimize the probability of 
default on his normal stream of payments, instead of maximizing the expected utility from 
future consumption. Parallely, the uses of money emerge because of agents' precaution 
in the choice of how to transfer wealth across markets and through time. In particular, by
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means of a portfolio choice problem in which the objective is to minimize the probability 
of loss in the monetary value of wealth, we shall see that money holdings must be 
positive independently of agents' tastes. The probability of nominal loss in wealth may 
well be defined a liquidity problem, and hence liquidity preference turns out to 
be a particular form of precautionary behaviour.
Finally, the chapter (sec.4) also aims to characterize the international dimension 
of the financial economy. It is stressed that the international dimension has no economic 
relevance in general equilibrium theory, whereas such a relevance may only derive from 
political judgements -which are not our concern here- or from the existence of different 
monetary constitutions and sovereigns. Money is doubly "essential" in international 
economics.
1. Time, money and finance
1.1. M onetary economies.
A monetary economy is an economy which uses money. Such a definition is not 
tautological if one can show that the use of money is, in some sense to be defined, 
rational. Consequently, a theory of the monetary economy has to be based on a theory of 
money. The importance of this seemingly pointless distinction between monetary theory 
and theory of money was advocated by Hicks as early as 1935.
The first, natural step of explorers into the nature of money has always been to 
look at "what money does" (Hicks (1967, p.l)). This can be justified as a sound 
empirical attitude, but immediately leads to a serious difficulty. Let us start by observing 
what money does today in "our own economy". We shall see that money perfonns three 
well-known functions: unit of account, means of paym ent and store of value. 
Thus anything acceptable as standard, currency and reserve is, in principle, money. 
Yet these three functions are generally performed by one single instrument -fiat paper 
notes issued by a State agency. We also accept it as natural that different State agencies 
should issue differently denominated monetary instruments. The difficulty arises from 
observations in different times and economies. For then we see the most varied
18
combinations of each of those three functions with the others, and with different physical 
instruments, in a way that it makes it impossible to define "what money does" 
independently of the time and place of observation. And even if we take money to be one 
or more of those functions, regardless of the physical instrument employed, any attempt 
to isolate the genesis of money is inconclusive -or meaningless, since it should be pushed 
so back in the past that virtually all known forms of economic life could claim to be a 
monetary economy ^ .
If historical excursions are discouraging, they are nonetheless a powerful 
antidote against the abstract modelling of the "invention" of money. After long and deep 
explorations in monetary history and theory, Hicks had to conclude that the theory of 
money is always topical (1967, ch.EX). Few monetary economists seem fully aware of 
this peculiar aspect of their subject, nor do they seem prepared to accept its conse­
quences. Most disputes live on different definitions of money -or of money functions- 
which in turn derive from different, often hidden, characterizations of the monetary 
economy under examination (Leijonhufvud (1983)). Thus, the correct question should 
be: "What does money do in our own m onetary economy?", which calls for a 
characterization of "our own" monetary economy. When we shall be able to give a 
satisfactory answer, we shall also be able to understand why a market economy uses 
State notes as standard, currency and reserve, and, accordingly, how it works.
1.2. Money and exchange. The pragm atic view.
The core of modem economics derives from Adam Smith's perception of "our 
own" economy as an exchange economy. Monetary economics is no exception - 
suffice it to read Book I, chapter IV of the Wealth of Nations, where the reader will 
find the distinctive concern of classical monetary theory: the efficiency of money as a 
medium of exchange of commodities.
In the exchange economy money enters the picture as the sum of money 
balances endowed to traders with a view to their future exchanges. Provided that the use 
of a general medium renders commodity exchange more feasible, the problem of 
efficiency is reduced to that of the exchange value of money itself. As is well known, this
19
is also the economy of the quantity theory of money. The quantity theory appears to be a 
theory of the exchange value of money according to demand and supply. But, as Mill 
aptly pointed out, "it is indifferent whether, in characterizing the phenomena, we speak of 
demand and supply of goods or of demand and supply of money. They are equivalent 
expressions" (1848, Bk.IU, pp. 12-13). Surprisingly enough, the reference to money 
turns out to be redundant.
Indeed, in the classical monetary theory in general, and in the "quantity
7
tradition" in particular, one could hardly find a satisfactory theory of money . The 
quantity theory claims to explain how a monetary- exchange economy works, but it is 
rather loosely related to an inquiry into the nature of money. It is well known that Walras 
(1900) proved the existence of exchange general equilibrium in the absence of a general 
medium and even of a unit of account; the idea of "dichotomy" between real and 
monetary exchange was thus given an unshakeable confirmation (1900, Lessons 29-30). 
Thus money's function as general medium is accepted as a matter of fact or as an alleged 
development of the barter economy, with no need for further inquiry. Such a "pragmatic 
approach to money" -in Patinkin's words (1982, p.6)- marks classics' monetary theory, 
and perhaps most moderns' attitude. Indeed, the modem theory of the monetary- 
exchange economy (popularized as "monetarism") is based essentially on the function of 
money as medium of exchange, on the consumer's desired cash-balances, on the gross 
substitution principle between money and real assets, and, in the last instance, on a given
3
state of Walrasian general equilibrium of real production and exchange .
The basic reasons for dissatisfaction with the classic tradition, and the 
foundations of the modem approach to money and monetary theory, are still those laid
4
down by Hicks in "A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money" (1935) .
I would disentangle Hicks's "suggestion" into the three following points. First, in 
so far as only the medium of exchange is considered, money holdings -desired cash- 
balances- are a dead-end in the pure theory of exchange: they are nothing else than the 
monetary equivalent, the "veil", of goods and services on current demand. There is no 
choice of money against anything else, and no rationale can be given to holding money.
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Second, only when it is recognized that money is chosen "rather than other things", only 
when money is regarded as an asset to store value, will there be true matter of choice 
analysis. Third, when money is a store of value, there is a double choice to be analyzed: 
money vis a vis goods, and money vis & vis other assets. It is time that underpins 
those three points. Money holdings are a genuine problem (i.e. they interfere with Say 
Law) only when demanders of commodities (or of services) hold money in excess of 
planned consumption (or production), and this can only occur if their wealth is to be 
carried through time. The demand for money is not the consumer's demand for 
transaction balances, but the wealth holder’s demand for a store of value.
The subsequent story is well known and at the moment we need not go deeper 
into its theoretical details. Rather, it should be noted that the theory of the wealth holder’s 
demand for money has been developed as if it were independent of the first point, which, 
one year later, did not find a place in Keynes's monetary revolution -in chapter XV of the 
General Theory the consumer's demand for money (the transaction motive) is mingled 
with the wealth-holder's demand for money (the precautionary and the speculative 
motives). This is the form in which "the demand for money" has been handed down 
since 1936. But revolutionary though the inclusion of the wealth holder may be, such a 
mixed form of the demand for money made theoretical rigour, and probably more 
revolutionary implications, vanish. I dare say it is doubtful whether Keynes or Tobin 
have covered Hicks's road up to the end. Room was still left for "the great traditional 
evasions which have led to Velocities of Circulation, Natural Rates of Interest, et id 
genus omne" (Hicks (1935, p.66)).
On the other hand, one major subsequent discovery has been that the theory of 
money as a "time machine" represents one crucial point of departure from Walrasian 
economics of monetary exchange. Most of Walras's successors have come to 
conclusions rather distant from those of Friedman^.
To the fastidious theorist -in Hahn's words- the most serious challenge that the existence 
of money poses is this: the best developed model of the economy [the Arrow-Debreu 
model] cannot find room for it. (1982, p.l).
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However, it seems to me that a decisive step forward in the understanding of money as 
essentially related to time has only been possible after "the missing ring" -information- 
came fully to light. Thus it is from this viewpoint that I propose to look at "our own" 
monetary economy.
1.3. M arket general efficiency in the timeless economy.
The previous paragraph recalled the principle that market general efficiency can be 
proved to exist independently of the existence of money. Since this is a fundamental point 
in monetary theory, we shall now review its conditions and implications in some detail.
The efficient allocation of resources is such that, given the relative price of any 
pair of goods, the marginal rate of substitution in consumption equals the marginal rate of 
transformation in production of those goods, the two marginal rates being equal to the 
relative price. General equilibrium theory shows that m arket general efficiency 
(MGE) is an achievement of perfect competitive markets. Given individual endowments, 
well-ordered preferences and production functions, there exists an equilibrium price 
vector such that the allocation of resources is efficient in all markets^.
Two aspects are to be stressed. First, efficiency ultimately relates to the allocation 
of resources in view of consumer utility maximization. Second, efficiency is not a matter 
of degree: an allocation is either efficient or it is not, and it seems deplorable to stretch 
this attribute to cover anything in the economic system that in some way "works well". 
On the other hand, such a rigorous definition of efficiency is extremely demanding.
In the first place, all markets must be perfectly competitive. We shall have to 
focus on one condition which is today regarded as crucial: perfect information 
(Stiglitz (1985)). Perfect information exists when:
(i) inform ation is complete: all necessary information is costlessly available to all 
agents;
(ii) information is efficient: all agents observe the same current prices and hold the 
same expectation of future prices conditional on the current information set.
Note that efficient information is only necessary, not sufficient, to achieve general 
efficiency: information transmitted by competitive prices must be complete too. The
22
efficient information hypothesis has become a cornerstone of modem macro and 
microeconomics, especially with regard to asset and money markets, whether it is taken 
as an assumption or as a hypothesis to be tested. Efficiency in information processing is 
of course an extremely interesting characteristic of market organization to examine; yet the 
chief reason for interest seems to be the welfare implication that informational efficiency 
(IE) is synonymous with MGE (e.g. Fama (1970, p.383)). Such a proposition is not 
correct. Competitive prices that "fully reflect" all available information dispersed among 
individuals work like a clear transmission channel, but we also need the correct signal 
to be channelled. This correct signal is identified in the Arrow-Debreu intertemporal 
version of general equilibrium.
Consider "m arket organization 1" (M Ol)^: for C goods and 1 current + T 
future consumption periods (t = 0 , 1 , T) all current and future markets exist and 
are open at time (t = 0); all current and future contracts are struck at time (t = 0) with no 
recontracting.
Take commodity 1 as numeraire. Then, the correct signal consists of a price 
matrix [P*] of dimension [C(T + 1)] with (Pjq & 1). If consumption is contingent on
the state of nature that actually obtains, and this state is not known with certainty but only
probabilistically, then for S different possible states of nature (s = 1,..., S) in each 
date (t > 0), each state having probability fst, the correct signal consists of a price space
of dimension [C(TS + 1)] with ( P j q  s  !)• The price space can conveniently be 
decomposed in the current price vector
P*0 = fP *l‘ •••» P*C’ P*C^0
and the future price vectors
P*t5 “  .................... ..............P'C s ]t fOTeaCh <l’ S)
t
Quantity vectors [q*] will follow the same notation.
S tate>dependent a llocations. Risk aversion . When consumption 
decisions are state-dependent, consumers are not certain about the utility they will draw 
from them at future dates. However, provided that the full price space exists, agents with 
monotonic, strictly convex preferences will choose their optimal allocation consisting of
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C goods for current consumption and CTS "contingent claims" for future consumption of
each good at the date and state specified.
Monotonic, strictly convex preferences can be represented by a strictly concave
utility function over goods (U(c), for all c). The current optimal consumption vector 
lq*0] is the same as the solution to the maximization of such a function. The state
probabilities for each future date being known (FIst, £ sI I st = 1, for each t > 0), the
optimal allocation of each agent to contingent claims is equivalent to the maximization of 
the expected utility function (EU(.)) over the future consumption vectors [Q*js*
maxEUCq^) = S ^ n ^ U iq * ^ ), for each t]. In equilibrium, relative prices for any date t,
state s, express the usual marginal rate of substitution between goods; whereas relative
prices at any date across states express the probability-weighted marginal rate of
substitution between goods across states.
The above properties of preferences (and utility functions) imply that consumers 
will hold the full portfolio of "contingent claims" (provided that p* c > 0, Tl_t > 0, forv 15 j I
all c, t, s). Zero holdings of some claims would correspond to comer solutions in
standard consumer theory, which would reveal non-convex preferences. The optimal
composition of the portfolio is subjective and results from each consumer's preferences
over goods (or from his utility function). From concave utility functions, it follows 
mathematically that, for any given t, [Xstr i stU(qts) < U(Xsn sqts)]. This property
means that the utility of a composite consumption vector of certain amount 
(q = 2  a  q. , co = n  J  is greater than the expected utility of the consumption
S St IS St St
vector of actuarial amount ( ^ i r ^ q ^ ) - 1° other words, the consumer refuses actuarially 
fair trades or displays risk aversion. If, for each (t, s), the portfolio [q*ts l of
"contingent claims" is actually held, the consumer must be gaining a risk premium in 
terms of consumption [Zsr i sq*ts = q + p] such that [EU (q*t s ) = U(q - p )].
Clearly, the degree of risk aversion, and hence the risk premium, depend on the curvature 
of the utility function, and this can be represented by absolute or relative measures of risk 
aversion, as was shown by Arrow and Pratt (Arrow (1965)).
Allocations under different numeraires. It is interesting to note that MOl
24
can also accommodate numeraire conversion rates if for some institutional reason there
are more than one numeraire convention across markets . Let us first consider the 
equilibrium price vector of goods for current consumption Ip *q]- Let us now introduce
two numeraire conventions: H (for home) and F (for foreign). Then we shall have the 
following terms of exchange between one unit of each commodity and the two standard 
commodities (h) and (f):
(1) p*(H )# = tq*h/q * |...... q 'h/q 'c.....  q V q'd o
p*(F)0 = fq 'f/q* ,...... q*|/q*c...... q y q 'c lo
For [p *(H )q] and [p *(F)q] to preserve the allocative efficiency of [p *q], the 
following relationship must hold at time (t = 0):
(2) P*c0 -  q W ^ cO  = (c> V <I*cO)rO for all c e H n  F
A non-trivial condition for the numeraire coversion rate (r^) is
(3) r*0 = q*h0/q*ro * 1
Relation 2 is the law of one price and states that for all the same physical goods 
available under both conventions there must exist only one equilibrium price. Condition 3 
states that the conversion rate preserves general efficiency if it is equal to the relative price
9
of numeraires . It is easy to check that the same condition also satisfies the law of one
price and general efficiency for all future contingent prices [for all t > 0, s: 
P*cts = q V ^ c t s  = ^*f0^*cts^r*0^ ^ un£^cr b°th conventions they are valued with
the current non-contingent numeraire (which is the usual assumption).
As some general equilibrium theorists have repeatedly warned, MOl can 
accommodate a numeraire (or numeraires) but provides no rationale for such instruments 
as currencies and reserves. This is due to the timeless, once-and-for-all organization of 
exchanges and, it should be added, the free availability of the whole correct signal; then 
each agent faces one single intertemporal allocative decision, and current and future 
deliveries can simply be performed by means of contingent claims to commodities.
It is also apparent that 2 and 3 are the core relationships in the monetary approach 
to the exchange rate (Frenkel (1976)). But is the conversion rate in MOl like the "price of
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two monies" in a monetary economy? The question is a thorny one since, as we know, 
MOl is not a monetary economy. Any commodity c can be obtained in exchange of any 
other, not only of h or f. As Walras himself stressed, numeraire commodities are 
exchanged as commodities and not as means of payment or stores of value. In an efficient 
market organization the exchange rate, as we usually think of it, is rather a curiosity. First 
of all because there is no need for currencies. Moreover, the efficient exchange rate is not 
one further relative price, but a conversion rate: a pure number. In fact, if for some 
inexplicable reason such things as "nations" exist which obdurately use different standard 
commodities, then all that is needed is conversion rates set equal to the efficient relative 
price of such commodities in every (t, s). Such conversion rates prevent any opportunity 
of allocating wealth across differently-denominated bundles of commodities. One might
be tempted to say that, as commodities, h and f could be traded for arbitrage purposes
whenever p(H) and p(F) happened to be "misaligned" at the given r. But, it will bec c
agreed, in MOl "misalignment" is a meaningless concept^. Hence the informational 
function of the exchange rate is not that of a price, but that of a numeraire: it saves 
calculations of arbitrage opportunities, if any.
1.4. M arket general efficiency in the financial economy.
We are now in the position to make one step further into the relationship between 
time and money. Money as a store of value is not simply justified by intertemporal 
allocations, not even by state-dependent allocations; these - as was shown by Arrow 
(1953) - must also be unfeasible all at once for all dates and states. An economy which 
makes use of stores of value must have, as minimal characteristics, trades at every date in 
the absence of future markets. In fact, agents must find it rational to make one allocative 
decision for each one date and link them by means of a store of value. According to 
Radner's famous definition a monetary economy must be a "sequence economy" (1968). 
The most robust reason for dated sequential decisions should be the lack of feasible 
contracts on all future possible states, that is, "an economy which either makes it too 
costly or impossible to engage in all desirable Arrow-Debreu trades" (Hahn 
(1988, p.957)). Less technically, and more familiarly, I shall call this a financial
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economy.
Consider "m arket organization 2" (M 02)11: exchanges and consumption 
take place at every date t after the state of nature s has occurred. At every date t each agent 
can obtain a bundle of goods for current consumption and a bundle of pure securities 
each of which entitles the bearer to one unit of numeraire if the specified state s occurs in 
( f  > t).
In the first place, M 02 reduces the number of markets that must be open 
simultaneously: they amount to [C + S] in each t. In the second place, there is still no 
need for means of payments, but there emerge stores of value; for pure securities perform 
the function of canying wealth over the next period’s probabilistic states of nature. Let us 
now briefly recall the conditions of efficiency equivalence between M02 and MOl since 
they are crucial to our argument.
First, define
p ts = ip l ’ PC’ pC^ts 
the equilibrium post-state s spot prices at date t established in M02. The usual convention 
is that the numeraire j is taken in the same (t, s), so that:
^  Pets ~ V ^ t s
The efficiency equivalence between M02 spot prices and MOl contingent prices 
for the same (t, s) requires the former to be equal to the MOl (t, s) terms of exchange 
between one unit of each good and the numeraire:
<5) P c t s - O V 1*«*
or, since in MOl
(«) P'cts = q*j(/q*cts and
<7) p*jt s = , V qV
then
^  Pets ~ P V P  jts
i.e. the M 02 (t, s) spot price of any good must be equal to the ratio between the MOl 
(t, s) contingent price of the good and the num eraire^. More precisely, if 8 holds and
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p*jts is the unit price of the pure security if (t, s) occurs, then the allocation to current
consumption and S pure securities under M 02 is equivalent to the allocation to current 
consumption and SC contingent claims to commodities under MOl 13.
The fundamental analytical point is that, under condition 8, the M 02 (T + 1) 
budget constraints
" V o  =  P '<>q * 0  + P * j O a O........ +  a l - l S ' » i s « *  +  " V t  •
are equivalent to the MOl unique budget constraint
P V o  -  ■ »‘ o'«*# -  W P * « * > t .
where, for each t, s: y = endowment vector, a = security holdings (Sxl) vector (and 
at j s e a t_|), p* = security price (lxS) vector, and q* = optimal allocations vector.
In fact, consider for simplicity the two-period budget constraint (t = 0; t' = 1, 
state s) with one single good that can be consumed in each period (q^, q^):
MQ2: P V o  = P'O’ O + P*j0sa0s' P ls^ ls  + "Os = f’ls'H s
and compare it with
M01: P V o  + p* lsy ls  = P*0l*0 + P*lsq * ls
By 8 it follows that the M02 (Is) budget constraint is equivalent to
MQ2: P V l S + P*jlSiilS = P*lS<<lS
Clearly the intertemporal budget constraint in M02 turns out to be
M02: P V o  + P*lsy l s = P*OqO + P*lsq ls
which implies (q^ = q*Q, q ls = q*1$).
Finally, note that efficiency condition 8 shows that M02 sequential decisions of
current consumption and security holding at each date achieve MGE only if spot prices 
embody the complete information contained in MOl price vectors [p*^].
Production with pure securities. If time-sequence economies generate a 
motive for holding titles to future consumption, who is going to issue such titles? 
Consideration of this question immediately reminds us that exchange is an insufficient 
characterization. Obviously, behind exchange there must be production.
At this stage we may think of a large number of independent, fully specialized producers
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demanding an individual bundle of goods and services and offering their individual 
product. If it is admitted that most future contracts are unfeasible and that production 
takes time, it follows that production costs must be borne in advance: production costs 
are to be raised by issuing claims on future output. Such claims will work like pure 
securities: the bearer is entitled to a specified share of output, measured in standard units, 
on the next date t if state s obtains. It is intuitive, from previous treatment, that under 
efficiency conditions the (T + 1) purchases of shares in M 02 will amount to the 
equilibrium total output in MOl H
Allocations to pure securities under different num eraires. Let us now 
consider explicitly the two numeraire conventions. From equation 4, the following law of 
one price for each M02 (t, s) market must hold:
^  Pets ~ ^hts^cts ~ ^fts^cts^rts
A non-trivial condition for the conversion rate is:
(10) rts = W « fts * >
i.e. the M 02 (t, s) conversion rate must be equal to the M 02 (t, s) relative price of the
numeraires. But the numeraires are also commodities and hence conditions 5 to 8 must
also apply. By simple manipulation of conditions 5, 8 and 10, the following interesting 
implications are obtained:
^  ^  rts = £,*hts^q*fts = r*ts
(12) rts = [P*(F)fts/P*(H)htslr*0
Equality 11 confirms efficiency equivalence: the M 02 (t, s) conversion rate is 
equal to the MOl (t, s) conversion rate. Equality 12 expresses the M 02 conversion rate 
as a "relative price of assets" and shows its efficient link with the MOl conversion rate 
of general efficiency given by 9. This, too, is a well-known definition of the exchange 
rate, namely in the portfolio approach (Branson (1977)). However, like the monetary-
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approach definition in the previous paragraph, it cannot be accepted without 
qualifications. Equality 12 is especially relevant to the allocative decision to pure 
securities in our M02 with two numeraires; for the agent faces the possibility to hold H 
or F denominated pure securities if he perceives commodity arbitrage opportunities in the 
next period. Under efficient conditions, home and foreign pure securities pay
[i/p*(H)hts = q*hts/q*h0’ 1/P*ip)fts= <i*fts/q*fO’ for each « s p e e d y -
The present value of the foreign security in the home standard is
for each s] or = ] by 12. Therefore, the amount of standard h
that the agent can obtain in the next period, state s, is the same whether he holds H or F
denominated pure securities. The reader himself can verify that, in force of 11 and 12,
any other form of arbitrage is excluded. Then, equality 12 states that arbitrage 
opportunities do not exist if (i) the pure security market is efficient (i.e. (p*- ) is the priceJtS
of the pure security contingent on s), and (ii) the current conversion rate is the efficient
one. In financial terminology, H and F denominated pure securities are then perfect
substitutes. Note that even if agents arc risk-averse, they will allocate their wealth across
pure securities according to their valuation of state-dependent future consumption, but not
according to the denomination of pure securities. Perfect substitutability turns out to be a
general equilibrium property, rather than something "intrinsic" in securities that can be
assumed regardless of the specification of market organization and of the amount of
information available to agents.
Rational expectations. In order to develop our argument, we have now to
focus on a fundamental characteristic of the financial economy; decisions in view of
future states of the economy must be based on e x p e c t a t io n s ^ .  The difference between 
a decision made on direct price information (p_f.) and a decision made on the expectationvlb
of (p ) should be clear. In the latter case a function is needed that transforms currentvia
information inputs into future values of decision variables. Such a function is generally 
called "the model of the economy".
We have seen above that M 02 sequential decisions of current consumption, 
production and security holdings at each date achieve market general efficiency only if
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security prices embody the complete information contained in MOl price vectors [p*^].
The obvious question arises: "How could [agents] know these prices if no exchange of 
commodities is to take place undl it is known what state of the world obtains?" (Dreze 
(1987, p. 129)). Paradoxically, M 02 is in fact justified by the lack of future contingent 
contracts.
Until now, the most sophisticated solution has been the assumption that efficient 
prices in vectors [p*^] follow a stationary stochastic process^. Accordingly, repeated
occurrences of Ip*^] make up an information set (/{, up to t) which is a monotocally
increasing sequence, and each observed occurence of [p*^]. is equivalent to drawing
from a population with a stable probability distribution. Therefore, under M02 and even
though future contingent contracting never existed, the correct ("objective") probabilistic
expectation of condition 8 would exist. The same holds equally for condition 12. Let 
(p' .,) be the (tf) forward price set by competitive bidding in (t) on the basis of theCl
expected value of the (t*) spot price, known in (t) the efficient discount factor (p*jt); then:
(13) P 'c  = E(P(,  1 y p * jt
(14) E(Pct.l/t)p*jt = E(p*ct,)
Relationship 13 is quite important, since it paves the way to the statistical analysis 
of informational efficiency under the form of martingale (Samuelson (1965)). 14 is the 
efficiency condition 8 in probabilistic form or, more familiarly, the rational-expectation 
condition. These two conditions generate a number of statements which lie at the core of 
current maricet-efficiency analysis:
(i) the forward price is the best unbiased estimator of the corresponding spot price;
(ii) from 13 [E(p‘ . - p* .11 ) =0]: asymptotically, the market is a "fair game"; theCl wl I
expected difference (i.e. excess profit) between any expected (or forward) price and the 
corresponding (efficient) spot price is zero;
(iii) the expectation is rational not only because it is self-fulfilling (13), but also because it 
preserves general efficiency (14).
Statement (iii) is noteworthy because it represents a necessary qualification of
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equilibrium in a financial economy: it adds expectational equilibrium  to the usual 
condition of market clearing.
It is also worth recalling, for later reference, that propositions (i)-(iii) can be 
interpreted as conditions for internal consistency of expectations, since they limit all 
possible expectations to those which
(i) use all available information optimally,
(ii) are set equal to the "objective" mathematical expectation of events,
(iii) are not systematically falsified and are asymptotically correct (orthogonality of 
errors).
(By implication, all agents have the same "true" model of the economy).
These are also the axioms of rational ex p e c ta tio n s  1?.
The form in which the problem of expectational equilibrium has been handled and 
solved by the New Classical school leads, in the most rigorous way, to efficient financial 
economies.
2. Im perfect inform ation, uncertainty and m arket inefficiency. General 
princip les
2.1. Incom plete inform ation.
What does M 02 tell us about the role of money in a time-sequence setting? M02
indeed displays the key features of a financial economy (sequential trading, discrete-time
decisions, the use of stores of value) and it actually permits economizing on the number
of markets (Arrow (1953, p.45)). M 02 has in fact become the standard representation of
an economy which uses "the barren asset" as store of v a lu e d  Yet such a representation
is not sufficient to give money a specific role to play as store of value -or any role to play-
unless fiat money is imposed to be the sole security (whether in force of a "Gower rule"
or of a "Lucas cash-in-advance rule"). In fact, in M02, money should be a pure security 
whose contingent value in terms of the standard is always (p*:t_ = 1, for all s). Look atJÏ5
conditions 5 to 8: (p*jts = 0  implies (pçts = P*cts* f°r all s) or that the M 02 (t, s) 
spot price is always equal to the MOl (t, s) contingent price, which would be rather
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peculiar. Of course, the fact that (p*- = 1, for all s) entails no efficiency loss only ifJis
agents actually had unit marginal rate of substitution of the numeraire across all (t, s). It 
is not difficult to envisage states of the world where other securities would render money 
w orthless^.
The precariousness of money in M 02 is just due to efficiency conditions,
including rational expectations, and to the fact that M02 does not permit economizing on
the amount of information, if general efficiency is to be preserved. This point can quickly
be seen in condition 14, or 18 for the conversion rate. These conditions hold, or
equivalently allocative decisions under M02 are as efficient as those under MOl, since 
information contained in all MOl price vectors [p*tel is still available and embodied in
[Pt$] vectors. It seems that in order to understand what money does we must qualify
time and uncertainty further.
Time cannot merely be a device for ordering goods, allocations and deliveries, 
one "inessential" to decision making, as it is in the MOl setting. Broadly speaking, time 
becomes economically essential if it acts as a constraint on decision making. There may 
be three forms of time constraint: (i) decision making is time-consuming, (ii) knowledge 
and information are a decreasing function of the time horizon, (iii) decisions are 
irreversible. In the present context we may be little concerned with the first form, but we 
must be extremely concerned with the other two. Indeed, the move from MOl to M02 
and the emergence of stores of value are closely related to time constraints (ii) and (iii). 
For the former implies that not all contracts on all possible future states are feasible, the 
less feasible the further away the time horizon is, while the latter implies that the feasible 
set of contracts at each date is constrained by the wealth carried over from the previous 
one. An "essential" role of time should entail imperfect inform ation, and firstly 
incomplete information. This brings us to financial economies in which time imposes 
sequences of temporary, irreversible decisions made under imperfect information. In the 
remaining part of this chapter we shall see that these latter are likely to be economies 
which use money.
Let me first recall a well-established result in market efficiency theory. If
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information is incomplete, a well-defined mapping from all possible states of the world to 
market prices is no longer feasible. Agents may find it impossible to partition the future in 
a complete set of states, or to associate their preferences or other market conditions to 
each conceivable state. Among market conditions, state probabilities play an important 
role. As said above, efficient future prices should transmit to the market the probability- 
weighted marginal rate of substitution of goods across states; their absence deprives the 
market of a powerful instrument of convergence of subjective probabilities. In all these 
circumstances the non-existence, or incompleteness, of future markets and the related 
price vectors can be interpreted as a negative externality of individual unwillingness to 
engage in contracts on future states. Uncertainty is a contagious disease.
Whenever uncertainty takes the form of incomplete information, the security price 
vector is smaller than the possible states vector, then the financial economy is constrained 
to inefficiency. As was emphasized above, market general inefficiency can occur because 
of incomplete information even though some (or all) markets process local available 
information efficiently. To repeat, the point is that all available information may well fall 
short of the complete MOl information signal. In this case, the efficient information 
hypothesis does not imply that security allocations at any one date should bear any 
necessary relationship with the MOl allocations to consumption at the next date (see 
Hahn (1988, pp.961 ff.) and below sec.4).
2 .2 . H eterogeneous inform ation.
The case of incomplete but efficient information is analytically useful in fixing 
some properties of financial markets; yet it appears rather weak a case after deeper 
economic considerations. Market IE turns out to have extremely strong implications, 
which arc counterfactual (e.g. the absence of asset trading) or paradoxical (who is going 
to produce information if information is a public good?) or even non-economic (it is 
rational to behave as pure gamblers)20.
We may say that a situation of deficient but efficient information is unstable. 
Deficiency of information is quite likely to generate private incentives to gather more 
information. For the very same reason that freely available information is initially
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incomplete, new information gathering will necessarily be costly . Information seekers
bear a private cost that must be rewarded; but if their information is fully revealed through
competitive contracting no one will ever bear the cost of producing information. This
point is better understood if one considers that informational efficiency may entail the
impossibility of trades at equilibrium prices; those who have paid for information about
an asset would not be able to adjust the asset's stock profitably by actually acquiring or 
22releasing the asset . One possible stable outcome is one where
(i) private information is unevenly distributed among agents, and
(ii) competitive prices do not reveal all private information.
This is currently defined as a sy m m e tr ic  or more generally h e te ro g e n e o u s
inform ation, which clearly implies that the market is inform ationally inefficient
too (Grossman-Stiglitz (1980)). In general, at any given date t, agents trade a state- 
dependent asset (a.) in function of observable current variables (say the price p )S a.
conditional upon the information set {/}; if the latter differs for the two agents (1,2), 
then trade equilibrium obtains when
(15) ^ l<Pa ''l)  + as2(Pa-/2>=°
Clearly equilibrium prices and quantities will be other than those obtained under IE (/j = 
/ 2 >.
Differences in information among different people seem an unassailable factual 
observation; yet many authors find it hardly believable that such differences can survive 
the massive, constant flood of public information currently available to economic agents 
at negligible costs. Nevertheless, the bulk of investment costs in financial businesses go 
to human capital and information gathering and processing. When information is scarce, 
the point at stake is not the amount of it available publicly, but the worth of the private 
further bit that one is able to secure for oneself.
However, it is true that the literature is rather silent on the causes and extensions 
of asymmetries, and imperfections generally, in information. The standard specification
21
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of imperfect information is an information set affected by a "white noise", which is quite 
useful, but cannot claim to be an explanation. This work cannot afford one; however - 
following von Hayek's seminal ideas- it should be said that the information issue cannot 
be kept distinct from the analysis of decision-making in general, of which infoimation is 
only one dimension. The other dimension is the agent's frame of knowledge, or more 
simply his "decision model".
In general, human beings explore their environment by means of common 
procedures which start from the selection and m anipulation of elements of the 
external world, and then proceed to the construction  of a model of the world. 
Constructing models is certainly based upon experience, but the experience of each 
individual is nonetheless constrained by originals interests and skills; he or she can only 
explore a part of the whole network of all possible relations. Market organization 
reinforces this attitude since it elicits individual interests that are reflected in labour 
division, and labour division becomes knowledge division. Knowledge, being 
subjective, is a component of each individual's human capital; and each one tends to 
maximize one's asset specificity rather than homogeneity. Knowledge thus consists of a 
plurality of subjective, heterogeneous and partial models.
Under the heading of "rational expectations" we have seen the conditions thanks 
to which our daily struggle against ignorance can be fully successfull in terms of efficient 
economic decisions. But this, as far as the monetary economist is concerned, belongs to 
the class of Neo-Walrasian "strong but negative results". Research on rational 
expectations has fixed some firm methodological benchmarks; but these should be used 
under a set of hypotheses on knowledge and information which should be consistent with 
the economy under examination, and which possibly lead to operational behaviours.
2.3. Expectations under im perfect inform ation.
With regard to these two requirements, the rational expectations hypothesis is 
liable to objection on two major points:
(i) the axioms of internal coherence of expectations,
(ii) the idea that expectations formed according to those axioms ipso facto guarantee
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MGE.
Consider point (ii) first. The idea that the informational requirement of MGE is
wholly contained in the sequence of past realizations of the market is now regarded as
hardly viable. Indeed, as equation 14 shows, that idea is circular: rational expectations
preserve MGE only if past market realizations have been efficient. We have a stochastic
version of general equilibrium, but we still lack an explanation of how the informational
requirement of general equilibrium can be satisfied. On the other hand, if one assumes 
that all necessary information is contained in {/j}, as specified above, the move from
MOl to M02 becomes inessential. Were all economic events like a lottery there would be 
no obstacle to implementing the full set of future contingent markets of MOl, and there 
would be no reason to resort to sequential decisions and engage in risky forecasts. Hence 
one should conclude that in as much as the rational expectations hypothesis is well 
founded and applicable it should drive money out of the economy, whereas that 
hypothesis simply cuts through the knots of expectations formation and expectational 
equilibrium in an economy where time limits knowledge and information effectively.
We thus come to the problems raised under point (i). These have recently been 
attacked on two main grounds:
(a) learning of the "true" structural model,
y i
(b) convergence of heterogeneous beliefs .
These two issues derive from the admission that, in general, (a) agents do not have full 
knowledge of the economy, and (b) the knowledge and information they have is, at least 
a priori, subjective and unequal. Hence the general form of asymmetric trade (see eq.15 
above) should be extended to include agents' specific knowledge or decision model (K):
(16) . s l (PI . / 1, * 1) + aa ( P , /2.* 2) - 0
Given many subjective models, the existence of, and convergence to, a 
unique conditional expectation of an economic event cannot be taken for granted. One 
easily understands the essential difficulty behind this point by taking the reduced form of 
the market structure 16, that is
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P a ^ l’^2’ ^ 1 ’ ^ 2}
The reduced form is the form agents can use to learn the market structure and to correct 
their own model; but agent 1 can only know or observe (pa> 1^, and so can agent 2
only know or observe (pa> Full knowledge of the market would require each
agent to know the information set and the subjective model of all the others. Firstly, full
common knowledge of the market structure becomes an extremely difficult task as soon
as the learning process is taken into account. A basic pre-condition of a viable learning
process (say a Bayesian one) is the stationarity of the structure; but at the same time
any learning process implies errors and revisions of the current model. Therefore,
whenever agents cleverly revise their own (JCs) they also compromise the structural
stationarity of relationship 16 for themselves and for the others as well. Convergence of
24agents' beliefs to a rational expectations equilibrium is far from certain . Secondly, even
more problematic, if not hopeless, is the case that if convergence does take place, the
25market outcome will be the same as under conditions of MGE .
If one admits that decision models are suited to the local environment of agents, 
and that agents may change them if unsatisfactory, one realizes that the economic 
environment can hardly be stationary, and that such a thing as the general model of the 
economy is unlikely to emerge (this, of course, applies to economists as well). On the 
other hand, the positive analysis of economic decisions thus structured, and of their 
aggregate effects on the economy, is still in its infancy, and shows a number of problems 
of formidable complexity that fall outside the scope of this work. As tool users , we 
have not yet a ready-made range of micro- and macro- applications at our disposal. 
Nonetheless it seems to me important that, since we shall have to make statements about 
expectations, we should be well aware of the problems involved.
For most applications in this work the crucial assumption will be incomplete 
knowledge and information for the reasons previously explained in sec.2.2; formally, 
agents base their forward-looking decisions on reducedform partial models of their own 
market (to be defined), and hence the probabilistic correctness ("unbiasedness") of such
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decisions (i) is limited to the relevant information set and forecast model, and (ii) does not 
27ensure MGE . The efficient information hypothesis on asset markets (see ch.m, sec.3 
and App.A.l) need not, and will not, be questioned in order to develop the so-called 
"fundamental analysis" of Part II. A step towards asymmetric information and 
heterogenous beliefs will be made in the last chapter in the context of exchange-rate 
analysis.
What should instead be emphasized as a general feature of the financial economy 
is that in the absence of perfect foresight, or of certainty-equivalent rational expectations, 
agents' (and our own) attention is drawn to failures (see also the Appendix to this 
chapter). Not only have agents to learn lessons from failures, they also have to take 
protection against them. This is by no means a negligible part of economic activity and 
decision making. It is indeed crucial to the use of money and other stores of value, as we 
shall see in the next section.
3. Money and securities in the financial economy
3.1. Holding assets. P recautionary behaviour.
To begin with, I shall develop the idea that the financial economy is a time- 
sequence economy which necessitates wealth carriers for wealth to be transferred across 
markets and through time. It is important to notice that, though different in other respects, 
spatial and intertemporal wealth transfers involve one and the same informational 
problem. Incompleteness of information was initially introduced as an increasing function 
of the time horizon, but there is no difficulty in considering it an increasing function of 
the market-space horizon too (not to mention the fact that searching across markets takes 
time). It can be shown that since uncertainty involves less-than-full insurance, asset 
holding obeys to precautionary behaviour instead of expected utility maximization.
Precautionary behaviour still lacks satisfactory analysis -and here we cannot 
engage ourself in such a task (see also the Appendix). Yet it seems to me correct, as the 
base step, to consider precaution as an alternative to expected utility maximization. First 
of all, the expected utility maximizer is able to diversify his contingent claims in such a
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way that he obtains the highest possible welfare in any possible contingencies. By
contrast, the uncertain agent faces a situation where all relevant information is not
revealed instantly and all eventualities cannot be insured against, so that it will be costly,
if possible, for him to switch to the "right position" when the state is revealed (Jones-
Ostroy (1984)). Here I shall exclude adjustment costs from the agent's consideration
(e.g. such costs are non-discountable or infinite) and I shall draw on Knight's
(1921, ch.VII) idea that precaution is commensurate with the consequences of
a finite, positive probability of error.
A simple measure of this probability is proposed in the Appendix; the probability
of an error of magnitude a  [II(ct) = V/a2] increases with the variability of prospects (V)
and decreases with the individual’s tolerance level (a), the most obvious measure of
which seems to be his wealth. The opportunity to be cautious has crucial consequences
upon the financial economy.
The first consequence involves an important phenomenon: wealth accumulation. 
In fact any specific state-dependent allocation (a$) of a cautious agent is strictly
conditioned by the payoffs (y„J, their variability (V ) and the value of his wealth, or hisaS a
"financial position" (A), that can back up those allocations in the event of adverse 
outcomes (a conclusion in line with new theories of financial non-neutrality 
e.g.Greenwald-Stiglitz (1987; 1988, p.251 ff.)). As is easy to see in the above 
formulation, one way of relaxing the constraint of fallibility is by raising the tolerance 
level a; in economic life this is basically done by accumulating wealth. In a general form,
(8) as(yas, Va, A) a'(y)>0, a’(V)<0, a’(A)>0
The better the financial position, the lower the individual probability of failure for given
(y , V ), the greater the allocations to specific uncertain states^, as &
Precautionary asset-holding, as a response to uncertainty, performs two typical 
tasks: (i) carrying wealth across markets or through time, without commitment to 
specified consumption decisions or states; (ii) providing a buffer against adverse 
outcomes. It is not difficult to explain saving within a consumer’s accumulation
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programme over A such that a desired A* is reached where the probability of default (cut 
in the expected consumption, or borrowing, or insolvency) for any given (y , V ) is
2LS &
minimal. Consider (from Appendix) the case in which Ct are random consumption outlets 
of an agent, with mean [E(C) = E l  and variance [V(C) = V ], whereas Y are hisv w I
income streams (for simplicity constant). In such a situation there exists a critical 
probability
(9) ri(A): Pr(Ct > E£ + A) < V/A*
that the actual consumption outlet in t will exceed normal consumption by more than the
available wealth. As a response, it is easy to find the desired value of A* which
29minimizes 11(A) under the income constraint (Y = E + A) (see also fig. 1) .
I V
Fig.l. The precautionary stock of wealth.
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Obviously, if (Yt < A*) a programme of accumulation becomes necessary, for 
example (Z tSt = A*) where (S{ = A* - < Yt). The rate of saving and of
consumption in each period are determined jointly; (Sj/Yt < 1) yields the usual
propensity to save.
Here we are not so much interested in the analytics of the saving- consumption 
pattern as in understanding the rationale of saving as a decision disconnected from 
commitments to future consumption. Quite clearly, unlike contingent claims or pure 
securities, actual securities are suited to that purpose. And it is precisely in virtue of such 
a desirable opportunity that, as Keynes would put it, to save today is not to buy 
tomorrow (1936, p.21). On the other hand, a serious problem of intertemporal 
coordination between consumption and production decisions opens up; this is perhaps the 
juncture where the financial economy most neatly departs from the Walrasian core, and 
we shall go back to it later on.
The reader will have noted that I have extended the precautionary motive to asset- 
holding as a whole, whereas it is traditionally limited to money-holding. This is a 
straightforward consequence of the definition of precautionary behaviour as the 
consumer's response to his not well-defined consumption decisions in the future. There 
is no clear reason why this response should be imputed to money hoarding only. The 
latter is the symptom of a more fundamental disease which other assets may alleviate but 
not defeat. What is specific to money is its role among assets.
3.2. S tandard , currency and reserve. Liquidity preference.
We have seen that the financial economy wants means to transfer wealth across 
markets and through time. What we should look for is the special characteristic which 
distinguishes money from other wealth carriers.
As was said in section 1, the form of money we are interested in works jointly as 
reserve, currency and standard. It is well known that the above three functions of the 
monetary instrument are performed by virtue of the following key properties;
(i) to transfer purchasing power across markets,
(ii) to transfer purchasing power through time,
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(iii) to have a fixed value in terms of itself for all dates and states .
Properties (i)+(iii) underly the function of currency; properties (ii)+(iii) underly the 
function of reserve. Monetary theory has generally focused on one function, and the 
underlying properties, separately from the other, moreover, the distinguishing property of 
money has been seen in (i) or (ii) with little, if any, connection with (iii). The perspective 
of human fallibility and precautionary behaviour gives a different view of the matter: 
monetary properties (i) and (ii) cannot be separated either one from the other or from 
property (iii); furthermore, it is property (iii) which underpins the other two; property (iii) 
in turn satisfies a particular form of precautionary behaviour that, in the tradition of 
monetary theory, we may call liquidity preference.
The cohabitation of money with other stores of value and claims to physical 
capital must be attributed to "essential" time and uncertainty, that is, decision making 
under imperfect information and less-than-full insurance. As a wealth carrier, money can 
hardly be understood by insisting on the artificial -however useful- separation of the 
problem of spatial from that of intertemporal wealth transfers (see above, sec.3.1). The 
modems' emphasis on the latter function alone is as unsatisfactory as the classics' 
exclusive concern with the former (Laidler (1988)). Quite the contrary, the Hicksian triad 
(standard, currency and reserve) cannot be split. In fact, when money is used as currency 
one of the parties will accept it against goods because it is storable as reserve, that is to 
say, because one such party believes that money will be accepted as currency against 
goods (no matter how far in the course of time or in the space of markets). This 
fundamental point has led some scholars to think of the use of money as a Nash 
equilibrium (Hahn (1982, pp.21 ff.), Grandmont (1983)). However, this result does 
not explain why a particular wealth carrier among alternative ones has to be selected as 
the currency. The further point, which has perhaps fallen by the wayside, is that once 
only one currency exists, this has by constitution a fixed value in tenns of itself (property
(iii)), whereas all other marketable items have a variable value in terms of the currency. 
Therefore, when we come to compare closely money with alternative wealth carriers we 
should draw the conclusion that the fundamental difference, the difference underlying all
30
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the others, should be placed in the exclusion of nom inal loss (Hicks 
(1967, ch.II))31
To understand this point let us consider the following quite simple, but general,
problem of wealth transfer. As already explained in section 1, the securities available in
the financial economy should in principle be provided by producers. In fact, in an orderly
sequence of decisions we should first consider that producers have to advance production
costs, and to this effect they should issue claims on future output Such claims will work
like pure securities if accepted by service suppliers. Let us consider labour as the sole
factor on demand and supply. Labourers supply their service on the labour market and
plan to buy goods for current consumption and, in the impossibility of contracting on all
future states, securities to finance future consumption. Within this decisional frame,
producers and workers contract a wage rate. The first problem relevant to the transaction
technology of this financial economy is how the wage rate is denominated and paid.
Given one standard of prices and means of exchange, let (pp..., pc, ...) be the
monetary prices of goods, and Wj be a wealth carrier consisting of w units of good 1 (or
claims to good 1). The real purchasing power of Wj is not known with certainty until all
relative prices (pi/p_, all c * 1) are known. Now let the price index P (for all c * 1)
1 V V
and Pj take S possible values; then the real value of wealth (w jP j s/Pcs) will take (S2) 
possible values. If held in standard units (h^p = w ^ )  the real value of wealth (hjp/Pcs>
p = 1 for all states) will take (S) possible values only. The real value of wealth is never
perfectly certain; however, the existence of one cunency, as compared with marketable
instruments, reduces uncertainty because it limits the variability of outcomes to the vector 
[pc, all c * 1] instead of [pc, p j].
Now, it is not difficult to define the liquidity of a wealth carrier as the
com plem ent of the probability of nom inal loss. Therefore, money is the
perfectly liquid means to transfer wealth through time and across markets. The liquidity
advantage of money vis a vis other stores of value through time manifests itself in
exactly the same way as the liquidity advantage of money vis a vis other means of
32exchange across markets .
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In this view, an economy which uses money has to be an economy where the 
possibility of nominal losses in wealth matters. Liquidity matters and may be desirable 
only in relation to incomplete information, and to incomplete contingent contracts, not to 
Anow-Debreu risk; in particular liquidity preference may be thought of as a form of 
precautionary behaviour. In fact, according to our previous definitions, precautionary 
behaviour aims at minimizing the probability of adverse outcomes; given the desired 
amount of wealth and the agent's tolerance level, there remains a probability of loss in the 
expected value of wealth which grows with the nominal variability of capital value, which 
in turn increases as the liquidity of wealth decreases. Hence I view liquidity preference, 
like precautionary behaviour, as a general and preliminary attitude of agents towards 
uncertainty, and as the basis of asset choice and pricing in the financial economy.
3.4. Portfolio choice and asset prices under liquidity preference.
We now come to the connection between precautionary asset holding, liquidity 
preference, and two firmly established facts of the financial economy: (i) diversification 
across assets, (ii) positive holdings of monetary reserve.
One preliminary point is that the portfolio problem may be given various different
specifications according to the characteristics of assets and to the objectives of the asset
holder. In the first place, the problem looks quite differently depending on which
objective is posited: expected utility maximization, liquidity preference, or, say, capital-
gains maximization. It has long been noticed that portfolio theory has often blurred the
differences among these objectives, which should instead be kept quite distinct,
33especially in the framework of imperfect information . Under imperfect information 
expected utility maximization breaks down, and precautionary asset-holding emerges as 
an alternative. Given that the cautious asset holder sets a safety level of wealth (A*), the 
consistent attitude is towards uncertain nominal values of wealth in the face of 
unexpected liquidity needs. The asset holder may be forced to sell and this may entail a 
capital loss if the market price of the stock has fallen. His problem is one of minimizing 
the probability of loss in the event of unexpected sales; this may be called a "capital« 
value p ro g ram m e” , which is substantially different from that of capitalgains
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maximization, or more generally from a "capital-grow th program m e" 34 As
explained above, the truly distinctive quality of money as store of value rests on its fixed
nominal value against the class of variable-price assets. The monetary reserve is the
35most liquid, or in this view the safest, asset because it is free from capital losses . Thus
the portfolio choice we have to consider deals with price, rather than interest, variability
of assets. It is not only a matter of changing a variable. The problem of portfolio selection
can usefully be formalized as follows. Consider a menu of variable-price assets indexed
with (a), and a time index (0 for the beginning, 1 for the end of one time unit). Each asset 
pays a nominal interest rate or unit dividend (i . for one time unit) and has a market pricea
index (pa <1 if it is sold below the nominal value, pa > 1 if it is sold above the
nominal value). The one-period market value of the stock of wealth and the return rate to 
each asset are thus given, respectively, by
A1 = S aAa lpal
*a + pal * pa0
pa0
It will be useful to distinguish between two components: the "effective interest rate" 
(ia/pao) and the "capital gain (or loss)" (Apa/paQ>.
The simplest way of approaching the liquidity problem is to suppose that an agent 
has an initial amount of wealth Aq while an Investment Trust offers an optimally sorted
portfolio of the non-monetary securities available; let this be the k-th asset in the menu 
(Afc) with a given (or warranted) interest i^ but a variable market price p^3^. Given A^,
the initial nominal value of the Trust, if a short sale happens to fall one period later (to
avoid the complications of compound interests) the cash flow to the holder will be 
[Afc(Pki + ifc)]* The desired cash flow should be based on the purchasing value of the
Trust [A* = A^ip^Q + ifc)]. Any discrepancy between the actual and the desired cash
flow out of wealth is thus given by [A^(pk j - p^q)], that is by price variations. A price
fall (p^ j < p^q) entails a capital loss and a cash flow lower than desired.
46
Now, in order to manage the capital loss intrinsic in the Trust, the holder has to
assess expected prices. It is in the nature of his problem to consider that for any 
probability distribution of prices centered on [E(pk) = p^qJ there exists a finite, positive
37probability of capital loss . By applying the methodology suggested in the Appendix, 
the obvious upper bound of the agent's tolerance to (eventual) capital losses seems to be 
his inital wealth, which, if the agent decides to place some wealth in the Trust, reduces to 
the share held in monetary reserve (let this be the n-th asset). Thus, the probability of 
default the agent bears is
(18) n(A):PKA*-A1[1>An0)< V I/A2n0
where = price variance of the Trust. By rearranging the argument of the probability its
meaning becomes more transparent: the probability that the actual capital value of the 
Trust plus the monetary reserve fall short of the safe level of wealth. Defining the
portfolio share placed in the Trust and Aq the initial amount of wealth, reminding that the
expected price is p ^ ,  expression 18 becomes
(19) IMPy, - Pk, > (1 - V / V  S V k 2/(1 ‘ V 2’
Now, in a capital value programme the correct comparison to make is between the 
prospective capital value A~ vis a vis the intrinsic capital loss L~ (rather than between 
the rate of return and its standard deviation; see Hicks (1967, pp. 114-117)). The two 
variables are reproduced below from the above definitions and then plotted in fig.2.
A~ = AkpkO(1 + rk} + An0 = A0 + V k 0^
L~ = A0( l - a k)II(A) *
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Fig.2. The choice of the monetary reserve in the protfolio.
Three observations are in order. The first is that capital safety is costly in terms of 
capital value; the former rises (L~ falls) at the expense of the latter as is reduced; this
is quite a traditional argument in portfolio theory.
The second observation is that whereas the traditional measure of risk -the
portfolio variance- would be (V a . 2), here we have a probability of default that
P K
increases faster than the portfolio variance. This property points to a second noteworhty
difference: here the choice of money is not a matter of tastes; for, as is clear in 18 and in 
fig.2, if there is no money in the portfolio (a^  = 1) not only is the portfolio variance
"high”, but the probability of default tends to infinity. This is not merely a mathematical 
paradox: a portfolio with no monetary reserve is "almost surely" bound to default with 
respect to the safe level of wealth. Yet this commonsense principle, which plays so large
48
monetary theory and practice, can only be given a consistent explanation when account is 
taken of agents' perception of being fallible tomorrow, rather than of their being right in 
the far future.
The third observation is the formal demonstration of the previous one. The best
trade-off between capital value and capital loss in inherent in the variables (as shown, for 
convenience, by the dotted curve in fig.2); in fact there exists a value (0 < j < 1)
such that the difference (A~ - L~) is at its maximum -below this share the capital value
can be increased faster than the intrinsic loss, while above it the intrinsic loss grows more 
than the capital value. Thus (a jcmjn) defines the share of the Trust in the safest 
•20
portfolio .
At the end of this section on the general analytics of asset-holding under
incomplete information, we are in the position to give more substance to the claim made
in sec. 1 that asset allocations will, in general, fail to secure MGE, regardless of whether
they are more or less efficient from an individual or local point of view.
If "the consumer buys lemonade because he likes lemonade, the [asset holder]
does not buy ICI because he likes ICI" (Hicks (1967, p. 104)). The amount of
financial wealth accruing in each period meets agents’ desire to be "flexible”, rather than
to be "tied", with respect to future unclear consumption prospects. Then the criterion that
agents follow in order to transfer wealth across markets and through time is liquidity
preference; this mostly concerns the composition of financial wealth and asset prices.
Any asset's nominal value is the issuer's promise to pay the specified amount of
currency. If the market is informationally efficient, then such promises will be
unanimously priced by the market, and wealth will be allocated to best promises
according to such valuation. But because of liquidity preference, a necessary condition
for positive holdings of non-monetary assets is that the latter should yield a return greater
39than the money interest This differential is usually called risk premium . There is no 
harm in the use of this technical term if one bears in mind that it has nothing to do with 
Arrow-Debreu risk premium. The latter measures the excess of actuarial consumption 
over certain consumption demanded by a consumer who is maximizing expected utility
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from bundles in all possible future states, whereas, as is clear from the above, the risk
premium demanded under liquidity preference measures the increase in capital value (a
sum of currency) necessary to compensate for the intrinsic capital loss (another sum of
currency) in the event of unanticipated  consumption payments (again a sum of
currency) before maturity. The risk premium cannot, and does not, convey any
information about the rate at which the consumer wishes to substitute certain
consumption today (of that one good represented by that one asset) with state-dependent
consumption tomorrow (of that same good). And if some asset holders buy ICI because
they expect, say rationally, that someone else will like ICI products in the future, thus
discounting a relatively higher flow of dividends, then they will push the asset price
vector not towards Arrow-Debreu efficiency but even further -indeed, their preference for
ICI is clearly affected by an externality (Stiglitz (1982)).
Consequently, in no way is there necessary connection between such valuations
and general-equilibrium prices at the time promises will fall due. With reference to the
formalization in section 1, agents have no full information on future efficient price vectors 
[p* ] for all t and s, so that the efficient price of securities (p*irc), or the "own interestCS Jw
rate" of the numeraire, is also missing. At any date t, securities will be valued by the price 
vector [pa t l whose dimension and elements will in general be [pgt *
breaks the efficiency equivalence between the M02 allocations and the MOl optimal 
consumption bundle [p*Q*lt «s (for all t’ > t, all s). Therefore, the M 02 (T + 1)
. 40budget constraints are no longer equivalent to the single MOl budget constraint .
4. The in ternational perspective
4.1. W hat is specific to international trade?
Demand for production and consumption goods and services may be satisfied 
either locally or by neighbouring or even distant areas. Contrary to the armchair 
anthropology of the Eighteenth century economists, long haul trades have generally 
predated the rise of local markets; in many cases, extra-community trades developed 
side-by-side with non-market intra- community organizations. However, it is not the
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experience of trades that may justify such a peculiar discipline as inter-national 
economics. What is specific to trades between Italy and Germany with respect to trades 
between a Milanese and a Roman?
The answer is hardly to be found in pure exchange theory -there is no room for 
such things as nations in it. In the Arrow-Debreu version of an exchange economy, 
items of exchange should be classified according to the date, state of nature and place of 
delivery. Transactions stem from different needs, preferences and endowments and are 
performed where and when they are most preferred. Independent, decentralized decisions 
are dictated by signals and constraints perceivable at the individual level. It is haid to give 
the distinction between "national" and "foreign" items any meaningful role in the set of 
decisional inputs of selfish and greedy individuals.
In fact, the classification of items can be refined at will, and there is no particular 
problem involved in distinguishing among goods (or even the same good) produced in 
Milan, Rome or Frankfurt. However, just as there is no Walrasian equation requiring that 
the amount of Christmas cake the Romans buy in Milan should be equivalent to the 
amount of cheese bought by the Milanese in Rome, so there exists no Walrasian equation 
requiring that the amount of beer the Romans buy in Frankfurt should be equal to the 
amount of cheese they sell there (obviously, this holds if each "locality" exchanges with 
at least two of all the others). Equilibrium conditions bring the sole requirement that (i) 
the total demanded and supplied quantities of each good should equal each other, (ii) the 
aggregate value of resources acquired through production and exchange should be 
equal to the initial endowment for all agents. These two conditions entail, as a purely 
formal result, that any particular subset of exchanges will show nil balance. In this 
context, that particular subset of exchanges labelled "foreign trade" has no special 
economic significance whatsoever.
The innovative outlook of international political economy has drawn our attention 
to the fact that international trade takes place across different monetary conventions (e.g. 
Kindleberger (1978,1981)). This track brings us back to the issue of the use of money 
in a market economy that we have examined in this chapter. In section 1 we concluded
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that an efficient market economy may have a standard of value, but need not use a 
currency or a reserve. If different numeraire conventions exist, all that is needed is a 
conversion rate. This is a pure number, not a price, which assures the indifference of 
allocations across the monetary conventions. Markets for exchanges and exchange rates 
as prices will not exist All equilibrium positions will be left unchanged. We are still in an 
economy where rational agents (and perhaps economists) need not bother with 
international trade -or at least with imtemational payments.
However, we also concluded that an efficient market economy has a prohibitive, 
generally lacking, informational requirement The signal conveyed by competitive prices 
may be clear but deficient. Not all future possible positions can be covered and this opens 
the question of carrying wealth across markets and through time, and possibly, in a 
world of differendy-denominated wealth carriers. The same motives that induce agents to 
use money and non-monetary assets will create a market for currencies.
Hence, the key to understanding the special status of international payments and 
exchange rates is the same as the one that would disclose the nature of general means of 
payment and stores of value. But consequently, the study of international monetary 
relations has to be framed in a world of imperfect information with less-than-full 
insurance. In such a world, MGE can hardly be invoked, and one is only entitled to put 
forward more modest and limited propositions.
According to section 3, currencies are instruments tailored to satisfy liquidity 
preference in carrying wealth across markets and through time in the face of incomplete 
information about future states and prospects. Foreign currencies are accepted in view of 
their use on goods markets under different monetary conventions. But not only. Liquidity 
preference in the choice of the wealth carrier is -we have seen- complementary with 
agents' precautionary choice to transfer wealth to the future. Precautionary behaviour 
stems from agents' inability to pursue expected utility from future consumption; actual 
securities are tailored to meet agents' demand for flexibility. On the other hand, they 
scarcely alleviate the intertemporal coordination problem between consumers' and 
producers' decisions. The same patently extends to different monetary conventions. If
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wealth allocation to securities cannot be directly determined in function of expected utility 
maximization, specific allocation to titles to foreign currency may occur independently of 
commodity arbitrage. Of course, to paraphrase Hicks, Italians do not buy dollar assets 
because they like McDonald's hamburgers (in fact they don't). Dollar assets are 
appetizing for non-dollar portfolios in so far as they help to thicken the prospective capital 
value, or to thin the chance of capital loss. And even those who do buy McDonald's 
hamburgers (because they have to import them, if not because they like them) need hold 
dollar monetary reserves only if they have reasons to be cautious in view of future 
uncertain cash flow.
In fact, look at condition 12 above. If there is no sufficient information for all 
states on securities' returns and/or on the efficient relative price between the two 
currencies, the present value of the two securities in home currency may not be 
indifferent to the investor. Thus a genuine problem of allocation across currencies arises, 
and the exchange rate actually comes into play as an asset price. For the reasons already 
explained, the fact that the exchange market may be informationally efficient does not
imply that today's exchange rate is consistent with general-efficiency prices at
• 41 maturity .
4.2. C urrency sovereignty and the exchange-rate regime.
We also found one property of money that seems hardly reducible to individual 
rationality: general acceptability has more the nature of a game-like social convention. The 
evolution of modem monetary conventions has been towards an openly artificial currency 
vouched for by the State (State paper money). This evolutionary path has also led to the 
two institutions that characterize international monetary relations: c u r re n c y  
sovereignty and the exchange-rate regime (e.g. Hamada (1977)).
Currency sovereignty confers absolute power on the State to issue the national 
currency and to pursue independent monetary policy, and also full responsibility for
AO
limited means of international settlement . On the other hand, currency sovereignty 
means that evolution towards the perfectly liquid currency at the world level is still on the 
way. The institution of State paper monies with fixed exchange rates in the whole area of
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market economies, after the breakdown of the gold standard, has been the most 
progressive step in that direction. A system of fixed exchange rates is, however, a hybrid 
creature between marketable currencies and prices fixed by authority. Such a system 
collapsed, too, when authorites were no longer able to guarantee convertibility at the 
going prices; since then it has been replaced by open multi-currency competition, with 
free market prices. Yet the tendency, propagating from Europe, now seems turned 
against currency competition, and may ultimately take the form of monetary union.
It is noticeable that several studies (e.g. Helpman (1981)) have concluded that 
general efficiency is equally preserved under a floating and a fixed rate regime. The 
irrelevance of the exchange rate regime may seem a surprising result in the light of the 
general idea that a fixed price should destroy efficiency (this is indeed one usual a priori 
argument in favour of floating rates). As Helpman and Razin (1982) have made clear, 
this strong result is due precisely to the assumption of perfect foresight, or complete 
future contingent markets, which implies perfect information. It should be added that 
these assumptions preclude the very existence of a market for exchanges and of exchange 
rates working as prices. Anyway, their conclusions echo those of the Hayek-Lange 
debate over the allocative efficiency of central planning vs. decentralized markets: the 
latter are superior only in the presence of imperfect generation and transmission of 
information (von Hayek (1945)). Advocates of flexible rates ought to base their 
arguments on some market imperfection, which rarely appears in recent models43.
Finally, in a world whose future states are no less vague to authorities than they 
are to private agents, it is the institution of responsibility for the means of international 
settlement that lends economic significance to that accounting sheet on which the 
handsome edifice of our discipline is built: the balance of payments. In one respect, 
responsibility for the national monetary reserve against future external payments imposes 
onto monetary authorities the same problem that private agents face in the choice between 
present and future consumption. It is no surprise, therefore, that the balance of payments 
matters, and that authorities are champions of precautionary behavior because of 
uncertainty about the future states of the economy. In another respect, it is important to
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bear in mind that the balance of international payments is not a micro-constraint. It is a 
typical macro-constraint, that is, it is not perceived at the level of individual choices but 
applies (or is enforced) at the level of systemic rationalization. To that level of analysis 
we shall move in the next chapter.
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A ppendix
A.I. On precautionary behaviour.
Recent studies in decision theory have reassessed Keynes’s precautionary 
motive for holding money and have given firm underpinning to Keynes's great intuition 
of the breakdown of intertemporal optimization. They suggest that precautionary 
behaviour should be considered a general attitude of the decision maker towards 
uncertainty generated by incomplete information. Studies on "flexibility" are particularly 
interesting in this respect. The field was pioneered by Koopmans (1964). As for recent 
developments and applications to monetary theory see Jones-Ostroy (1984); see also 
Hicks (1979, pp.91 ff.) and Hahn (1982, pp.26 ff.; 1988, pp.963-964; ed.,1989, and 
in particular the paper by Makowski). Laidler (1988) has strongly emphasized the 
precautionary component in the demand for money in this vein.
" The rationale for flexibility is the unwillingness to commit oneself to not well- 
defined future prospects in terms of payoffs or preferences or needs. "One position is 
more flexible than another if it leaves available a larger set of future positions at any given 
level of cost [...] This principle potentially applies whenever (i) there will be 
opportunities to act after further information is received, and (ii) current actions influence 
either the attractiveness or availability of different future actions" (Jones-Ostroy (1984, 
p. 13)).
In the financial field, unlike contingent claims or pure securities or any forward 
contracts whatever, actual securities are currently accepted because they are flexible 
instruments: they give entitlement to a sum of currency without any prior commitment to 
physical goods or states. It should be noted that here flexibility arises from the entitlement 
to currency, that is, to the general means of purchase. Therefore, if access from the 
position in securities to the position in currency is costly, the latter offers further 
flexibility with respect to the former, this consideration seems to support the inclusion of 
money among assets.
However the mere appeal to transaction costs may, apart from being not new, be 
unsatisfactory if we admit that transaction costs matter to the extent that they are not 
discountable ex ante. In fact there is another, perhaps neglected, dimension of 
precautionary behaviour to consider. This is a dimension which is relevant to the 
transition from one position to the subsequent one where some uncertainty is resolved (or 
where transaction costs fall due). As pointed out by Knight (1921, ch. VII), precaution is 
commensurate with a positive probability of error, rather than with the first two moments 
of the probability distribution which dominate traditional risk-aversion theory. On the 
other hand, a positive probability of error is economically relevant if not all eventualities 
can be insured against. Knight concluded that it is just precaution in the face of 
"fallibility" that "prevents the theoretical perfect outworking of the tendencies of 
competition" (1921, p.232). This also seems the main message in the new literature on 
market inefficiency (Stiglitz (1985), Greenwald-Stiglitz (1987,1988)).
Decision theories centered on asymptotic measures -such as mean and variance- 
can only be acceptable on the explicit assumption of complete contingent markets and full 
insurance. Otherwise they are not operational. This can be seen clearly in the case of the 
axioms of rational expectations. Consider the random variable Xt with mean
[E(X) = E ] and variance [V(X) = V ]; let it represent payment streams of an agent,
X X
whereas Y are his income streams (for simplicity constant) and (Ex = Y). Let the agent
have a rational expectation of future payment streams [E(Xt - Ex) = 0]; the expectation
is asymptotically correct, forecast errors are uncorrelated and orthogonal. Nonetheless 
such an agent does, for any actual (X ), make forecast errors, and only a very naive idea
of randomness can suggest that gains and losses will be "balanced" over any finite 
(possibly thin) slice of time (Lopes (1986)). Rational expectations do not rule out the
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possibility of strings of losses or gains and hence do not exonerate the economist from 
explaining how the agent copes with favourable and unfavourable outcomes. 
Precautionary asset holding is one possible response when contingent markets are 
missing.
The model of precautionary behaviour proposed here only captures a few basic 
aspects. It is based on a well-known technique of statistical decision which consists of a 
measure of fallibility and the choice of a means to minimize it (interestingly, this 
procedure is largely used in technological applications; see Ventsel (1983, par.64)). A 
concise measure of fallibility is given by Tchebycheev inequality which states that
Pr(l Xt - Ex I > a) < V ^a2 a > 0
That is to say, the probability f(a) of an error of magnitude a is equal to (Vx/a 2 > 0).
This measure holds true for any probability distribution. The interesting point of 
Tchebycheev inequality is the subjective parameter a. The assessment of fallibility is not 
only dependent on the variance, but also on the tolerance level a: the less the subject is 
tolerant, the smaller a, the greater his probability of error, the more cautious his 
behaviour. Fig.Al represents the falliblity problem with a normal probability distribution.
Fig.Al. Tchebycheev inequality with a normal probability distribution.
In economic matters, it seems plausible that a will be set in relation to the 
subject's ability to withstand uninsured positions as measured by the subject's wealth. In 
our example in which X( is a payment, setting a equal to wealth (A) gives the critical
probability f(A)
Pr(Xt £ E x + A)<; Vx/A2
that the actual payment in t exceeds the normal level of payments (and incomes) by more 
than the available wealth (this is a right-hand problem in fig.Al). This point has been 
developed in section 3.1. By taking the probability of negative deviations from the 
expected nominal value of wealth, one obtains another fallibility problem (a left-hand 
problem in fig.Al) that has been analyzed as a liquidity problem in sections 3.23.3.
Neidier the tolerance level nor the variance of the probability distribution need be
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fixed or equal across agents, and both may be totally subjective parameters. For instance, 
an increase in the variance of outcomes increases the probability of error, as a counter­
measure, the subject should raise his tolerance level, e.g. by enlarging his precautionary 
wealth.
The use of variance in uncertainty problems is notoriously controversial. In the 
present context we cannot address this problem, but there is no reason to reject statistical 
variance as an operational tool, while bearing the numerous caveats in mind. In particular 
that the statistical variance is a sample parameter, it is based on past occurrences and, as 
such, it is a consistent parameter only if the process is stationary over time. A number of 
reasons have already been given such that stationarity cannot be taken for granted. If we 
admit the sample variance as an operational approximation, we should be prepared to 
regard it as a subjective parameter within a subjective decision model yielding boundedly 
rational decisions. It is easy to become convinced of this just in the case asset prices; for 
it is well-known that an asset may have a positive short-sale price for the individual 
holder, but not for the market as a whole. As a subjective parameter, V is likely to be
unstable, since it should change as agents perceive new "out of sample' events.
58
Notes
(1) Many textbooks tell that money "was bom" in Lydia, Eastern Mediterranean Sea, toward the end of 
the vn i century B.C. Yet this is hardly more than a conventional agreement The Kings of Lydia, 
perhaps the mythical Croesus, introduced the State coinage of precious metals in the Western 
world in order to regularize tributes from Greek towns. No doubt, this was an innovation which would 
enjoy long lasting success; nonetheless, it was but one of the many arrangements and innovations that 
earlier and later, in Western regions as well as elsewhere in the world, organized communities adopted to 
measure, transfer and store claims to physical resources. For further development of this argument see 
such classical works as Polanyi (1957), Hicks (1969, ch.V), Ardant (1976, Part I), Kindleberger 
(1984, ch.n).
(2) See again Hicks (1935), and later, the attack by Clower (1967).
(3) The fundamental reference is to work by Patinkin (1956). Of Friedman's vast production mention 
should be made of one of the earliest expositions of his neo-quantity theory (1956). The Walrasian roots 
of the monetarist thought are clearly pointed out and discussed by Davidson (1982) and Hahn (1982).
(4) In part I the author tells us that his "suggestion" was largely inspired by Keynes's A Treatise on 
Money (1930, vol.I, ch.X).
(5) The issue "time and money" has been pursued not only in the Neo- Walrasian programme that 
followed Value and Capital, but also by the post-Keynesian school. The issue is obviously central to 
the General Theory, but the analytical structure adopted by Keynes made it rather opaque (see Hicks 
(1979, chs.VI-VII; Graziani (1988)). Keynes tackled the question of the timing of decisions more 
explicitly in his later writings (1937a, b, c). Following this line of reasoning, Post-Keynesians 
(Davidson (1972), Minsky (1975)) have emphasized the essential incompatibility between the use and the 
role of money according to the "Keynesian revolution” and the Walrasian foundations of the textbooks' 
neoclassical synthesis or of the "monetarist counter-revolution".
(6) It is well known that efficiency is only one possible characterization of general equilibrium. An 
efhcient allocation is also Pareto-optimal and such as to maximize consumers' utility and production 
value.
(7) See Krouse (1986, p.82)).
(8) One such reason is the existence of "nations" and then the purely institutional fact that some 
exchanges are "international". In general equilibrium theory one can only say that goods are available in 
different places and distinguish them accordingly. See also below, sec.4.
(9) Note that r*^ gives the amount of commodity h for one unit of commodity f and therefore, for H 
markets, it corresponds to the usual definition of exchange rate.
(10) Moreover, analytically, general equilibrium theory does not afford a well-founded theory of 
disequilibrium price adjustments (Arrow (1959), Hahn (1977)). This lacuna extends to commodity 
arbitrage, or "monetization and demonetization" of standard commodities, which play such a large pan in 
the classical theory of metallic circulation and purchasing power parity.
(11) See Krouse (1986, p.84).
(12) Note that by definition (p* .^  is the amount of today's standard per one unit of standard contingent 
on ( t  s). Hence, (1/p*.^) is an interest factor or, in Keynes's words, the "own interest rate" of the 
standard.
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(13) See Krouse (1986, p.87) and Dreze (1987, p.123).
(14) For the full demonstration see Krouse (1986,pp.71 ff., pp.96 ff.).
(15) As is well known this issue was introduced in monetary economics by the Swedish school 
(Wicksell, Lindhal, Myrdal) and propagated by Hicks's Value and Capital (1939).
(16) See Samuelson (1965), Lucas (1978) and, for a general treatment, Sheffrin (1983).
(17) The methodological literature on rational expectations is now vast See e.g. Sheffrin (1983, ch.I).
(18) The most representative are the so-called "overlapping generations models" inspired by Samuelson 
(1958); see Wallace (1980), and the critical analysis by Hahn (1982, ch.I; 1988). The foregoing argument 
equally applies to the older tradition that includes money balances into the utility function. Since the 
utility of the currency is the utility yielded by goods, the allocation problem to money balances boils 
down to the M02 allocation problem to pure securities that has been examined so far. Following our 
formalization in sec.l, the traditional optimization problem truns out to be based on the M02 (T + 1) 
budget constraints
(py = pq + M)q...... (py + Mt j = pq + M)ts, ... t = 1,.... T
where M = money balances = pVa for p*. = [1] all s. For the complete proof see Grandmont
(1983, ch.V.5) who aptly adds that "the introduction of money balances in the trader's utility function is 
a valid procedure, provided, however that the utility of money is derived from the trader's intertemporal 
decision program which lies underneath" (p.32).
(19) See Hahn (1982a, pp.16-19; 1988, p.960)).
(20) These considerations have progressively gained the centre of stage thanks to the pioneering works of 
Knight (1921), Hicks (1935), Keynes (1936, ch.XII), Kaldor (1939), von Hayek (1945), up to the recent 
decisive contributions of Grossman and Stiglitz (Grossman-Stiglitz (1980), Stiglitz (1982,1985)).
(21) Of course, there remains information which, however necessary to optimize decisions, is not 
obtainable at any cost whatsoever (think of the subjective uncertainty, or plain ignorance, about one's 
own future needs or preferences).
(22) Note that as Hicks warned (1935, pp.77-79), the advantage in the actual possession or assignment 
of a title cannot be confused with, and may not be satisfied by, the change in the capital value of the 
existing stock which enters traditional asset-demand functions. If the interest in taking over a stock is at 
work, and no one contents oneself with a capital gain, the market may become unstable.
(23) Fundamental contributions are those by Frydman-Phelps (eds., 1983), Bray- Kreps (1986), Pesaran 
(1987).
(24) As shown by Bray and Kreps (1986), for agents' beliefs to converge a "rational learning model" 
would be necessary, such that the (ICs) are constantly updated to specify the effects of past estimated 
parameters on the structural parameters.
(25) Bray-Kreps (1986), Pesaran (1987. ch.IV). An intuitive explanation, based on modal logic rather 
than econometrics, is the following. Suppose common knowledge has been reached thanks to a so-called 
"fully revealing" market equilibrium (Grossman (1981)); then agents would get a common model which 
is some combination of the original ones, but since a combination of subjective models is no more than 
another subjective model, agents would display rational expectations without (necessarily) achieving the 
"truth" of market general efficiency (this is the well-known case of self-fulfilling expectations). In fact the 
usual strategy in models of "fully revealing" equilibria is that at least one agent has already got the 
"truth".
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(26) Arthur C. Pigou used to distinguish economists between "tool makers" and "tool users".
(27) More on this methodology can be found in Frydman-Phelps (1983), Pesaran (1987, ch.IV).
(28) The above resembles Arrow-Pratt principle of decreasing absolute risk aversion. There are, however, 
substantial differences as explained in App.A.l.
(29) That is to say, df(A)/dA = -1, which yields A* = (2V ) ^ .  Note that this formulation gives thec
upper bound of the agent's tolerance to default; he is in fact minimizing the probability of losing his 
whole wealth. In practice, savers are likely to be far less bold. Nothing is implied as to the variance of 
consumption payments, which enters the measure of the probability of default -it may well be a totally 
subjective parameter.
(30) With this definition I wish to capture two peculiar characteristics of money. The first is that money 
is the only currency; hence monetary payments resolve contracts immediately and definitively, whereas 
private bills require further conversion into currency at the contractual terms or through discount The 
second is that money has a fixed value in terms of itself in the broader sense of zero utility from 
consumption in all dates and states, whereas the monetary services of commodity standards may be 
"exchanged" for their services as commodities under particular states.
(31) It is interesting to observe that, according to the gametheoretic approach, the property of currency 
can hardly be explained in terms of individual rationality alone. Moreover, such enforcing devices as 
"gold" or "State" may be necessary to explain why the acceptance of gold coins or State paper, unlike 
private bills or promises to pay, need not be forced by means of a supply {»ice lower than their nominal 
value, so that they bear no capital risk. The elimination of currency competition is thus the basic form 
of "protection" of the monetary convention which makes production and exchange feasible. This solution 
has been challenged by advocates of currency competition (such as von Hayek; see the debate in Gaassen 
(1986)); but one immediately notices that their arguments are generally based on assumptions of perfect 
competition that ignore the informational problems we are considering here. Anyway, historical 
evolution seems to be in favour of a unique currency which, in modern monetary economies, is typically 
vouched for by the State. As a matter of fact, the last two centuries of history of money have been the 
history of waves of private monetary innovations followed by their statalization for the sake of a safer and 
safer monetary convention. For further developments see Ardant (1976, Part I and Part II).
(32) It is interesting to note that currency choice, instead of the more usual asset choice, was the point of 
entry of liquidity preference in the General Theory (ch.XVII, p.233 ff.) together with the highly 
controversial introduction of wages "fixed" in monetary terms. It seems to me that the foregoing account 
should make clear that by definition all monetary contracts are "fixed" in monetary terms, which is a 
characteristic quite independent of their being "rigid" in the face of changing economic conditions. On the 
other hand, the rationale of monetary contracts should be sought in the unwillingness to enter "crop- 
sharing” contracts in "real" terms, i.e. liquidity preference. However Keynes's treatment was quite 
ambiguous as he also seems to suggest that monetary contracts are liquid, and thus preferable, because 
they render monetary prices of goods stable, which may happen if monetary wages are in fact "rigid" 
(e.g., p.237). As already explained, liquidity preference has to be confined to the comparison of nominal 
values; it leads to the institution of a single universal currency, not to goods price rigidity.
(33) See e.g. Chick (1983, ch.X, App.). Such an unsatisfactory state of the theory can perhaps be traced 
back to Keynes's own work, in particular to his "demand for money" as an aggregate across a variety of 
"motives". No doubts, the General Theory and most Post-Keynesian writing have put greater weight 
on the "speculative motive" (i.e. capital-gains maximization) than on the precautionary one. However, it 
is no surprise that the idea of speculation as the "fundamental" inducement to hold money has led to an 
endless quarrel as to the anchor of speculators' expectations. Indeed, when he had to clarify the 
fundamental perspectives of his work before his critics, Keynes brought precautionary behaviour into full 
light (e.g. 1937c).
(34) The point was made by Hicks (1967, pp. 114 ff.). I have taken those terms (capital-value
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programme, and capital-growth programme) from the jargon of Common Trusts offers. One major branch 
of portfolio theory (following the seminal paper by Markowitz (1952)) is concerned with capital-growth 
programmes. That problem is one of optimally combining return and risk in the class of variable- 
interest securities. The standard deviation of the return around the mean value is usually used as a 
measure of risk of variable-interest securities. There is no explicit role of price variability in the objective 
function, and this can only be justified by the absence of unexpected short sales -i.e the absence of 
liquidity problems. The further contributions by Tobin (1958), Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) grafted 
money onto that problem as the "riskless asset”; but there remained considerable obscurity as to the 
"risklessness” of money and the choice of money in the portfolio apart from agents' personal taste's.
(35) The usual contention that the monetary reserve undergoes the negative interest rate of inflation (and 
the inflation rate may also be uncertain) seems to fail to consider that any asset stock and interest is 
realized in terms of currency units; as a consequence, the inflation rate affects the real value of the stock 
of financial wealth but is neutral to the comparison among interest differentials. As already stressed in the 
previous paragraph, the liquidity problem has to do with uncertainty in nominal, not in real, payoffs.
(36) The portfolio offered is optimum according to Sharpe-Lintner "separation theorem": for the expected 
i^, the portfolio minimizes the variance of dividends and interests.
(37) The fact that the problem assumes a probability distribution centered on the current price is 
tantamount to assuming static expectations, which is the standard procedure in traditional portfolio 
theory. Static expectations on asset prices are also rational if the market is a "fair game" (Fama (1970)). 
Note that, if [E(p) = p ^ ] , the expected return rate is reduced to [E(rk) = ^/P^q] or to the effective
interest rate; therefore, on the sole basis of asymptotic values, the liquidity problem would not exist 
while capital-gains maximization would be pointless.
<*> akmin*, - (V V rk>ll/2
This result may be considered a further "separation point" in the spirit of Sharpe-Lintner separation 
theorem. Of course, there is still room for personal tastes, in the trade-off between capital value and 
capital loss, for less safe portfolios up to a value (a jcmax < 0  where (A~ = L~). This point
corresponds to the usual definition of "fair bet” or risk neutrality. The model could be made more precise 
by introducing the interest rate paid on the monetary reserve. However, as already explained, the 
circumstance whether money yields an interest or not is inessential to our argument
(39) From the solution for a, . , see n.38, we have (a. . > 0, for r > 0). In fact the moneykmin km in
interest in the model is zero. Consequently, r associated with coincides with the risk premium
demanded on the Trust The risk premium can conveniently be expressed in terms of the desired stock of 
reserve (an = 1 - a j:mjn) 38 follows
(40) See Hahn (1988, p.967). In more traditional terms this is the Wicksellian theme of "the natural 
interest rate". From what precedes, it is very difficult indeed to see how something like the natural 
interest rate on the standard commodity can survive in a financial economy (quite apart from well-known 
difficulties in equating marginal productivity across heterogenous capital goods). In the first place, 
whereas Wicksell and the neoclassicists used to assume uncertainty away, the latter implies that there 
must be as many interest rates (1/p*.^) as possible states of the world at the maturity (or at least as the
number of diversifiable assets). Moreover, were one tempted to pool the whole array of interest rates in
the rationally expected value [L II (1/p* • )], then there would still be the problem of the efficient
s S JS
marginal rates of substitution between the standard commodity today and in each possible state at the 
maturity, which cannot exist independently of all other commodities' marginal rates of substitution. 
Then, in the absence of intertemporal utility maximization, Keynes's conclusion follows that the interest 
rate cannot be determined by "real factors".
(41) On the detachment of portfolio efficiency from MGE consider, for instance, this instructive paradox:
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"Suppose a country reduces money growth and this leads (as it will) to an increase in the interest rate on 
financial assets. Incipient capital flows will lead to currency appreciation and a current account 
deterioration financed by borrowing abroad. It is hard to argue that the current account deficit is a 
reflection of enhanced investment opportunities or increased time preference that, in an efficient and 
integrated capital market, would call for a redirection of lending toward the home country. On the 
contrary, the decline in demand will have reduced profitability of domestic real capital. It therefore would 
not be optimal for capital to flow toward the country with a tightened monetary policy." (Dombusch 
(1983, p.26)).
(42) Of course, were means of international settlement unlimited, currency sovereignty would lose part of 
its raison d'etre. In a hypothetical pure metal system, the quantity of means of payment for each 
country is physically limited by the production of metal; the same applies, albeit indirectly, to a 
convertible system on metal base. In a purely paper system, international means of payment are limited if 
not all national currencies are freely convertible, or if not all currencies are acceptable in international 
settlements.
(43) To be true, the early Keynesian generation of proponents of the floating regime would argue that 
commodity prices are not as flexible as necessary to achieve general equilibrium in domestic and external 
trade. This argument survives in the "overshooting" version of the monetarist school. However, the 
modern wave of supporters rather make reference to general equilibrium models or asset-market efficiency 
models, and focus on the inefficiency due to authority's intervention in the exchange m arket. But as 
Helpman (1981) and Helpman-Razin (1982) have shown, exchange-market intervention cannot affect the 
competitive efficient allocation unless the Ricardian equivalence theorem fails -i.e. agents fail to discount 
the a priori information that the path of intervention must eventually sum to zero. See also the accurate 
discussion of the various arguments in favour of flexible rates by Dombusch-Frankel (1987).
CHAPTER TWO
THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE FINANCIAL ECONOMY
Introduction
The informational perspective which we have followed so far, and which we 
shall keep following, enables us to lay deeper, possibly firmer, foundations of the 
macroeconomics wof the financial economy. This is the aim of this chapter, which is 
basically a methodological premise to the macroeconomic analysis that will follow in the 
subsequent chapters.
Since the financial economy lies in a sequential setting, time is the key element It 
is time that brings uncertainty and money into the analysis in an essential manner. In fact, 
money becomes the device whereby today's commitments are tied to tomorrow's 
deliveries and settlements in an economy where uncertainty inhibits agents’ willingness to 
take forward positions in physical goods or specific states; this is the essence of monetary 
contracting. Ch.I, sec.3.2 showed how monetary contracting involves the whole set of 
monetary functions. As was explained, "money" is nothing else than a set of economic 
funtions performed by ad-hoc instruments, each of which is more or less specialized, but 
each of wich shares with the others some fundamental properties. In modem market 
economies, misunderstanding of this principle may arise from the fact that monetary 
instruments usually have a low degree of "specialization"; our means of exchange, e.g. 
State paper notes, is also our means of payment as well as of reserve in bank deposits. 
Nonetheless, attention should be paid to the economic functions of money rather than to 
the material instrument used. Therefore it is desirable, at the cost of some lexical artifice, 
to label each money's function as if it were served by a specific, "fully specialized", 
instrument Note that the same monetary instrument might well change name by simply 
changing hands or by moving from one side to the other of a balance sheet
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1. The economics of balance sheets
1.1. Basic m onetary taxonomy and relationships.
In ch.I we related three monetary instruments -standard , currency and 
reserve- to the three economic functions of money -accounting, payment, and store of 
value. The currency, which takes on the functions of means of payment and exchange, 
consists of paper notes issued by a State agency. Hence, the monetary standard is 
nothing other than the unit of currency. The monetary reserve is any amount of 
currency held as store of value, according to the definition given in ch.I, sec.3.2. In a 
broader view, we may draw a distinction between currency, whenever money is 
exchanged against an equivalent value of goods and services, and finance, which 
embraces all instruments whereby money is exchanged against more money in the future 
(see e.g. Keynes (1930, p.217)). The amount of such claims held by an individual or by 
the totality of them may be defined financial wealth.
Let us now focus on that function of money which is the most easily understood 
but also the most easily overlooked: accounting.
In a sequential setting, accounting serves two fundamental purposes. The first, 
and the most obvious one, consists of recording current receipts and disbursements, 
thus providing the current budget constraint The second, which is more important to us, 
consists of recording changes in future claims and commitments, otherwise known as 
assets and liabilities. The balance sheet of assets and liabilities gives information 
according to which decisions are linked from period to period. The essential function of 
such information can only be appreciated with reference to our definition of uncertainty 
and precautionary asset holding. In purely accounting terms, the capital account yields the 
net monetary amount of resources that add to tomorrow’s budget constraint. Far more 
importandy, the financial position is an essential piece of information in the decision of 
how to invest or consume tomorrows’ receipts, even though not a penny of today's 
financial wealth will be used tomorrow. In financial theory, "we have to concentrate on 
those forces which make assets and liabilities what they are" (Hicks (1935, p.75))*.
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Therefore, the balance sheet can also be given an analytical content We may say 
that an agent cannot be held to be in stock equilibrium  until he has achieved the 
desired asset-liability balance; at the same time, the same agent is not in flow 
equilibrium until he has achieved the desired cash- flow. These definitions imply that in 
full equilibrium, or stationary state in a static setting, all flows and stocks must be at the 
desired level and unchanging (this point will be developed further in sec.2 below).
Note, finally, that the balance-sheet is also a document which has, or may be 
given, legal relevance. An economy which so essentially lives on monetary commitments 
and claims can only work in so far as those commitments and claims are actually fulfilled 
as they fall due. This is such a vital principle of the monetary convention underlying 
market production that it has been safeguarded by a special branch of the Law. While 
current income constraints can be bypassed by getting indebted, solvency of liabilities is 
the very cogent constraint on agents' choices.
1.2. Decision units and their balance sheets.
Unlike in a perfect market organization, in the financial economy under 
examination agents are no longer undistinguishable. Since their knowledge and 
information is incomplete and unequal, individuals' original attitude towards uncertain 
economic activités leads them to genuine specialization. The latter is something 
different (and more) than a specific maximand function. Specialization also involves the 
techniques by means of which ends are pursued namely, the type and organization of 
the relevant information. Consequently, different economic ends relate to specific 
organization of information, and to specific financial positions. Thus, to recall 
ch.I, producing entails taking illiquid positions that sound saving would refuse. Our true 
microeconomic elements become economically distinct decisions, not the 
"anthropomorphic agent" (or "N featureless agents") that make them (Leijonhufvud 
(1968, p.361)).
It is remarkable that in real life economic activities and decision techniques are 
highly standardized. For those who are (justly) suspicious of "representative agents" I 
stress that decision techniques, not individuals, are standardized. We shall take four
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prototypes of decisions into account: production and investment; consumption,
saving and portfolio choice; monetary policy; fiscal policy. It is convenient to
associate each decision with a specific "decision unit", that is, the firm , the
household, the central bank, and the government. This is done for expository
2
purposes, but does not sharply conflict with economic practice . A fifth unit -the 
foreign one- is added simply to point out the resident units' transactions with non 
resident ones. Such choices are by no means "objective"; they only claim to single out 
decisions which are determinant on macroeconomic performance. The latter is in turn far 
from being a "value-free" concept; it is centered on the maximization of goods and 
services available to the community; these are mainly manufactured goods and marketable
3
services which make up the so called Gross Domestic Product . Since GDP goes 
through the market, macroeconomists normally believe that its composition cannot be in 
sharp contrast with consumer preferences.
Each decision unit is qualified by a specific balance sheet of financial positions. 
Quite obviously there will be a good deal of simplification in order to capture the essential 
properties of the system. The top part of balance sheets records current receipts and 
disbursements, the bottom part shows the counterpart change in assets and liabilities. The 
sum of the two parts must be nil (taking an increase in assets as a disbursement and an 
increase in liabilities as a receipt), or 
Receipts • Disbursements = A(Assets - Liabilities)
The Firm
Receipts______________________________________________________ Disbursements
Sales revenue Factors cost
Assets____________________________________________________________Inabilities
Fixed capital 
Circulating capital
Net worth 
Monetary capital 
Long-term debt
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The firm is a productive unit. It is endowed with a stock of fixed capital (plants, 
machines, etc.) and it buys services of labour and raw materials at the beginning of each 
production period on the expectation of a given amount of total sales at the end. Sales 
revenue is entirely distributed to production factors. Factors cost amounts to the cost of 
labour (wages and salaries), capital (profits and interests) and raw materials.
Labour and raw materials form the circulating capital of each period which adds 
up to the fixed capital to form the firm’s assets'*. Firms are not supposed to hold financial 
assets. On the liability side, at the beginning of each period each firm records the 
currency-equivalent of circulating capital as monetary capital (which amounts to a short­
term debt). Fixed capital is owned by share-holders; the total value of shares is the firm's 
net worth. Liabilities also display a long-term debt (debentures and the like) which we 
assume to be towards the private sector or the bank. Additions to fixed capital 
(investment) are to be matched by an increase in liabilities (namely, equities or long-term 
debt).
The Household
Receipts --------------------------------------------------------------------------PigtmrsgmgpB
Personal incomes Consumption goods
Taxation
Assets______________________  ____________________________________ Liabilities
Durable goods 
Transaction balances 
Monetary reserve 
Bonds 
Debentures 
Equities
Foreign securities
The household is a consumption unit supplying productive services. Its receipts 
are given by personal incomes from services (wages, salaries and distributed profits). 
After deducting taxation from personal incomes, householders buy perishable goods that
68
are consumed within the production period, along with durable goods (house, car, etc.) 
recorded as an item of their assets^. Households may display the whole range of assets, 
which may be monetary (transaction balances and reserve) or non-monetary claims 
towards the public sector or the private sector (bonds and debentures, respectively), 
firms’ ownership (equities); non-monetary assets may come from the foreign sector as 
well. Households are not supposed to run liabilities; a consequence is that durable goods 
are bought out of cuiTent income or by reshuffling existing assets.
The Central Bank
Liabilities___________________________________________________________ Assets
Currency Discount
Bank Reserve Bonds
International Reserve
As far as the monetary institutions are concerned, we shall have to make a few 
substantial, but useful, simplifications. There is one central bank, whose tasks are to 
issue the State paper currency, to hold government bonds and the national reserve of 
means of international settlement, and to offer deposit services. We shall simply 
disregard other private banks by considering the central bank's balance-sheet as the 
consolidated account of the monetary positions in the economy**.
The central bank operates three windows; for the private sector (discount), for 
the public sector (government bonds) and for the foreign one (international reserve). As 
usual, the total amount of currency issued appears as a liability against these operations. 
It is also usual to emphasize that pan of the emission which is held by the economy in the 
form of deposits; this part virtually flows back to the bank (bank reserve). In accordance 
with modem institutional arrangements, the banking institution is not allowed to hold 
firms' shares.
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The Government
Receipts Disbursements
Tax revenue 
Assets
State property
Public expenditure
_______ Liabilities
Public debt
The government is economically relevant as a transferor or as a buyer of 
consumption goods or of durable goods which add to the State property (it is neither a 
direct producer nor employer). Any excess of current expenditure over current tax 
revenue is financed by issuing bonds that accrue as public debt. Note, however, that the 
share of bonds purchased by the issuing bank becomes an equivalent issue of currency.
The foreign sector is a conventional record of exchanges of goods, services and 
assets with non-resident units from the point of view of resident units. We shall call a 
national economy open if there are no absolute legal prohibitions on the exchanges of 
goods, services, securities, and currency with non-resident units.
It is timely to specify just at the outset that our economy is assumed to be an 
industrial economy that imports basic goods and foreign manufactured goods in exchange 
for domestic manufactured goods. In most exercises it will be useful to consider imports 
as a component of consumption. For reasons that will be explained in due time (see Part
II, ch.IV), it is convenient to single out receipts and disbursements due to trade in goods 
(the trade account) against changes in assets and liabilities (the capital account) . Receipts 
and disbursements recorded in this balance sheet are parts of receipts and disbursements
The Foreign Sector
Rgccipts______
Exports
Assets_________
Foreign securities 
Official reserve
Disbursements
Imports
Liabilities
Bonds
Debentures
Equities
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of other units. Expons and imports come from firms' sales (manufactured goods) and 
purchases (raw materials) abroad as well as from consumption by households. Financial 
transactions with foreigners are instead limited to households and the central bank.
The trade account of the foreign sector is by construction always in balance with 
the capital account, the official reserve held by the central bank being the most important 
compensatory item. The capital account also displays private assets (foreign securities 
held by resident households) and liabilities (resident firms' debentures and shares, and 
government bonds held by non-residents).
2. M acroeconomic equilibrium
2.1. The stock-flow m atrix .
So far we have singled out a few economic units which make the crucial 
decisions in the economy, and we have written down their basic monetary and financial 
positions. Albeit rather simplified, such positions are closely interrelated; each unit's 
position depends on someone else’s decision. The resulting interrelations are summarized 
in the following stock-flow matrix.
Tab.l. Stock-flow matrix
Flows 1 Stocks
. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Firms o - r - i = ♦ ★ *
Households Y-T-C = ♦ * ★ * ♦
Government T-G = *
Bank 0 = * * * * ♦
Foreign sec. M-X = ★ ♦ ♦ * *
0 * = 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flows: O = sales revenue, Y' = factors cost, Y = personal incomes, I « investment, C = consumption, T 
= tax revenue, G = public expenditure, M = imports, E = exports.
Stocks: 1 = monetary capital, 2 = currency and reserve, 3 = Public debt, 4 « Private debt, 5 = Equities, 6 
= Foreign assets. (* = -) = increase in liabilities, (* = +) = increase in assets.
Memo: Y* wage bill (W) + gross profits (R1) + raw materials (L); Y = wage bill (W) + net profits (R); 
O = GDP = domestic sales(L + I + C + G - M) + exports(X).
To save on notation, all variables referred to asset stocks will hereafter be denoted by the numbers given 
in this table; asset holders will be denoted by H * households, B ■ central bank, F = foreign sector.
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The column of flows displays the balance of receipts and disbursements; the 
columns of stocks display the corresponding changes in assets and liabilities for each 
decision unit By construction (or ex post) all columns sum to nil. Note that the column 
of flows is the usual GDP identity; this obtains by aggregating the flow balances for each 
unit. The row of the foreign sector is the balance of payments. Consider for example this 
sector; when foreign receipts exceed disbursements (M - X > 0, the home country's 
trade account is negative) foreigners are accumulating deposits with the home country's 
bank (+2) or are buying the home country's public debt (+3), private debt (+4) or 
equities (+5), or alternatively, are buying back their own liabilities (+6). If this is the 
case, households or the bank or both are to be selling foreign assets (-6). Such sales have 
in turn to be compatible with other ongoing modifications in these units' stock position 
and, ultimately, flow position.
Analytically, the stock-flow matrix displays ex post magnitudes. To paraphrase 
Hicks, we have to understand why a given matrix is what it looks like. Such a task 
requires us to analyze how the set of independent economic decisions under consideration 
interact with each other and are eventually brought to mutual consistency. A few 
methodological preliminaries are necessary, however, before going into the analytics.
2.2. M icro and macro analysis.
It is now well understood that macroeconomics is not about aggregation; it is 
about systemic coordination. Aggregates matter not because they are entities with a life of 
their own, but simply because they are our "observables". If we agree that decisions are 
to be our microeconomic simplest elements, then, it is not decisions, even less 
individuals, but the effects of decisions that are the observables. And, in this perspective, 
the observable effects of the decisions of a single firm, or of a single household, even of 
a single "single", are macrophenomena, in the sense that they contain some systemic 
messaged
Systemic coordination addresses the question; "How has the economic system 
solved the problem of inter-transactor communications?" (Leijonhufvud (1969, p.24)). 
One might perhaps wonder why we should think of an economic system instead of an
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economic chaos. A system obtains when the disposition of its independent elements 
obeys a given rule. In economics, the systemic constraint is usually the last equation of a 
general-equilibrium model, or equivalently (O = V ) in the stock-flow matrix. Such 
constraints are legitimated by basic rules of the game (such as "receipts = 
disbursements") but what is crucial is that they may not be directly pursued by the 
independent elements of the system (as explained in ch.I, sec.4, this is exactly the case 
with the "external constraint": X - M = 0)). Hence one has to explain how the systemic 
constraint is fulfilled.
The problem of systemic coordination in economics has been examined under two 
alternative forms: the Walrasian tatonnement vs. non-tatonnement coordination. The 
former applies to what we have called "market organization 1" -timeless, once and for all 
transactions; an instance of the latter is given by "market organization 2" -sequential, 
dated decisions and transactions (see above, ch.I). In MOl, which is the core of general 
equilibrium theory, transactions take place only when all individual and systemic 
constraints are fulfilled simultaneously; we know that a necessary condition is that all 
information must be freely available to all agents. Such a form of coordination sharply 
dichotomizes micro- and macro-constraints simply because individuals need not revise 
their actual plans (or need not "internalize" systemic signals); they are allowed to act as if 
they were atomistically alone. Accurate inspection of this mechanism has long concluded 
that it plainly eliminates the problem of how available information is actually 
communicated from one agent to another. If this has to happen through effective 
decisions that modify prices, then we are just shifted from tatonnement to non-
9
tatonnement coordination .
The most important difference is that in the latter case systemic coordination is 
made effective by internalizing systemic signals into individual decisions. This happens 
not by authority nor by design, but merely because the effective decision of one 
individual impinges as an externality on other individuals' decisions. Individual i's 
consumption plan will be constrained by his effective (and perhaps prospective) income 
from firm j, while his consumption at the same time enters the budget constraint of non-j
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firms. A change in firm j's labour policy is transmitted to non-j firms through changes in 
i's effective demand; these firms will have to adjust their sale and labour policy 
accordingly, thus spreading the message to their own consumers and workers, and so 
forth. Now, the ultimate effects of the original decisions of firm j and of individual i can 
either be perfectly discounted by all the agents or not. In either case the systemic 
constraint (O = Y') emerges from a chain of micro decisions which, however, already 
contain the gene of systemic coordination. This important gene can easily be uncovered in 
any rational-expectations model, even in the most enthusiastically microfounded one; 
there consumer i, firm j and all other agents are supposed to act on the basis of a model 
that tell them the "true” (i.e. general equilibrium) consequences of their actions; such a 
model must, as every modeller knows, contain true systemic information which is the 
solution of "the" systemic model (say, the equation of the general price level; see e.g. 
Frydman-Phelps (1983,1.2.1)). In the financial economy we are interested in, we know 
that agents are not endowed with systemic information and hence that their actions are 
fallible -if because of firm j's new labour policy individual i's effective demand falls, 
non-j firms will find their prices or quantities unexpectedly high, and will have to 
implement a restrictive sale policy. Thus it is through errors that the systemic gene 
works.
The much abhorred macroeconomic equations are nothing more than systemic 
constraints; they signal where micro decisions must eventually be reconciled. This leaves 
the question of what decisions will be reconciled to the others and by what means entirely 
open. On the other hand, one would say, this is the essence of economic analysis, since 
it is only in so far as some sort of order arises as a result of individual action but without 
being designed by any individual that a problem is raised which demands a theoretical 
explanation (von Hayek (1942, p.288)).
2 3 .  Modelling time. Discrete time and the norm  of stationary state.
In reality if we had a stock-flow matrix of the economy updated in real time, we 
would observe chaotic, ceaseless changes in entries. But as already explained in the 
previous chapter, it is not continuous time the form of "essential" time for decision
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makers: it is discrete time^®. Partitions of time mark out the horizon within which
decisions are made and assessed. As we know, partitions of time are conventional; as a
matter of fact, most economic decisions (and the relevant statistics) follow common time
units (such as the week or the month for wage-eamers, or the quarter for monetary
authorities). Without loss of generality, I shall assume that our time unit (the period) is
the same for all agents (when necessary, beginning-of- period variables will be denoted
by the subscript (0), end-of-period variables by the subscript (1)). Thus there are
"checkpoints" in time where the results of decisions are drawn and assessed^
Those who achieve results that disappoint their expectations will have to revise
their policy (or perhaps even their decision pattern); such modifications are a major
source of disturbance and motion in the economy. As a complement to this aspect, one
should also ascertain the conditions under which agents need not change their policy (and
the whole decision pattern), that is, the conditions of equilibrium. Although widely
employed in economics, "equilibrium" is notorious for its lack of precise definition and
its ambiguous uses by economists. However, in the field of macroeconomic analysis,
12there has been convergence towards the definition of equilibrium as stationary state . 
An economy is said to be in stationary state (in its static version) when all flows and 
stocks are invariant and at the level desired by all agents. Two criteria are therefore 
involved:
(i) an objective one -the unvarying state of stocks and flows;
(ii) a subjective one -the satisfaction of agents.
These two criteria are closely connected and must be fulfilled together. In fact variations
in stocks and flows entail a revision of the agents' economic position, while
unsatisfactory economic positions will be modified thereby causing variations in stocks
and flows. As already explained previously (see also above, ch.I, sec.2) the subjective
criteria must also include the acceptance of the decision model employed.
Let us begin with stock-flow stationarity; the above stock-flow matrix will serve 
13our purposes . A first useful piece of information to be drawn from the matrix is that, 
whereas net changes in stocks are nil, the stationary state requires each and all stocks
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to be invariant (i.e. all * = 0) . Stationary-state macroeconomic flows have to be14
consistent with those given stocks, namely, receipts and disbursements for all units must 
be balanced. I shall now make these conditions explicit for each period (t, t ' , ...) as 
follows:
0 = beginning of period variables, 1 = end of period variables.
C*, X* = expected sales of consumption goods and export goods; O* = planned GDP.
M emo: O = Y’ = W + R', Y = W + R; Y' = factors cost, W = wage bill, R’ = groos
profits, R = net profits. The other variables are the same as in tab.l.
The model is simplified by the harmless assumption that labour and capital are the sole
production factors (there are no purchases of raw materials; hence all imports come from
households' consumption). Equations 2a-d give explicit account of the condition of
fulfilled expectations; firms' revenue expectations correctly anticipate the other units' 
spending decisions. Equation 2d also implies that (Oj = Yj = Y’j, R'j = R j, Ij = 0,
i.e. all profits are distributed, there is no investment), which is the condition of stationary
G D P ^. The last two equations complete stationarity for the government and the foreign
sector. Therefore firms' sales revenue is entirely distributed to factors; investment net of
capital maintenance must be nil. Households exhaust their incomes for current consum­
ption and taxation, and do not save (Yj = C j + T j, S j =0). The government budget
is balanced (Gj = T j), and so are the foreign current account and capital account (all
external capital flows being absent: X j - Mj = 0); then countries that receive (pay) a
net permanent income will run an equal trade deficit (surplus). If we admit that agents 
want a given real value for the stock of financial wealth the appropriate deflator has to be 
stationary too. For the time being we simply take for granted that also prices are
(la)
(c)
(d) 
(e)
t (0  
L .
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stationary.
It is instructive to compare very briefly the stationary-state conditions with some 
more traditional definitions of macroeconomic equilibrium. Let us consider the case of a 
M unde Ilian "external-internal" equilibrium in which the optimal public expenditure (G*) 
is partly financed by taxation and partly by foreign purchases of bonds; hence
G* - T = AF3 = M - X
All goods, labour and asset markets clear (for simplicity let it be I = S = 0); yet on the 
market for bonds it happens that foreigners are supposed to absorb the home country's 
public debt at the rate (F3) indefinitely; hence the above cannot be a stationary 
equilibrium. We should rather specify the terms at which foreigners absorb bonds as well 
as the possible repercussions of their growing stock on other stocks and flows These 
are in fact the fundamental questions which concern the current wave of macroeconomics; 
such questions, and their solutions, represent no doubt substantial progress over the 
traditionally exclusive concern with flows-and-money-stock equilibrium (i.e. the IS-LM 
methodology). Yet some reservations are in order.
New Macroeconomics has taken quite an extreme position according to which (i) 
flows matter to the extent that they alter stocks, (ii) altered stocks are re-adjusted to their 
initial stationary-state level. Such a position rests on the assumption that the stationary 
state (on the objective side) is synonymous with market general efficiency under rational 
expectations (on the subjective side). It will be seen that such an assumption is 
unwarranted. It is well known from traditional macroeconomics, and especially open 
macroeconomics, that stationary flows and stocks can equally obtain from quite different 
levels of flows -and in particular of GDP| or of personal incomes. The argument that if 
such flows and the underlying allocations are not those of general efficiency the economy 
cannot settle down is far from being obvious. In fact this argument crucially hinges on 
the informational structure of the economy; if information is less than perfectly 
transmitted across markets, then the "dissatisfied” may be unable to modify their own 
position. Therefore one should always keep stationary state conditions carefully distinct
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from their welfare gifts. In this respect, one would say that the current literature is often 
guilty of economic sience's original sin of associating equilibrium with a positive value 
judgement. This procedure is not only incorrect from a scientific point of view; it can also 
be misleading for economic policy.
This study will use the methodology of stationary state as a purely analytical tool. 
As in the little example given above, stationary state will serve as the reference point for 
the analysis of economies in which a few elements are varying. Variation, like motion, 
can be only perceived and assessed in relation to a reference point. I would like to add 
that most of the macroeconomic analysis that follows will be concerned with non- 
stationary states, their causes and their possible effects, rather than with the search for, 
and return to, a new stationary state. One reason is obvious: international capital flows do 
not pertain to a system in stationary state, not even if they arc in balance with trade flows. 
"The real world is never in equilibrium" (Hicks).
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Notes
(1) Hicks also developed this methodology of balance sheets in his Critical Essays (1967, esp. ch.III).
(2) This is not a concession to "anthropomorphism". The fundamental point remains that the 
microeconomic level consists of decisions distinguishable by function and by informational 
characteristics; yet our labels of decision units will help remind us that some important differences in 
information and decision patterns persist just because they belong to different individuals, business 
departments or organizations (think of the well-known separation between ownership and control in the 
firm).
(3) Were we interested in the creations of arts or in a healthy environment, we should probably 
concentrate on other decision units.
(4) We shall disregard stocks of processed output. See also assumptions on the foreign sector below.
(5) We shall not consider stocks of perishable goods. See also assumptions concerning the foreign sector 
below.
(6) To this effect it is sufficient that other banks' reserve/deposit ratio is equal to unity.
(7) The main difference from the usual balance-of-payments accounting is given by the item of net 
transfers of personal and capital incomes, that for the moment will be ignored.
(8) To a greater extent aggregates are the sole observables for all statistical and policy purposes.
(9) The basic understanding of this problem was prvided by Clower's 1963 paper, then see again the 
fundamental contribution by Leijonhufvud (1968,1969), and the survey of the issue by Hahn (1973).
(10) The essential methodological arguments in favour of discrete time are those put forward by Hicks 
(1965, ch. VI).
(11) This point is obviously connected with the issue of uncertainty and expectations. The reader is 
referred to chJ, sec.2. It should be clear that if there were no uncertainty, or if rational expectations were 
taken as an axiom, then there would be no room for "checkpoints" at all; expectations (and the underlying 
model) would be either true or false, but this would be disclosed at the end of times (dynamically, the 
economy would jump on either the saddle point or an explosive trajectory among all possible trajecto­
ries). In fact, dynamic models under rational expectations are generally worked out in continuous time. 
On the contrary, discrete time becomes essential if account is taken of expectations formation with the 
operational possibility of learning from errors.
(12) In the 1950s the macroeconomics of the open economy offered an instructive episode of fierce debate 
on the definition of equilibrium (which was acutely commented upon by Machlup (1958)). During the 
last decade the school of "New Macroeconomics”, that arose out of criticisms of Keynesian and neo- 
Keynesian macro-models, has progressively imposed the norm of stationary state. The principles and 
results achieved by this methodology are well presented by Tumovsky (1981). An extremely stimulating 
critical discussion can be found in Tobin (1980).
(13) I wish to stress one subtle, but important, methodological point It is not possible for the criteria of 
stationary state to have an absolute extension and validity. In fact, the economic variables that relate to 
the position of all agents, and the standards of satisfaction for the latter, are infinitely greater than our 
capacity to encompass them all. Therefore, any theory can only qualify relative to others according to 
those forces of change that it includes or, more importantly, it excludes from its domain -a choice that is 
always partial, often misleading and never objective. A fundamental contribution on this point has been
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made by Hicks (1979); with obvious reference to the debate over the stationarity of Keynes's 
unemployment equilibrium see also Tobin (1980).
(14) Some authors (e.g. Tumovsky (1981, ch.XI)) relate stationary state conditions to the degree of asset 
substitutability and to the degree of sterilization of the balance of payments operated by the central bank. 
However it should be clear that these characteristics are irrelevant to the criterion of invariance of all 
stocks.
(15) A rigorous definition of stationary state should include fixed-capital maintenance, which should be 
paid out of gross profits thus leaving all the properties of the model unchanged.
(16) This point was first made at the end of the 1960s by McKinnon (1969) and others. Tumovsky 
(1981, ch.Xl) provides a thorough analytical comparison of the two perspectives.

CHAPTER THREE 
MONEY, FINANCE AND PRODUCTION
Introduction
A financial economy is an economy in which production and consumption 
decisions are made over a limited time horizon (conventionally defined as a period), and 
are linked by means of stores of value. The use of money as means of payment and store 
of value, in addition to its function as an accounting unit, indicates that the economy has 
to be less than perfectly informed and insured, which makes markets fail the conditions 
of perfection and general efficiency. As a consequence, decisions that entail 
commitments to physical goods or to particular future states, namely production and 
investment, are essentially conditioned by the financial position that can back up those 
commitments. Of course, in this perspective, money and finance "come first". This 
chapter is organized around three markets: the market for money (secs. 12), the market for 
assets (sec.3) and the market for goods (sec.4); it ends up with the determination of GDP 
and macreconomic equilibrium as a result of the interrelated decisions made on these three 
markets. The aim of the chapter is not to set out a full-blown macroeconomic model, but 
to analyze each of these markets within the framework outlined previously, which in 
important points differs from today's standard macroeconomic framework. Some basic 
macroeconomic properties obtained here will be used in the subsequent parts of this 
work.
1. The money m arket
1.1. The money m arket in stationary state.
According to the methodology set out in ch.n there are four basic decision units 
to be analyzed: the firm  (production and investment), the household (consumption, 
saving and portfolio choice), the issuing bank (monetary policy), and th e  
go v ern m en t (fiscal policy) (a fifth fictitious unit -the foreign sector- records 
transactions with units resident abroad). These units' decisions intersect in a few basic
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junctions: the m arket for production factors, the m arket for assets, th e
m arket for goods. In all these markets transactions are mediated by a specific 
monetary instrument -the currency- which can also be held as an asset itself -the monetary 
reserve. Therefore there must be one further market whereby monetary instruments are 
injected by the monetary authority into the economy -the m arket for money. 
Transactions on this market are mirrored in the issuing bank's balance-sheet, which is 
rewritten here for the reader’s convenience.
The Issuing Bank
Assçtg___________________________________________________________ Liabilities
Discount (B1 ) Currency (CU)
Bonds (B3) Bank reserve (B2)
International reserve (B6)___________________________________________________
There are three channels through which currency is circulated:(i) a private 
channel, whereby the bank discounts claims of the private sector, (ii) a public 
channel, whereby the bank buys government bonds; (iii) an international channel, 
whereby the bank is committed to exchange foreign currencies for national currency. 
Against these operations, the bank entitles the beneficiary to a corresponding bank 
deposit which thus results in an increase in the bank's liabilities (bank reserve). Since 
agents are assumed to keep their monetary reserve in bank deposits, the bank reserve 
always amounts to the monetary reserve of the economy. As depositors withdraw from 
their deposits to make purchases, and the corresponding receipts are not re-deposited, the 
bank's liabilities record a reduction in the bank reserve offset by an increase in the 
currency actually in circulation.
From the foregoing market organization we obtain the usual definition of the 
stock of monetary base, at any moment (t), as the liabilities of the issuing bank:
(1) Ht = CUt + B2t
From the definition of the bank reserve, since we are considering one single centralized
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bank, it follows that the monetary base is always equivalent to the definition of the stock 
of money as (currency + deposits, CUt + H2 )*.
But of course, the stock of money is also equivalent to the assets of the bank towards the 
private sector, the public sector and the foreign one.
This latter definition points direcdy to the issue of the "creation of money" ,and, 
as is customary, let us start by imposing stationary state conditions; equations la-e in 
ch.II, which are reproduced below, ensure balanced budgets and stationary stocks for all 
units.
Now, the classical assumption is that the existing money stock is due to the bank's 
cumulated stock of public debt (H( = B3t; e.g. Grandmont (1983, ch. 1.6)). However
this assumption raises some conceptual difficulties. In the first place it is not clear why 
other potential sources should be disregarded; and secondly it is necessary to suppose 
that stationarity suddenly starts after a past of public spendthriftness. After all a monetary 
economy should be able to work even without "the naive old tale of 'spendthrift and 
warlike princes'" (Cipolla). Such difficulties can be overcome if we frame the money 
market operations within a consistent sequential setting limited to private, domestic units 
and the issuing bank.
In fact a private channel through which the bank can immiss currency exists: the 
bank can lend on discount. On the other hand, given the stock of fixed capital and the 
technology, planned output at the beginning of each period generates a demand for 
production factors on the part of firms, which, with no net investment, consists of 
circulating capital only (labour and raw materials; the latter are now excluded). Labour 
suppliers wish, for reasons of liquidity preference, monetary contracts at the going
(2a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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market rates, which the firm then has to cover with an equal amount of monetary capital.
Now it would seem natural to turn to money holders, namely households; yet there are
two further difficulties. The first is that we would be forced to posit that a stock of money 
already exists (say, households’ monetary reserve: = B2t = H2(). The second is a bit
more profound and interesting: householders should lend money to the entrepreneur now
on the promise that they will eventually have it back as wages; but to the extent that
production is uncertain, this operation would correspond to an exchange of certain for
2
uncertain which is exactly what the contractual monetary wage is enginereed to avoid . 
Therefore it seems logic to conclude that a monetary economy comes to existence when 
firms can find the monetary capital they need; plausibly, monetary capital has to be
3
supplied by the issuing bank through its private window .
From the foregoing two important monetary relationships derive that must hold 
in each period. The bank's private discount covers the wage bill (BIq = Wq); this is
credited to firms (workers) as a deposit and amounts to the money stock for the period 
(B Iq = H2q = Hq). This is the basic opening operation of the money market and can
be synthetized in the following general form:
(3) H( = Wt(0*t)
which emphasizes that the money stock is, via the wage bill, a function of planned output 
for the period (0*t).
Moreover, the stock-flow equilibrium conditions of firms (0 *q = O j = W j +
R 'j, see eq.2a-c) entail that the bank also achieves stock-flow equilibrium at the end of
each period: firms' revenue is exactly suffient to pay for capital income and to redeem the 
bank discount (Oj - R'j = Wj = BIq, BIq = -B11); the bank ends up with the same
reserve, or money stock, it issued at the outset (-B1 j = B2j = H j = Hq). Then a new
production round can start exactly equal to the preceding one (provided that the bank 
grants the same amount of monetary capital to firms)
1.2. The creation and circulation of money reconsidered.
In a stationary sequential economy the creation and circulation of moeny
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displays some noteworthy characteristics that are at variance with traditional pictures (of 
various schools), and hence are of some relevance to the modelling of a monetary 
economy.
First of all, the currency flows into the economy through a well- defined market 
operation with the private sector, rather than being mysteriously "endowed" to it in form 
of transaction balances. The money market is the market for monetary capital. The terms 
themselves "demand for and supply o f ' money gain in clarity. Their conventional 
meaning in economic analysis (addition to and subtraction from existing stocks) can only 
be applied to monetary capital. For from this point onwards no one can increase or 
decrease the stock of money as a whole: one can only make use of it, one possible use 
being to hold a reserve. Individually, the money stock may be higher or lower, and such 
choices are extremely important, but the money stock of the economy in each period is no 
more, no less, than that determined on the money market between firms and the bank.
By the same token, disequilibrium changes in the money stock are not such 
obvious phenomena as they appear to be in the current literature. At the beginning of each 
period the money stock is always equal to the monetary capital obtained by firms. The 
amount of monetary capital results from a market transaction: it may be lower than the 
initial demand, but no central authority can force more money into circulation than the 
quantity entrepreneurs are prepared to use. As for households, they receive as much 
money as the wage bill; to them "excess" money would strictly mean that the wage rate is 
in excess of the contractual one, and such a circumstance seems to make little sense. 
Unfortunately, no one can get money in excess of how much one is prepared to give in 
exchange, whether the sweat of one’s brow or more money in the future. What does 
matter, then, is the uses of money.
We thus come to a third, quite important consideration. The uses of money in 
the economy mostly concern firms, their ability to achieve flow equilibrium 
(receipts = disbursements) as well as stock equilibrium (the redemption of monetary 
capital). We have seen that one condition to this effect is that households should spend 
the whole monetary income (Y), and in the way they are expected to. Traditionally,
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money holdings have been regarded as the most serious threat to this condition; firstly 
because they interfere with Say Law, secondly because they render unexpected changes 
in the pattern of expenditure easier. Gassics and Keynesians alike agreed that transaction 
balances are a crucial element in this respect, with the lonely exception of Hicks (1935;
4
see also above, ch.I, sec. 1.2) . Indeed, in an orderly sequential analysis under stock-
flow equilibrium conditions transaction balances turn out to be a false track; simply, their
equilibrium stock must be nil. The plain logic behind this result is that transaction
balances will sooner or later be spent by the end of the period, which, after all, conforms
to the old rational argument that transaction balances ought not be held for their own
sake. This obtains quite trivially in stationary state, but it is not limited to such a state,
which only implies that the monetary reserve is also nil.
I shall take it for granted that we agree on a well-made measure of transaction
balances (say cash, CU). An important point is that those who at any moment (© <0,1 > 
for all periods t) hold (CUq) are doing so in order to cover the planned stream of
payments of the current period (t). Consider the firm first. Its stream of payments is 
given by purchases of circulating capital, and this is initially covered by the monetary 
capital. The firm's stock equilibrium only requires it to pay back the initial monetary 
capital; as soon as it has accomplished this commitment by means of the period cash­
flow, the firm's balances fall to zero. As for the household, it receives monetary incomes 
that are spent according to the consumption plan by the end of the period; then the
household's equilibrium stock of transaction balances falls to zero too. Therefore for the 
economy as a whole, at the end of each period, (CUj = 0). The stationary state only
implies that (H2j = 0) too.
It should be concluded that transaction balances are not a permanent subtraction 
from monetary income: they are monetary income. More precisely, at any given moment
(0) they are the temporary stage of the adjusment process of a stock which is being 
driven towards zero, namely the stock of currency received as monetary income at the 
beginning of period and set apart for consumption and other current transactions. All in 
all, the quantity equation cannot be a supply-demand equation as it claims to be. At the
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of each period it is an identity (see eq.3), while within each period it shows how the 
given monetary income flows out of consumers' pockets (the left-hand side) into 
suppliers’ (the right-hand side).
Put another way, the transaction motive is not a use of money relevant to the 
coordination problem among decision units. In particular such parameters as the velocity 
of circulation are of little concern to the issuing bank, since transaction balances as a 
whole are unlikely to reside outside the coffers of the banking system most of the time 
(apart from abnormal currency/deposit ratios). For the same reason, such a phenomenon 
as "an excess demand for (supply of) money for transaction purposes", which is so 
pervasive in textbooks, is hardly understandable. If firms anticipate correctly the other 
units' expenditure decisions, the existing money stock is always sufficient to fulfill those 
units' transactions; if say households wish to consume more out of the given monetary 
income then they are dissaving, they are generating a real (intertemporal) shock, not a 
monetary one, and as such, it is transmitted to firms, not to the issuing bank. What really 
concerns the bank is firms' ability to redeem the initial loan. But as the stationary state 
equations show intuitively, velocity of circulation and the like need not enter the firm's 
forecast model; to ensure equilibrium, that model must capture the pattern of the demand 
for domestic goods period by period, regardless of the rhythm of this demand within 
each period^. Accordingly, the sole use of money that matters is when money is "chosen 
against other things" (Hicks), against physical goods, or against financial assets, that is, 
the use of money as reserve, which is to be analyzed out of the stationary state.
To sum up in view of further stages of analysis, we may say that the 
payments system determines
(i) the in-period pattern of adjustment of transaction balances towards zero;
(ii) the velocity of circulation of money;
whereas macroeconomic equilibrium depends on
(i) the conditions of the money and asset markets;
(ii) the (expected) conditions of the goods markets.
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1.3. The monetary policy and the discount rate
The conditions of the money market result from the production policy of firms, 
on the one hand, and the monetary policy of the issuing bank on the other. Firms demand 
monetary capital on discount of private claims, the issuing bank supplies it in form of 
State paper currency. Let us now focus on the supply side of the money market.
According to the canonical taxonomy of Gurley and Shaw (1960), the market 
organization we are considering has inside money as well as outside money 
available, the former coming from bank operations with the private sector and the latter 
from operations with the public sector. The core of monetary theory is concerned with 
outside money, but we have seen a number of reasons why this exclusive approach is 
highly unsatisfactory (especially under stationary state conditions) and should rather be 
reversed, so that inside money is taken as the starting point. It is very important to note 
that the specification of the money market organization is a prerequisite to the the 
modelling of the monetary policy -many controversies have only been fed by people’s 
talking about different worlds (Leijonhufvud (1983)).
Although economic modelling is rarely committed to realism, the traditional 
concern with outside money is often justified as appropriate to the modem State paper 
regim e, whereas inside money is regarded as limited to the older convertib ility  
regime. Accordingly, the former requires a policy of quantity control, while the latter 
leads to a policy of price control, and the two policies correspond to quite different 
subject matters (Leijonhufvud (1983)). However, it is not entirely true that the establish­
ment of the State paper regime has dissolved all traces of the convertibility regime. The 
substitution of State paper currency for metallic currency has set the issuing bank free 
from the legal commitment to convert metals into paper, but cannot keep the banking 
system from participating in the conversion of private paper into State paper. Since the 
ability of the private sector to design and print private paper has proved to be virtually 
unlimited, it is even doubtful whether the policy of quantity control has gained or lost 
effectiveness in the modem regime. This is seen most clearly as soon as one considers 
the traditional problems of control of the foreign channel of money creation; and there is
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no reason to posit that the market power of the issuing bank should be any greater with 
the domestic private sector than with the foreign one^.
The market organization outlined here could thus be called a discretionary 
convertibility regime. It has the advantage of placing the issuing bank in the position 
of choosing the target variable (albeit with less than full control on both): either the 
quantity of currency, thus leaving the discount rate to the market, or the discount rate, 
with the market determining the quantity of currency. The same choices are open on the 
market for foreign currencies, where the former corresponds to a flexible exchange-rate 
regime and the latter to a fixed exchange-rate regime .
Stationary state conditions constrain monetary policy options in a way that 
reveals some important properties. Since stationarity must obviously extend to all prices, 
both prices of domestic and foreign currency must not change. Hence the issuing bank is 
confined to the pure convertibility regime on both markets by pegging the discount rate 
and the exchange rate. At these rates, it is committed to providing firms with the same 
amount of monetary capital period by period and to clearing import and export operations 
in foreign currencies. Given that the foreign sector keeps a balanced monetary position, 
the basic question is how the bank chooses the discount rate and how the market 
determines the quantity of currency.
As a first step let us examine the bank's own budget constraint. The bank
should in any given period (t) keep assets and liabilities in balance; since the equilibrium 
stock of transaction balances is null, it must be that (Bl^ = B2(). The traditional
"microeconomic” reading of this equality constraint is that the bank cannot lend more than 
the reserve, i.e. deposits are the source of the money supply (Tobin (1963)). But this 
principle turns out to be a typical microeconomic optical illusion. In fact, firstly there 
cannot be a monetary reserve of the private sector unless money is already available in the 
economy; secondly, in stationary state the private monetary reserve must be null too. As 
any textbook on banking teaches, deposits are not the source of the money supply; rather, 
the reverse is true, according to the so-called "deposit multiplier" (Turaovsky 
(1981, ch.2.3)). We have already verified that in our model the money supply coincides
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with the bank discount (there is no "credit multiplier") and that the bank fulfills its budget
constraint anyway; therefore, the bank enjoys an unconstrained supply schedule at the
given discount rate, while the discount rate can be set independently of the public's in-
o
period supply of deposits .
An important conclusion is then that the discount rate is a free instrument 
variable that the monetary authority can attach to some objective, which must of course be
9
consistent with stationarity of the economy . This is a point that cannot be examined at 
this juncture; for the time being let us assume that the discount rate ( il{) has been fixed by
the authority. Then the money-market equation 3 can be rewritten in a form where the 
bank's supply is unlimited at ( i l ) and firms' demand is negatively sloped with respect to
(il), since it represents a variable cost to them (this schedule will be derived rigorously in 
due time),
(3b) Ht = Wt(0*t, i l t) W (0*)>0, W '(il)<0
Hence the period money stock will be determined by the demand side to the amount (Ht) 
as explained above (see f ig .l)^ .
Fig.l. The money market in stationary state
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Finally it is interesting to observe that, in order to obtain stationarity, it is the 
interest rate on deposits (i2) that must be adjusted to the discount rate (i2t = i l ). In fact
the discount rate is a component of variable costs for firms, which must pay 
[ W q (1 + iip ]  to the bank (say out of gross profits, R' - R = WqU ). Consequently,
factors cost would exceed personal incomes by (W ^il^, thus violating firms' flow
equilibrium, unless personal incomes were proportionally increased by (W ^iip by the
end of the period.
2. Money in the expanding economy
2.1. Investm ent and saving.
Let us now relax the conditions of stationary state. Stocks will be free to be 
cumulated or decumulated at agents' will. Householders display a positive porpensity to 
save out of current income; firms demand new capital goods, the government is allowed 
to pursue an active fiscal policy. The determinants of saving and portfolio choice are 
those expounded in ch.I, sec.3. Investment and fiscal policy will, for present purposes, 
be regarded as exogenous changes in demand. Focus will be on comparisons among 
flow equilibrium conditions and the related modifications on the money market, with no 
consideration at all of the underlying price and quantity dynamics; it is easy to understand 
that this section is a prelude to the analysis of asset markets in the expanding economy.
As a first stage it is convenient to constrain the public and the foreign sector to 
stock-flow stationarity. Let us write the equations of flow equilibrium under the new 
conditions (compare with system 2a-e in the previous paragraph);
(4a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
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Only one comment. Finns achieve flow equilibrium because it is as usual assumed that all
firms correctly anticipate all others' expenditure decisions (equation 4d). In particular,
note that now there appears a particular inter-firms decision: producers of capital goods
have to forecast all other producers' demand for capital goods (call them investors). On
the other hand, producers of consumption goods now have to discount householders'
decision to save (S). Thus our quite simple web of decisions shows a threefold
coordination problem: savers do not demand capital goods directly, but their decision
concerns the consumption goods market; investors send instead a signal to the capital 
goods market. Given that it must be (Oj = Y’j), a well-known implication of firms'
flow-equilibrium equation is (Ij = S^), that is to say, investment must be equal to
saving. For the moment we shall not examine how this problem is solved, but we shall
instead concentrate on the creation and circulation of money in this economy.
The basic question is how the investment decision affects firms' demand for
monetary capital. In order to give a correct answer, the two sides of an investment -
likewise any other transaction- should be kept well distinct: the purchasing power of the
demander, on the one hand, and the production cost of the supplier on the other. Whereas
financing investment is investors' business, capital goods producers only need raise the
means of purchasing circulating capital just like any other producer. Therefore the sole
direct effect of investment on the money market is that firms' demand for monetary
capital is increased by the amount of the planned cost of circulating capital (under the
going assumptions, the wage bill) in the production of capital goods. In fig.2, which 
reproduces fig.l, W , is the new locus of equilibrium demand for monetary capital after
positive demand for capital goods has been anticipated.
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What are the possible responses of the central bank? In the first place it is
obvious to observe that in the very first period of expansion of the economy, the bank
reserve in existence (the one inherited from the previous period) will be insufficient to
meet the enlarged demand. Hence, the issuing bank enjoys the full range of monetary
policies: (i) pure price control (the money supply expands to clear the market), (ii) pure
quantity control (the discount rate rises to clear the market), (iii) a mixture of the two.
Case (i) is the simplest: all firms' plans are satisfied at the going discount rate. The other
two cases give rise to a complicated adjustment, since firms have to adjust their plans to a
smaller monetary capital available and to a higher money cost (for instance it is not clear
whether consumption or capital goods production will be curtailed the most); it may
happen that capital goods production has to be reduced, but note that this would be a fall
in investment supply, not in demand like in standard macroeconomic models.
For the moment let us limit ourselves to case (i), with (il^. = i l t, Hj,) the
unchanged discount rate and the new money stock, respectively. Recall from equation 3 
that (H{, = Wt,(0*t„ i l t,)). The bank then pays interests to depositors by the amount
(Wt,i2t„ i2t, = ilj,), which add to their personal incomes. Provided that firms' plans 
are correct, it is still true that the money stock will be sufficient "to buy" the period GDP;
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from equation 4d firms' aggregate revenue is sufficient to pay for net profits and the 
initial provision of monetary capital [Oj = Rj + W j(l + i l ,)]. Hence, as in the previous
analysis of stationary state, the crucial point seems to be firms' ability to anticipate the
expenditure pattern in the economy. This result deserves closer inspection because now
householders are allowed not to spend the whole monetary income on the goods market.
To begin with, consider the extreme case in which householders choose money 
as the sole asset (i.e. Sj = AH2j). In this case they materially buy consumption goods
only, and do not finance investors directly. Since aggregate payments to firms allow them 
to return [W j(l + i l t,)] to the bank, at the end of the period the bank reserve, net of
interest payments, amounts to (B2j = W j + H 2 j)  vis à vis initial assets
(B Iq = Wq). The missing item for the bank's asset-liabilities to be kept balanced is
clear: investment finance. In an efficient financial economy investment finance is
indifferent for both firms and householders (see above ch.I, sec.2.1 or the well-known
Modigliani-Miller theorem). This is not the case under precautionary behaviour and
liquidity preference: assets (liabilities) are not perfectly substitutable for households and
firms. There are two distinct sources of exogenous investment finance to be analyzed: (i)
debentures bought by the central bank, (ii) equities bought by households; remarkably, in
either cases the bank will achieve asset-liabilities balance. In case (i) because bank assets 
are increased by exactly (Ij = H 2j); in the other case because bank liabilities are
decreased by exactly (-H2j = Ij).
Recall that the conditions of the money market are relevant to the determination 
of planned output, consumption goods and capital goods alike. Investors' demand 
instead derives from the expectation of future demand, and their present ability to issue
♦
liabilities. The latter is exerted on the asset market, not on the money market, although if 
the central bank decides to buy investors' debentures it parallely increases the money 
stock. But whose money is this, and for what purposes is it held? This additional money 
stock has nothing to do with transaction balances, exogenous shocks and the like: it is 
households' equilibrium monetary reserve. In fact investors have spent the debentures 
revenue with producers; these have paid for labour, physical and monetary capital;
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workers and capital owners have fulfilled their consumption plan and have decided to
hold a monetary reserve rather than buy back investors’ debentures. Figure 2 depicts an 
intermediate situation where at (i2(, = il*  ,) saving is partly allocated to monetary
reserve and partly to capital assets; thus the money supply initially increases from point A 
to point B, but the final equilibrium level of the money stock (Ht>) depends on savers'
portfolio policy (which is represented by the traditional upward sloping curve (H2)). At 
point D the whole period saving would go to monetary reserve, with full monetization; 
the segment BE measures the equilibrium stock of monetary reserve, but, as we know 
from liquidity theory (above ch.I, sec.3.2), neither the stock nor period additions to 
monetary reserve can ever fall to zero, however small the interest rate. On the grounds of 
pure monetary relationships, what the central bank is doing when it "monetizes debt” is 
allow someone else, not to be more spendthrift, but to be more liquid by holding a greater 
monetary reserve in the portfolio.
Note, however, that as soon as householders are free to hoard assets and a 
monetary reserve, the central bank ceases to be the sole supplier of investment finance; it 
loses full control over investment demand, while monetary policy may affect capital 
goods supply through the supply conditions of monetary capital. Thus the central bank 
finds itself in a rather uncomfortable position when the economy is expanding: if 
householders are high in liquidity preference, the central bank faces a higher demand for 
money through investment finance; if householders are low in liquidity preference and are 
willing to hold capital assets, the central bank faces a higher demand for money directly 
from production1
A final important issue is that flow equilibrium in the expanding economy 
hinges on the saving-investment equality. Open macroeconomics is witnessing an 
enthusiastic revival of the neoclassical flow theory according to which the amount of 
investment depends on the amount of saving via the real interest rate (see Frenkel-Razin 
(1987, Part II) for all). On the contrary, and consistently with the theory of effective 
demand (see above ch.n, sec.2.2), the present sequential framework makes it transparent 
that investment "comes before" the additional saving of the period, and that the latter can
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be neither a source nor a constraint to the former . This is not a matter of hours and 
minutes, but of the sequential dissemination of market signals in an economy in which 
assets are accumulated and selected under uncertainty. The first important consequence 
bears upon the choice of saving. The period rate of saving can be explained with no 
commitment to future consumption, but within an accumulation programme aimed at 
minimizing the probabilty of default (entailing a cut in the normal level of consumption, 
or borrowing, or insolvency) by means of an adequate stock of wealth. C eteris 
paribus, additional saving is a flow decision that can only come from additional 
personal incomes, and these can only come from additional output; the latter is in ttim a 
supply decision that must be based on some market signal from the demand side; such a 
signal must contain the terms on which investors' liabilities are accepted in asset-holders' 
portfolios, and this is a stock decision. It is in this sense that capital goods demand 
must be made effective "before" additional saving is generated, and consequently, the rate 
of investment is not a matter of flow equilibrium with saving, but of stock equilibrium 
with money. This brings us back to the coordination problem outlined at the beginning 
of this paragraph, and to the crucial role that the asset market plays in it.
The traditionally oriented reader may ask whether "the" return rate to capital 
assets may still be given a role to play in the accumulation programme of our cautious 
saver, thus providing a coordination device between investment and saving. The general 
answer should be no for two main reasons.
In the first place there is a whole array of return rates precisely because there is a 
variety of assets available for choice, and equilibrium among return rates can be expected 
to be established by raising some rates while lowering others; as a consequence, it is not 
clear which group, if any, will influence households' decisions to save.
In the second place, the precautionary accumulation programme entails 
foregoing some consumption today. Hence greater wealth growth rates, at the given level 
of normal consumption, should be preferred. Therefore, if asset return rates have to 
affect saving, this may happen with a negative, rather than positive, sign; high return 
rates ensure a greater wealth growth rate, and hence allow for a lower propensity to save
12
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or a faster accumulation programme. Anyway, the effects of return rates on saving would 
pass through the saving-consumption pattern, thus reacting back on planned output and 
personal incomes. I shall henceforth exclude direct effects of return rates on saving, and I 
shall instead concentrate on the allocation of wealth among different assets.
A final remark here. As far as a single-period flow equilibrium is concerned, the 
solution, as stated at the outset, lies in the goodness of producers' forecasts of the 
current expenditure pattern in the economy. Saving-investment equality, however it is 
reached, indicates only that condition; it by no means indicates that investors’ forecasts of 
future expenditure patterns, and their related adjustment of output capacity, is correct 
This crucial difference between one-period and intertemporal coordination should become 
clear once the implications of saving as a precautionary choice are borne in mind.
2.2. G overnm ent deficit spending.
Government deficit spending is here considered an exogenous decision, with no
further investigation on its size. Its direct impact on flow equilibrium conditions is shown 
by equations 5 (which imply nothing as to changes in the aggregate value C * q  with
respect to equations 4):
(5a) C*0 = Y1 + D 1 - M 1 - S 1
(b) Dj = G j  - T j  > 0
Now firms' flow equilibrium must include the correct forecast of the government budget
policy. When this is the case, the private deficit spending decision -investment- happens 
to be commensurate with the excess of private saving over public deficit spending (Ij =
S j - Dj). Note that such a forecast problem is producers', not investors', business.
The latter are, as before, only concerned with the future evolution of demand, whereas 
the former have to anticipate consumers', investors' and the government's current net 
expenditure.
It is worth noting that the analysis of the relationships of the government deficit 
with the money market is essentially the same as that of private investment. The direct 
impact takes place through producers' demand for monetary capital (say an increase).
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Then the government has to provide the means of covering excess expenditure; this it
generally does by selling bonds. Bonds can be purchased by the issuing bank or by
households. The former operation results in a parallel increase in the bank's assets 
(AB3j = Dj); the latter leads to a reduction in households' monetary reserve
(-AH2 = D p  or other non-monetary assets (of course intermediate cases will display a
mixture of the two results, but they do not change the essence of the problem). Again, if
firms' expectations are correct, the bank will achieve flow and stock equilibrium
whatever the portfolio policy of households may be. Yet this conclusion does not imply
that the bank has full control on the creation of money, nor does it mean that government
deficits inject money into the economy in any of the simple ways told in textbooks.
If government deficit spending is translated into greater planned output by firms,
then the money stock is increased by the amount producers obtain from the issuing bank 
at the market discount rate (Wj), according to the process of creation and uses of money
described in the previous section. Although is true that if the bank accepts government
bonds, the end-of- period money stock will result to be increased by the same amount 
(AB2j = W j + Dj),  this is nothing else than the phenomenon of "debt monetization"
described in the previous paragraph; the central bank allows households to allocate
marginal saving to monetary reserve rather than to public bonds. In this view, the bank's
financing private or public debt bears exactly the same monetary consequences.
Just as saving is not the source of investment, so public and private deficit
spending do not compete for the in-period am ount of saving: they compete for
portfolio shares for any given stock of wealth. As already explained, the flow of
13saving is always sufficient to buy public and private debt issues provided that 
producers, not investors, correctly forecast the current pattern of expenditure in the 
economy. Accordingly, competition for finance does not reflect itself in the the 
propensity to save but in the structure of asset prices. Viewed from this side, open- 
market bank interventions mostly affect the asset market conditions, and hence asset 
prices and return rates, by relaxing or tightening asset demand vis á vis private and 
public suppliers of liabilities.
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2.3. External imbalances.
As I have repeatedly warned, the foreign sector is a fictitious decision unit. Its 
accounting book -the balance of international payments- is not kept by any individual 
private agent but by the monetaiy authority.
Consequently, it is an outward manifestation of what is a systemic constraint -one which 
is notoriously quite cogent Formally, the balance of payments is the natural candidate as 
the "closing equation" of the system in flow equilibrium. In fact flow equilibrium of the 
expanding economy entails an important relationship among the budgets of the private, 
the public, and the foreign sectors. The economy expands from a stationary state when 
investors, the government, or both, entertain a deficit spending policy. Then from 
equations 4 we know that in flow equilibrium
(6) (Sj + T j) - (Ij + G j )  = Xj - Mj or equivalently
S' - D' = Z 
b I 1 1
Let us call the two terms on the left-hand side "national saving” and "national
deficit spending” respectively. Hence if the trade balance has to be balanced 
(Zj = 0), national deficit spending must equate national saving. Consequently, if one of
the two domestic sectors is in surplus (e.g. Sj > I j)  the other must be in deficit
(Tj < G p . On the other hand, imbalances between national saving and deficit spending
are parallely mirrored in external imbalances. External deficits may well correspond to 
excess private expenditure (Sj < Ij), to excess government expenditure (Gj > T j) or
both. It goes without saying that at the present stage we do not know how this happens, 
only that it must
Now recall the stock-flow matrix in ch.II. If a domestic unit is running a deficit
spending policy, it must at the same time be shifting its financial position towards 
liabilities; if (Zj < 0), either the deficit spending unit is placing liabilities (reducing
assets) abroad or the issuing bank is reducing its own foreign assets. Then the usual 
identity of the balance of payments follows:
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(7) z i + Fi s  AB6j
where Z = trade account, F = capital account (changes in private assets and liabilities with 
non-resident units: + = capital inflows, - = capital outflows), AB6 = official settlements 
(changes in the central bank's means of international settlement: + = increase, - = 
decrease).
The squaring of the balance of payments is due to the institutional commitment 
of the central bank to exchanging foreign for domestic currency. Technically, the central 
bank acts as a clearing house, and, note, this must be the case even in stationary state, 
when the trade balance is nil. For if it were not, domestic exporters would have growing 
foreign assets (while domestic importers would have growing foreign liabilities), and this 
state would violate the condition of stock stationarity, regardless of whether all net 
balances were zero.
Official settlements have to take place whenever private demand and supply of 
foreign currency do not clear at the going exchange rate, although it may be in the power 
of the bank to let the exchange rate equate demand and supply. As already explained in 
sec.l, the choice of the exchange rate regime is analogous to the choice of the domestic 
discount regime (while bearing in mind the many qualifications already advanced). The 
general principle is that imbalances of private international payments impinge on the 
money market and the money stock only if the central bank pegs the exchange rate, and to 
the extent that the central bank does not "sterilize" them through offsetting open-market 
operations. In the market organization under consideration here, this principle is still valid 
though with some important qualifications.
If the central bank operates under a fixed exchange-rate regime, official 
settlements are, as a first impact, fully transmitted to money circulation. Consider the case 
of excess receipts from abroad; bearers of foreign currency (or equivalent bills) obtain a 
bank deposit in domestic currency in exchange (hence, in any moment 0, AB6© = 
ACUq + AB2e  = AHg). But the final equilibrium level of the money stock will 
depend on a particular circumstance: whether suppliers of foreign currency are 
themselves debtors of the bank or not The former circumstance clearly occurs in the case
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of firms, when they wish to convert receipts from sales abroad; these receipts are in fact
part of the expected cash flow that must pay for the period discount with the bank (hence, 
AB6j = -AB1 j, AHj = 0). That is to say, when excess supply of foreign currency is
backed by domestic debt, official settlements are ipso facto sterilized. On the contrary,
official settlements have a one-to-one impact on the equilibrium money stock when the
central bank cannot offset excess supply of foreign currency with the outstanding
domestic discount. This is the case of the government or investors who wish to convert
receipts from sales of liabilities abroad; then what happens is exactly the same as if the
bank decided to "monetize" public or private debt: domestic asset-holders are allowed a 
greater monetary reserve in their portfolios, AB6j = AH2j (see above, par.l, and fig.2
where let (AT) be the locus of equilibrium demand for monetary capital in view of 
(S'j < D'j); then the segment BE = AB6j). Therefore, the monetary effects of official
settlements will be quite different depending on whether payments imbalances arise from
the trade side or from the financial side. Indeed, the latter is the most interesting case.
The other basic principle of open monetary economics -that a flexible exchange-
rate regime insulates the money stock from the foreign channel- has to be briefly
reconsidered too. Consider now the case of excess trade payments which are kept in
balance with excess financial receipts through movements of the exchange rate. As we
know, flow equilibrium of other sectors imply that national saving falls short of deficit
spending (for simplicity say that this happens both in the private and the public sector);
the saving gap is equivalent to foreign capital inflows, that is, foreign units are buying 
liabilities issued by domestic units up to (F^ = D 'j - S'j). The domestic monetary
circulation follows exactly the same channels as those described in previous paragraphs,
and accordingly, the final level of the money stock will depend (i) on the composition of
national saving, and (ii) on possible open-market operations of the central bank. National
saving consists of taxes and the possible uses of private savings (mainly net purchases of 
domestic assets (Sj = D 'j - T j - F j)  or bank deposits (Sj = AH2j)). The money
stock is insulated from the foreign channel to the extent that domestic householders 
wholly employ saving in domestic assets; if they instead wish to hold a greater monetary
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reserve, and the central bank interevenes to buy domestic assets, the money stock will 
result parallely increased.
All in all, in a discretionary convertible regime the monetary effects of external 
imbalances, in relation to different exchange rate regimes, are by no means mechanical or 
given once and for all. The central bank of an open economy in a world of free circulation 
of goods, assets and currencies has a limited control over the creation of money under 
whatever exchange- rate regime. The most important difference is that if the bank pegs 
the exchange rate, official settlements are equivalent to monetizations of private and 
public debt, whereas, if the exchange rate is fully flexible the bank can refrain from such 
monetizations -although it seems quite difficult to fully avoid monetization when savers 
wish to add some marginal saving to the monetary reserve.
3. The asset m arket
3.1. Again on saving and portfolio choice.
The analysis of flow equilibrium in the expanding economy of the previous 
section was based on the composition of three key decisions: investment, public deficit 
spending and saving. A fundamental distinction was drawn between saving, as a flow 
decision, and portfolio selection, as a stock decision. Contrary to neoclassical flow 
analysis, it was stated that the rate of national deficit spending is not dependent upon the 
flow of saving but upon the allocations to asset stocks. At the same time, such allocations 
also determine the evolution of the money stock in the economy. We shall now go deeper 
into the analysis of allocations to asset stocks.
The "core" asset market examined here retains the property of processing 
information efficiently, but it is endowed with incomplete information relative to the 
Arrow-Debreu requirement (on this distinction see above ch.I, sec.2; the efficient 
information hytpothesis is analyzed below, App.A.l). Three distinctive features of the 
asset market are to be explained:
(i) the set of equilibrium return rates;
(ii) diversification across assets;
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(iii) positive holdings of currency reserve.
The above three issues fall in the domain of portfolio theory. This has been one 
of the outstanding developments in modem monetary theory, becoming a cornerstone of 
Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics and even of later currents. The characterization of the 
financial economy given here (and, one would say, in Hicks's 1935 seminal ideas) 
entails some major qualifications with respect to the current uses of portfolio theory in 
macroeconomic models (see above ch.I, sec.3.3). Given a desired safety level of wealth, 
the asset holder faces a liquidity problem to the extent that he is uncertain over the 
cash flow out of wealth in the event of unexpected short-sales. We saw that such a 
problem has two fundamental characteristics:
(i) the liquidity problem is a problem of positive, finite probability of deviation from the 
expected nominal value of wealth (the asset holder has a less than asymptotic horizon);
(ii) the liquidity problem leads to a "capital-value programme" instead of a "capital- 
growth programme".
The problem sub (i) is due to the class of price-variable assets. The probability
that the market value of wealth falls short of the desired value by more than the tolerance
level increases with price variability and with the share of price-variable assets. Money is
eligible for the status of the anchor of the wealth value since it is free from capital loss.
Therefore, a capital-value programme is one which combines price-variable assets with
the monetary reserve so as to obtain the highest prospective capital value with the lowest
intrinsic capital loss. The general findings of ch.I, sec.3.3 can easily be applied to our
menu of six assets (a = 1,..., 6). Each asset pays a nominal interest rate or dividend 
( i j ,  has a market price (p J  and yields a (realized) return rate (r = i/p_  + Ap /p ). Thea  a  a  a  a  a  a
share of non-monetary assets (combined into a seventh asset, the Investment Trust with
warranted interest rate (i7) and market price (p7)) will be greater the greater is their
(expected) return rate (r7 = i7/p7) and the smaller their price variability [a7min = 1 - 
(Vp/Vp + r7)]. An important result that we obtained is that the share of monetary
reserve in the safest portfolio (number 2 in the menu, a2  = 1 - a7min) is not a matter of 
tastes, as it is instead in traditional Markowitz-Tobin capital-growth programmes; there
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must be a positive monetary reserve for the eventuality of default not to grow "almost 
sure". Given nominal interests and dividends on non-monetary assets, the price 
established by the market determines the return rate to each of them and hence the 
prospective capital value. In equilibrium, prices will be such that return rates on non­
monetary assets pay a risk premium proportional to asset-price variability and inversely 
porpordonal to the desired stock of monetary reserve [p = V p(l/a22 -1)].
The asset market considered here provides two important services for asset 
traders. On the demand side it allows asset holders to achieve the desired amount and 
composition of wealth within their accumulation programme. On the supply side, the 
asset market conveys two fundamental pieces of information to deficit-spending units: (i) 
the terms at which their outstanding liabilities are valued, (ii) the terms at which issues of 
new liabilities are acceptable. How the asset market achieves stock equilibrium will be 
analyzed in the next paragraph, while the way in which asset-market information affects 
deficit-spending decisions will be examined in the final section of this chapter. However, 
the information conveyed by the prices at which assets are accepted by the market, when 
prices (or risk premia) are set under liquidity preference, is of little guidance, if any, to 
the am ount and composition of future consumption, and hence to optimal planning of 
future production (or current investment). The service the asset market offers to asset 
traders may be efficient, whereas the one it offers to the economy as a whole is generally 
not.
3.2. Asset stock equilbrium.
We can now turn to establish asset stock equilibrium as an allocation mechanism 
governed by the foregoing principles. The stocks of non-monetary (i.e. variable-price) 
assets and of monetary reserve for any given level of wealth are determined jointly. Stock 
equilibrium is established whenever the existing stock of each asset (at the going market 
price) is equal to the desired one. Therefore asset market equilibrium can be represented 
by means of the following system:
(&) A’, W V  = AaPa, ^ a » 0 ’ W '  A'(Vpa)<0
105
(b) V a > V Pc. = A*t
where P = goods price index, L a ,  = 1, a /  a.
Cl a  a t
The endogenous variables in the system can be identified with asset prices. In
fact, given the the vector of interest rates [L] (along with expected prices and their«1
variability), demand equations 8a determine the vector of asset prices [p ]; hence the 
vector of return rates [r ] is established accordingly. The wealth constraint 8b allows forA
one degree of freedom in the solution vector: this corresponds to the price of the 
monetary reserve which is fixed at 1; thus the solution vector consists of the prices of 
non-monetary assets and the quantity of monetary reserve. It is important to bear in mind 
the two main channels through which asset prices are supposed to bring demand and 
supply into balance:
(i) an interest effect: a fall (rise) of the asset price increases (decreases) the return rate 
to the asset, and hence raises Gowers) demand;
(ii) a wealth effect: a fall (rise) of the asset price decreases (increases) the nominal 
value of the existing stock of the asset, and hence fosters (dampens) demand.
There are two widely-used synthetic representations of asset stock equilibrium 
which are worth reporting here. One shows the relationship between the monetary 
reserve in the safest portfolio and the return rate to non-monetary assets (say our 
Investment Trust). From the solution for (a7min) such a relationship must be negative in 
sign and asymptotic to (r7), since the monetary reserve can never be nil (see fig.3). Note, 
moreover, that an increase in asset price variability imposes an upward shift to the curve. 
Each point (A2, r7) on the curve represents a stock equilibrium point of the reserve, and 
correspondingly, of the Trust (A7 = A* - A2).
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Fig-3. The stock equilibrium schedule of the monetary reserve
Gearly, excess supply of non-monetary assets requires a higher return rate. It
should be noted that deficit spending units in the expanding economy are concerned with
the allocations of marginal wealth (i.e. the saving of the period AA*). In this case,
excess supply of (A7) only occurs when (AA7 > AA*a7min); therefore, the initial
portfolio share and the period saving (all other portfolio determinants being unchanged)
determine the expansion of non-monetary assets that can be accommodated without
changes in return rates. But since, at the end of period, (AA* = AA7) and (a7 < 1),
the general result will be (i) an increase in return rates and/or (ii) a central bank
14intervention as explained in section 2 .
The second standard representation of asset stock equilibrium considers the 
equilibrium schedules of non-monetary stocks one against the other. Such schedules are 
expressed in terms of asset return rates (i.e. the total differentials of equations 8a set 
equal to zero). This viewpoint is the complement to the previous one, since it 
concentrates on the return rates which are combined in the Trust (by constraint 8b, the 
remaining asset, the monetary reserve, is adjusted endogenously)^. Let us consider for 
instance the case of equities (A5) against government bonds (A3) (the two financial
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counterparts of national deficit spending) in fig.4. The two schedules (A5, A3) yield, 
given the respective stocks, the pairs (r5, r3) such that the stock is held willingly; 
movements along the schedules show the relative change in return rates (dr5/dr3) 
necessary to keep the stock unchanged. Asset stock equilibrium obtains at the intersection 
of the schedules.
Fie.4. The stock equilibrium schedules of equities against bonds___________________
The relative change in return rates basically depends on the degree of 
substitution among assets, which in turn embodies price variability^. The standard 
result is that (i) the stock equilibrium schedules between two assets, one being relatively 
more risky than the other, both display a slope greater than unity, and (ii) the schedule of 
the riskier one is flatter. In fact, supposing that A5 is riskier than A3, if r3 is rising, r5 
must rise more than r3 for asset holders not to shift from AS to A3. On the other hand, an 
inducement to increase A5 given A3 must raise r5 to a greater extent than the inducement 
to increase A3 given A5.
This latter usefully portrays the case in which one asset is being supplied out of 
portfolio balance with the other -a most likely case in the expanding economy, as 
explained previously. To allocate liabilities, both the government and investors have to
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promise higher yields or have to offer lower prices. The competition between the two 
components of national deficit spending for the share of non-monetary assets in 
households' wealth is represented in fig.4 by the relative extent of the two arrows, the 
vertical one for A5 and the horizontal one for A3; as a result, the two rates have to soar 
within the shadowed area.
The adjustment may take two main forms. To keep the analysis of this important 
point simple, let us isolate the excess supply of one single asset (say A3), the other being 
given.
The first pattern of adjustment involves prices only. Given excess supply, a 
rightward shift of A3, the new equilibrium will be at point B. Excess supply of bonds 
has been allocated by means of a higher return rate (a lower stock of monetary reserve); 
concomitantly, an inducement to shift from equities to bonds has been engendered, which 
has been nullified by the fall in equities' prices (that is a full wealth effect, since no one 
succeeds in selling equities when the market demands bonds). This is the standard 
solution in asset market theory, and is the necessary solution under the efficient 
information hypothesis (see below App.A.l), that is if
(i) asset holders have the same preferences,
(ii) information is the same for all agents, and
(iii) asset supply is fixed for whatever price (Hicks (1935, pp.77-79), Grossman-Stiglitz
(1980)).
The second pattern of adjustment comprises the possibility that quantity 
exchanges, that is to say redistribution of existing assets, actually take place. We shall see 
that this possibility, which remains almost unexplained under market efficiency, is in fact 
an extremely important aspect of asset markets. The resulting equilibrium will be at some 
point within the shadowed area, where movements of the schedules indicate effective 
trades which dampen the escalation of rates relative to the previous case.
Quite clearly, our understanding of the dynamics of asset prices and quantities 
crucially hinges on the specification of the market structure.
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3.3. Asset stock equilibrium  with foreign assets 
The extension of asset market analysis to the foreign channel deserves special 
emphasis, since the latter is such a crucial part of the open financial economy.
First of all let us single out the two key variables concerning foreign assets, the 
one-period domestic value and return rate of the stock (number 6 in our asset menu):
A*i0t6j =A 6jp6jej
i6 + p6j - p6q ej
r f j  = --------------
P60 eo
With respect to the general expressions of those variables for domestic assets, there
appears a new crucial variable: the exchange rate (e). The domestic value of the foreign
asset is obtained by applying the exchange rate to its foreign market value. The rate of
return to the foreign asset must take into account the initial conversion from domestic to 
foreign capital (A*Qa6Q/eQ) and the final reconversion from foreign capital value to the
domestic one (A6jp6jCj). Quite clearly, holding foreign assets incurs a specific source
of uncertainty due to possible changes in the exchange rate; this is usually called foreign
exchange risk. It is also clear that such a source of uncertainty has the same nature as
asset-price uncertainty, since it affects capital value in the event of unexpected short sales. 
Appreciation (a fall of the price of foreign currency, < Cq) amounts to a capital loss;
depreciation (a rise of the price of foreign currency, e^ > Cq) amounts to a capital gain.
It goes without saying that foreign exchange risk arises to the extent that exchange rates
are not perfectly fixed.
International portfolio theory has followed in the footsteps of pure portfolio
theory. Early models, and the majority of those currently in use, have been based on
17Tobinian retum-risk optimization , thus propagating that unsatisfactory mixture of 
expected utility maximization, capital growth maximization and liquidity preference. More 
recent models have in fact been founded neady on expected utility maximization, and on 
the apparently solid argument that the latter, if consumption embraces foreign goods,
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implies holdings of foreign assets .
When we looked at the key characters of the financial economy from the 
international standpoint (above, ch.I, sec.4) we concluded that there should be a 
substantial lack of information and of market general efficiency behind international 
diversification and the exchange rate as an asset price (or even as a price generally). In 
fact both phenomena could never arise unless agents made an "essential” use of money, 
that is a use intended to cope with incomplete information on all possible future states. 
The degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign assets cannot be assumed a 
p rio ri, as some sort of physical property, independently of the specification of the 
informational conditions of the market. In a perfectly informed market all assets, for the 
same date and state, would be perfect substitutes, regardless of the risk attitude of agents, 
simply because there could not be false trades. On the contrary, when the market is 
imperfectly informed, and false trades are possible, any kind of agent is far from being 
indifferent towards assets, unless these bear the same expectation of return and price 
variance for the same date -which would be rather peculiar. The inclusion of foreign 
monetary as well as non-monetary assets in the scope of portfolio choice is then 
straightforward, not because of expected utility maximization, but because of liquidity 
preference principles. As a matter of fact, those who hold foreign securities are not 
necessarily planning to buy goods on foreign markets; foreign asset diversification may 
be advisable for the mere precautionary purpose of reducing portfolio variability (Tobin
(1981), Levy-Samat (1983)). In a capital-value programme under liquidity preference, 
the status of foreign assets essentially depends on their specific price variability and on 
the exchange rate regime.
Fixed exchange rates. If exchange rates are perfectly fixed, agents are able to 
distinguish the class of foreign non-monetary (price-variable) assets from the foreign 
currency as a perfectly liquid asset (i.e. bank deposits abroad). Then, in the problem of 
the choice of the monetary reserve, the former can simply be pooled with domestic non­
monetary assets in the optimum Investment Trust (if they contribute either to raising the 
resulting yield or to lowering the price variance). Foreign currency is directly
18
I l l
substitutable with home currency; the former is worth being held to the extent that it pays
a higher interest rate. If this is the case, the foreign currency can simply be included in the
Trust as one further asset (in fact it offers a definitely positive effect by raising the
19compound yield without increasing the variance) .
What is more interesting is the direct comparison between domestic and foreign
non-monetary assets. Exchange rates being fixed, all assets are distinguishable in terms
of their own price variability. Thus the analysis of stock equilibrium between domestic
and foreign non-monetary assets runs in exactly the same way as that of stock
equilibrium between domestic ones expounded above (sec.3.2). Now let agents compare
the Domestic Trust (A7) as defined previously with a Foreign Trust (A6), an optimally
sorted bundle of foreign assets. By plotting the stock equilibrium schedules one against
the other we obtain fig.5. The two schedules are in terms of the domestic (r7) and foreign
(r6) return rate. The figure is drawn on the usual assumption that foreign assets have a
20lower degree of substitution with respect to domestic ones ; thus, if (r7) increases, (r6) 
must increase more than proportionally for asset holders to accept the existing stock (A6). 
Moreover, A6 is flatter than A7.
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Fig.5. The stock equilibrium schedules of domestic and foreign assets under 
fixed exchange rate________________________________________________________
The relative positions of the two schedules and of the two rates in fig.5 have, 
quite obviously, a counterpart in the international position of the country. Although this is 
matter of Part n , here a few basic introductory concepts are in order.
In the first place, equilibrium return rates obtain at the intersection of the two 
schedules, that is, when both stocks are willingly held at the going market prices. 
Therefore, in stock equilibrium neither domestic nor foreign units must be supplying their 
liabilities; the international capital account will then be nil along with each and all asset 
trades. If this condition holds through time the economy will be in stationary state, but 
the same condition must (ideally) hold at the end of each period, though asset demand 
and supply are allowed to change period by period (see the treatment of stock-flow 
equilibrium in ch.n above).
As in the market for domestic assets, the most important source of disturbances is
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competition among liability issuers, in this case domestic vs. foreign ones. Such 
disturbances hit the market with two well-known types of disequilibrium pairs (r6, r7). 
Those above A7 correspond to "high" return rates abroad; those below A6 correpond to 
"high” return rates at home. The former generate excess supply of (existing) domestic 
assets in order to switch to foreign ones; the latter bring about the opposite phenomenon. 
In either case, return rates must go up (prices must go down) within the shadowed area. 
Again, the adjustment may take two forms, by price, with an important qualification, or 
also by quantity.
Let us focus on excess supply of domestic assets (A7 shifts rightwards). First 
comes the canonical solution of "magnification" of return rates at unchanged stocks (a 
movement along the given schedule A6), with the "low" foreign rate chasing the "high" 
domestic one until the two converge (since the schedules are differently sloped, i.e. the 
two assets are not identical for demanders). The equilibrium level of rates will settle 
down at B. A noteworhty implication of this price adjustment is that international trade of 
existing assets will never emerge, not even as a stock adjustment phenomenon.
Moreover there is a widely-used variation on the foregoing adjustment with 
regard to the so-called "small country", a country such that
(i) domestic assets are not tradable abroad,
(ii) bids are unable to modify asset prices abroad.
Portfolio management in the small country is constrained by the straight dotted schedule 
in fig.5. When the supply of domestic assets grows as high as C, no one is able to sell 
foreign assets, while their prices (return rates) are given exogenously, then at C the stock 
and the return rate of domestic assets would disrupt portfolio balance relative to the 
foreign ones. The only stable solution is then the original level at A, or the well-known 
idea that a small country is unable to modify the domestic rates (and the composition of 
portfolios) unilaterally. Note, however, that the domestic rate of the small country need 
not be exactly equal to the foreign one (as many textbook models state); rather, the one 
must be in a relationship with the other given by asset holders portfolio choices (the diffe­
rential being imputable to a risk premium).
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In Part II we shall have to deal with less ad hoc a world where anyone has
access to world financial resources, albeit not on the same terms; in such a world
21allocations of issues of liabilities abroad must keep the center of the stage . In this 
respect, the standard modelling strategy is unsatisfactory in that (i) international asset 
trades are aggregated into changes in the country's account of "Net Foreign Assets", and
(ii) domestic asset supply is reduced to "outside assets", i.e. government bonds. On the 
contrary, it will prove to be of the utmost importance to distinguish between changes in 
assets or liabilities with foreigners; at the same time, even admitting that financing private 
deficit spending is neutral to the extent that it remains within the private sector, it cannot 
be disregarded to the extent that it involves foreign lenders (Tobin (1981, pp.121-122)). 
A rigorous procedure would require us to specify the foreigners' equilibrium schedule for 
the Domestic Trust (say AF, as the foreign holdings of A7). This is by no means an easy 
task since it entails aggregating over attitudes of asset holders dispersed worldwide (see 
e.g. Frankel (1983, 3.3.2)). Having excluded any direct connection between asset- 
holding and consumption patterns, an elementary form of the foreigners' equilibrium 
schedule should contain the same arguments as those in the residents' one. Thus, if we 
accept the traditional argument that international allocations are (subjectively) regarded as 
riskier, we obtain an upward sloping schedule, flatter than the other two, like AF in 
fig.5. Therefore part of the issue of domestic liabilities can be accommodated abroad, 
while return rates escalation will stop at a point like D. Fig.5 shows that the final 
equilibrium pair (r7, r6) will depend on (i) the share of domestically issued liabilities 
allocated abroad (the upward shift of AF), (ii) the attitude of foreigners, relative to that of 
residents, towards the home stock (A7) (i.e. the relative slopes of AF and A6). Assets 
will actually be transferred internationally, and the balance of payments will record an 
inflow of foreign capital. Furthermore, we move from one scenario where residents are 
reducing foreign assets to another where they are actually increasing external 
indebtedness; anyone sees that this fact makes substantial difference as to wealth 
distribution and the longer-run perspective of the economy.
A final remark. We know from sec.2 that under fixed exchange rates the central
115
bank is forced to "monetize" external imbalances originating from placements of domestic 
liabilities abroad. That is, the central bank's clearing operations (in our example 
purchases of foreign assets from the domestic private sector) will work in exactly the 
same way as the surge of demand of foreigners for domestic assets.
Flexible exchange rates. The first considerable consequence of the exchange 
rate liability to change is that foreign assets, vis a vis with domestic ones, bear a further 
specific source of price variability. This specificity shifts them definitely towards the far 
end of the liquidity spectrum. Parallely, the foreign currency ceases to be perfectly 
substitutable with the domestic one in the role of reserve; in spite of its perfect liquidity 
on the foreign asset market, the foreign currency is perceived as a true price-variable asset 
by home agents. To the extent that foreign assets are included in the Trust optimally, that 
is after exchangerate variability has been discounted, the problem of the choice of the 
domestic monetary reserve is not essentially modified (see e.g. Levy-Samat (1983)); 
once again we can concentrate on the comparison between domestic and foreign non­
monetary assets; analysis will be kept at an introductory level for further use in Part n.
Let us begin by going back to the definition of the one-period value and return
rate of the stock of foreign assets. Since the capital-value programme is one which is 
centered on the probability [e j - E(e) = 0] for an expected exchange rate [E(e) = Cq],
we see that, unlike the asset's own price, the purchasing exchange rate does not affect the 
return rate of the asset The channel through which the going exchange rate affects the 
demand for foreign assets is the market value of the stock; in fact I wrote
(9) A*j0t6j = A 6jp6jej, or
ej = A*j0c6j/A6|p6j
Thus, formally, e instead of p6 is usually included in the solution vector of the asset-
22market equations 8 . That is to say, according to the well-known aphorism, "the
exchange rate is an asset price", the price at which the stock of domestic assets is 
willingly held in relation to the stock of foreign assets.
To see this in detail, it is sufficient to redraw fig.5 by expressing the stock
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equilibrium schedules (A6, A7) in terms of (e, r7) (see fig.6, and Branson 
(1977, pp.72-73)). The analytics are exactly the same; the two schedules are now 
negadvely sloped because changes in (r7) must now be offset by wealth effects due to the 
exchange rate. The relative slope of the two schedules derives from the fact that A6 is 
ranked riskier than A7. Thus, as the home economy expands (rightward displacements of 
A7), r7 rises, e must fall to reduce the market value of the foreign asset stock as much as 
necessary to dampen the incentive to switch from A6 to A7. This happens as asset 
holders try to sell foreign assets thereby pushing the exchange rate down.
Fig.6. The stock equilibrium schedules of domestic and foreign assets under 
flexible exchange rate______________________________________________________
The process just described has attracted the greatest attention in both theoretical 
and applied developments of portfolio theory in the present era of floating rates. Even at 
first glance, such a process reveals a number of strong assumptions and limitations which 
will be discussed in due time. Just as an introductory remark I wish to remind that 
movements along the schedules imply that the adjustment process is borne by prices 
alone, with no trades of existing assets. This is generally accepted as a corollary to the 
assumption of "small country", despite having little to do with the international size of the
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economy. Within such a traditional taxonomy, it is usually concluded that the most 
important difference deriving from a flexible exchange rate concerns the small country; 
for adjustment of the exchange rate, in the place of foreign asset prices and rates that are 
given exogenously, re-establishes full autonomy of domestic-units' portfolio policy.
However, under floating rates, no less than under fixed rates, external placements 
of liabilities are of paramount importance in the present analysis. Expliciting the 
foreigners' equilibrium schedule of the stock of home assets (AF, i.e. the foreign 
holdings of A7), as suggested in the previous paragraph, changes the picture. If 
foreigners regard the home stock as riskier than home residents do and still buy a share of 
the increase in the home stock, then the exchange rate will appreciate while the domestic 
return rate will rise by less than it does in the "small-country" case. Moreover, what is 
more important in a loger-run perspective, the distribution of wealth is crucially different, 
since the exchange rate appreciates, not because residents are selling assets, but because 
they become indebted.
4. The goods markets, quantities and prices.
4.1. The demand for consumption goods. Private and public 
components.
As sec.l of this chapter showed, macroeconomic flow equilibrium depends
(i) on the conditions of money and asset markets (ii) on the (correct anticipation of) 
conditions of the goods markets. The previous three sections mainly analyzed the markets 
for money and assets. In essence, the former determines the discount rate at which 
production units can obtain monetary capital to start off current production; the latter 
determines the prices at which deficit spending units can raise financial means on a debt 
or equity basis. Asset prices are a fundamental bit of information in the decision proces­
ses leading to so-called "exogenous expenditures", namely investment and, albeit to a 
more limited extent, government deficit spending. On the other hand, the discount rate 
enters firms' costs and hence their supply function.
Therefore, we have now to focus on pan (ii) of the problem. This part comprises
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a number of crucial issues in macroeconomic theory, which are mostly still hottly debated 
and which will, by necessity, reduced to few essential models. In particular, we shall 
begin with modelling consumption and investment decisions, passing then to production 
and pricing decisions, and ending up with the basic analytics of GDP determination as 
macroeconomic flow equilibrium.
Demand for consumption goods is a traditional starting point in macroeconomic 
theory. Beyond time-honoured considerations on the "consumer sovereignty", 
consumption decisions in the economy represent a basic input to firms' production and 
investment plans. We need first of all to frame consumption decisions into the 
characteristics of the financial economy.
In a workable sequential setting, individual consumption plans can be constrained 
within one single period, so that they can be fulfilled by the output of the same period (or 
current production). The consumer’s attitude towards future consumption is embodied in 
his saving decision for the same current period. Ch.I, sec.3, gave detailed explanation of 
why the consumer’s time attitude cannot be derived consistently from intertemporal utility 
maximization, but from a precautionary accumulation programme. In a very simplified 
form we can re-write:
(9) Ey = Ec + [A* - (Zj. jS t_ j/Pct)] + u /Pct for each period t
E = expected disposable income (real), E = normal desired consumption (real), A* = y c
desired level of wealth (real), -  period saving (nominal), u{ = unexpected shocks 
(nominal).
Unexpected shocks (u ) may equally impinge on current income (Y = P_tE -I i ci y
uf) or on current consumption outlets (Ct = PctEc + ut)- The consumer’s aim is to have 
enough wealth as to meet such eventualities as (Ct > PctEc) ct (Yj < Pc{Ey) without 
curtailing E or resorting to borrowing (which is quite a different matter from committing
v
himself to consuming specified goods in specified future states). The term in parentheses
23yields the period rate of saving in the accumulation programme .
As far as macroeconomic flow equilibrium is concerned, the important point is the
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consumption-saving pattern within the time horizon of the accumulation programme. To
keep the point as simple as possible, notice that the accumulation programme (in real 
terms) is based on a wealth-income norm (E^/A* = a) and a wealth-consumpdon norm
(Ec/A* = y), where normally (0 < y  < a  < l ) 24. As long as the desired wealth
amounts to multiples of income flows and consumption outlets, the basic accumulation 
programme will be
S*t/P ct = A*(a  *
The corresponding average propensities to save and consume will be, 
respectively,
s = S*t/PctEy = 1 - y/o, c = Ec/Ey = yto
25The following saving-consumption norm is also implied (S*t/PctEc= o /y -1) .
The above relations assure us that a stable consumption-saving pattern can be
detected under households' precautionary behaviour. The next step is examination of
m arginal propensities to save and consume, that is, the adjustment in actual
consumption and saving as the period income changes. It is now customary to 
distinguish between a temporary shock (i.e. u{ = 0) and a permanent shock leading to a
revision of Ey. This distinction is undoubtedly important, but as one moves towards the
macro level its importance loses considerable force; one is only interested in incomes
changes that spread through markets, and when this happens, the chance of facing an
individual random shock (or the chance of mistaking a random for a permanent change) is
extremely low (Leijonhufvud (1969, ch. VII)). As a matter of fact, industrial economies
bear no evidence of insensitivity of consumption over the business cycle (Okun
(1981, ch.V), Greenwald-Stiglitz (1988)). In the precautionary decision model, marginal
propensities are stable and coincide with average ones in so far as households have no
reason to revise their desired wealth, that is, until they also perceive greater variability 
of future prospects. A fall in income translated into a lower (Ey, cet.par. a smaller s)
works as a parallel displacement of the income constraint 17, given A* (see also
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ch.I, fig.l); this should lead to a "Keynesian" proportional fall in normal consumption
. • 26 and saving .
We have so far considered constant prices. Clearly, price changes in 9 make the
income constraint rotate; for instance, inflation makes it flatter and gives rise to effects
qualitatively similar to a fall of E . A once and for all step-up in the price level (P_J,y ct
however, appears a bit more complicated phenomenon. For now the consumer is likely to
desire more nominal wealth; by combining a fall in purchasing power with a higher
accumulation programme the correct response should be a stronger cut in real
consumption in favour of greater nominal saving, that is, a rise in the marginal propensity
27to save .
The foregoing considerations can be synthetized into the following general 
expression of the demand for consumption goods (nominal and real):
(10) Ct = PctQct<yv Pct, At) Q’(Y)>0, Q’(Pc)<0, Q'(A)>0
where, generally, changes in income operate at constant propensities while prices and
wealth operate through changes in propensities. The above specification is open to two
important qualifications which will now be only outlined.
The first qualification regards the composition of consumption. Qc{ (as well as
P ) refer to a basket of goods. The amount of nominal consumption allotted to eachvl
period within the consumer's accumulation programme represents a budget constraint; the
composition of the basket of goods purchased is clearly a matter of relative prices. For
our purposes, the most important difference among the goods in the basket is the one
between domestic and foreign goods. Household consumption is one source of
imports from abroad (see ch.n, sec. 1.2). The relative price ruling the relative weight of
domestic and foreign goods in the consumption basket is the so-called real exchange 
ra te  Pm( = foreign price index, pd. = domestic price index). Parallely, the
consumer price index will be defined as (P„. = 0) e .P _ . + c o . P a > . + co = 1). On r  ' ct m t mt d dt d m
the other hand, the real exchange rate will produce reciprocal effects on foreign demand 
for domestic goods. As usual in demand theory, it will be useful, but not always safe, to
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keep income effects distinct from relative-price effects. An income variation transmitted to
the consumption budget will impinge on domestic and foreign goods proportionally. But,
for instance, changes in the exchange rate will affect directly both the relative price of
foreign goods, and hence their share in the basket, and the consumer price index, and
hence consumers' general purchasing power. For instance, from the above discussion of
the effects of higher consumer prices, it follows that we should expect Laursen-Metzler 
effects of nominal devaluation; in fact, as e rises, P also rises, and hence consumersI vl
should display both greater marginal imports and marginal savings.
The second qualification of the consumption function has to take into account 
fiscal policy. We shall consider the government in its very basic functions of public 
consumer and transferor (see ch.II, sec.2.1). Therefore, the channels through which 
fiscal policy affects consumption-goods demand can be deduced from the government 
budget constraint in each period;
(11) Gt + (H3t + F3t + B3t)i3t - Tf = A(H3( + F3t + B3t)
Public expenditure (G{) is a net addition to (nominal) demand 18. Interests payments on 
the outstanding internal debt (H3{i3t) are a positive transfer to households, the tax 
revenue (X{) is a negative transfer. For simplicity it is convenient to keep interest
payments in the background as a component of consumers' accumulation programme; the 
tax revenue instead directly hits personal incomes (Yt), and hence the period consumption
budget. (F3ti3t) are transfers abroad. Imbalances between expenditure and net transfers
are reflected into changes in the public debt (#A3) financed by households, foreigners or
the central bank. The right-hand side of 11 thus creates an intertemporal accelerator of the 
public deficit; a constant primary deficit (Gt - Tt) feeds period-by-period growth of the
overall deficit by (AA3ti3t). This phenomenon, in the precautionary model, could have a
direct impact on private consumption to the extent that consumers' accumulation
28programmes were modified
On the other hand, the government may have not a flow but a stock target; in this 
case, the primary deficit will be constrained, given each period interests payments, and so
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will consumption demand either via or via Tj. Since the interest rate on bonds is one
of the determinants of interests payments, here is one important way in which asset- 
market conditions may affect fiscal policy and its impact on demand.
5.2. The dem and for capital goods.
The essential micro- and macro-characteristics of investment in the financial 
economy have already been set out in previous parts of this work. In ch.I, sec.3, and 
ch.n, sec.4, it was shown why investment and saving are to be regarded as two distinct 
decisions, conveniently attributed to different decision units (the investing firm and the 
saving household), which pose a crucial intertemporal coordination problem for the 
economy. Again, in ch.I, sec.3, and ch.m, secs.2-3 it was stressed that the arena of the 
coordination problem is not that of expenditure-saving flows, but that of asset stocks. We 
also concluded that, because of incomplete information, the problem is scarcely alleviated 
even by an asset market in which prices were set efficiently. Here, specification of the 
investment function will be on the conventional "net present value" (NPV) basis. Onto 
this kernel of the investment function it is relatively simple to graft the elements of 
uncertainty and precaution surrounding the investors' decision, thus pointing out the 
forces whereby asset-market conditions can impinge onto the level of investment in the 
economy.
The fundamental force driving the enlargement of production capacity today is the
expectation of the profit streams from sales in the future. Therefore, the investor in a
specific capital good enters a future long position in that specific good obtained from that
specific process. In the absence of complete future markets such a position is taken or
refused on the basis of a rational calculus based on indirect market signals; as such,
market signals are surrounded by uncertainty. The well-known basic elements in the 
investor's decision model are the expected stream of (gross) profits [EiR’^ ) = E^], a
discount factor (¡t), and the price of the capital good (P ^ ). Uncertainty can be
concentrated in the profit expectation, which requires the investor to forecast future
output prices, quantities, and input costs; consequently, he will perceive a given 
dispersion of possible profits [V(R’^ ) = V^]. Let actual profits in any future period be
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[R'j^. = + ut„ ut, i.i.d. N(0, Vu)]. NPV of the project (k) of life T is
NPV = I t.R’kt./(l + i /  t’ = t+l,...,T
taking the expected present value of the projetc (and recalling that £^(1/1 + it ) -> 1/i 
for t' -> <*>) we obtain (Ej^/ip. The profitability condition of the project is that the
expected present value at least covers the cost,
EPV= Ek^«a p k.
Now, since (r'^ = E^/P^) is the rate of profit on the capital good k, the profitability 
condition also implies that (r'^ ¡> ip, i.e. that the rate of profit be at least equal to the
discount rate. So far I have simply refreshed well-known elements in investment theory,
which, as such, are common to all schools. It is generally agreed that the profitability of
an investment project is inversely related to the discount rate and to the capital-good price.
However, much more must be said when investment uncertainty and asset-market
liquidity preference are explictly brought into analysis.
Equity-constrained investment. What is the appropriate discount rate of the
project? Or, does investment finance make any difference in the demand for capital
goods? The answer of the neoclassical tradition (the Modigliani-Miller theorem, see also
above ch.I, sec. 1.3) to the latter question is no, so that the former question is redundant
-there is only one discount rate on the market. As a further consequence any profitable
project is virtually unconstrained up to the point where the profitability condition is
equalized. It is now well understood that those answers hold if the asset market is
embedded in a perfectly informed economy with market general efficiency; but then the
asset market would be redundant with respect to complete future contingent contracts.
By contrast, consider first equity finance under asset holders' incomplete
information and liquidity preference. Remember from sec.3 above that equities are
expected to pay a nominal dividend i5 and are quoted at pS, thus yielding a return rate
(regardless of capital gains) (r5 = i5/p5). Admit that, as a rule, equities are floated at a 
price equal to the expected present value of the project (p5q = Ej^yi); evidently, (i = r5)
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and (r'j£ = r5) only if (p5 = p5q, i5 = E^), that is to say, only if shareholders hold the
same probability distribution of profits as the investor's, and equities are sold at the
floating price. Even if one accepts the former condition (a quite generous extension of the
efficient information hypothesis), one cannot neglect that shareholders face a specific
liquidity risk due to equity price variability; they will demand an additional risk premium 
such that (p5/p5Q < 1) If this happens, then equity finance entails a cut in the
profitability of the project. Since the value of the emission falls to (EPVpS), there exists a 
well-defined interval of the equity price (P^/EPV < p5 < 1) below which the project
cannot be financed on the equity market. It is to be stressed that the above argument does
not describe the usual downward slide along the schedule of the marginal efficiency of
investment as "the" interest rate is rising (or Tobin's "q" is falling); it depicts an asset-
market equilibrium situation where a certain class of investments is "equity constrained"
30(or, if one likes, a discontinuity in the investment function) .
The p recau tionary  behaviour of the investor. The existence of a
constraint to investment finance on the equity market yields a solid rationale for the
31opening of an alternative market; the m arket for debentures . For obvious reasons, 
the new market is viable to the extent that finance suppliers demand a risk premium at 
least lower than households do. This goal is usually accomplished with the help of 
specialized funding institutions which, in our simplified economy, are represented by the 
long-term window of the central bank (above, ch.II, sec.2.1). It makes the analysis 
more definite and fruitful to assume that all investment is normally financed by long-term 
debt, while the equity market is asked to finance the redemption of the outstanding 
debt32.
This new pattern of investment finance introduces a major modification in the 
investor's decision model. On the one hand he is certain of the cost of finance (or the 
discount rate of the project); on the other, he commits himself to repaying the principal
and interests at a specified date. He (with the bank) faces the unfavourable eventuality 
that, at the due time (say t’ = t+1), [R'^ , < P^t(l + i4)]. Such an event can be trans­
lated into a probability of default by noting that, if the project is valued correctly, then in
125
t' [Pjjjíl + i4) = E jJ; hence PrCR'^. - E^) is the usual fallibility measure in the 
probability distribution (E^, V^); given a tolerance parameter, the present value of the
investor s net worth being the most widely used, the probability of default is then
(12) Pr(R’kt, - Ek < A/(l + i4)) < Vfc(l + i4)2/A*
33The probability of default grows with the interest rate i4 and shrinks with the
"collateral" (A); these are well-known results in the new theories of capital markets under
34imperfect information . Technically, the investor’s decision is similar to the asset- 
holder’s (above, ch.I, sec.3.3). Given the parameters (E^, V^) for unit of capital, the
scale of investment is constrained by the capability to withstand the intrinsic loss at stake. 
There will be an investment/collateral ratio where the difference between EPV and 
intrinsic loss of the project is maximal. The market value of the collateral at the time the 
project is being financed sets an upper limit on the scale of investment. On the other 
hand, higher interest rates or greater prospective variability of profits raise the probability 
of default and should lead to a reduction in the scale of investment. Combining the 
determinants of EPV and of the probability of default we may write the following general 
specification of the investment function:
< 1 3 > ^ W % v k - p k . - i 4 . A >
Q'(Ek)X), Q’(Vk)<0, Q’(Pk)<0, Q'(i4)<0, Q'(A)>0.
A final comment on the investment function and the asset market On the financial 
side, the crucial arguments of equation 13 are (i4t> A{). The former is established by
demand and supply of long-term debt, essentially outside the canonical equity market In 
this way the long-term interest rate plays a direct role in the investment function, perhaps 
a more meaningful role than in the textbook Keynesian function. However, since i4 
affects the probability of default, there will be an upper limit to debt-financed investment, 
though plausibly higher than the one constraining equity- financed investment Is there 
anything left for the equity market to do? "The daily revaluations of the Stock Exchange, 
though they are primarily made to facilitate transfers of old investments between one
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individual and another, inevitably exert a decisive influence on the rate of current
investment" (Keynes (1936, p. 151)). In equation 13 the channel through which the
equity market conditions investment is mainly A, through the provision of fresh capital
and the valuation of the existing one; but this is an indirect channel, not the exclusive one
35it happens to be in efficient portfolio theories . By indirect channel I do not mean weak;
I mean that it concurs with alternative financial channels. This consideration casts a 
different light on the international enlargement and integration of capital markets. To the 
extent that equity prices across world markets are not perfectly correlated, and that long­
term interest rates are not perfectly equalized either, the demand for investment finance 
may profitably cross the boundaries in the search for less stringent equity constraints or 
less tight interest rates. One important reason for openening capital markets seems to 
spring from their being imperfect As will be seen, open, imperfect capital markets, with 
their effects on expenditure decisions, offer an important contribution to explanation of 
the performance of the open financial economy.
5.3. Production and pricing.
This section addresses the modelling of output and price determination. No 
doubt this is one of the most challenging issues in the research on the microfoundations 
of macroeconomics. While leaving many controversial issues in the background, this 
section extends the sequential approach to the firm's decisions as to the quantity and price 
of output; this immediately entails substantial departure from the traditional theory of 
perfect competition. As was recognized a long time ago, in an economy of sequential 
decisions unassisted by tatonnement or an auctioneer "there exists a logical gap in the 
usual formulations of the theory of the perfectly competitive economy, namely, that there 
is no place for a rational decision with respect to prices as there is with respect to 
quantities" (Arrow (1959, p.380)).
Here the treatment of the problem will be in the line of recent approaches whose most 
interesting trait is the abandonment of competition as optimal choice dictated by given 
parametric signals towards analysis of firm's genuine decisions within a process of 
production, pricing, sale and consumers' shopping .
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The environment of the price maker is notably more complicated than that of the 
price taker. Wc shall consider an industry of J "small" firms producing a homogeneous 
product. From the firm's point of view a sequence of decisions may be devised and 
defined "the production period". Given fixed capital and the related productive capacity, 
the production period divides into three stages: (i) production planning and employment 
of factors, (ii) production and pricing, (iii) sale of output. Let us begin with the stage of 
production planning. The budget constraint of the firms was introduced in 
ch.II, sec.2.1. The firm purchases factors at the beginning of period on the basis of: (i) 
the actual prices of factors, and (ii) the expected demand at the end of the production 
period. Given technology, (i)-(ii) together should determine the production scale and the 
unit supply price. Output is then sent to the market. The firm's flow equilibrium requires
(iii) expected proceeds to be equal to actual proceeds; actual proceeds are then wholly 
distributed to factors. The firm's objective is to maximize expected one-period profits. 
The critical step is clearly (ii), which involves a problem of expectations formation.
In the first place, following ch.I, I assume that entrepreneurs have incomplete
knowledge and information, that is, they do not base their forecasts on "the" fully
specified structural model of the economy, but on the reduced form of their own product
37market We shall see how they can obtain probabilistically correct demand forecasts .
Equations 14 describe the basic elements in firm's j  individual plan of production 
for any one good (the good's subscript is omitted): (a) is the input-output function for 
each variable factor h, (b) is the total cost function, (c) is the market demand function, (d) 
is the equilibrium condition in the market
price, u = vector of exogenous variables of demand; (0) = planned (beginning of
(14a) Nhj0 = Nh(qj0) N'h(q)>0
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period) variables, (1) = realized (end of period) variables.
The specification of the individual firm's plan highlights the first important point. 
At the stage of planning (14a-b), neither the equilibrium price nor the equilibrium quantity 
(14c-d) can be "taken" from the market. The profit-maximizing firm should set output to 
equate the marginal cost (MC) with the expected marginal revenue (EMR). How is the 
latter obtained?.
The firm's decision has to be based on its information set and the relavant market 
signals. The former, broadly speaking, contains knowledge of the market structure; there 
are firm-specific elements as well as elements of common knowledge. In a competitive 
market, for instance, it seems correct to assume that:
(i) Market conditions in general are common knowledge and the same for all competitors 
in the same industry (D_t, P_{, N(.), Wq; for all -t<0). Let the market demand function be
of the CES type and the production function be represented by a vector of inputs [n] for 
each level of output [wq] is the vector of unit factor costs.
(ii) Production decisions and errors are firm-specific (qj t, pj_t, Zj_t, qjQ, p^).
That is to say, competitors know the market but do not know each other. At the same
time, assumption (i) can be regarded as a barrier to entry in the short run.
It is rational for competitors to use all common information they have access to
plus all private information. Preliminarily, consider the log-linear specification of the
market demand function,
Dt = a - bPt + ut
define, for all past (-t < 0), P_{ as the price such that realized sales (S_{) are equal to 
demand,
W - s ,
and define individual realized sales as the difference between output and a stochastic error
5j->= V zj-i 311 j
Then by simple substitutions we can say that each supplier has experienced that
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normal random variables i.i.d. with zero mean.
38In words, firms face both parametric and strategic uncertainty . In fact, in each period
each firm experiences output decision errors; these errors are assumed to be randomly
distributed among all firms and show up in a random error in aggregate supply.
According to our informational assumptions, the j-firm is unable to specify equation IS in
disaggregate form; it rather perceives its sales as residual, given market demand, non-j
firms aggregate output and its own specific output error. Let us concede that repeated 
occuiTences of 15 make up a stationary stochastic process of the form {Sj t(P t> Qj t> z-_
t)}; hence, if no one makes systematic errors, each competitor can obtain the correct
estimation of eq. 15. Therefore the decision problem of the profit-maximizing firm can be 
represented by two equations in two variables -planned output [qjQ = E.(s.)l and
This expression for EMR makes the crucial point. Rational, competitive price-making
(Arrow (1959)). The correct specification of EMR would require each competitor to 
know at the stage of planning how all other competitors would alter their plans as
Is there a conjecture that is logically consistent with the informational structure of
supply price [pjQ ■ Ej(P)]
(16)
inevitably involves a degree of strategic uncertainty, represented by the parameter Ojq
he alters his own. As has been aptly noted, Ojq is conjectural and there is no unique
40"true" value given by the market (Pesaran (1987, pp.54-55)) .
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a competitive market? According to the informational assumptions (i)-(ii) it would seem
plausible for each firm to conjecture that its own production plans are not observable and
are not influential on other firms' production plans, or to select a Cournot-Nash
41conjecture (Ojq = 0) .
If the above is true, under the traditional competitive assumption that market
shares are all equally small, given the number of firms (J), it follows that j perceives 
[Ej(Qj) = Ej(D)(J-l/J), and hence qjQ = Ej(D)/J]. This implication of the Coumot-Nash
conjecture is important because j's output forecast porblcm is thus reduced to the forecast 
of the market demand as a whole, regardless of non-j's output decisions. If all firms 
adhere to the same conjecture, the correct pricing policy for all is
(17) EMR = MC
PjO - Ej<D>/bJ -  wo" jO
Pj 0 ( l  - 1/bJ) = w0n 'j0
PjO = w0" V j  
p g - i y i ^ l
where wQn'j0 is the marginal cost of producing qjQ out of Ej(D). We have thus reached
the well-known pricing equation of monopolistic competition, bj being equivalent to an
individual demand elasticity at the point qjQ. Since the CES demand function is
assumed, it also follows that (b- = bJ and cr. = a) for all firms and for any quantity 
42supplied . All values (I b 1 > 1) that yield (Pjq > 0) also imply that (p. > 1) or that the
price is set above the marginal cost
It should be noted that here m emerges not from product, but from information
43specificity combined with output-price "trials and errors" . In fact, demand forecast 
errors manifest themselves at the time output has to be sold (the end of the production 
period) in the form of a price scatter, individual supply prices can only differ if firms bear 
different marginal costs, that is, if they have different production plans. As Arrow 
pointed out, if each firm's market information is incomplete, the missing information 
being other firms' plans, then, until market equilibrium is established, the single firm will
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not experience an individual demand infinitely elasdc at the price it has set, unless it is the
sole outlier. However small the market share, the single firm will experience a definite 
relationship in the sale process between quantity sold (dSj/dqjQ) and sale price (dpj/dpjQ)
such as to reveal the elasticity of market demand (see also Rotschild (1973, sec.II-III)). 
Consequently, "as has been understood since the days of Cournot and emphasized in 
more recent times by Chamberlin and Joan Robinson, the competitive firm is a 
monopolist with a special environment" (Arrow (1959, pp.383-384)). I wish to stress 
that the result obtained here is common to a whole class of firm's decision models 
showing that demand uncertainty in an otherwise competitive market will itself give firms 
the power to set prices, and that such prices will generally be higher than marginal costs 
(see again Rotschild (1973)). Since this kind of market power does not spring from 
traditional sources of imperfect competition (product differentiation or "small" number of 
firms in the industry), the market could still be defined "competitive", albeit imperfectly 
so. Interestingly, this view of competition, if not the analytical apparatus, is akin to the 
one Kahn called "polypoly" at the time of the Cambridge debate (1929, ch.I). This 
term seems quite appropriate to define such a situation where a competitive firm enjoys 
some market power left over by other firms' forecast errors; if all firms are fallible, which 
seems quite reasonable, market power over "small" market shares becomes pervasive.
A digression on fu rther aspects of price-making. The measure of each 
competitor's market power [Ej(D)/bJ] is stable and reliable in forecasting demand in so
far as all other competitors' behaviour, and notably market shares, are stable. This is a 
typical problem of composition of rational decision models with a strategic conjectural 
component; the resulting decision is the correct one in so far as nobody deviates (Hahn 
(1989)). Here we-cannot go deeper into this point; if only a broad observation is 
permitted, one would say that structural stability, which is the crucial factor to mutually 
successful decision making, is like a public good which requires each market participant 
to move with the market, not against i t  This situation, which seems closely akin to the 
perception of competition by businessmen, engenders strong inhibitions against indvidual 
moves to exploit the market, the most remarkable case being the use of the price to clear
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the market
An instance of this is the following. Since in the present model all firms make use
of the correct forecast equation 15 and follow the same pricing rule, it turns out that 
[Pj = E(Pjq), j = 1...J], that is to say, price decisions are on the average (cross-section
and through-time) correct so that aggregate supply will be sold at an average price greater 
than marginal costs. Put differently, Pj is the price a consumer may pay with the highest
probability. Whether the price scatter will eventually collapse onto a single market price is
entirely an open question, whose answer is highly sensitive to the behavioural and
informational characteristics of the search-arbitrage process on the part of consumers
(Rotschild (1973)). We have by now an abundant and well-founded literature which
shows that cost- based pricing with quantity adjustments, instead of full price market
clearing, emerge as a rational response to the "odds of the market" among competitors
with insufficient strategic information facing consumers with incomplete information and
44costs of search .
There is another important reason why full price adjustments may be unprofitable, 
a reason which relates to the financial position of the firm. Any firm has normally to 
serve some debt out of cument proceeds, whether the short-term bank discount for 
current production or the long-term investment debt; as we know, the flow equilibrium of 
the firm requires it to sell the planned quantity on the marginal cost schedule, whereas 
full price correction of errors imposes onto it to sell off the marginal cost schedule. As a 
consequence of excess supply cleared by price reduction at the market place, the flow of 
proceeds would fall short of the expected level; some factor (presumably the physical or 
monetary capital factor) could not be paid as expected. The possibility of a fixprice policy 
emerges with a clear financial component; stocked unsold output is recorded as a firm's 
asset vis & vis an equivalent outstanding debt (say unrepaid monetary capital to the 
bank). Creditors may accept a longer asset-liability balance against a certain cut in capital 
income. In a forward-looking perspective, the present value of this asset does not fall in 
so far as the discount rate does not rise and the selling price will not fall in the future 
e ither^ .
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Variable costs, mark-ups, and the price-quantity trade off. The
optimal pricing rule 17 is equivalent to marking-up variable costs. Moreover m is not
arbitrary, but is dictated by (experienced) market conditions, in the particular sense
intended above. In this sense, it rationalizes the feeling among businessmen that the
mark-up they charge is consistent with the existing market shares. On the other hand, the
common use of variable costs, to the extent that a competitive market actually equalizes
46them, reduces strategic uncertainty in each firm's policy
Unit variable costs are given by the sum of the costs of the marginal input of each
variable factor. Total variable costs are obtained by applying the scale of production. An
important aspect of variable costs in the financial economy is that they arc raised through
the bank discount window (above, ch.II, sec.2.1, ch.m, sec. 1.1). The discount rate is
thus a factor cost itself, and the flow of proceeds must pay for all factors; the vector of
factor prices becomes [w(l + il)].
If the firm is to draw up a consistent plan, it must know the vector of factor costs.
As a first approximation, one should think of the firm as price maker on the goods
markets and quantity maker on the factor markets; factor prices are thus determined by the
supply side of the market (Hart (1982)). For the purposes of this work we need not
model factor markets explicitly; we may limit ourselves to taking factor prices as given in
any production plan. Let factor contracts be struck at the beginning of period for at least
one period. The single firm has now enough information to draw a MC schedule and a 
EMR schedule for different output levels. The plan qjQ is chosen at the intersection of the
two schedules. Given the technology and a stable market structure, the impact of antici­
pated demand on the supply price is compellingly positive only if the technology requires 
increasing marginal inputs, or if factor prices have been changed procyclically; in this 
case the trade-off between price and quantity is given by the slope of EMR. It seems 
more sensible, however, to model an industrial sector in which variable costs are based
on constant average productivity, the real labour cost is stable, while both nominal labour
47cost and output prices are (sluggishly) procyclical .
Given these specifications, the plan of the competitive firm facing an expected
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increase in market demand is drawn in fig-7 in the (pj, qj) space. For any given expected
demand schedule ED, output expansion is constrained by a downward sloping EMR; 
given the market mark-up parameter (m) the supply price is governed by MC, which is 
constant (equal to average variable costs). As a result, the increase in output from A to B 
can be supplied at a constant price up to a change in unit factor costs. The trade-off 
between price and quantity, for any given level of demand, is given by the slope of EMR.
Fig.7. The production plan of polvpolvstic firm_________________________________
On the other hand, factor prices (say the wage rate) do not affect employment directly,
either in nominal or real terms, but only indirectly through the price effect on expected
48demand discounted by the firm . As has been repeatedly argued in the Keynesian view, 
when some workers are not hired at the going wage rate, "the problem is not that the real 
wage is too high; it is that the demand for output is too low" (Okun (1981, p.20)).
4.4. Gross Domestic P roduct and macroeconomic equilibrium  
In contrast with current macroeconomic theory, the present framework does not 
admit macroeconomic equilibrium as the solution of the optimization problem of a 
representative agent. As was widely discussed in ch. II, macroeconomic equilibrium 
should instead emerge through market coordination among different choices made by 
different agents using limited information relevant to their own markets. GDP springs 
from basically two output markets which serve two crucially different purposes -
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consumption and investment. The modelling strategy expounded in this section can be
summarized as follows.
In our consumption function there appeared factor incomes (Y), consumption 
prices (P ) and wealth (A). As long as goods prices do not change, the crucial
V
determinant of consumption is factor incomes. Income changes should affect
consumption at constant propensities, and if such changes are random, marginal
propensities should coincide with average ones. Wealth effects should be positive, since
they allow the consumer to shift onto a higher consumption path in his precautionary
accumulation programme. As to investment, this was found to depend on the parameters 
of the probability distribution of future returns to the capital good (E^, V^), on its
current price (P^) a discount factor (i^) and wealth (A). In the absence of price effects,
the traditional interest effect on investment predominates only if it is jointly assumed that
the probability distribution of future returns is stationary, and that positive wealth effects
on the probability of default do not predominate themselves. We may admit the former
condition, but we shall have to pay attention to the latter. For simplicity, r7 (the return
rate to the domestic composite asset) can be taken as the investment discount factor. GDP
at the current prices should be equal to factor incomes. In conclusion we may write the
49following functions :
<>*> Pc O ° c O 'PcO(3cl(Pc’ Y- A) Q c(Pc)<0,0<Q C(Y)<1, Q c(A)>0
<19> PkO°kO -  PkOQkl(fV r • A> Q'k(Pk)<0- <?k<r )<0- Q'k<A>>0
<20> Yl - PcO<3c I +Pk(Ad
The markets for consumption and investment goods might be regarded as two
industries with a large population of polypolystic firms as those described in par.3. The
two industries as a whole are linked by a crucial asymmetric externality to the extent that
consumption demand depends directly on factor incomes, and hence on incomes in the
investment industry, whereas investment demand does not. Given independent 
production plans by the single firms in the two industries (PjgQ. q ^ I  P ^ q. q ^ )*  there
exists one single value of factor incomes which satisfies macroeconomic flow equilibrium
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20; this will be, as in Keynesian theory, a multiple of planned investment value over the
share of factor incomes not spent on consumption (Hart (1982), Solow (1986)). In fact,
if c is the consumption-income norm (see above, par.l), the consumption industry as a 
whole cannot expect to sell more than ic(Pc()Qc i + ^fcO^kl^ and hence to produce
more than [(c/l-cX P^o/P^Q ^]. It follows from 20 that 
(21) Y p d / l - O P ^ j
Two observations are in order. The first is that each single firm in the 
consumption industry is so small that it should take the income component of demand as 
given (Hart (1982); there is no difficulty in identifying income effects as the scale 
component (a) in the log-linear demand equation IS). Put differently, if knowledge and 
information are limited to their own product markets, firms will hardly be able to discount 
the macroeconomic externality at the individual planning stage; rather, macroeconomic 
equilibrium will be established through mostly unanticipated demand surprises due to 
income effects, to which workers and firms will respond via short-run quantity 
adjustments (see above, par.3). The second observation is that polypolystic price-making 
may leave employable resources at the single firm and market level, which ensure the 
possibility of quantity adjustments; it is no surprise to find the same result at the 
aggregate level. Equation 21 implies nothing as to the level of employment of resources; 
as we know from par.3, the trade-off between quantities and prices basically depends on 
the response of factor markets. That equation does, however, imply something as to the 
determinants of the employment of resources. The fundamental driving force is realized 
investment; consumption is ancillary, since it only amplifies additional demand; prices 
simply reflect productivity and factor costs; factor costs, and mainly labour cost, play 
tortously -they may affect prices and demand on the one hand, but they also counter­
affect income on the other; in any case, their actual effect springs from the balance 
between those two forces in the expectations of entrepreneurs.
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Appendix
A.I. The exchange rate as an asset price and the efficient 
information hypothesis
This Appendix shows some important implications of the efficient information 
hypothesis (EIH) concerning asset market equilibrium and asset price dynamics that have 
been mentioned in previous chapters. The model that will be used is derived from the 
general form of asset market equilibrium 8a-b that I reproduce here:
(Al) A * ^ , ,  V ) = AaPat A'a(ra» 0 , A ^ rj)« ), A'(V )<0
(A2> V W c r A * .
A few operational assumptions are necessary in order to obtain a model 
specification comparable with standard efficiency models of the asset market. First, the 
price variance of all assets is constant Third, all base-period (0) nominal magnitudes are 
set equal to 1; the consumer price (P ) and the desired stock of wealth A* are given; A* is
V
equal and small for all agents. Third, it will be useful to express the total differentials of 
eqs.Al in terms of rates of change of the variables d(.)/(.)Q and denote them by 8(.)t
(hence the level of each variable in t will be [1 + 6(.)t)]). Finally, the total differentials of
eqs.Al are assumed to be of the CES type (for instance, this results from both the 
conventional maximization of exponential expected utility with constant absolute risk 
aversion and the safest portfolio choice considered in this work, ch. I, sec.4). Therefore 
from eqs.Al-A2 we obtain for (i = l,...n) agents:
(A3) SAia  = aia(5iat - SpjjP + - Sp&) + bla(5p*at, - 8pa,)
aia > ° ’ ai 8 < 0 ’ bi a > 0 ;
(A4) £iSA¡at = 0
The first term in A3 measures the own-rate effect net of the price wealth-effect, the 
second term the substitution effect, the third term the (expected) capital gain effect 
(t' > t). The linear coefficients (a, b, i.e. elasticities) reflect the degree of asset 
substitution according to the exposition in the text The signs are obvious. The a's should 
differ from the b's if the agent prefers a certain increase in the effective interest rate
(5ifit - 8pat > 0) than an uncertain capital gain of the same amount (8p*at- * Spat > 0).
We also know that the demand elasticity for a risky asset is in relation to its variance; 
hence (aja < a ^ ) if pa is more variable than pA .
Our focus will be on the demand for the foreign asset, which was shown to be 
(A5) A*1o61(ril(,V pa) = A61p61e I
and consequently on that particular asset price which is the exchange rate. However, our 
conclusions carry over to all types of assets in the above class of asset demand functions. 
As usual in asset-market models of the exchange rate, asset price variations will be 
ignored; the foreign asset A6 is distinguishable from the domestic one A7 only because of 
exchange-rate variability (i.e. a.g = a.y), while the choice between the two is ruled by
changes in the foreign interest differential (8i6t - 8i7t) and by the expected rate of
depreciation of home currency (8e*t, - 8et). Therefore, eqs.A3-A4 can be rewritten as
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follows (the asset identification numbers is dropped):
(A6) ki, = V , + V e*f ' V  • et 
(A7) S.kit = 0
where kJt = 8A it, yt = 8i6t - 5i7t, e*t, = 8e*t„ e t = 5et-
Equation A6 yields the i-th agent's demand or supply (the change in the asset 
stock kjt > 0, k*t < 0, respectively) as a function of the change in the return rate. The
desired stock of the foreign asset increases if the foreign interest differential increases (yt
> 0) or if expectations of capital gains arise (e*t. - > 0). Given one or both of these
conditions, the exchange rate will be bid up (domestic currency will depreciate) (et > 0);
this will inflate the current value of the stock, thus damping demand, up to the
compensation for capital-account risk.
Let us now turn to the information structure of the market. The EEH imposes
that:
(i) the decision variable y{ is the same for all agents,
(ii) information y{ is instantly and costlessly available to all agents, (iii) all agents form
the same expectations of future rates (e*t<= 1 + e*^).
Further, in order to exclude any discoverable pattern in y{, it is assumed as usual
that:
(iv) yt follows a stochastic process described by yt, = yt + ut„ where ut. is a random
variable i.i.d. N(0, Vu) (i.e. y is a martingale).
Finally, it is important to add that EIH is not irrelevant to the thorny question of 
the specification of agents' risk attitudes -i.e. whether demand elasticities across agents 
differ or not (Arrow (1986)). It is a well-known result in general equilibrium theory that 
for any given aggregate excess demand function (like that in system A6) the underlying 
(unobservable) map of maximand individual preferences is not unique; yet a sensible 
definition of El should admit that the (observable) relationship between the decision 
variable(s) and the market outcomes is common knowledge, and to this effect, such a 
relationship must be stable and unique. To solve the dilemma, efficiency market models 
are generally compelled to the strong restriction that all agents have the same risk attitude. 
In the precautionary portfolio model examined in ch.I, where the safest portfolio is 
independent of agents' tastes, the equivalent restriction has to be imposed onto agents' 
assessment of price variance. In any case,
(v) aj = a, b. = b, for all i.
Under the above conditions, system A6 yields, for any (yt, e*£l) the equilibrium
solution for the current change in the exchange rate and the asset stock adjustment (et,
k. )•V *
(A8) et = a(l + b)_1yt + b(l + b)'1^ ,
kjt = 0 for all i
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follows (the asset identification numbers is dropped):
(A6) ki t = aiyt + bi(e V  et) * et
(A7) Sikit = °
where kit = 5A jt> yt = 5i6( - 5i7t, e*t> = 5e*t„ e t = 8e{.
Equation A6 yields the i-th agent’s demand or supply (the change in the asset 
stock kjt > 0, k-t < 0, respectively) as a function of the change in the return rate. The
desired stock of the foreign asset increases if the foreign interest differential increases (yt
> 0) or if expectations of capital gains arise (e*t, - > 0). Given one or both of these
conditions, the exchange rate will be bid up (domestic currency will depreciate) (et > 0);
this will inflate the current value of the stock, thus damping demand, up to the
compensation for capital-account risk.
Let us now turn to the information structure of the market. The EIH imposes
that:
(i) the decision variable yt is the same for all agents,
(ii) information yt is instantly and costlessly available to all agents, (iii) all agents form
the same expectations of future rates (e*t,= 1 + e*t,).
Further, in order to exclude any discoverable pattern in y{, it is assumed as usual
that:
(iv) y£ follows a stochastic process described by yt> = yt + u ,^, where u£, is a random
variable i.i.d. N(0, V ) (i.e. y is a martingale).
Finally, it is important to add that EIH is not irrelevant to the thorny question of 
the specification of agents' risk attitudes -i.e. whether demand elasticities across agents 
differ or not (Arrow (1986)). It is a well-known result in general equilibrium theory that 
for any given aggregate excess demand function (like that in system A6) the underlying 
(unobservable) map of maximand individual preferences is not unique; yet a sensible 
definition of El should admit that the (observable) relationship between the decision 
variable(s) and the market outcomes is common knowledge, and to this effect, such a 
relationship must be stable and unique. To solve the dilemma, efficiency market models 
are generally compelled to the strong restriction that all agents have the same risk attitude. 
In the precautionary portfolio model examined in ch.I, where the safest portfolio is 
independent of agents' tastes, the equivalent restriction has to be imposed onto agents' 
assessment of price variance. In any case,
(v) a- = a, bj = b, for all i.
Under the above conditions, system A6 yields, for any (yt, e*t.) the equilibrium 
solution for the current change in the exchange rate and the asset stock adjustment (e{,
(A8) et = a(l + b ) '1^  + b(l + b ) '1^ ,
kjt = 0 for all i
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account. The absolute change in capital account is given by (et, - et). The EIH implies 
that there must be only one "objective" conditional expectation of future values of et, that
is, from (ii) [E(et.) = E(l+et,) = 1+ = e ]. The axiom of rational expectations restricts
individual forecasts to be [e*t> = E(et<)] for all agents. Therefore, the rational expectation
of changes in the exchange-rate level at the maturity has to be [E(et> - e() = 0]. In so far as
oscillations in the interest differential, or more generally in fundamentals, and hence in 
the exchange rate have no drift, the desired stock of the foreign asset should only vary in 
response to the current interest differential.
3. Stock equilibrium is maintained by pure price adjustments with no effective 
trade in assets. This is an important implication of asset-market equilibrium models under 
the EIH (Hicks (1935, pp.77-79), Grossman-Stiglitz (1980), Arrow (1986)), including 
the first generation of exchange-rate models. I have already been explained why the 
principle that different risk valuations are a condition to trade cannot be accepted without 
restrictions. Suppose (y{ > 0) under El conditions (i)-(v): whatever the risk valuation,
there will be no suppliers and bids will continue until e{ has totally offset the demand
incentive y{ (which is in fact another definition of El).
The unprofitab ility  of forw ard  and  speculative transactions. A 
forward exchange contract for one period (t,t') is feasible if, given the current exchange 
rate e{ the current domestic interest rate i7n> and the current foreign interest rate ¡6^.,
et(i + i7tt.) > ft,(l + i6tt>) or
(A 10) ^ tt ' " *^tt' ^ t' * ^ t
--------------> ----------
The latter is the well-known "covered interest equation”. The left-hand term is the 
domestic interest differential, the right-hand term is the "forward premium". To close the 
model, all spot and forward transactions should be considered simultaneously (for a 
general treatment see Kaldor (1939), McKinnon (1979, ch. VII)). To this effect, a 
forward market equation should be added to system A6-A7, where the parameter c 
measures the deviation from perfect covered parity. Defining the so-called "swap rate"
[stt, = (l+ i7tt,)/(l+ i6 tt,)], and remembering that (et = l+et) system A6-A7 now
determines one further endogenous variable:
(A ll)  ft, = et[c + (1 - c)stt,] 0 < c  < 1
Note that A ll does not contain forecast variables; the forward contract is totally 
free of risk (Levich (1985, p.1027)). The usual covered interest parity holds when (c = 
0). (c > 0) entails that arbitrageurs have some monopolistic power to charge brokerage 
fees; transaction costs have long been recognized as a cause of imperfection in the 
covered interest parity. Nonetheless, the evidence cumulated in the years of declining 
barriers to capital mobility suggests that transaction costs tend to become relatively small 
and that covered interest parity works reasonably well (McKinnon (1979, ch.VIII), 
Levich (1985)). However, if by absence of transaction costs one means that the asset 
holder himself is free to take a covered position by enjoying the same swap rate used by 
forward dealers, then it would be hard to find any comparative advantage in the existence 
of a forward market
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The EIH has much stronger implications as to the forward rate. As we know 
from the theory of futures markets (above, ch.I, sec. 1.3), if the EIH holds on the spot 
market, it must also extend to the forward market in such a way that the forward rate is 
set equal to the corresponding expected spot rate [ft> = E(et>)]. As a consequence, the
forward premium (discount) should reflect the expected rate of depreciation (appreciation) 
and the home interest differential. Now, consider property (ii, point 1 above): the asset 
holder's rational expectation of future rates should be equal to the current rate 
[E(et<) = e{]. If f{, is set efficiently, a sequence of "buy spot and sell forward" is
perfectly equivalent to one single "buy and hold". There is no gain from trading forward.
It should be stressed that standard efficiency theory establishes that the above 
market efficiency conditions should hold continuously through instant price adjustments. 
Some authors would rather view market efficiency conditions as the outcome of a process 
of arbitrage and/or speculation, in the course of which spot and forward positions are not 
indifferent(e.g. Bray (1985)). In fact, if all agents are risk-averse, even assuming 
transaction costs away the forward premium will fail to reflect the expected depreciation 
rate exactly; suffice it to compare eq.AlO, set to equality, with eq.A8, where, at the 
equilibrium value for c£, the expected depreciation rate (i* t, - e () instead exceeds the
home interest differential [-(l+yt)] by a positive risk premium given by coefficients
(a, b). The traditional efficiency argument is that if a class of risk-neutral agents exists 
(usually called "speculators") informational efficiency can be re- established since they 
will find it profitable to buy forward in so far as the forward premium lags behind the 
expected depreciation rate. Parallely, risk-averse asset holders will be able to cover their 
position by selling forward, and hence the forward market will operate effectively. 
However, a straightforward result from the above properties is that the expected gain 
from speculation (spot as well as forward) will be [E(e*t, - et) = E(ft, - et) = 0], that is to
say, there will be no rational (i.e. profitable) speculation either. This is simply a 
restatement of the "fairness" of the market, which is in turn a stochastic reformulation of 
the old principle that "in a world of perfect foresight nobody could make a speculative 
gain; speculators would be non-existent" (Kaldor (1939, p. 18)). It should perhaps be 
stressed that the EIH implies the absence, or at most the neutrality, of speculation, and 
gives no role to play to the other old principle of "stabilizing" speculation, which predicts 
that only stabilizing speculation is profitable. The reason should be obvious: in efficiently 
informed markets prices need not be stabilized.
All in all, it would seem that opening the forward market is useful in so far as 
either information is not efficiently used or opportunity costs are not negligible.
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Notes
(1) The same result would be obtained by imposing a unit reserve ratio on private banks.
(2) See again the explanation of liquidity preference in ch.I, sec.3.1. Clearly the possibility that firms 
pay a fixed interest to wage earners is immaterial; for firms should then borrow a greater monetary 
capital.
(3) If this happens, as it does, it means that the bank should pursue a less liquid position than its 
depositors. The very existence of banking suggests that such a service cannot be a neutral intermediation 
between demand and supply of money. The significant thing is that the person who deposits money with 
a bank does not notice any change in his liquidity position; he considers the bank deposit to be as liquid 
as cash” independently of the bank's liquidity position (Hicks (1935, p.72)). If banking must act a wedge 
between households' (high) and firms' (low) liquidity preference, this has ultimately to be reflected in the 
structure of interest rates. This point will be treated below.
(4) This holds true for Keynes's General Theory too, since transaction balances were rescued in the 
demand for money. When in the vintage 1937 theory he came to explicitate firms' demand for monetary 
capital (his "finance motive"), Keynes was still convinced that it was to be treated as an addition to other 
motives, and so it was in most Post-Keynesian models (see Graziani (1988)).
(5) Of course, in practice, the production period may not coincide with the consumers' expenditure 
pattern, so that firms may find themselves short of cash or with excess cash at the moment of starting a 
new production round. Such practical problems are tackled with the help of banks, and in no way should 
they be confused with the determinants of monetary equilibrium. For instance the conclusions of the 
Radcliffe Report on the velocity of circulation are worth repeating: "We have not made more use of this 
concept because we cannot find any reason for supposing, or any experience in monetary history 
indicating, that there is any limit to the velocity of circulation; it is a statistical concept that tells us 
nothing directly of the motivation that influences the level of total demand [...] The more efficient the 
financial structure, the more can the velocity of circulation be stretched without serious inconvenience 
being caused" (1959, parJ91).
(6) The modern author who has most forcefully supported the idea that the quantity of money is 
endogenously determined by the private sector is certainly Kaldor (see e.g. 1982). In his view, the 
capacity of the private sector to have private paper converted into State paper totally outweighs the formal 
power of quantity control of the issuing bank, which is in fact locked into a pure convertibility regime. 
There is one way in which the monetary authority can enhance its power of control domestically, namely 
by administrative measures -which I do not consider here. However, the historical experience of integrated 
markets teaches us that resident units can easily bypass administrative controls through the foreign 
channel; in practice, the market power of monetary authorities seems to be very low, and declining, on 
both fronts (see e.g. De Cecco (1987)). For extended technical analysis of money creation and control 
through the banking sector in the inside money approach see e.g. Moore (1988, Part 0*
(7) It may be useful to emphasize the points where the discretionary convertibility regime differs from 
both the extremes of pure quantity control and pure convertibility. On the one hand, the quantity of 
currency chosen by the bank has to flow into the economy through a market transaction with firms; as a 
major consequence there may be discount rates at which not all that quantity is demanded, or at which 
more than that quantity may be obtained on the asset market On the other hand, Kaldor’s analysis shows 
that the actual degree of quantity control depends on the degree of control on the credit policy of private 
banks; the former is zero when the latter is zero too, and hence money creation is "fully endogenous” 
within the private sector. Since we do not consider the relationship between the issuing bank and private 
banks, or equivalently we assume that the degree of control on the credit policy is complete, we need not 
go as far as Kaldor.
(8) This was Wicksell's conclusion in his famous article of 1898. It should be noted that the assumption 
of one centralized bank only simplifies the model; the result stays the same after private banks are added.
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With the help of a standard inter-bank model (e.g. Tumovsky (1981, pp.18-19)) one immediately verifies 
that, since the equilibrium stock of transaction balances is zero (the currency/deposit ratio is zero), 
(BIq = B2j) always obtains, for whatever reserve/deposit ratio of private banks. Of course one should be
careful not to fall into the "macroeconomic illusion” that all individual private banks are therefore in 
stock equilibrium too; the individual bank does have the problem of matching loans with deposits, its 
own deposit multiplier being smaller the smaller its market share of deposits, but quite obviously a lack 
of deposits cannot occur for all banks simultaneously. Hence those banks which find themselves with 
unbalanced loan/deposit ratios can always resort to the inter-bank market (see also Moore (1988, Part I)).
(9) It was, however, pointed out in ch.I (sec.2.1), that there does not exist such a thing as Wicksell's 
"natural interest rate” to take as the benchmark of the bank rate. Contrary to the neoclassical world of 
perfect information and perfect foresight, in the present characterization of the financial economy it is the 
bank rate that acts as the anchor of the whole array of rates, and not the other way round. Indeed, in the 
financial economy money is an artificial instrument vouched for by the central bank; it is not a "natural” 
market commodity.
(10) Figure 1 is the typical portrayal of the money supply in the endogenous-money approach, where the 
supply schedule is horizontal (Kaldor (1982, p.24), Moore (1988, ch.V)); the orthodox approach would 
draw it vertical. As we shall see later on, the most appropriate supply schedule in a discretionary 
convertibility regime is upward sloping.
(11) Interestingly, the argument can also run the other way round: in a discretionary convertibility regime 
households' portfolio policy loses the full and direct impact on the rate of investment it has been given in 
the General T heory  and in Keynesian monetary theory generally. When investors' debentures are 
convertible by the (or, actually, a) bank "Liquidity Preference turns out to have been a bit of a red herring 
-not the ’crucial factor' which, in the view of the great economists of Keynes's generation, such as Dennis 
Robertson or Jacob Viner, and, of a later generation, Harry Johnson and James Tobin, alone enabled 
Keynes to argue that an economy can be in equilibrium at less than full employment It has nothing to 
do with that at all” (Kaldor (1982, p.26)). However, it should be clear from the above that the textbook 
story, that the 'supply of money” is the instrument by means of which the central bank meets changes in 
households' ”demand for money”, is a complete misconception.
(12) The above does not mean that the rate of saving is irrelevant all the way. It is certainly important in 
the short run because it is a variable of flow equilibrium, and in the long run as it determines the 
evolution of the stock of wealth through time. In neither case, however, can it be considered the in-period 
supply of investment funds.
(13) This is true for the domestic saving generated in a closed economy as well as for the domestic pi us 
foreign saving available to an open economy (see below, sec.2.3).
(14) It seems important to specify that the above two effects, and in particular bank intervention, do not 
occur because asset holders are at their lowest bound of the safest monetary reserve (A2min in fig.3, or 
more traditionally, the "liquidity trap"). We need not go that far -and, after all, "the liquidity trap was not 
in the General Theory" (Leijonhufvud (1969, p.21, point 6)). The bank is forced to ’monetize” some 
national deficit spending, in order to preserve flow equilibrium, because total and marginal monetary 
reserves of households do not fall to zero along the whole schedule of desired reserves. Yet this may also 
be deliberate, if the bank realizes that asset suppliers are not prepared to finance their activities at 
whatever price.
(15) Since the expected return rate of the Trust is (i7/p7 = £  ot r , a * 2) the terms at which the Trust21 S fl
is held vis Jk vis the monetary reserve are transmitted to the single non-monetary assets.
(16) See the solution for (a7min). Since [V = a'Va] (where a  is the vector of piotfolio shares and V is 
the variance-covariance matrix), shifts from one asset to a more variable one will increase (V^). 
Therefore, in our present case,
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A5: drS/dr3 = - A'5(r3)/A'5(r5) > 0 
A3: dr5/dr3 = - A3(r3)/A3(r5) > 0
Supposing a relatively high price variability of AS as compared with A3 implies a lower demand 
elasticity and a lower degree of substitution,
A’5(r5) < I A’5(r3) I 
I A'3(r5) I A3(r3)
A'5(r5) < A*3(r3)
The above relations yield the following slopes (AS > 1, A3 > 1, A5 < A3). For these relationships of 
asset substitution see Tobin (1969).
(17) The relevant literature is boundless. See the seminal works by Branson (197S, 1977).The most 
representative open macroeconomic models in this vein are those by de Macedo-Tobin (1980), and Tobin 
(1982). Useful surveys of this stock of models have been provided by Frankel (1983) and Krueger 
(1983, ch.4.3). I have also analyzed them in Tamborini (1987,1988).
(18) See the general treatment by Branson-Henderson <1985. sec.3).
(19) More on direct currency substitution can be found in Krueger (1983, ch.4.33).
(20) If we abstract from international-specific transaction costs or information gaps, we have to invoke 
other non-economic criteria of distinction between the home and the foreign "habitat”, such as social 
customs and political factors, in explaining the ranking of foreign assets. See Tobin's interesting 
discussion of the "home preference hypothesis" (1981).
(21) It seems quite clear that the assumptions identifying a "small country" have nothing to do with the 
international weight of the country, however measured, or any other empirical observation. Rather, these 
are assumptions on the asset market structure, whose most appealing "motivation is to simplify the 
accounting” (Frankel (1983, p.98)). However, the most innovative aspect of today's financial integration 
is not that London, New York and Tokio work like a single market, but that those market trade actively 
debt claims issued in Chile or the Philippines.
(22) As is often the case, the economics behind this formal solution is not so easy to swallow. There are 
two possible justifications, which I leave to the reader to assess: (i) the foreign asset under consideration 
is actually the foreign currency (say deposits abroad at fixed interest rate (r6* i6, p6 * 1), (ii) the 
foreign asset is a price-variable asset, but exchange-rate variability is separated from price variability on 
the assumption that [p61 = E(p6) » p6^]. The correa operation to do would seem to leave p6 in its place
and to add the missing equation, the foreign-exchange market equation; but, strangely enough, this is not 
to be found in the standard specification of asset-market models of the exchange rate. This correction will 
be made in applications of chs.VI-VII.
(23) The formulation of the consumption-saving pattern in the precautionary approach is patently in line 
with modern consumption theories based on some long-run standard of living. There are, however, 
important differences due to the informational hypotheses. Essentially, standard theories posit that the 
consumer enjoys perfect forsight and faces no obstacle to keep consumption optimal throughout his life, 
whereas consumption is here viewed as a programme affected by uncertainty. For instance, unwillingness 
to borrow to smooth down the consumption path, as traditional life-cycle models would instead suggest, 
is a well-known corollary of risky capital markets in which households' borrowing rates are higher than 
lending rates and/or the future ability to meet the real debt burden is uncertain. See Okun (1981, ch.V).
(24) The role of the wealth-income norm in the expenditure function is strongly emphasized in the so- 
called "New Cambridge” view (see e.g. Cripps-Godley (1983), Vines (1976)). A controversial point of 
their analyses is that they assume realized wealth-income norms (so that the average propensity to save 
tends to zero); it seems more interesting to consider the case in which at least a part of the population has
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not yet reached the golden age in which it is no longer necessary to save.
(25) This programme will have an average time horizon [T = l/(a - y) > 1]. As already remarked, the 
time horizon can be shortened, or the period rate of saving reduced, within a more realistic programme 
where compound interests are reckoned. Note, then, that higher interest rates may enhance consumption 
over time, rather than exert the traditional negative effect
(26) In fact (7) will also be lowered as much as necessary to keep (S * ^ ^  unchanged. For completeness,
note that in the face of a random shock to income, the model leaves no ambiguity; since, at constant
prices (S* /P E = 1 - y/cr) is clearly the expected value of [S = (1 - y/cr)Yt], the marginal i ci y t
propensities should coincide with the average ones.
(27) On this result see also Okun (1981, pp.215-217). The fact that households regard the current price 
level as the permanent one implies that they also regard the inflation rate in each future period as a 
random process with zero drift. If they believed in an extrapolative process, the adjustment in current 
consumption and saving would be far more ambiguous; the real wealth effect could be reverted into a 
speculative enlargement of current consumption (Grandmont has shown this possibility even in the 
traditional case of intertemporal utility maximization (1983, ch.I)). In the present case of static 
expectations, the real wealth effect could be counteracted by a real interest effect Expliciting the return 
rate to the asset portfolio (r), the asset holder wishes
At( l + r t)/Pc( l+ 5 P ct) = A *(l+r)
A complete "Fisher effect" {(1 + r )  = (1 + r)(l + 5P )] would leave the current nominal wealth at itsI Cl
desired level. However, in the context of precautionary asset-holding and liquidity preference, the real 
interest effect is far from being obvious and neutral. In fact to increase the portfolio return rate, asset 
holders would have to move towards riskier assets; the hedge they seek against inflation would be 
weakened by increased riskiness. See again Okun (1981, pp.208-212) and the literature on the failure of 
the Fisher Theorem quoted therein.
(28) More precisely, a growing public debt (and interests payments) may have the by-now conventional 
positive wealth effect on private consumption if (i) consumers lower the target of wealth, that is, perceive 
less variability of future income-expenditure prospects; or (ii) return rates on bonds grow exceedingly 
high with respect to portfolios' liquidity risk. In both cases, however, the wealth effect would manifest 
itself in a higher marginal propensity to consume, rather than in the form of a direct jump in expenditure. 
What about "Ricardian equivalence” of bonds today with tax tomorrow'? A wide range of counter­
arguments have been opposed to Barro's provocative dynastic tale (see Tobin (1980, ch.III)). One 
especially suited to the present context is that "Barro’s Ricardian theorem presupposes intertemporal 
general equilibrium”, whereas the absence of it underlies the qualifying economic behaviours in the 
financial economy (Leijonhufvud (1983)). One element which makes for the uncertainty of households' 
future budget constraints is the profile of taxation itself, which must be known with certainty for 
Ricardian equivalence to hold. In a growing economy, or in an open economy, it is not even certain that 
the government debt will ever disappear over time. The phenomenon closest to the Ricardian effect that 
the precautionary model seems to suggest is that a chance of heavier taxation in the future may increase 
the variability of expected outlets, and hence may lead households to a tighter accumulation programme 
and to a reduction in the average propensity to consume.
(29) There is a quite simple rule which is practically used by stock-dealers and which embodies the 
general principles expounded above: buy shares below the "normal" price/earnings ratio. The P/E ratio is 
an index published daily by financial newspapers which, in our terms, reads (EPVp5/i5). The "normal" 
P/E ratio is computed by using the risk-free bank rate (say our i2) to obtain (EPV = i5/i2, p5^ = 1,
P/E = l/i2). Evidently, the rule amounts to buying at (p5 < 1). In a liquidity-preference context it is 
natural to think that the discount should pay for the liquidity risk premium.
(30) We have by now a wealth of theoretical and empirical investigation into the phenomenon of "equity 
constrained investment" and, more generally, into failures of the Modigliani-Miller theorem due to
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imperfect information: from early works by Minsky (e.g. 1972) to more recent analyses and 
formalizations of the problem prompted by Stiglitz and others (see e.g. the synthetic treatment by 
Stiglitz-Greenwald (1988, pp*251-ff.) and the survey of theory and evidence contributed by Gertler- 
Hubbard (1988)).
(31) I shall neglect a third important component of investment finance: firms' internal funds.
(32) In this respect, it is important to notice that the equity constraint becomes more binding the closer 
the firm to the condition of marginal efficiency (i.e. EPV -> P^). One would expect small competitive
firms, even though publicly quoted, to conform to the investment pattern assumed in the text. Indeed, the 
evidence largely supports this theoretical prediction, even for not-so-small firms, throughout 
industrialized countries (see e.g. Gertler-Hubbard (1988)).
(33) Someone might like to deal with the real interest rate; if the real interest rate is expressed, as it 
should be, as the difference between i4 and the expected rate of inflation, then the latter also applies to 
(R'l^,, E^) thus leaving expression 12 unaffected.
(34) See Greenwald-Stiglitz (1988, pp.251-ff.), Gertler-Hubbard (1988) and the literature quoted therein.
(35) Of course, when the equity market is bearish "there is no sense in building up a new enterprise at a 
cost greater than that at which a similar existing enterprise can be purchased", while in a bullish market 
"there is an inducement to spend on a new project what may seem an extravagant sum" (Keynes 
(1936, p.151)). However, as was already said, there is little evidence of systematic recourse to the equity 
market
(36) Main reference will be made to the results discussed by Rotschild (1973) and to the contributions by 
Okun (1981) and Chick (1983, ch.V). It should also be noted that, as is well known, the various 
traditional forms of imperfect competition are all compatible with the principle of the profit-maximizing 
firm as price taker; further, the largest part of the literature concerned with uncertainty focuses on price 
parametric uncertainty, so that "the basic assumption that the firm is a price taker is retained -in a 
probabilistic sense" (Sandmo (1971, p.65)).
(37) On the related methodological aspects see again ch.I, sec.2, and especially Frydman-Phelps (1983) 
and Pesaran (1987, chJV).
(38) For the definition and methodological implications of strategic uncertainty, as opposed to parametric 
uncertainty, see again Pesaran (1987, chs.I and IV).
(39) Recall that
EMRs  ■XPjoy/dqjo
" jO '1-  v W 1
EMR = [a-2qj()-E.(Qj) - q ^ Q j ^ b ' 1
(40) It can be shown that in fact E.(<jj) is the consistent expected value for whatever value of o.^, 
provided that all firms make the same conjecture and use it to set the price. The result is intuitive, 
since the EMR is derived from the estimated market-clearing equation 15.
(41) Notice that does not measure the unintended overall correlation among firm's output decisions,
Jv . . .
but the intended cross-sectional correlation among those decisions. In other words, j is not assuming 
that non-j are not expanding as it expands, but that non-j expansion is not caused by its own expansion.
(42) Recent models of imperfect competition (see e.g. Hart, 1982) generally lay stress on the extension of
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the market (the number of firms J) in the determination of the mark-up m above the perfect case (m = 1, 
EMR * Pjq). The argument raised by Arrow and taken up here is independent of that parameter.
Formally, as (J -> <*> , EMR •> p.^) regardless of Ojq. However, the economic meaning of this result
is not that a larger number of Arms reduces the elasticity of demand -which is given and invariant to 
scale- but that it swallows the individual market shares. It is sufficient to consider the existence of 
sizeable fixed costs to prevent operational market shares from falling to infinitely small. On the other 
hand, if one assumes marginal and scale decreasing returns, competition is socially preferable in this 
model only because it generates small-scale production units.
(43) It is well known that Keynes posited that firms' short-run (i.e. current demand) expectations may be 
considered fulfilled because they have learnt the market demand by trials and errors; he did not notice that 
such a process may not be compatible with perfect competition (see again Chick, 1983, ch.V). It is also 
useful to stress that the errors in question are not those assumed by Lucas's business-cycle theory. To put 
the difference very simply, Lucasian firms operate on Walrasian (price-takers) markets, but "mispercept" 
general-price for relaiive-price shocks; here firms operate on non-Walrasian (pricemakers) markets under 
incomplete information about their own competitors, but may well distinguish aggregate -demand from 
industry- demand shock (a distinction which is not however so crucial). On this point see the important 
remarks by Okun (1981, ch.IV) and Pesaran (1987, ch.IV.2).
(44) One of the most interesting results is so-called "customer markets", where "most products are sold 
with price tags set by the seller and through a process of shopping by the buyer", where "customers are 
valuable to sellers because of their potential of repeat business" and where "demand- insensitive prices 
stem from the recognition by sellers that they can influence the shopping behaviour of customers by 
pledging continuity of an offer" (Okun, 1981, pp.138149)). For extensive treatment see Okun 
(1981, ch.IV). There are, also, illustrious predecessors who are often forgotten: see for instance Kahn's 
Dissertation (1929) and the masterly piece by Joan Robinson (1953).
(45) On this point see especially Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (196S, ch. VII).
(46) More in this vein can be found in the rich contribution by Okun (1981, pp.l54-ff.).
(47) Since shortly after the publication of the General Theory empirical investigation has cast doubts 
on the implications of the neoclassical production function (or labour demand), namely the anticyclical 
pattern of productivity and real labour cost The monitoring of industrial economies in the last forty years 
suggests that average productivity grows in expansions and falls in depressions while the real labour cost 
is stable (Okun (1981, ch.I), Greenwald-Stiglitz (1988)). Short-run swings in productivity are not in 
contrast with the use of a long-run "norm" of average productivity if the the technology does not in fact 
require increasing marginal inputs in the long run. Since the real labour cost turns out to be stable over 
the cycle it seems that entrepreneurs can afford that practice (Okun (1981, pp.155-169). In fact, let 
(w0 = w
labour input; hence the real labour cost is (wq/Pjj -  X/n). since (Pjj s  w^p/X), while (X - X/|i) is the
real capital-income share). Now, if X' are procyclical "Short-run deviations of average productivity from the 
norm, and if wages and prices are not sensitive to them, the only effect is that the real capital-income 
share becomes procyclical (X* - X/ji increases when X' > X), as in fact it turns out to be.
(48) See, in general, Weintraub (1979), Chick (1983, ch.VII). Another important point clarified by the 
sequential approach is that labour suppliers are unable to bargain for real incomes (see also above, 
ch.I, sec.3.2). For each period the labour market establishes nominal wages, though the supply function 
may well contain a real-income norm. On the other hand, since firms are price makers on the goods 
markets, and there are no obstacles to transfer generalized cost variations onto prices, firms are always on 
the labour product schedule if they sell on the marginal cost schedule.
(49) For obvious reasons I shall explicitate functions of the home economy only. Those of the foreign 
one are analogous.
be the nominal wage rate, X the average labour productivity, and (n'.A = rX) the marginal
J®

PART TWO
THE ADJUSTMENT OF TRADE FLOWS 
TO FINANCIAL FLOWS

CHAPTER FOUR 
THE OPEN FINANCIAL ECONOMY AND 
THE WORLD TRANSFER PROBLEM
Introdcution
The first part of this work was largely concerned to provide a consistent 
characterization of a financial economy. We saw that such a characterization requires us 
to bring time and uncertainty into the the picture as essential features (see esp. ch.I). 
Monetary and non-monetary financial instruments -like those currently in use- are in fact 
viable means to carry wealth across markets and through time when information on all 
possible markets and states is lacking, when there is no auction market for all the 
necessary information. Accordingly, among the variety of motives for using money, 
"precaution” has been singled out as the "fundamental" one. Precaution means 
minimizing the probability of failure; as a consequence, financial positions do matter for 
economic activity in the "real" sphere because they determine the extent to which agents 
can afford fallible decisions.
The most widely debated issues in what goes under the heading of "international 
monetary economics" stem from the interaction between private market decisions and a 
balance-of-payments constraint. However, rational motives for using money scarcely 
account for the existence of "national economies", or perhaps more technically, for the 
existence of different monetary conventions delimited by authority. As I have said, we 
should regard this as a matter of fact. Currency sovereigns, given the exchange rate 
regime they establish, are the only agents in the world economy who perceive the balance 
of payments as a direct constraint and who have the power to make it effective at the level 
of market decisions. International monetary economics, and in particular balance-of- 
payments theory, deal with essentially macroeconomic phenomena -in the sense of 
"systemic coordination" as explained in the previous pan (ch.n, ch.HI). From this view­
point, we have, on the one hand, firms, investors and households who manage their real 
and financial resources on integrated world markets, and on the other, that institutional
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balance-sheet which tells us whether home payments are exceeding foreign ones or not. 
The transfer-theory idea revived in this work -that financial capital movements are the 
driving force of goods movements, the balance of payments being the result of the two 
effects- thus naturally appears as the "open-macro" companion to the "closed-micro" 
relationships between financial and real decisions analyzed previously.
The world overflow of financial means towards the United States and the brisk 
pace of economic activity in the latter over the last decade, and parallely, the severe slump 
which debtor economies have incurred in order to pay for their debt in real terms are only 
the most striking examples of the working -and of the importance as well- of the world 
transfer process . In this opening chapter of Pan II I shall first introduce the basic 
accounting relationships between the open financial economy and the rest of the world, 
and a taxonomy of international transfers and of patterns of world transfers. This 
preliminary task is made necessary by the well-known fact that the tangle of world 
payments can only be "read" according to specific criteria, which in the case of the 
transfer approach are those of the availability and circulation of real in relation to financial 
resources. Attention will be paid, on a purely static-comparative basis, to the properties 
of various world "scenarios", under conditions of stationarity, which entail the absence 
of financial transfers, as well as under conditions of non-stationarity due to the presence 
of financial transfers. I wish to stress that the non-stationary scenarios that follow should 
not be taken to involve any "value judgement" (such as greater or lesser desirability, 
longer or shorter durability, etc.), nor do they claim any closer resemblance to the real 
world with respect to the stationary state. A few considerations on the issue of 
sustainability will however be made. The reader will finally find a more vivid rendition of 
the whole matter in the historical outline that closes the chapter. I also wish to premise 
that since this work is not empirical in aim, this chapter will remain at a basic level of 
refinement both statistically and historically.
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1. The open financial economy in the world economy
1.1. The balance of international transfers. A Taxonomy.
Let me start by reproducing for reference the stock-flow matrix introuced in 
ch.II, which gives us a systemic representation of the interrelations among decision- 
u nits' balance sheets.
Flows 1 Stocks
1 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Firms O-Y'-I = * ♦ *
Households Y-T-C = * * * * *
Government T-G = *
Bank 0 = * * * * *
Foreign sec. M-X _ ♦ * ♦ * *
0 = 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flows: O = sales revenue. Y' = factor cost, Y = personal incomes, I = investment, C = consumption, T 
-  tax revenue, G = public expenditure, M = imports, X = exports.
Stocks: 1 = monetary capital, 2 = currency and reserve, 3 = Public debt, 4 = Private debt, 5 = Equities, 6
= Foreign assets. (* = -) = increase in liabilities, (* = +) = increase in assets.
Memo: Y'= wage bill (W) + gross profits (R*); Y = wage bill (W) + net profits (R); O = GDP =
domestic sales (I + C + G - M) + exports (X).
Drawing up a balance sheet of international payments is notoriously problematic. 
Items may be organized in a variety of combinations according to the information which 
has to be extracted. The key point in the transfer- theory approach is the correlation 
between trade payments and financial payments; accordingly, the outstanding 
modification that must be introduced in the standard balance of payments is the isolation 
of trade payments from all autonomous finance-related payments*.
The balance sheet of the foreign sector previously given in ch.II can be reproduced as 
follows
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Receipts
The Foreign Sector
___ Disbursements
Exports of goods & serv. 
Incomes
For. Gov. transfers 
Sales of domestic securities
Net Real Transfer
Net Financial Transfer
Imports of goods & serv.
Incomes 
Gov. transfers 
Purchases of foreign securities
Official Transfer 
(compensatory settlements of the central bank)
Assets Liabilities
Foreign sec untie 
Official reserve
In symbols we may write:
Bonds
Debenture
Equities
(4a) Zt + F t s 0
(b) F t s V Bt
(c) Ft sY F t + GFt + K,
(d) Kt sA A Ft -AA6t
(d) Bt sA B6t
Z = Net Real Transfer, F = Net Financial Transfer, B = Official Transfer, YF = Net
Foreign Incomes, GF = Net Government Transfers, K = Capital Transfers.
Memo: AA6 = change in domestic holdings of foreign assets; AAF = change in foreign
holdings of domestic assets; AB6 = change in official reserve. Note that (AA6 > AAF) 
is an increase in private "Net Foreign Assets” or a capital outflow K < 0).
We thus have the skeleton of the Balance of In ternational Transfers (BIT). The 
use of the term "transfers" is obviously borrowed from the tradition of the transfer 
theory; but, it also indicates that the stress is so much on receipts and disbursements as 
on the amount of resources, real and financial, made available to, or raised from, the rest
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of the world. A few comments on the items of the BIT are now in order.
The Net Real T ransfer (NRT). The NRT, being the difference between
expons and imports of goods and services, is clearly equivalent to the usual trade 
balance. To repeat, one only has to notice that when (Z{ > 0) the economy is collecting
foreign currency but it is also transferring home real resources abroad. As a consequence, 
transfer theorists have also attached great importance to possible divergences between the 
nominal trade balance and the NRT; in fact -as will be seen in detail in due time- falling 
prices of exports relative to imports will impose a larger NRT on the economy in order to 
obtain the same nominal trade balance.
The Net Financial T ransfer (NFT). For analytical purposes we shall 
consider the following components of the NFT:
Incomes: income payments to and from foreigners on the existing stock of capital 
assets.
Government transfers: home and foreign governments unilateral transfers due to 
international commitments.
C apital transfers: purchases from, and sales to, foreigners of capital assets 
distinguished between:
(i) direct investment, purchases and sales of physical capital;
(ii) portfolio investment, purchases and sales of financial securities.
The NFT thus encompasses a number of items that are generally kept distinct in
the standard balance of payments. This is the case of Net Foreign Incomes and
2
Government Transfers, on the one hand, and Capital Transfers on the other . The first 
common characteristic which allows us to pool these items together is their being
3
monetary payments which are not in direct exchange for real resources . The second is 
more functional in kind; from the viewpoint of the individual units in the economy, 
financial transfers all represent an addition (subtraction) of means of payment in their 
budget constraint, whether this is due to capital transfers (e.g. borrowing or lending) or 
to incomes of existing physical, human and financial assets (liabilities) or to government 
transfers tied to international commitments; an addition (subtraction) which should have
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some effect on the amount and uses of real resources, as we saw in Part I.
This second characteristic has enabled transfer theorists to handle NFT as 
"exogenous shocks" to a given state of the economy. In most treatments NFT are simply 
reduced to government transfers (such as war payments, or commitments towards 
developing countries). This is a useful device for most analytical purposes, yet the scope 
of the theory can be extended well beyond i t  Capital transfers and incomes cannot be 
considered "exogenous" like government transfers, and nonetheless they arc still in the 
nature of transfers of means of payment from units in one economy to units in another. 
As a matter of fact, capital transfers, and their intertemporal effect on capital incomes, 
account for the largest share in most countries' NFT and represent enormous shifts of 
financial means across the world economy (see below, sec.3) . In any case, it is 
important to fix the idea that all forms of financial transfers contribute, in principle, to the 
determination of real resources in the world economy even though the contribution by 
each form of financial transfer differs in degree and in kind, and even though -as will be 
seen later- the characteristics of the adjustment process will differ according to which 
form prevails. At the same time, this should warn us right from the outset against 
pursuing a one-sided "general theory"; on the contrary, we should direct our efforts to 
singling out the properties and consequences of the different ways in which financial 
means are transferred across the world economy.
1.2. The balance of in ternational transfers. Basic relationships.
For our purposes the key relationships in the stock-flow matrix underlying the 
BIT are simply two:
(5) z t + Ft 2 B t
(6) (St + Tt) - ( I t + Gt) s X t -M t
The first is the BIT identity (see above 4a-b). The basic proposition in the transfer 
approach is that, in general, 
dZ/dF < 0
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Some useful definitions can be introduced here.
The nominal transfer burden and the transfer effect. Let us assume an 
initial situation such that (Zq = Fq = 0). An autonomous NFT arising in period t can be
expressed as (Ft = Fq + dF = dF * 0). Taking it for granted that dF is precisely
measurable ex ante, the ratio of the NFT to initial exports is usually defined as the
nominal transfer burden^
f = dF/X0
This terminology elicits the idea that the economy with negative NFT (dF < 0) has to 
develop a positive NRT (dZ > 0), while at the same time the economy with positive 
NFT has to accommodate a negative NRT.
Quite obviously, an important aspect of the transfer problem is the extent to which
the NFT affects the NRT; three cases are usually found in the literature:
(i) dZ/dF > -1 (Zt > Ft): the transfer is overeffected;
(ii) dZ/dF = - l (Zt = Ft): the transfer is completely effected;
(iii) dZ/dF < -1 (Zt < Ft): the transfer is undereffected.
The straightforward implications are that in case (i) the BIT remains positive (net increase
in official reserves), in case (ii) the BIT is kept in balance, in case (iii) the BIT turns into
negative (net decrease of official reserves).
The above three cases are first of all relevant in terms of international payments
and their effects on stocks of international money held by central banks. However -as I
have already observed- the transfer approach also has a deeper focus on the correlation
between transfers of financial resources and transfers of real resources. In this
perspective, changes in NRT may yield a misleading measure when prices of
international trade are variable.
The real transfer burden and the real exchange rate. As is well-known, 
the overall change in Z£ can always be decomposed into the change in quantities and the
change in prices**; assuming initial balance (Xq = Mq) one obtains
Z0 “ Q0Px ( ) 'i W n i 0
d Z .X 0(SQx -5Q m) - X 0(6Pm -8P x)
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where (x, m) indicate exports and imports. Strictly speaking, the transfer effect on goods 
movements is thus equal to [Xq(8Qx - SQm)]» while the nominal NRT also contains the
price effect [XQ(8Pm - 5Px)]. The former effect is usually defined as the real transfer 
burden^ or
The latter effect can be shown to correspond to an important variable in the open 
economy. If we define the real exchange rate as the ratio of import prices to export 
prices we see that
' • V ,
wr = 8P_ - SPV m x
dZ = XQz - XQSr
Hence, the nominal NRT always consists of the algebraic sum of the real transfer burden 
and the rate of real appreciation (5r < 0) or depreciation (5r > 0); and the two 
magnitudes are inversely proportional. An important relationship exists between the real 
transfer burden, the rate of real depreciation and the nominal transfer burden. Such a 
relationship has been widely used in the literature as an ex ante indicator of the transfer 
problem. Let us consider the condition under which the transfer is completely effected in 
goods; by making use of the above definitions and relations it is easily seen that 
dZ = -dF 
z = -f + 8r
That is to say, in order to leave the BIT unaffected by an autonomous NFT the real 
transfer burden of the paying country must be at least equal to the nominal transfer 
burden, or else it must be greater (lesser) by the rate of real depreciation (appreciation).
Implicit transfers. To complete this part, the above relationship also helps to 
notice some neglected aspects of such important phenomena in the open economy as 
exogenous changes in the real exchange rate. These may occur owing to exogenous 
movements of the nominal exchange rate, or of foreign relative to domestic prices. An oil
g
price increase with fixed exchange rate is paradigmatic .
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Let us first consider the price effect The conventional view is that the oil importer
incurs a trade deficit due to the greater value of imports. Alternatively, we may say that
the oil importer faces a real depreciation which measures the additional volume of goods
that is necessary to export in order to obtain an unchanged volume of imports. Hence, we
can conveniently use the relationship between nominal NRT and real transfer burden 
introduced above. As long as (8QX = SQm = 0), it follows that (dZ/X = -5r);
consequently, the impact effect of real depreciation is a net increase in monetary 
disbursements abroad that can be expressed as a so-called implicit transfer of nominal 
burden (f = dZ/X). The oil importer is thus in the position of the T-economy, whereas 
the oil exporter acts as the R-economy. The analysis of an exogenous shock to the real 
exchange rate as a transfer problem clarifies (or confirms) that a monetary transfer is 
involved in the adjustment. Then the extent of trade adjustement and of its real costs are 
closely dependent on the model specification of the transfer problem.
1.3. The balance of international transfers. Transfer-econom ies and 
recip ien t-econom ies.
The second basic relationship we are interested in (see 6 above) links national 
saving and national deficit spending with external goods movements (see ch.m, sec.3). 
From 5 and 6 we also obtain
On the left-hand side of both identities we still have the excess of national saving over 
deficit spending, whereas the right-hand side makes the difference. 7a may be read as the 
foreign component of the change in real wealth associated with domestic private and 
public decisions of spending and saving. 7b may instead be interpreted as the financial 
counterpart of 7a, that is, the foreign component of the change in financial wealth due 
to that same pattern of saving and spending. Since 7a and 7b are both dependent on 6, 
they jointly define the function of the open economy in the world economy. 
We shall define:
(7a)
(b) S't - D't s  -Ft + Bt = AAFt - AA6( + AB6t (YFt,G F t) * 0
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(i) (S't > D’t; Zt > 0; -Ft + Bt > 0) a transfer-econom y (T);
(ii) (S’t < D't; Zt < 0; -Ft + Bt < 0) a recipient-economy (R).
The position of T- or R-economy is known without ambiguity as soon as one of 
the three underlying relations is known. It should be noted that the position is defined in 
terms of observable flows. The T-economy has excess national saving and transfers real 
and financial resources abroad; it displays a NRT surplus, a NFT deficit and an increase 
in "net foreign assets" (reduction in foreign liabilities) held by private units and/or by the 
central bank. The R-economy has excess expenditure and receives real and financial 
resources from abroad; it displays a NRT deficit, a NFT surplus and a reduction in "net 
foreign assets" (increase in foreign liabilities). If we look at the world economy as a 
whole, it is easy to see that R-economies perform the same function as net spending 
units, whereas T-economies perform that of net saving units, in a closed economy. This 
is more than a mere coincidence; indeed, the R or T function of the economy as a whole
derives from the underlying relationship between net-spending and net-saving domestic
. 9 units .
2. The world transfer problem: alternative scenarios.
2.1. P atterns of world transfers.
Having set out the basic relationships between domestic units, the BIT and the
world function of the open economy, let us now move to examining the network of
transfers that links each economy with all the others. To this effect, and for further uses,
one may usefully represent the world economy in matrix form ^.
Given N national units in the'world economy, the country-by-country trade 
network (Z-; i, j  = 1...N) yields the trade square matrix Z such that (u being the unity
column vector) [z = Zu] is the vector of each country's NRT (Z-). Note that it is also [z
= x - m], where x and m are the vectors of each country's overall exports (X-) and
imports (M-), respectively.
The country-by-country financial network (F.j) yields the financial square matrix
F (Fjj = -Fjj; Fjj = 0), such that [f = Fu] is the vector of each country's NFT (F.). It
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follows that
(8a) z + f s  b
(b) u'z = u’f = u ’b = 0
8a displays the individual BIT in the world economy, and b is the vector of each 
authority's change in official reserves in the given period (Bj). 8b expresses the system
constraint that, by construction, the overall sums of Z, F and B all amount to nil.
It is interesting to note that the world network can be rearranged formally so that
the function of each economy (or group of economies) discussed above is singled out. In 
general, any pair of vectors z and f will contain some non-zero elements (Zj, F- *  0); by
means of elementary transformations^ it is possible to obtain the he mi symmetric 
matrices Z and F where (Z- £  0, Fy < 0; j > i, 0 elsewhere); that is to say, where each
element (a group of countries, in fact) is a R-economy from all the preceding ones and a
T-economy to all the following ones (Hilgerdt (1943)). It is intuitive that such matrices 
can be either of order 2 (whenever Zj, Fj * 0 for all i) or 3 (whenever Zj, Fj = 0 for
some i). The former case shows a bilateral pattern of world transfers, where we see a 
T-economy (Zy > 0, Fy < 0) face to face with a R-economy (Z^ = -Zy < 0, F ^  = -
Fy > 0). The latter case represents a trilateral pattern  of world transfers, since in
addition to R and T there will be a balanced economy such that (Z = F = 0). To fix
12ideas the two cases are reproduced in Tab. 1 .
Tab. 1. The bilateral and trilateral pattern of world transfers________________________
T ■° ^ > 0 ^  ‘ ---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
1
o s
f A O ---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
--
i
f t
N N I
I
*2 = F 2 = f2 =
R . *ZTR . - v
-F. TR 0 .-FT
T 0 * 2 ^ > 0 ' * r  ]
1
o • A
*
1
ft
Z 3 = * 0 * Z3 =
0 ; F3 = * o * f3 = 0
R
i ,"ZTR * 0 r-ZT s
’
* O -FT
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In the development of this work the above two patterns of world transfers will be
taken as the analytical benchmark. In a broad sense, the world transfer problem can
be defined as the problem of reducing a tangle of NxN individual relationships to one of
the two ordered scenarios under a given vector of constraints (e.g. b = 0). Indeed,
what does matter for each individual authority is overall and not bilateral, Z and F; at the
same time, each individual Z and F must find a place in the world network consistent 
with the system constraints 8a and 8b, and hence with either Z2 or Z y  Rigorously, the
transfer problem of no economy could be taken in isolation, however "small" we assume 
such an economy to be. A multilateral system typically involves some degree of 
intermediation, that is, bilateral deficits may be offset through surpluses with third 
countries. This is why a trilateral pattern emerges and is significant (when, of course, * 
are non-zero): because it makes explicit and simple what is implicit and complex in the 
full-blown network.
From the standpoint of the world transfer problem we also see that the conven­
tional treatment of capital movements in open macroeconomics is not entirely suitable for 
study of the adjustment of international payments in the system as a whole or even in the
individual economy. The first and most apparent reason is that only few kinds of capital
13transfers are considered; substantial shifts of financial means remain unmodelled . The 
second and more subtle reason is that on analytical grounds the point of the priority of 
financial means over production and trade is completely lost. Even in a Mundellian 
world, capital movements cannot be an endogenous variable in all countries 
simultaneously. Since there are N countries but only N-l independent balances, in at least 
one country the capital account cannot be determined endegonously so as to finance the 
trade balance. Rather, the opposite is true: the N-th country's capital account is 
exogenously given by the finance requirement of the rest of the world, and its own trade 
balance must be adjusted accordingly. Suppose the rest of world wishes to be the R- 
economy, Le. to run a trade deficit; then the N-th country must become the T-economy: it 
must provide an equivalent NFT deficit and NRT surplus in the same time unit The 
general implication of this view is that the economic performance of each individual
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country (and eventually of the system as a whole) is not fully self-determined dome­
stically, but it depends on the economy's function in the world network of transfers, and 
on changes in i t
2.2. The world economy in stationary state.
Following the methodology introduced in Part I (ch.II and ch.III), our first step 
will be to analyze the conditions of stationary state at the world level and to point out their 
implications at the individual economy level. To do this we only need two sets of 
equations, one showing the vector of GDFs, the other showing the vecor of BITs. The 
world economy is in stationary state in so far as each individual economy is in stationary 
state; from the latter conditions, which we already know (see ch.n, sec.2), we obtain by 
extension:
(9a) o - c - g - x  = 0
(b) z = f = 0 F- =0
The first set of equations states that GDP is wholly absorbed by private consumption, 
public consumption and exports for all economies; by implication, there is neither net 
saving nor net investment. Moreover, asset stock stationarity requires both the 
government budget and the NRT to be balanced; the NFT and all bilateral financial 
transfers must also be nil. We already know that under those conditions the domestic 
money stock is also stationary and sufficient to reproduce the economy through time; the 
same applies to the stock of international money for each economy and the world 
economy as a whole. Implicit in the above formulation is that all prices and exchange 
rates do not change over time (nominal and real magnitudes coincide), and that actual 
magnitudes that appear in the equations also coincide with expected ones.
As was already remarked in Part I, one of the key phenomena in the international 
economy -financial flows- cannot be ascribed to a stationary world; they involve, to a 
greater or lesser degree, adjustments somewhere in the system. This is an important 
achievement of stock analysis, one which has corrected previous conclusions drawn from 
flow analysis (the typical reference being Mundellian internal-external equilibria). The
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non-existence of financial transfers bears consequences upon internal-external equilibria
in individual economies which are worth discussing.
On first inspection of the stock-flow matrix one realizes that, at the stationary
level of prices (wages, interest rates, and exchange rates), the sole exogenous sources of
14output for the individual economy are public expenditure and exports . However, their 
stationary level must be such that (Gj = Tj, X. = Mj). Since the tax revenue (T-) and
the level of imports (Mj) are both a share of factor incomes (say t-, n r, respectively), it 
follows that
(10) Gj/tj = XjAnj
In other words, the exogenous sources of output (and factor incomes) must be exactly
offset by endogenous leakages from i t ^ .  In each economy, in the time unit, the foreign 
trade performance (X /n r) is to be taken as given exogenously. Therefore, the stationary
fiscal stance (Gj/tp must be constrained to be equal to the trade performance, after either
G- or Xj have been fixed. But taxation is an indirect argument of the private consumption
function, and should therefore be regarded as implicitly fixed in the current level of 
consumption. In conclusion, if G- is determined independently of (X-t/m-), say in order
to optimize output, then the economy is bound to incur a trade deficit (if Gj > X^t/nr) or
a trade surplus (if G- < Xjtj/mp. We may say that in stationary state the fiscal stance
bears the external constraint, and therefore output and income also turn out to be trade-
balance constrained. The consequences at the world level are noteworthy.
Domestic and world o u tp u t Each economy's foreign trade performance 
can be reduced to two structural parameters: the share of world trade (e-), and the share of
imports out of income (m-). Accordingly, the suitable expression for world trade is given
by the amount of world imports u'm. Each economy contributes to world trade by m-
and claims on it by e-. Hence the public expenditure constraint for each government is
(11) Gj = u'meit./m.
while GDP and world output will be (given that u'm  = u'x)
(12) Oj = u'm e^l + tj/m^it. + mp"* = u'me^/nij
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(13) u'o = ii'mSjEj/mj
Given the structural parameters (Ej, t., m.), GDP will depend on the level of world trade
u 'm . Ceteris paribus, an exogenous expansion in u 'm  allows for a proportional 
stationary expansion in Gj, O- and u'o. By contrast, modifications of (e-, m-) will feed
back onto u'm and therefore will activate a non-stationary adjustment that will have to be
examined under specific circumstances. Each economy's requirement of goods and
services from other economies appears to be a key factor of world output. However, to
the extent that the actual level of imports in turn depends on the level of output, a two-
way relationship is established, which is the delicate mechanism underlying contractions
and expansions in world economic activity^.
The dominant country. A second important point is that condition 11 also
embodies trade balance. As is well known, in the world system only n-1 external 
constraints are to be fulfilled, and hence only (n-l)G- are constrained. In one country,
often called the dom inant country, the government is free to fix expenditure 
independently^. Analytically, Gn can be considered the exogenous variable which
activates the whole system of output determination. It is easy to show that GDP in n will 
depend on Gn, whereas in all other countries it depends on E.. Moreover, to the extent
that n contributes to world trade, world output will also be proportional to Gn> Let kfl be
18the contribution of G„ to world trade (u'm = G k ); as a result n n n
(14) u 'o = G ^ C ^ e / m p  i = l...n
Clearly, the stationarity conditions imposed so far have no direct relation to the 
desired level and distribution of output by the residents of each country. The traditional 
presumption is that stationarity conditions imply subjective satisfaction. Today's general 
attitude among policy makers and advisors is that "full equilibrium" is "good" in itself. 
Were the world economy a collection of perfect markets, one could make appeal to the 
Two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. However, as was already noted in 
connection with the perfection failures examined in ch.I, the international economy is not
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a mere collection of national markets, no matter how markets are integrated. Political
sovereigns, and usually currency sovereigns, are still there; it is their duty to impose the
"foreign constraint" on home economic activity. My aim here is not to discuss conditions
of international general equilibrium; yet it is worth concluding this section by pointing out
a peculiar consequence of "foreign constraints" in the stationary case.
It has been observed (Kindleberger (1981)) that in a world economy subdivided
into political units, the dominant one should provide public goods. Some of these may be
like national public goods (the military defence of the whole system is typical), others are
essentially international in nature. As the above formulation shows, the level of world
trade, or world output, is one of the latter. Since the provision of national-like public 
goods turns into a greater Gn, the two kinds of public goods generally go hand in hand.
However, unlike a national sovereign, the dominant country has little, if any, power to
levy taxation on beneficiaries; as far as the direct cost of public goods is concerned, all
other countries are free riders by constitution. Thus the stationary world economy rests
on a fiscal agreement which is not mediated by taxation, but through redistribution of
policy instruments: the dominant government has full control over its own fiscal stance
(and hence world output), other governments have none.
Kindleberger concluded that international public goods are likely to be 
underproduced. His conclusion seems to follow from our analysis too. If Gn includes the
provision of international public goods, it should exceed the level necessary to satisfy n's
own demand for public goods. The first obstacle may be raised from n's taxpayers, who
19may perceive exploitation on the part of foreign beneficiaries . A second obstacle may
come from resource supply in n; there is no mechanism underlying equations 12-14 by
virtue of which the optimization of resource utilization in n is necessarily consistent with 
the same objective in all other countries. One reason is clear from equation 11; given GR,
20Gj cannot be assigned to optimizing domestic output .
2 3 . International transfers: the world economy in expansion.
As we already know, international transfers reveal that idle resources in one 
economy seek profitable employment elsewhere, possibly in economies which want
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resources . As we know, the existence of international flows entails ongoing stock 
adjustments in at least two economies. Strictly speaking, we should say that the violation 
of one or more flow-stock conditions is implied. As usual, disequilibrium situations are 
more interesting, but also more puzzling. Following an established tradition in the 
discipline, I shall adopt the class of non-stationary flow equilibria as reference 
point. Their fundamental characteristics are
(i) firms' planned and realized output coincide,
(ii) total financial wealth is constant in each economy.
The outstanding difference with respect to full equilibrium is clearly due to point
(ii), since it now allows for compensatory changes among specific asset stocks. For the
time being, I shall not be concerned with adjustment processes, but I shall examine the
properties of important patterns of payments with financial circulation.
Balanced Net Financial Transfers. The case of com patibility. Let us
think of a world economy where in a given time period there emerge conditions for
redistributing resources among individual economies, and let us consider that this process
takes place -as it should- through financial means. As already shown, there will be a 
group of T-economies with an excess of resources (S 'j  - D 'y = Zy > 0; F^ < 0) and
a group of R-economies with a lack of resources (S '^ - D '^  = < 0; F ^  > 0) (and
possibly a group of "intermediate" economies, F = Z = 0). R demand for, and T 
supply of, resources is compatible when:
(15a) Zj + Fj = 0 i = R ,T
(b) z + f = 0
which in fact implies (S j  - D 'y = D’^  - S^).
Provided that T export excess and R import excess are correctly anticipated in the
planned output, a non-stationary flow equilibrium occurs if financial wealth is constant in 
all economies (AA. = 0). In the first place, firms' flow equilibrium ensures that
(S. ss I.) or that inside private wealth is constant Then official reserves do not change
(B. = 0) as required by 15 if (Dj + Z. = 0, D. = -Zj = F. * 0). That is to say, the T
21
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government should be running a surplus equal to the trade surplus, while the R
government should be matching this with a deficit parallel to the trade deficit. Finally
there should be offsetting changes in outside wealth in both economies; namely, the T
private sector should be releasing domestic bonds at the same rate at which it embarks
foreign assets, with the R private sector performing just the opposite substitution (so long
as they are not involved in financial flows, intermediate economies are in full stationary
state). To sum up, income-expenditure flows are those desired by private units and
governments, overall stocks of assets and official reserves are kept constant, all
operations on asset markets are consistent The degree of unsteadiness depends on the
stock of government liabilities or the willingness to accumulate foreign assets in T, on the
22stock of foreign assets or die willingness to accumulate government debt in R .
Such a pattern of world transfers has long been the core of international 
economics and pursued as "the equilibrium position" of the system, though it cannot 
claimed to be such if "equilibrium” means stationarity. On the other hand, contrary to 
what the modem stock approach suggests, one's interest in that scenario is not 
misplaced, or better, it is not misplaced if one has a theory of non-neutrality of money 
and finance. Were money neutral, the case of world stationarity would be the only 
relevant one (while international economics would make little sense as a special disci­
pline). At most, one could dwell on demonstrating that money, if it exists, is
"internationally" distributed according to the requirements of the "natural" distribution of
23trades -a task accomplished by Ricardo a long time ago (1809) (see also above, ch.I, 
sec.4).
The question of compatibility between real and financial transfers is, quite the 
contrary, of prime importance if money is non-neutral. In the international perspective, 
the issue of non-neutrality was raised by Frish in two well-known articles as early as 
1934 and 1947. It also appeared in Keynes's General Theory in the largely unread 
chapter XXIH and was brought into full light in his Bretton Woods writings (1943-45) 
and in the related literature . Let me follow Frish's argument, which is so admirably 
akin to modem restatements of money non-neutrality as those followed in this work.
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Frish concentrates on an economy of production and trade which uses money and 
in which the monetary authority has full responsibility over international money. In a 
monetary economy, agents' uncertainty over sales on forward markets, or over the means 
of settlement of commitments, may jeopardize their willingness to buy or to commit 
themeselves to production for forward delivery (1947, p.538). In an open economy, 
production plans of the economy as a whole in the time unit give rise to an import flow of 
goods and services (including the provision of consumption goods for workers); this is 
analogous to a beginning-of-period borrowing denominated in foreign currency. 
Therefore, for the economy as a whole -that is, from the standpoint of the monetary 
authority- it is the current flow of exports that has to pay for the initial borrowing made 
through imports (both being denominated in foreign currency). Of course, in our 
terminology production plans at the going prices are feasible only if demand for, and 
supply of, production inputs across economies are compatible.
At the level of both the national and the international system, the necessity of the
equivalence between current proceeds and beginning-of- period borrowing is made
25effective by the banking system backed by the monetary authority . It seems quite 
natural to recall here the principles of precautionary behaviour set out in ch.I. Minimizing 
the probability of country default will call for a reserve accumulation programme 
commensurate with the variability of exports and with the import content of output. In the 
face of uncertainty over the level of current exports, or if current exports are actually 
falling, the period availability of international money fixes the maximum level of imports 
that the central bank can choose to allow the economy. Imports will have to be kept 
below expected exports in the course of the accumulation programme and in line with 
them thereafter. Frish (1934, pp.275-277; 1947, par.V) argued that an endogenous 
solution to the problem of cutting individual excess imports under the constraint 
[z = 0] may not emerge . Not only are deficit countries compelled to reduce their 
utilization of world production inputs, but their efforts, if implemented independently, 
will not converge to any stable solution (1947, pp.542 ff.).
This conclusion is one of lucid pessimism as to the possibility that n independent
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currency sovereigns are able to achieve a scenario of compatible utilization of real
resources. Note also the complementarity with the stationary case of par.2, where
stationarity allowed for only one independent fiscal authority. As is now well
understood, this kind of pessimism of Frish and the other economists mentioned above
was partly exacerbated by their neglect of financial flows. We have seen above that the
demand for NRT of some economies has a counterpart in the supply of NFT from some
others. When the two meet, R economies' constraints on import expenditure and
government expenditure are shifted upwards. Moreover, one should be stressed, in this
case the role of dominant country disappears; overall payments being kept in balance by 
NFT, the n G /s must fulfill the n (D. + Zj = 0). The level of world output is that
allowed for by domestic expenditures in all countries together given the amount of NFT 
from T to R.
In this perspective, Mundellian open macroeconomics was a U-turn towards 
optimism as it showed the possibility for any economy to finance the desired external 
deficit by means of appropriate assignment of policy instruments. The approach espoused 
by this work rather points to the fact that the utilization and circulation of real resources 
cannot take place independently of financial means and that this fact should be interpreted 
and modelled within a different framework of stock-flow interaction. Nonetheless, the 
case of compatible world transfers should still be regarded as a crucial one, both on 
positive and normative grounds. Little room is instead left for modem stationarity 
optimism.
U nbalanced Net F inancial T ransfers. The case of the dom inant 
cu rren cy . Suppose now that in the relevant period the NRT and NFT of some 
economies happen to be unbalanced, i.e.
(16a) Zj + F j - B .^ 0
(b) z + f = b 0
As long as (Dj + Z. = 0, so that AAj * 0) private sectors are essentially in the same
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position as before: at the desired levels of income-expenditure flows they should perform
offsetting substitutions in the stocks of government liabilities and foreign assets. The
crucial point is that one further stock is changing: the stock of official reserves in R vis a 
vis T economies (say > 0, By < 0).
In principle, all that can be said is that the present case is a "weaker" non- 
stationary state than the previous one. The general presumption is also that the reaction of 
monetary authorities (especially in reserve- losing economies) is likely to be quick; but of 
course there are no a priori arguments which ensure that the reaction of R central bank to 
the overflow of T currency should be faster than the reaction of T asset holders to the 
overflow of R liabilities in the previous case. History suggests that the opposite may be 
true. The case is worthy of consideration because it stresses the role played by 
institutional factors, such as the function of currencies in the international system.
The willingness of R central bank to accept T currency is clearly a matter of 
portfolio choice. As we know from ch.I, the portfolio role of currency is closely related 
to the nature of general means of payment. By extension, a national currency can be 
accepted in foreign official portfolios to the extent that it is acceptable as international 
means of payment. However, unlike national currencies, international currencies cannot 
achieve the status of perfectly liquid assets; threats may come from exchange-rate 
variability and legal restrictions to convertibility. The matter is not only one of economic 
calculus; as the establishment of a unique national currency involves an institutional 
element (see above ch.I, sec.4), so does the establishment of an international currency 
(Hamada (1977)). As usual, I shall not analyze this particular aspect, but I shall 
concentrate on the characteristics of such a scenario.
In one respect the issuer of the international currency gains the power of any
currency sovereign, namely "seignorage". However, some aspects are specific to the
27international context . The most apparent of these is that the international issuer faces no 
BIT constraints: not because of Walras Law, but thanks to seignorage. This fact brings 
us back to the the same institutional framework as that of the dominant country. In fact it 
is a commonplace that the consequence of seignorage is unconstrained government
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expenditure; this fits into our framework since it may be that, given (Fy < 0), T obtains 
(By < 0) because Dy is too small a surplus (and hence Zy is too small a surplus too). 
However the other possibility should not be overlooked -i.e. that the private Fy is too 
large in relation to the given Dy (Zy). Both public and private transfers may take
advantage from seignorage. Moreover, there are advantages for third parries too. To the
extent that the dominant country exploits seignorage to enlarge government expenditure,
all participants in the system may gain for the reasons already shown in the stationary
case; they also gain -for the reasons shown in the balanced-transfers case- if seignorage
leads to larger private transfers from the dominant country; finally, the overflow of T
currency, to the extent that it is acceptable, meets R central banks' precautionary demand
for liquid assets. Thus the resulting scenario lends itself to a two-fold interpretation: 
either (By < 0) is due to spendthriftness of the sovereign or it is due to parsimony (or
28free riding) of subjects .
2.4. A note on sustainability.
The analysis of patterns of world transfers in this section has been mainly 
taxonomical and static-comparative. The institutional dimension of world scenarios, 
which is usually neglected, has also been emphasized. One important issue has been that 
financial flows violate stationarity conditions, and yet may be associated with greater 
international benefits with respect to a stationary world economy- On the other hand, it is 
certainly true that the so-called problem of sustainability moves to the front of the 
theoretical stage. Since this study concerns the correlation between capital and goods 
movements, in a sense it concentrates on how world scenarios are bom -and whether 
transfers are balanced or not- rather than on how long they will survive. Indeed, though 
the two issues do relate one to the other, the latter involves extended analysis of long-run 
factors and is now developing into a special branch. In this paragraph I only wish to 
make some observations from the transfer-problem standpoint.
On the premise that, for a given world pattern, flows of resources match the 
levels desired by all public and private agents, the degree of sustainability will depend on 
the limits on compensatory substitutions among stocks that have been identified above.
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This is a simple and general principle. However, it is of prime importance in so far as it
29tells us what we should look at in each scenario relative to a specific theory .
In his above-mentioned work Frish viewed the world transfer problem as one of 
incompatibility among country preferences over real resources utilization. It was in the 
Ricardian spirit of that age to regard modifications in such preferences as hardly feasible, 
or scarcely desirable anyhow (see also Keynes (1919, 1929)). Moreover, Frish warned 
that an endogenous solution of the problem may not exist. He thus proposed an 
interesting measure of the degree of incompatibility in a given pattern of NRT -that he 
called "absolute skewness" (1947, p.542)- given by the total amount of negative elements 
(deficits) in vector z. By extension, also interesting is the measure of "relative skewness" 
(8) as the ratio of absolute skewness to world trade, i.e.
s = u 'z '/u ’m z = [z. < 0]
The higher the relative skewness in the international economy, the heavier the weight of
adjustment in real terms. On Frish's premise that an international lending plan cannot
exert corrections on skewness, s may also express a measure of the unsustainability of a
given pattern of NRT (1947, p.543).
It has already been observed that the idea according to which the real requirement
of R-type economies could not, at least temporarily, be sustained by financial means
flowing from T-type economies was based on an artificial separation between real and
financial activity. Moreover, the alleged inability of financial transfers to modify the
utilization of real resources has to be investigated, and has in fact become the leading
theme of transfer theory. We have seen that when NRT and NFT do make up a network
of compatible world transfers, T must absorb, wholly or in part, R issue of debt per unit
of time. In a portfolio view (see above, ch.m , sec.3), the limit to sustainability arises
from the return rate to R debt in relation to its stock in foreign portfolios. Since the return
rate must discount the future price, i.e. the debtor's ability to service the debt, the
30fundamental factor is therefore the expected debt-service . We also know that in order 
to maintain compatibility conditions among transfers, in the absence of further borrowing
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the future debt service must be piad out of a trade surplus (that is, the R and T positions 
should be switched in the long run). Therefore, a pattern of compatibile transfers is 
sustainable as long as the rate at which T lends to R, and the return rate to R debt, 
compensate for T asset-holders' probability of default, i.e. R probability of not being 
able to generate a future trade suplus commensurate with the future capital income 
transfer. Once again, the latter circumstance amounts to a typical transfer problem that, 
we shall see, has various possible solutions involving various possibile adjustment 
variables. As a consequence, it cannot be taken for granted that there should be only one 
rational time path of T lending and of the adjustment variable(s) involved in the future R 
transfer problem.
An important instance of non-stationarity has been seen in the case of unbalanced 
transfers under a dominant currency. The peculiarity of this form of non-stationarity with 
respect to balanced transfers lies in that part of overall financial transfers from T to R 
consisting of international currency or official assets accruing to the coffers of R central 
banks. Apparently, not only is the scenario unsteady in the future, but it should even be 
unsustainable in the present. The arguments in the paragraph on the dominant currency 
suggest that sustainability cannot be analyzed successfully as if all the parties involved 
were like the impersonal and atomistic agents of pure theory. Overflows of the dominant 
currency are acceptable by R central bank at the rate compatible with the likelihood that,
and in so far as, that currency performs the function of international means of payment.
31In a given time period, the critical variables for R are therefore two :
that is, the cumulated flows of T currency in relation to the existing stock of assets held
by R central bank, and in relation to the existing stock of assets held by T central bank.
The former is a standard portfolio share; the latter is a usual indicator of solvency. A 
classical measure for B6y  is provided by gold (Triffin (1960))^ . As Triffin’s early
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two ratios: in fact, the international stock of T currency should not fall short of R
precautionary demand nor should it grow higher than the convertibility ratio. In a 
forward-looking attitude, however, the assessment of B6y  should also discount the
future current-account position of T (Minsky (1979)). To the extent that T displays a 
positive NRT now, B6y  may be expected to grow steadily with Z lBy . Since it is
obvious that the evolution of the convertibility ratio can be re-expressed as
t' > t
the expectation of a worsening in T transfer performance brings about a fall in T solvency 
and in the actual sustainability of the system, whereas the opposite expectation (or even 
the expectation of unchanging transfer performance) sustains both T solvency and the 
existing transfers pattern.
With due care we may extract from the foregoing considerations the general
principle that the sustainability of today's world transfers pattern depends on the forecast
of tomorrow's world transfer problem. It goes without saying that the latter problem is
closely related to the former, even if one thinks of financial transfers as water flowing on
stones, one should admit that in the long run water does reshape stones. We have seen
that in the paradigmatic case, a T (lending) economy and a R (borrowing) economy
should in the long run take each other's place; as is well known, and as the transfer
theory helps to show, that should happen if R makes (or T supervises) the correct use of
borrowed capitals. For this aspect the transfer approach is akin to the so-called "balance-
of-payments stages hypothesis". A continually sustainable international system is one in
which R and T BIT cycles are perfectly synchronized. As is intuitive and will be seen
from some historical examples below, turning points are critical. If it is rational that a
NFT should flow only into economies which are expected to have a positive NRT, the
33most critical point is the one where the T-economy is entering the R-economy stage 
As is exemplified by the dominant currency problem just discussed, a successfull transfer 
from T to R may progressively erode T solvency thus making its position unsustainable 
at the turning point and creating a discontinuity in the cycle.
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3. World transfer problems: Lessons from history.
3.1. Transferring purchasing power. The birth of modern finance 
and trade
"Never has there been international trade without movements of capital". This 
statement by John Williams in 1929, one which marked a fruitful period of theoretical 
and historical reappraisal in international economics, draws our attention to the fact that 
the evolution of the modem economy (by which I mean over the last six centuries) has 
been characterized by the joint development of financial and commercial circulation.
During the dynamic phase of the commercial revolution towards the end of the 
13th century, which paralleled the resurgence of monetary economies, princes, merchants 
and manufacturers came up against a formidable obstacle: the shortage of metallic 
currencies. The statesmen of those days (the economist had not yet been bom) realized 
something that would become taboo (much more in theory than in practice) to their 
liberist successors: the availability of precious metals could increase less rapidly than 
trade and industry would require, principally because the latter would call for large- scale 
advances. Scant trust was placed in the self-regulatory mechanism of metal prices. 
Instead, sophisticated techniques were devised for the management of what is today 
called the monetary base: firstly by taking care of a positive balance of payments, then by 
manipulating the coinage, and finally by economizing metal currency with the help of 
substitutes.
The joint operations by merchants, bankers and money-changers in order to
facilitate credit payments lead one to think that the linkage among credit, increase in
purchasing power and sales of goods must had been understood quite clearly: "In the
34commercial world credit reigned supreme" (P.Jones) . According to Cipolla's acute 
interpretation (1982, pp.14-15), at the outset of the 14th century Florence represented a 
dominant and developed economy standing between the kingdoms of North and South 
Europe, such as Britain and Naples ("two definitely underdeveloped countries"), which 
prompted exports of manufactured goods by means of commercial credit while it financed 
imports of raw materials thanks to the "offshore" deposit service offered by Florentine
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banks. Quite interestingly, the sand in the wheels was thrown from the financial side; in 
particular, chains of bankruptcies among Northern indebted sovereigns (who had 
dissipated credits in unproductive uses, especially wars) dried up the fuel of Florentine 
export industry and, at the one and the same time, undermined the solvency of its banks 
and their ability to attract foreign capitals (Cipolla (1982, pp.13 ff.)).
Although a modem economist might define the first two centuries of the Merchant 
Age (the 13th and the 14th) as ones of "high capital mobility", the subsequent period 
from the 15th to the 18th century saw a determined effort towards nationalization of 
finance: not in the modem sense of direct management by the state, but consequent on the 
concept of "national interest", in the name of which merchant-financiers -often 
descendants of Adam Smith's "citizens of no country"- were called upon to offer their 
services to newborn nation-states. If the practice of private outbound lending declined, 
this was because the capitals required for trade expansion rode on the ships of the great 
Companies -the financial innovation of that age. These capital movements would be 
recorded in modem accounting as "government transfers" (military or otherwise) and 
"direct investments".
3.2. The sterling system and the gold standard
The structure of world trade and finance inherited from the Imperial Age affected
35the European industrial revolution to a considerable extent . If one fails to bear this 
legacy in mind, one finds it difficult to account for the singular fact that the "the 
workshop of the world", Great Britain, during most of the 19th century never regained a 
surplus in merchandise trades; but neither did it incur a deficit in the overall balance (see 
below, App.A.l, tab.l)). During the first half of the century a number of unorthodox 
economists advanced the hypothesis that investments and loans made by the mother 
country were insufficient to encourage imports from colonies (see Hobsbawm 
(1968, ch. VII)); during the second half of the century that hypothesis was no longer 
tenable. The fundamental role played by financial (non-gold) flows, especially to and 
from London, in the development and stabilization of the gold standard has progressively 
emerged from a number of studies in the last decades; these all agree that the gold-
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standard should be redefined as a sterling system
From 1870 to 1889 Great Britain invested some 1.3 billions pounds abroad, at a 
pace of 65 million a year -a sum which were almost worth 23% of commodity exports; 
between 1890 and 1914 foreign investment surged to 2.7 billions pounds, averaging 108 
millions each year and 26% of commodity exports (De Cecco (1975) and below, 
App.A.l, tab.l). Recipient countries were no longer only Britain's colonies, but also 
countries in North America, South America and Europe. Over the whole period, 
however, interests and dividends (an annual average of 100 million pounds) were by 
themselves more than enough to compensate for the deficit in goods and services (an 
average of -19.6 million pounds per year); on the other hand, residual excess supply of 
pounds from foreigners was almost negligible as foreigners largely re-deposited their 
balances in London. As a result, the British BIT was always kept positive or broke even.
If we refer back to the patterns of world transfers described earlier, the gold
standard can be seen as a trilateral system of balanced transfers (see in particular
Hilgerdt (1943) and below, App.A.l, tab.2). Great Britain was the R country in the
system; it absorbed net real and financial resources from the rest of the world and was
thus able to neglect its "fundamental disequilibrium". Great Britain's debtor countries -the
T countries in the system, mainly located in the Southern hemisphere- were able to
service their debts thanks to their sales of primary goods.chiefly in the newly
industrializing areas of Europe and North America, which compensated for them by their
37surpluses of manufactured goods towards Great Britain .
It is remarkable that such a pattern reached its greatest degree of stability when the 
pivot R country became a chronic dependent country as to real resources; its absorption 
being adjusted to the yearly world rent. Great Britain acted as the determinant of the 
world trade level. At the same time, the sterling pound had de facto the status of 
international money, and as a "bank", Great Britain offered absolute safety to those who 
came "even from the Moon” to deposit to London. Yet such a situation sharply contrasts 
with those general principles of sustainability according to which the currency issuer -or 
the "world bank"- has to perform a trade surplus, or that R countries should be expected
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to become T countries in the long run. This seems to confirm that the scope for absolute 
principles in this matter is very limited. One reason for the British peculiarity may be that, 
as the world currency sovereign, it did not exploit seignorage on a large scale and the
'IQ
world was not flooded with British paper (e.g. McKinnon (1988)) . However, further
explanations should be sought for worldwide neglect of Britain's inability to turn itself 
into a T economy. An explanation may be found in the composition of Britain's NFT: it 
consisted largely of income transfers and short-term capital transfers from the rest of the 
world. The former component -which was the trailer of the latter- indicated that the 
dominant country was not living beyond its own means as a foolish debtor: it was living 
like an affluent rentier. There was no British transfer problem in the reasonable future.
3.3. The inter-war reshuffle.
After the First World War the structure of Britain's foreign payments did not 
change substantially at least until the end of the 1920s. However, this was not the case of 
the conditions for financial sustainability. From the world transfer problem viewpoint of 
the collapse of the gold-standard and the inter-war international crisis, the well-known 
issue of competitive deflation and beggar-my-neighbour policies should not be kept 
separate from the issue of the reshuffling of world financial transfers. I shall only 
emphasize two outstanding events in this respect.
First came the German transfer problem of war reparations. From 1919 to 1924
German war payments were primarily effected in kind (provisions of finished goods and
raw materials), while financial installments became prominent between 1924 (Daws Plan,
revised in 1929 by Young) and 1932 (year of the official cessation of payments instead of
the established 1988). Between 1924 and 1932 Germany paid slightly more than 11
billion marks in various forms, about 1.4 billion a year, estimated to be close to 2.5% of
national income and 6.5% of foreign trade. In 1924-28 the annual average NRT was
negative (-1.4 billion marks) vis & vis reparation payments by 1.2 billion marks. In
1929-32 the NRT turned into positive by practically the same amount as reparation
39payments (about 1.4 billion marks per year) .
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than a decade; it also became a paradigmatic exercise in the transfer theory^. Although it 
did not grow to a dramatic quantitative dimension, the German problem represented an 
important qualitative turning point in the European economy -one of which few became 
aware at the time (Keynes (1919, 1929)). In the sterling system described above, 
Germany was one of the economies that provided intermediation for the transfer problem 
between Southern primary economies and the final consumer mother country. Under the 
pressure of export-oriented transfer policy, and as a result of a longer trend in 
industrialization, Germany turned out to be an aggressive exporting economy. Moreover 
-as Ohlin pointed out (1929)- Germany never displayed such a huge negative NFT as 
was expected; large capital inflows from North- Eastern Europe, as well as from Great 
Britain and the United States, witnessed that a new European pole had been bom, both in 
the allocation of financial resources and in the production of real ones. The brilliant 
transfer performance of Germany after 1929, which some saw as proof of the 
"malleability" of transfer problems (Machlup (1963)), was in fact obtained at the cost of 
giving up foreign capitals and of severe domestic slump (Webb (1988)). Both measures 
interfered heavily with the emerging pattern of trades and exacerbated Europe's 
destabilization, thus partly vindicating Keynes’s disapproval of the Peace Treaty.
A second, even more revolutionary modification took place in the group of 
intermediaries. The United States turned into a typical T economy, a net exporter of 
goods and capitals with cumulation of large quantities of gold. More importantly, in the 
expansionary cycle 1922-29 the outlets of US goods and capitals conflicted with those of 
Great Britain and eventually displaced them. A large R-arca had to be created anew, while 
both newly industrializing European economies and Southern primary economies were 
pursuing positive NRT. Since Kindleberger (1937, and 1984, ch.XV)), Brown (1940) 
and Nurkse (1944), the "financial" interpretation of the inter-war crisis has related it to 
the struggle for currency dominance; a struggle fought more on the field of ''hot money" 
than on the field of long term capital transfers^*. Great Britain was herself a major 
importer from the United States. The dollar began to compete with the pound as the 
invoicing and numeraire cunency of international payments. While the progressive
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depletion of Britain's comfortable capital rent unvealed the weakness of its foreign trade, 
hot money ceased to behave as the willing hand-maiden to London's discount rate and 
entered the world scene as an independent force in the stabilization of the balance of 
payments.
There is, however, something more to be told about the long-run evolution of 
sustainability of the sterling system -something which is relevant to the issue of 
sustainability in general. Newly-industrialized exporters in Europe and America had 
largely benefited from British direct investments; hence -as Feis noted (1930)- that part of 
the world transfer problem had been successfully accomplished. Yet at the cyclical 
turning point when Great Britain moved into the stage of world importer, international 
financial funds broke the cyclical path on the expectation of British trade deficits. Here 
we have an example of the kind of difficulties envisaged above (sec.2.4) that may disrupt 
smooth BIT cycles. It was at this juncture that the lack of an orderly distribution of 
financial resources, and of a dominant currency, was most acutely felt in the international 
economy; national selfish interest did not find harmonization, as was explained by 
Frish’s analysis of unsustainable requirements of real resources.
3.4. The dollar system under fixed exchange rates.
The dominant country that presided over the reconstruction of a sustainable world
scenario after World War II was the United States. As in post-Napoleonic Britain, this
reconstruction came about on the basis of the the long-term financial structure that had
been established during the preceding period. However, unlike the Britain of the sterling
42system, the United States of the dollar system was still the world T-economy ; the 
corresponding R-economy had been created by the war in Europe and the break-up of 
empires in the South. A second difference lay in the fact that the circuit of transfers had 
changed from being trilateral to bilateral All the parties concerned (principally, the United 
States, Europe and the then-developing countries) showed both NRT and NFT 
imbalances. The third and most important difference was that the United States, which 
transferred capitals (primarily government and military transfers, and direct investments) 
and goods to Europe and the developing countries, very soon had a NRT that lagged
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behind the NFT. The US "transfer gap" -as it was aptly named by Machlup (1969)- was 
half a billion dollar a year between 1951 and 1957, it grew threefold to 1.6 billions yearly 
in 1958-69, and in 1971, when the dollar inconvertibility and the end of Bretton Woods 
Agreements were declared, the gap amounted to 30.5 billion dollars.
The dollar system clearly belongs to the class of bilateral unbalanced transfers
described in sec.2.3. That system held for more than twenty years thanks to the US
dollar status as reserve -or as we named it, dominant- currency (indeed, most theorizing
on transfer patterns and sustainability is tailored on the dollar system). By virtue of the
adoption of a paper reserve currency virtually free of a gold base, the world transfer
system ushered in a new order in the pattern of financial transfers, thus freeing the
43productive energies that had been bound by the convulsions of the previous system 
However the qualitative and quantitative differences mentioned above emerged once again 
in the form of a collapse in the conditions of financial sustainability. According to 
Triffin's analysis recalled in sec.2.6, the mass of short-term US liabilities (hot money 
once again) had exceeded its critical ratio with the gold reserves which should formally 
have provided an anchor for i t  As others have added, a correct forward-looking attitude 
towards the US transfer problem should see the erosion of the US NRT as the critical 
factor (e.g. Minsky (1979)). In any case, traditional wisdom would say that whereas 
international lenders in the sterling system had sanctioned the rentier position of the R 
country, in the dollar standard they sanctioned the unproductive excess of seignorage of 
the T country (the waste of money during the Vietnam War is paradigmatic).
It should be added that, as in the case of the sterling system, the crisis in the 
dollar system broke out at the cyclical turning point of the dominant country's BIT. 
Similarly to what happened to Great Britain, the United States had a substantial share of 
its export capacity eroded by its own direct investments in former R-economies (Machlup 
(1969) gives an excellent account of this process). One may note that US financial 
transfers had been unable to open an adequate R-area of developing countries (Biasco 
(1984)), but it seems clear that the US-Europe transfer had been successful (perhaps too 
successful); nevertheless conditions of supply of financial means did not allow for a
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smooth switchover between United States and Europe.
3.5. The world transfer problem under flexible exchange rates.
The 1973 declaration of fluctuation of the dollar marked the beginning of the 
present-day scenario. The choice in favour of fluctuation was tantamount to admitting that 
the ex-ante international pattern of real resources and of financial ones were not 
compatible with the given terms of trade. Policy-makers in industrial countries believed 
that floating exchange rates, by linking trade imbalances to financial flows, and by 
correcting trade imbalances in the long run, would have taken care of the problem of the 
financial requirements and of the financial sustainability of the system. The message of 
adherents to the new stock approach was, in this respect, full of promise (Kenen 
(1985, sec.4)). At the same time, producers of raw materials, led by the OPEC cartel, 
went to the heart of the same problem by changing the terms of trade in their favour in 
order to obtain the monetary means they lacked; they got what they wanted, albeit 
through the world intermediation of the US banking system.
As I have said in the previous paragraph, such dramatic changes at the 
institutional level took place at the turning point of the pattern of world transfers: midway 
through the 1970s (not the 1980s) the United States had become the R-economy of the 
system and had come to assume structural features similar to those of Great Britain a 
century earlier. By 1976-77 the long-term NFT had turned to positive (i.e. an inflow) by 
more than 4 billion dollars per year, in 1978 the overall NFT (inclusive of short-term 
capital movements) also became positive by 2.1 billion dollars. Since then the US 
absorption of world financial resources has increased constantly, reaching 111 billion in 
1986. The main items and sources of the NFT towards the United States have been 
capital income from developing countries (up to 1983), direct and portfolio investments, 
and short-term capitals from Europe and Japan (since 1981). Hence, whereas Great 
Britain was a rentier, the United States has become a pure debtor. The absorption of real 
resources has progressed at a similar pace: the first US NRT deficit, the first in a series 
that lasted without interruption to the present day, fell in 1976 when it scored 9.5 billion 
dollars; it reached 144 billion in 1986.
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The free fluctuation of the key currencies has, almost by definition, eliminated 
transfer gap problems thus re-establishing the R-economy role in the system -the famous 
"locomotive". On the other hand, anyone sees that the change of exchange-rate regime 
has hardly solved the "skewness" in real resources requirements inherited from the 
previous phase; rather, the new regime has complied with i t  The lesson to be learnt from 
the 1980s, one that still needs studying in depth, is that exchange rates have been 
rendered endogenous in the process of world transfer of resources (Dombusch (1987)). 
Moreover, an important part of the story lies in the vicious (virtuous?) circle of NFT- 
revaluadon-NRT that has pivoted on the dollar, with sizeable effects on both financial and 
real transfers towards the United States (Biasco (1987), Tamborini (1987)). Hopefully, 
the next three chapter of this work may contribute to our understanding of the issue.
A second important aspect is that, until a stationary state is reached, the flexible
rates regime can modify (possibly ease) the transfer problem, but cannot eliminate the
underlying question of sustainability; and the critical point is still the asset-liability
structure of the R-economy. In 1973 the dollar system collapsed since no one was able to
sustain the transition of the United States to being the R-economy. As the dollar was
peaking in mid-1985, some analysts warned that the ongoing pattern of world transfers in
favour of the United States was still unsustainable (Frankel (1985), Krugman (1985));
the dollar was running inconsistently with the trend necessary to generate a NRT surplus
to pay for the US external debt. Furthermore, on the eve of the international financial
crisis of October 1987, the United States as the "world bank" was virtually illiquid -just
44as it was fifteen years ago when the dollar was declared inconvertible (Triffin (1987)) 
There are signs that the crisis of 1987 was not an isolated accident, but, more than a 
cyclical downturn within a stable scenario of international economic functions and 
institutions, the beginning of a change of scenario, the features of which are still 
largely hidden from view. One of the pieces of the puzzle will be the United States' 
ability to pay for external debt, or even further, its ability to give up the role of world R- 
economy in favour of East-European and Southern economies. The interested reader may 
look at the analytic contribution of the following chapters in this perspective.
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Tab.2 The world transfer network in the 1920s (Millions of US dollars, f.o.b., 1928)
A. The triangular trade matrix (Net Balances) 
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Tab. 6 General price indexes of major industrial countries, 1953-1984 (1953*100)
United
States
Japan France Germany Italy Great
Britain
1953 100 100 100 100 100 100
1954 101 105 101 100 103 101
1955 103 106 102 101 106 104
1956 106 112 109 105 111 111
1957 110 119 111 108 113 114
1958 112 117 106 112 116 120
1959 115 120 92 114 116 122
1960 117 127 95 116 118 124
1961 118 137 99 126 121 128
1962 120 142 103 132 128 133
1963 122 148 110 136 139 136
1964 124 155 114 141 148 139
1965 125 158 115 145 154 146
1966 130 164 121 151 159 153
1967 134 174 125 152 164 155
1968 140 183 130 155 166 139
1969 147 194 131 163 173 147
1970 155 208 130 191 184 158
1971 163 225 138 215 201 178
1972 170 272 159 246 226 196
1973 179 339 196 316 252 206
1974 194 381 202 347 268 226
1975 213 404 254 386 314 272
1976 224 429 250 390 290 253
1977 237 501 266 439 326 280
1978 255 672 320 528 386 341
1979 276 659 371 602 457 434
1980 303 656 421 635 537 567
1981 331 690 362 531 479 554
1982 351 625 339 518 470 513
1983 364 376 320 508 483 468
1984 377 663 298 464 462 428
Source: Aquino (1986, tab. 14)
Tab. 5 Wholesale national price indexes of major northern
trading partems, 1814-1913, selected years (1913=100)
United
States
Great
Britain
Germany France Italy
1814 178 178 129 132 a
1849 80 90 71 96
1872 133 125 111 124
1896 67 76 71 71 74
1913 100 100 100 100 100
a * 1820
Source: Triftin (1969),
Tab. 7 The general price level and the real exchange 
rate of the United States relative to major 
trading partners, 1953-1984 (1953*100)
Tab. 8 The general price level and the real 
exchange rate of Italy relative to major 
trading partners, 1953-1984 (1953*100)
RGPL RER RGPL
1953 100 100 1953 100
1954 101 98 1954 99
1955 101 96 1955 98
1956 105 94 1956 98
1957 104 92 1957 100
1958 102 90 1958 98
1959 97 85 1959 98
1960 100 85 1960 100
1961 105 85 1961 101
1962 107 85 1962 100
1963 111 86 1963 96
1964 113 87 1964 93
1965 115 85 Ì965 91
1966 115 84 1966 92
1967 114 82 1967 93
1968 111 81 1968 91
1969 111 79 1969 92
1970 113 80 1970 93
1971 116 82 1971 93
1972 128 87 1972 93
1973 145 94 1973 98
1974 149 93 1974 102
1975 153 89 1975 100
1976 151 84 1976 109
1977 157 86 1977 108
1978 171 93 1978 108
1979 174 90 1979 102
1980 174 92 1980 96
1981 155 77 1981 101
1982 143 70 1982 100
1983 138 67 1983 96
1984 128 63 1984 98
RER
100
101
108
119
118
122
131
128
136
139
131
130
136
139
140
139
139
140
139
140
151
149
144
156
149
157
154
144
149
152
154
157
Source: Elaborations on Aquino (1986, tab. 12) Source: Elaborations on Aquino (1986, tab. 12)
Tab. 9 The nom inal and r e a l  exchange r a t e  
o f th e  U nited S ta te s  1975-7988 (1980 * 100)
Nominal R eal
1975 93,7 90
1976 89,1 87
1977 89,5 89
1978 97,9 99
1979 100,1 101
1980 100,0 100
1981 88,7 89
1982 79,4 79
1983 75,1 77
1984 70,7 71
1985 68,4 68
1986 85,3 85
1987 97,4 98
1988 103,8 103
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Notes
(1) Machlup (1943, 1969) develops all the statistical and technical details that I have kept here at a 
simplified level.
(2) As is well known, the former enter the current account in addition to the trade balance, whereas the 
latter form the capital account.
(3) We are therefore excluding government transfers in kind from analysis.
(4) It should be stressed again that the organization of NFT in this work is for the purpose of theoretical 
analysis, and as such it is far from being exhaustive on statistical and empirical grounds. The reader is 
referred to Machlup (1943) for a thorough treatment. In particular, Machlup points out where the 
transformation of the standard balance of payments into the BIT may be misleading. He argues quite 
correctly that not all figures in "Non Official Capital Movements'1 qualify as "Net Financial Transfers"; 
some of these (like inter-bank swaps and all forms of lagged payments) do not involve an effective 
monetary payment; others (like commercial credits) are actually "induced" by trade transactions. One may 
observe that even these items still exert an autonomous financial effect on budget constraints, in spite of 
the absence of effective shipments of means of payments. For instance, if an importer lags his payment 
abroad, his own (or his bank's) corresponding debt position amounts to shifting his ability to spend (or 
his bank's ability to lend) upwards. Be that as it may, we shall not consider these particular aspects 
explicitly.
(5) This measure is widely employed in the literature on the transfer of international debts; see e.g. Webb 
(1988).
(6) For the time being the change in quantities and the change in prices are taken to be two independent 
measures. Recall that (8) is the rate of change of a variable x defined as [dx/x^].
(7) The real transfer burden was first defined by Mill (1844) and Taussig (1920) who drew attention to the 
aspect of redirection of real resources entailed by international financial transfers.
(8) Important insights into changes in import prices as a transfer problem can be found in some works 
on the oil shock (esp. Balogh (1978), Balogh- Graham (1979)). Devaluation was explicidy examined as a 
transfer problem by Johnson (1956).
(9) Note that in order to identify a network of payments the definition of "receiver" and "transfer- 
economy" adopted here is more general than the usual one of "creditor” and "debtor" or, what amounts to 
the same thing, of "lending" and "borrowing" economy. In fact, the former are based on the current sign 
of the economy's Z and F (flows), whereas the latter are based on its cumulated net financial position 
(stock) or on the "motivation" of capital flows. Thus a creditor economy may be a T-economy, when 
lending abroad, as well as a R-economy, when enjoying earnings from previous lending, and vice versa a 
debtor economy. On the other hand, neither Ts  must all be lenders, nor R's must all be borrowers; some 
T may also be debt payers, whereas some R may be rentiers.
(10) The methodological reference is to Hilgerdt (1942,1943), Frish (1947), Tinbergen (1964), Metzler 
(1966), Goodwin (1980).
(11) For instance by adding up rows thus obtaining "regions" instead of individual countries: £.Z. for all
Z. > 0, I .Z . for all Z. < 0, etc.. 
i J J J
(12) For some historical examples see sec.3 below.
(13) Capital movements in conventional open macroeconomics are essentially the portfolio component of 
Capital Transfers in the BIT, with the inclusion in a few, more sophisticated models of the direct-
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investment component (compare e.g. Dombusch (1980, chs.X-XI) with De Macedo-Tobin (1980)). 
Further important observations on this point have been made by Machlup (1964, Part V; 1972).
(14) In fact, in equilibrium, GDP is wholly exhausted by factor incomes, and after-tax factor incomes are 
wholly spent in domestic consumption and imports. The former is therefore equivalent to (Y* - T - M). 
For simplicity's sake, we are now taking public consumption to be equal to public expenditure, that is to 
say we are assuming zero interest payments. On this point see above, ch.III, sec.4.1.
(15) For detailed treatment of this point see Godley-Cripps (1983, pp.296-ff).
(16) See e.g. Cripps (1978) and below sec.2.3.
(17) "One country, firm or person dominates another when the other has to take account of what the first 
entity does, but the first can ignore the second" (Kindleberger (1981, p.185)). Kindleberger attributes the 
concept of dominance to Professor Francois Perroux, of the Collège de France. Balogh's pioneering 
contributions in the field should also be mentioned (see e.g. 1963)).
(18) If G is set independently n will have [O = (u’me + G )(t + m )* ]^. If (u'm = G k ), thenn n n n n n  n n
[O = G (1 + k e )(t + m )**]. The fact that (O m = G k e ) for whatever G , implies n n n n 'v n n ' v n n n n n ' n ' v
(k = m /e t ) and (O t = G ) at the same time, for whatever positive t . This fact also entails that n n n n  n n n  n
(Ofl = Gnkn£n/mn); suppose initially that 13 expresses total output of the first n-1 countries, then by 
adding Or to 13 one obtains 14.
(19) As a response, a cut in xr would rise kn> but would also reduce the share of domestic public goods
in the given Gr . A more acceptable solution will be a cut in the share of international public goods. For
instance, President Reagan's idea of simultaneously cutting taxation and expanding the supply of world 
military defence has driven the US budget into a huge deficit. The Bush Administration hais promised to 
reverse the course of action.
(20) The literature on instability and breakdowns of dominance is now expanding. See again Kindleberger 
(1981) and Padoan (1986, chs.II-III).
(21) If one is prepared to accept as a possible conclusion of the previous paragraph that a world stationary 
economy may involve maldistribution of resources (if not global underutilization), one may regard 
international transfers as a way to escape from that state (a way quite similar to lump sum transfers in 
welfare theory or, on the private side, similar to shifts of resources from savers to investors).
(22) Tumovsky (1981, ch.XI.4) and others regard the above situation as one of full stationarity allowed 
for by "perfect" capital mobility, provided that the government budget is financed by means of bonds 
only, thus leaving the money stock unchanged. As a matter of fact, T private sector is called upon to 
accommodate R public bonds by the whole amount. Moreover, whereas standard open macroeconomics 
focuses on outside money, we have seen in ch.III that inside money will vary to the extent that savers 
choose to allocate some marginal wealth to the money stock at the expense of equities; parallely, 
investors should get more indebted with the bank. On the whole inside and outside wealth are both 
constant, but, as already remarked, the fact should not be overlooked that changes in specific asset stocks 
are involved that cannot be expected to last forever.
(23) For modem monetarist arguments see Frenkel-Johnson (1976, p.25 ff.).
(24) From Kalecki-Schumaker (1943), Kalecki (1946) and Nurkse (1945, 1946) up to Polak-Rhomberg 
(1962).
(25) Generally speaking, the main consequences a firm incurs whenever its current proceeds fall short of
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outstanding debt are current losses (sales of real or financial assets to settle the initial debt) or bankruptcy 
(liquidation of the whole productive unit). Given that a country cannot be liquidated, the international 
banking system traditionally adopts a number of discriminating measures against reserve-losing countries 
very similar to those adopted by any domestic commercial bank (see e.g.the literature on country risk in 
Padoan (1986, ch.IX)).
(26) Frish's problem is to find a column vector a  (nxl) such that
z = (X - Xd )a* = 0
where X is the world matrix of exports and X** is the diagonal matrix of each country's total imports 
computed as the n sums of the columns of X [X** = d i ag(u ' x^ ,u ' x^ ) ] .  Since by construction
E diagonal has null elements, diagonal is also (X - X*S diagonal. Vector a* should yield for each 
deficit country the cut in imports (no matter how obtained) and the cut in exports due to other deficit
countries' cuts in imports. In general [rank(X * X**) = n -1] and hence the above equation has non 
trivial solutions; consequently, it is necessary to fix one element of a* exogenously. It should be noted 
that Frish does not consider indirect repercussions of income effects due to initial import cuts (for a 
model extendend to these effects see Tamborini (1986)).
(27) For the relevant literature see Padoan (1986, ch.II).
(28) The classical argument runs from seignorage to spendthriftness and hence the necessity of a 
constitutional constraint upon the currency sovereign. Yet the developments in international political 
economy have pointed out that international currency and government transfers are both in the nature of 
public goods; in this view, parsimony (or more crude "neomercantilism") may emerge as a form of free 
riding. For the literature in this field see again Padoan (1986, ch.m).
(29) I would stress again that no-one can claim to possess an absolutely objective criterion of 
stationarity, because there can never be any theory able to encompass all the factors and variables 
impinging on individual choices and the accomplishment of them. On the basis of the arguments already 
set forth, the approach followed in this work, like that of most open macroeconomic theories, gives 
priority to factors of financial nature. This does not exclude that real factors and variables, once 
endogenously expressed (e.g. the exhaustion of non-reproducible resources, etc.) may, or should, play an 
equally important role in the issue of sustainability.
(30) See e.g. Branson (1977, Part III; 1985), Krugman (1985), Masera (1986), Dombusch (1987a).
(31) See basic contributions by Triffin (1960), Kenen (1960), Officer-Willet (1969).
(32) There is no difficulty in extending B6 .^ to include R-denominated assets or assets readily convertible 
in R-denominated assets.
(33) For a discussion of the balance-of-payments stages hypothesis and a simple model of unstable 
export-led borrowing see Padoan (1986, chsJI, VII, and Appendix).
(34) See Ardant (1976) and the masterly treatments by Carlo M. Cipolla (e.g. 1982). After Keynes's 
reappraisal of certain aspects of Mercantilism, followed by the important works by Dobb and 
Schumpeter, few scholars are today willing to endorse the old condemnation of economic foolishness and 
pure imperial greed.
(35) This argument, especially as it concerns finance, has often been pushed into the background in 
historical-economic studies. In addition to the already cited Williams (1929) see also Hobsbawm 
(1968, ch.VII), and Lewis (1978)
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(36) Suffice it to cite here the most representative works by Brown (1940), Bloomfield (1959), Triffin 
(1969), De Cecco (1975). The recent reappraisal by McKinnon (1988) is also worth mentioning.
(37) The contribution of intermediary countries was a decisive factor in enabling interest payers to solve 
the transfer problem. In fact, as stressed by De Cecco (1975), Great Britain reacted to declining exports by 
forcing them into her colonies. In the period under consideration, the bilateral NRT towards the mother 
country remained slightly negative, and at those terms, interest payments would never have been served.
(38) This amounts to saying that the ratio of paper pounds to the asset stock of foreign banks and to the 
gold stock of the Bank of England remained within the boundaries defined in sec.2.4.
(39) For the complete historical and statistical account see Machlup (1963), Webb (1988).
(40) An exhaustive overview of the various positions ca be found in Iversen (1935), and Machlup 
(1964, Part V). See also Tamborini (1985).
(41) See also Clarke (1967), Eichengreen (1985), De Cecco (1985), Eichengreen-Portes (1987). As the 
last two contributions stress there was a connection between war debts and the ability of the United States 
to emerge as world lender.
(42) I am making reference to the interpretations of Lamfalussy (1962), Triffin (1969), Machlup (1969), 
De Cecco (1979), Biasco (1984).
(43) This happened with complete success in the United States and Western Europe; less so in many 
former colonies or economies producing industrial raw materials and foodstuffs in the Southern belt, 
which lost their advantageous position they had occupied before the war (I am thinking here of Latin 
America) or were unable to "take off” (the case of many African countries). On this point see Lewis 
(1978).
(44) In June 1987 US call debts to foreigners amounted to 748 billion dollars equal to 55% of the total 
external debt. Such debts were only by 29% with central banks and governments, almost 68% was in 
private hands and they burdened on commercial banks by more than 62% . In the books the United States 
claimed short-term credits by about 479 billion dollars: the liquidity balance was then negative by 279 
billions. Further, 93% of credits were written in banks' balance-sheets and were largely inexigible.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE TRANSFER PROBLEM AS A CURRENCY PROBLEM. 
THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
Introduction
In the non-stationary world economy a transfer of capitals (NFT) and goods 
(NRT) from T-type economies to R-type economies is constantly in progress. As Ohlin 
saw it,
in principle the chief difference between domestic and international capital movements is 
that the monetary mechanism is somewhat different. Purchasing power and credit cannot 
be transferred without being, so to speak, transformed from one monetary system to 
another, this gives rise to certain complications. But it cannot be said too often that the 
chief difficulty in the way of interlocal [real] capital movements, whether they pass across 
a national frontier or not, arises because capital moves only in the form of goods or 
services, and neither of them is freely mobile geographically; hence a cumbersome 
readjustment of production becomes necessary (1933, p.406).
Now the problem we are interested in is, at the single economy level, the process 
whereby transfers of financial means from T are capable of generating those transfers of 
real means which are demanded in R, and, at the world level, the possibility of flow 
equilibria. By flow equilibria I mean the case of "balanced net financial transfers", the 
scenario examined in ch.IV, sec.2.4.
Transfer theories have accompanied the development of international payments 
theory since the early days. It seems to me a richness of such a body of theories that they 
reflect a variety of institutional and historical situations, albeit often hidden in the 
background, thus bringing into light different aspects of such a complex phenomenon as 
international transfers. The chapters that follow are organized around the two key 
approaches to the transfer problem: the currency problem  and the financing- 
utilization problem. The former approach views the transfer problem as a problem of 
excess demand for foreign currency; the latter focuses on why and how the financial 
transfer is raised in T and used in R. The two approaches lead to two different "transfer 
mechanisms": the one based on the real exchange rate, and the other based on real
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expenditure and income. It goes without saying that in a sufficiently complicated 
representation we should expect both mechanisms to be at work; however, it is of greater 
theoretical interest and analytical clarity, at least as a preliminary step, to take the two 
separately and to see under what conditions the one dominates, if not excludes, the other. 
In this respect, the predominance of one aspect over the other is also highly sensitive to 
the general theoretical framework (perfect competition with full employment vs. 
imperfect competition with employable resources). Hence not all the different viewpoints 
are compatible one with the other, nor can they simply be lumped together in a general 
eclectic theory; an effort will be made to bring the specificity of each model, and the limits 
of its applicability, to the forefront. The comparison between the two approaches is also 
of interest since recent analyses on major world transfer problems are mostly based on 
the currency problem view.
Hence the present chapter focuses on the currency problem involved in NFT. It 
shows how the transfer process necessarily operates through the real exchange rate when 
the transfer is identified with a shift of currency, say "gold", from T to R under a gold- 
standard-type monetary regime, and when conditions of general competitive equilibrium 
with money neutrality are assumed to hold. These are the building blocks of the classical 
transfer theory, which is analyzed in sec.l in the price-specie-flow version. Sec.2 deals 
with some major difficulties, both empirical and theoretical, of the classical transfer 
theory and illustrates a number of important modifications on the monetary as well as the 
real side of the model.
1. Transfers of currency and the real exchange rate
1.1. The transfer problem as a currency problem.
The identification of the transfer problem with the currency problem is well-suited 
to the theoretical framework of the classical gold-standard regime*. Any international 
transfer requires an amount of currency of T to be moved into R; the cumency problem 
is basically one of draining "gold" from the domestic stock and of shipping it abroad, and 
this is all that is necessary to put the adjustment in motion. In theory, and to some extent
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in practice, the major concern of the monetary authority of the small open economy 
idealized by the classics is the stability of the gold reserve, in a regime where exchange 
rates are constrained within the so-called "gold points" and where international settle­
ments have to be effected by means of actual gold shipments. Shifts of gold endowments 
which are not dictated by changes in pure trade or in the world production of the precious 
metal are highly undesirable; international payments independent of commodity trade are 
then seen as a typical monetary disturbance and a threat to gold reserves. The aim is to 
show that under an "orthodox" monetary regime such disturbances are able to exert 
transitory effects on goods movements, but have no permanent effect on the "natural" 
distribution of gold endowments and real resources. With the exception of Keynes, 
scholars in this vein have generally been highly confident that monetary self-regulation 
and neutrality are in fact operational. The neglect of motives of capital transfers as a
permanent and fundamental element in the transfer process has primarily been due to
2
doctrinal bias, which has become inexcusable since the second half of the past century .
As was pointed out by Viner (1937, ch.V), the above represents an extreme 
approach to the problem, which is useful but unnecessary in obtaining the distinctive 
results of the theory: changes in real exchange rates. In the first place, the classical price- 
specie-flow mechanism gives rise to a number of problems concerning the links between 
international shifts of currency and international trade via relative prices that are examined 
in sec.2. Moreover, in a developed monetary system, the "material support" of the 
monetary transfer might well be obtained by offsetting existing credit or by means of 
international assets other than gold; indeed, from Mill to Keynes the monetary side of the 
theory replaced the price- specie-flow mechanism with the interest-rate mechanism. Thus 
what stands out as the crucial point in the currency transfer problem is not actual 
movements of gold, but the effects of the monetary transfer on T stock of 
international means of payments when these act as a constraint. 
Accordingly, the currency problem is a problem of the monetary authority. 
However, this specification implies that the small-economy assumption is also a strategic 
one, where by "small economy" is meant a non-dominant country or one which does not
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enjoy seignorage. In fact, the right of seignorage would allow T to make the payment 
simply by printing money with no monetary impact, at least in the T country.
1.2. The classical transfer model.
The basic elements of the transfer theory under examination were put together and 
daily set out by Mill:
Commerce being supposed to be in state of equilibrium when the obligatory remittances 
begin, the first remittance is necessarily made in money. This lowers prices in the 
remitting country, and raises them in the receiving.
The natural effect is that more commodities are exported than before, and fewer imported, 
and that, on the score of commerce alone, a balance of money will be constantly due from 
the receiving to the the paying country. When the debt thus annually due to the tributary 
country becomes equal to the annual tribute or other regular payment due from it, no 
further transmission of money takes place; the equilibrium of exports and imports will no 
longer exist, but that of payments will [...] (1848, ch.XXI, p.638).
Evidently, the core of Mill’s model is the price-specie-flow mechanism, which is 
based on opposite movements in the general price levels in T and R in relation to the 
transfer of currency from T to R. We may simply call this the classical transfer 
model. An up-to-date formalization of such a model may be the following:
Home variables are referred to the T-country; (*) denotes the foreign R-country; (t) 
denotes the period in which endogenous variables are changing. PtQxt = value of
exports, PA  = value of imports, Hq = nominal stock of money, H2q = desired stock 
of money by the public, a  = degree of external sterilization.
(la) is the NRT equation, (b) is the BIT identity, (c) is the equilibrium condition on the 
domestic money market and (d) is the same on the foreign money market. The model 
rests on the following assumptions as to the monetary economy it portrays:
(i) At the beginning of period (0), the economy is in stationary state.
(ii) Each economy is specialized in the production of one (composite) good which is
da) zt = PtQxt(Pt) -P mtQmt(Pmt)
(b) Bt = Zt + Ft
(c) Hq + ( l - a ) B t = PtH20(Y0)
(d) H*0 - (1 - a*)Bt =
0< a< l, H2’(Y)>0 
0<a*<l, H2'*(Y*)>0
Q'(P)<0, Q’m(Pm)<0
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exported and consumed domestically.
(iii) Given real output and factor incomes (Yq), the stationary stock of money is also 
given by [H2q(Yq)]; the money in the economy is only outside fiat money and the sole
source of supply is through BIT imbalances, net of the sterilization degree.
(iv) The monetary regime is of the "orthodox" gold-standard type, hence (a  = a* = 0), 
and the exchange rate (e) is fixed. Therefore the stationary state requires (B{ = 0,
Z t = 0 , Ft = 0).
(v) All market disequilibria generate competitive price adjustments.
The monetary transfer can be represented as an exogenous shock to T monetary 
equilibrium (dF < 0). The sign of the change in general price levels is that given by the 
price-specie-flow theory (dP/dF>0, dP*/dF<0 and hence dP < 0, dP* > 0). Now, 
under monoproduct specialization and fixed exchange rate, T real exchange rate coincides 
with the general price levels ratio
r s  P f? = eP*/P m
as a consequence, it must be that (dr/dF > 0). We shall say that the T- economy has a
real depreciation (or worse terms of trade), and conversely, the R-economy has a real
appreciation (or better terms of trade).
In the model under consideration the transfer problem hinges on variations of the
real exchange rate as the decisive force able to activate an adequate goods movement from
T to R. The change in the real exchange rate comes from a deflation component of export
prices and an inflation component of import prices; given the nominal exchange rate, the
former component coincides with general domestic deflation and the latter component
coincides with general foreign inflation.
A great deal of work has concentrated on equations (la-b) since Mill’s
formulation, and in this respect the transfer theory has overlapped with the elasticity
approach to the trade balance. Bearing in mind that (dF/X s  f) is the nominal transfer 
burden upon T, taking the total change in BIT (and remembering that Qx = X/P,
= M/eP*. Xq = Mq), the world transfer takes place under flow equilibrium if:
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(2) (1 - ex)5P - (1 - em)5P* + f * 0 8P<0, 8P*>0
ex = price point elasticity of R demand for T exports, Em = price point elasticity of T
demand for R exports, 8P = dP/P = T inflation rate SP* s  dP*/P* = R inflation rate 
Since (dF < 0), the change in NRT must be positive; a necessary condition is
1 v  em '> 1
As long as the focus is exclusively on the NRT equation the extent of real
depreciation is determined on the market for international trade, and it seems obvious to
solve for the equilibrium change (8P). From equation 2, T deflation will be greater the 
larger f is, and the smaller ex, em, 8P* are. If T is so small that the inflationary effect of
its currency transfer abroad is negligible (8P* = 0), the burden of adjustment in terms of
3
internal deflation will necessarily be larger .
However, equation 2 is the market equation of demand for, and supply of, 
foreign exchanges, and as such it does not contain any explanation of price changes -the 
market equations of home and foreign goods (prices) arc missing. It was only in the great 
wave of exchange-rate studies of the 1930s that the price changes involved in 
international trade adjustments came under closer examination. The first well-known 
solution was brought by Joan Robinson (1937) and Machlup (1939-40), and consisted in 
adding the price elasticity of production of home and foreign goods. We shall not 
formalize this point here, but it is intuitive that wP will be smaller the higher home supply 
elasticity is, while wP* will be larger the lower foreign supply elasticity is. In sum, high 
home supply elasticity and low foreign supply elasticity should ease the transfer problem
4
and shift part of the burden from home deflation to foreign inflation .
Notoriously, the "four elasticity" extension of the real-exchange-rate model raises 
a number of serious difficulties^. First comes a difficulty which is specific to the 
currency transfer problem. This problem is one of inducing enough T deflation (relative 
to R inflation) as to increase the export revenue (decrease the import disbursement) just to 
offset the currency outflow; therefore, the initial conditions of export supply are totally 
irrelevant, since what is required is a shift of the whole supply schedule (e.g. Keynes
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(1929, pp. 164-ff.))- Hence the necessary rate of T deflation still remains dependent on 
demand elasticities, and we still lack an explanation of its determinants. Secondly, if a 
positive NRT has to emerge after the currency transfer we should be able to analyze the 
substitution process whereby more goods are exported rather than absorbed in T, and 
vice versa in R (Keynes (1930, ch.XXI)) -or else, the process whereby excess output 
and excess absorption arise in T and R respectively.
The gold-standard regime which frames the currency problem provides a 
straightforward explanation of T deflation (excess output), and R inflation (excess 
absorption) according to equations lc-d. These are the equations of the money market in 
T and R respectively. With no sterilization, the transfer of currency from T to R 
(dB = dF < 0) is equivalent to a contraction of money supply in T and an expansion in 
R; thus (SP, 8P*) are determined in the substitution between goods and money in order 
to keep the desired stock of money in equilibrium in both economies (H 2 q , H 2 * q ). The
NRT emerges because of excess supply in T and excess demand in R, in accordance with 
stock-flow matrix constraints (see above, ch.IV)^. A crucial variable in this respect is 
the monetary effect of the transfer in the two countries as measured by
dF/H2 = h, -dF/H2* s  h*
From equations lc-d it is easy to see that (8P = h<0, 8P* = h*>0). Moreover, the rate 
of real depreciation in T will also be determined [Sr = dr/r = h* - h)] as a weighted 
average of the nominal transfer. By substituing these results into the BIT equation we 
obtain
(3) dB/X = ( l - e x) h - ( l - e m)h* + f
Therefore, the NRT from T to R will depend on the monetary effect in the two economies 
and on international demand elasticities. Hie monetary effect will in turn be maximal with 
no sterilization, that is, if both monetary authorities accept the necessary price adjustment. 
We have thus a mixed elasticity-monetary model of the BIT which is a useful intermediate 
step towards introducing further aspects of the problem.
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Since equation 3 does not contain specific endogenous variables, it follows that in 
general T will obtain a positive NRT after a currency transfer, but there is no a priori 
presumption that the former will be equal to the latter. What if NRT in fact falls short of 
NFT (dZ < -dF)?
In order to answer, we have to introduce the distinction between stock and flow
equilibrium, that was absent from the debates over the transfer-of- currency problem.
Accordingly, equation 3 should be regarded as an impact effect of the currency transfer. 
For simplicity's sake, let us consider the case of a single installment transfer (Ft = -dF,
Ff, = 0, t' = t+1,...). The problem is illustrated in fig. 1, where T price level (P) is the
dependent variable of the transfer (F), and where the schedule B is the locus of BIT 
equilibrium according to equation 2 and the schedule H is the locus of T money stock 
equilibrium according to equation lc.
Fig.l. The currency transfer problem in the classical model_________________________
Initial stationary state exists at point O. In period, point A, the transfer turns out to be a 
redistribution of the world money stock, with a consequent finite change, in opposite
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directions, of the price levels in T and R [Pt(Ft) < PQ, Pt*(Ft) > P*Q]. Point A shows
a situation in which T money stock is in equilibrium whereas BIT is not; in fact all points 
above schedule B are such that (0 < dZ < -dF; Ft< = 0, Zt ,(P t , P* ) =
Zt(Pt, P*t) > 0)); hence (i) T monetary authority in period t has raised less "gold" than
the initial transfer, and opens period t' with a "gold" reserve lower than the initial one; (ii)
T money holders in periods (t, t',.„) increase their nominal balances, with respect to the 
equilibrium level associated with (Ft, Pf, P* ), because of positive trade balances.
Therefore, at point A, upward pressure on T prices will arise and will persist until Z( (Bt)
is driven to zero and full stock-flow equilibrium is reached again at point O.
The classic ideal of the "natural" endowment of currency is thus upheld, either 
because T deflation and real depreciation are just enough to effect the ongoing currency 
transfer in goods (schedules H and B coincide), or through cumulated trade surpluses 
accompanied by T reflation and real re- appreciation after the initial currency transfer has 
ceased. The latter case is only a matter of time profile, which is proportional to the gap 
between actual and necessary T deflation (the distance between schedules H and B at 
point A).
To conclude, the oustanding feature of the classical transfer theory is its 
prediction of swings in real exchange rates proportional to world NFT, then reversed in 
the transition towards the steady state. There is no presumption, however, that flow 
equilibrium should hold throughout the transfer process. Therefore, world NFT generate 
equilibrium real cycles of currencies and payments, such cycles being unsynchronized 
between T and R economies. The resulting picture contrasts sharply with the general 
view of the modems who rather regard real exchange rate movements as disequilibrium 
phenomena, or at least as undue by-products of uncoordinated monetary policies.
1.3. The real transfer burden.
In the classical transfer model the T-economy suffers from no loss of currency, at 
least in the long run. The nominal transfer burden only gives rise to transitory effects on 
the real exchange rate. On the other hand, this only happens because the currency transfer 
has to force a goods transfer from T to R; such real effects were interestingly pointed out
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by Mill (1848) and later by Taussig (1920), and have been paid great attention in the debt 
literature (e.g. Webb (1988)). As the currency transfer is effected in goods, the cost of 
the transfer is not in terms of gold, but in terms of goods, formerly consumed 
domestically or imported. The fact that the real transfer is extracted through real 
depreciation entails that such real transfer burden ensues from the two compound effects 
of price and quantity adjustments. As was shown in ch.IV, sec. 1.2, assuming initial 
equilibrium (X = M) and normalizing to X,
^ x - S Q m
= -f + 8r
are two equivalent measures of the real transfer burden upon the T-economy. Clearly, if 
the transfer process has to involve prices, the real transfer burden must also exceed the 
nominal transfer burden (f < 0) by the amount due to price effects or to the rate of real 
depreciation (8 r> 0 ). Even under the presumption that the switch of domestic 
production from domestic demand to exports leaves the employment of factors unaffected 
(on this point see below, sec.2.2) international transfers are not so neutral until they 
persist; the transfer process entails a displacement of real resources from T to R 
consumers in a way that no full-body classical economist would see favourably (see 
again Mill (1848, ch.XXI), Keynes (1919)).
In the classical view of the world economy, currency transfer problems may arise 
not only owing to exogenous monetary payments but also because of exogenous shocks
7
to prices of international trade . As was shown introductorily in ch.IV (sec. 1.2), we can
conveniently use the relationship between NRT and real transfer burden. The price effect
of the oil price rise is that the oil importer faces an impact real depreciation. As we know, 
in so far as (SQX = 5Qm = 0), it follows that (dZ/X = -8r); the exogenous real
depreciation is thus equivalent to an implicit currency transfer of nominal burden (f = - 
8r). The oil importer is thus in the position of the T-economy, whereas the oil exporter 
acts as the R-economy.
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis of the transfer problem is
205
that the study of partial equilibrium conditions on the markets for international goods is 
inadequate; the underlying monetary transfer implies adjustments on other markets as 
well. This conforms with the outstanding conclusion in the debate over the effects of 
devaluation . A conclusion, note, that concerns the inadequacy of partial equilibrium 
analysis, not the irrelavance of elasticities (see also below, sec.2.1-2). An interesting 
analytical point clarified by the transfer approach is that the link between devaluation and 
domestic markets need not go through imported price-effects, but (also, perhaps mainly) 
through the direct transfer-effect of means of payment from the devaluing to the revaluing 
economy. Hence the extent of trade adjustment and of its real costs are closely dependent 
on the model specification of the transfer problem. The real burden on the depreciating 
economy is at least as high as the inital impact (dZ/X). Yet in the classical transfer model 
-as we have seen above- a new equilibrium of trade may call for further real depreciation 
(as a combination of T deflation and R inflation), and hence an additional displacement of 
real resources from the depreciating to the appreciating economy, unless the initial import 
price rise is immediately offset by a fall in import demand. If this is not the fortunate 
case, the implicit monetary transfer plays the fundamental role of inducing further price 
changes and goods movements, through money stocks adjustments, as described in 
sec.1. 1.
2. The classical transfer model revised
2.1. Some facts about the role of relative prices in tra n sfe r 
ep iso d es.
The classical transfer model rests on two pillars: the assumptions as to 
international trade determinants, and the assumptions as to national and international 
monetary organization. Both have turned out to be shaky, whether on the grounds of 
theory or of historical evidence.
It is perhaps interesting to begin with a brief account of the empirical 
shortcomings to the classical transfer model, or at least to its distinctive prediction that in 
a world economy with large and persistent NFT across economies we should observe
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proportionally pronounced and peristent real depreciation between T- and R-economies.
In the first place, assuming fixed exchange rates, we have seen that in the 
classical transfer model the real exchange rate (eP*x/Px) coincides with the relative
general price level (eP*/P); real depreciation must spring from divergent movements in T 
general price level (deflation) vis k vis R general price level (inflation). The underlying 
assumption is one of national monoproduct specialization. Shortly after World War I a 
few empirical studies on the pre-war international economy already signalled scarce
9
evidence in support of the classical explanation . Two crucial departures from inherited 
tradition were found: (i) the surprisingly high precision and speed of adjustment of goods 
movements (i.e. NRT) to non-trade monetary movements (i.e. NFT); (ii) the surprisingly 
scant contribution of gold movements and relative price changes to those adjustments. 
These two points have since been revived and confirmed to become comestones of non- 
classical interpretations of the gold-standard (see above, ch.IV, sec.3.2.). A well- 
established interpretation dating back to these studies is that substantial changes in relative 
prices were prevented by effective arbitrage on integrated world markets with fixed 
exhange rates (Frenkel-Johnson (1976), Zecker-McCloskey (1976), McKinnon (1988)).
Q ian 1 reproduces cyclical movements of wholesale price indexes of major 
Northern trading partners in 1814-1913. While in the second half of the period Great 
Britain was becoming the R-economy, and was steadily enlarging its negative NRT, its 
general price index did not show any countercyclical tendency with respect to emerging 
T-economies (namely United States and Germany). It should be observed that the 
prominent role as T-economies in that period was not played by manufacturing Northern 
economies but by primary Southern economies (see above, ch.IV, sec.3.2); they had to
%
furnish raw materials and food to the former group. On the other hand, the data do show 
that general price levels were not perfectly correlated and that changes in real exchange 
rates took place. It remains the case, however, that such changes were not always in the 
right direction or of the supposed magnitude and that they apparendy were not originated 
by shifts of gold from T- to R-economies*®.
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Chart 1. Wholesale national price indexes of major Northern trading partners, 1814- 
1913. selected vears (1913.= JQQ)
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The picture resulting from another world transfer episode -the US transfer with 
industrialized economies under the dollar standard (see above ch.IV, sec.3.4)- is more 
complex. By taking for reference the period 1952-1970 as the most representative of the 
emergence of the US transfer problem, the first observation is that general price levels of 
trading partners still showed a clear procyclical pattern (chart 2). The second observation 
is that despite procyclical general price movements, the relative general price level of the 
T-economy actually depreciated by 12 points (11.4 %) according to theory (chart 3). The 
third observation is that, contrary to theoiy, at the same time the US transfer gap widened 
dramatically, while the US real exchange rate (US imports/US expons price ratio) 
appreciated by some 25 points (20%). It is instructive to find a mirror pattern of relative 
prices in a supposedly "small economy" in the R area, such as Italy (chart 4). At this 
stage of analysis it seems that the widening US transfer gap may find some explanation in 
US partners' ability to depreciate their own export prices.
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Chan 2. General price indexes of the United States and major trading partners. 1952- 
1984 (19S2 = 100)
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Chart 3. The general prive level and the real exchange rate and of the United States
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Chart 4. The general price level and the real exchange rate of Italy relative to major 
trading partners. 1952-1984 (1952 = too)
---- RGPL —  RER
2.2. An alternative monetary mechanism: the discount rate.
The emphasis on "gold movements" in the classical model, that has proved to be 
misplaced, is due to the difficulty to adapt the doctrinal requirements of money neutrality 
to a world of substitutes of metallic currencies and of quasi-monies. As we know from 
the history of the international monetary system, shifts of gold were largely replaced by 
monetary assets even in the heyday of the gold standard. Generally, monetary assets are 
convertible at a price -the discount rate- by the central bank (the basic operations of the 
discount window were examined in ch.m, sec.l). Hence, the rate at which T central 
bank has to convert a given NFT into gold is an inverse function of the discount rate.
Important extensions of the transfer theory were made in the wake of the then 
new theories of international payments (Hawtrey (1926, 1927), Keynes (1930, 
ch.XXI, XXVII, XXVIII), Kindleberger (1937), Viner (1937, ch.V)). In particular, 
Keynes envisaged a classical solution to the transfer problem (changes in relative prices) 
but with a mechanism based on discount rates in the place of gold movements. It is 
higher discount rate in T (possibly with lower discount rate in R) that should bring about 
excess supply of domestic output (namely investment) and deflation in T, coupled with
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excess domestic demand and inflation in R, necessary to obtain the NRT between the 
two. Keynes concluded that
for the most part, approximate equality between [NFT] and [NRT] is preserved, not by 
an increase in [NFT] directly stimulating and increase of [NRT], but because an excess of 
[NFT] over [NRT] brings about either the threat or the fact of a movement of gold,.which 
induces the banking authorities of the countries concerned so to alter their terms of 
lending as temporarily to reduce the net amount of [NFT] and ultimately to increase 
[NRT] [...] through the medium of a disturbance of the existing investment equilibrium 
in both countries leading to appropriate changes in relative prices at home and abroad 
(1930, p.296).
The outstanding feature of this monetary mechanism is that the condition of 
international flow equilibrium is endogenized through discount rates -or else, the discount 
rate is assigned to the external objective. The overall balance of payments being null, the 
money stock is also implicitly in equilibrium. Thus the problem arises of whether internal 
flow equilibrium still obtains. Evidently, Mundellian issues of thirty years later were not 
absolutely novel. * *
In order to capture this point it is sufficient to specify the "compensatory effects" 
of discount rates on NFT and to substitute the money stock equations in system 1 with 
external-internal flow equilibrium equations, i.e.:
i, i* = T and R discount rate, 0 , O* = T and R total output.
The key issue in this model is immediately apparent: there are four endogenous variables 
for three equations. The trouble lies in the BIT equation; for only one independent 
endogenous variable (discount rate) is admissible. In other words the missing equation is 
the one showing the relationship between the two discount rates. According to modem 
analysis, either the two rates must be continuously equalized ("perfect capital mobility") 
or their differential reflects imperfections in capital mobility. Clearly, the former case is 
the most consonant with the classical framework and was in fact widely accepted. In this
(le)
(0
(g)
F(i)>0, F(i*)<0 
0'(P)>0, 0'(P*)X), O’(i)<0
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case, each single central bank cannot modify the "world rate" independendy of the others, 
while it cannot differentiate its own rate individually. This means that we can hardly 
expect divergent movements in discount rates to take place as was sometimes envisaged 
by early analyses. Consequently, the opposite effect of NFT on demand in T and R is not 
fully explainable within the discount-rate model. This is an important analytical flaw, to 
which we shall have to go back later on (see ch. VI).
Nonetheless, it is still possible to study a situation in which T central bank must 
raise its own rate (plausibly because the world rate is rising) in an attempt to countervail 
an exogenous NFT (-dF). With a slight re-arrangement of system le-g, the solutions of 
the three endogenous variables (i2, P, P*) are given by the following Jacobian matrix 
(see App.A.l):
F i -O ’^  X Q’^  m
■°'i -Q’^  X Q’^  m
0 Q'^  X 0*’P
di dF
dP = 0
m
dP* 0
We obtain:
di > 0, dP < 0, dP* > 0
The rise in the discount rate is proportional to the insensitiveness of compensatory 
capitals and of domestic output [l/(F j + O'.)]. Given the fall in domestic output (-
O'jdi), and the switch from imports to domestic consumption if P* rises (Q'mdP*), T
general price level has to fall to fill the output gap with exports (-Q'xdP). Since lower P
induces a switch in R from domestic consumption to imports (Q'xdP), P* has to rise to
generate additional domestic output (0*'p*). The depth of T domestic deflation is
exacerbated by rigidity of R demand for T goods, by low domestic inflation in R, by 
strong discount-rate effects on output. The first factor has already been considered in 
sec.l (see also below, par.3-4, for further treatment). The latter two factors offer instead 
a novel insight which was especially emphasised by Keynes; indeed, if R demand for T 
goods is rigid and R inflation is low, there must be strong discount-rate effects on T 
output and prices^.
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The classical mcxlel-cuni-discount rate highlights some important aspects of the 
transfer process; in particular it shows how flow equilibrium can be obtained im m e d ia te ly  
with no, or little, shift of gold. On the other hand, the model retains the principle that the 
only means of sending goods to R economies is through real depreciation in T 
economies, though it is faulty in its explanation of whether and how R-economies’ 
monetary expansion is brought about. The strong implication seems that world transfers 
should be expected to raise T-economies' discount rates and real exchange rates 
substantially, the evidence for which was, at times of fixed exchange rates, scant. It is 
hard to believe that in the case of NFT spanning years or decades, the world transfer 
process should only hinge on steady increases of discount rates and decreases of prices in 
one part of the world.
2.3. T radable and non>tradable goods.
The few figures on relative price changes in world transfer problems shown in
par.l point to various possible amendments to the international-trade side of the classical
model, (i) Almost all countries, no matter how "large", involved in substantial and
persistent world transfers have normally displayed two distinct patterns of relative prices:
a pattern for relative general price levels (eP*/P), and a pattern for the real exchange rate 
(eP*x/Px). (ii) Such changes in relative prices were, however, too small to sustain large
and persistent goods movements. Not all the solutions so far proposed in the literature are 
consistent with both facts and theoretical arguments.
The first and most celebrated amendment is Cassel's (1922) principle according to
which international trade across integrated markets deals with homogeneous goods no
less than domestic trade; the assumption here is one of world monoproduct. The extreme
implication is that the Law of One Price must hold on all markets (Frenkel-Johnson
(1976)), or less strictly, that purchasing power parity should be established as a long-run
13norm (McKinnon (1979)) . The evidence in favour of international trade m
homogenous goods, or of effective commodity arbitrage, or of purchasing power parity 
as a dynamic law of price changes has always been puzzling, whether under fixed or 
flexible exchange rates; lately, there seems to be widespread disbelief in any of these
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conditions (Kravis-Lipsey (1978), Dombusch (1987b)). For instance, charts 3 and 4 
(above) and chart 5 (below) do not bear evidence that exchange rates have worked to 
offset changes in relative prices over the first ten years of fluctuation (1973-1984). The 
usual lines of attack concentrate on the set of strong conditions that must hold if the world 
monoproduct assumption is to be linked with the law of one price. These conditions are 
essentially two: (i) perfect competition among producers, (ii) perfect arbitrage among 
consumers (see also above, ch.I, sec.2). The law of one price fails if either (i) or (ii) fail. 
A number of cases have been made in which imperfect competition (Dombusch 
(1987b, sec.IHA)) or imperfect information (Giovannetti (1987)) interfere with the law 
of one price even under the assumption of world product homogeneity. However, this 
assumption is questionable in itself.
It was shown in ch.I (sec.2) that the law of one price for homogeneous goods 
and purchasing power parity for different currency-commodities are trivial implications of 
Arrow-Debreu general competitive equilibrium. In fact, general competitive analysis is 
concerned with alternative allocations, and problems of alternative allocations arise either 
because (i) goods are not homogeneous, or because (ii) if they are homogenous, they are 
still produced in different "places". In case (ii) the price must be equalized net of transport 
costs, and, of course, there are no interlocal movements of such goods (there are neither 
"exports" nor "imports"). But why would it be worthwhile producing the same good in 
different places if, say, proximity to consumers did not yield producers any benefit? 
General competitive analysis indicates the place of a theory of localization; the pure theory 
of international trade is on the whole an attempt to take that place (though it brings nations 
and national interests into the analysis deceitfully). In this view, pure trade theory has 
tried quite correctly to explain product specialization, rather than homogeneity. According 
to Harrod's (1973, ch.IV) sensible systematization, and to the celebrated revision of 
trade theory by Helpman and Krugman (1985, Part II), we have both theoretical and 
empirical reasons for distinguishing between a class of homogenous products and a 
class of specialized products. The former typically includes primary commodities, for 
which organized markets and hence one world price exist The latter instead includes
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manufactured goods, in the production of which localization is important because of 
comparative advantages in local knowledge and information on techniques and tastes. In 
the class of specialized products the law of one price cannot hold (Dombusch 
(1987b, sec.IIIB)).
It is well-known that one need not invoke the law of one price to obtain positive 
correlation across goods prices -i.e. a weak form of purchasing power parity or of 
international market integration. If two goods are substitutes to consumers and to 
producers, though not perfect substitutes, the price dynamics of the one good will be 
transmitted to the other through substitution with a correlation degree closer to unity, the 
closer the two goods are substitutable. Yet what is implied in most modem versions of 
the purchasing power parity doctrine is not substitution across goods, but substitution 
between the consumption basket and money in different countries. In this case, in order 
to observe perfect correlation (albeit spurious correlation) between general price levels, 
one should impose two severe restrictions, namely that consumption baskets have the 
same composition, and that the dynamics of money supply relative to the money stock is 
equal, across countries. By contrast, classical transfer theorists would argue that world 
monetary stability obtains as the dynamics of money supplies is divergent and relative 
general price levels do change.
As a matter of fact, the items of evidence collected above do not support the idea 
of large and systematic divergent price cycles; yet the extent of actual changes in relative 
prices suggests that the classical transfer model assumes, not too much, but too little 
specialization. Taussig (1917, 1928), Viner (1924; 1937, ch.VI, sec.VI)) and Keynes 
(1929; 1930, chJCXI) all brought modifications to the classical model by introducing an 
element that would become quite popular in later developments of trade balance models: a 
class of non-tradable g o o d sN o n -tra d a b le  goods belong to specialized products; 
they are in fact fully specialized products on a local basis, either because they have no 
other market than the local one or because they cannot be transported profitably. Home 
producers of non-tradables do not compete with foreign producers of the same non- 
tradable abroad. The first important consequence of the inclusion of non-tradables is that
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the NRT emerges as a genuine problem of substitution in each economy's output mix. 
The second is that the composition of the output mix becomes relevant to price dynamics; 
and in particular real exchange rates may diverge from relative general price levels. 
Finally, as a third consequence the model allows for explicit analysis of the conditipn that 
the level of output does not change in the course of adjustment (a condition which must 
hold if demand for real balances is to stay stationary).
Let the general price index in T and R simply be
where (co  ^+ com = 1) are the weights of non-tradables and importables (for simplicity,
exportables are not consumed domestically). Changes in the general price index, which
must be consistent with money stock equilibrium, result from compound changes in
sectoral prices. Therefore two further endogenous variables are added to system 1 for 
each country: the price of non-tradables (P^, P*^), and the price of importables (the
price of other countries' exportables) (P = eP* , P* = P /e). In principle, sectoral
111 A  111 A
prices should be determined by respective product market equations; however, since 
sectoral prices are linearly dependent through the price-index constraint, we only need 
one further equation for each country. The classical candidate is a constant output 
equation. We may thus rewrite system 1 as follows
(4a) z t = Px,(W '  eP*xtQ* « (P V
(b) W Ft
(c) Hq + B( = P(H20(Oq)
(d) H*0 -B t =P*tH2*0(O V
(e) O0 = Odt(Pdt) + Oxl(PM)
(0 o v o * dt(P*dt) + o y p * xt)
X t^X tv Xt'
Equations 4c-f are sufficient to determine the six endogenous variables consisting of 
sectoral and general prices in T and R, given an exogenous transfer (-dF). This porperty
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can be verified in the Jacobian matrix of sub-system 4c-f, expressed in rates of change, 
whose determinant is different from zero (see App.A.2):
CD, 0 0 CD d m ' 5Pd '
»
■ -h
0 co*. co* 0 a m 5P*d h*
V ^ d  0 0 X
CL,
co 0
0 n*dO*d 0 -emQm _ _SP*x . 0L J
Since the full expressions for the endogenous variables are unwieldy and of little 
use, it is convenient to make the simplifying assumption that (co^, co*^ = 1). This
captures the classical idea that the core of the transfer mechanism lies in the sectoral 
adjustment between non-tradable and exportable goods. The sectoral adjustments of 
prices and output are drawn in fig.2.
Fig.2. The currency transfer problem and sectoral adjustments of prices and output in the 
classical model with non-tradable goods (T-economy)_____________________________
deflation in T and general inflation in R. This is obtained by cutting demand for non-
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tradables in T and expanding it in R until (8Pd = h < 0, 8P*d = h* > 0)). T domestic 
output will also be cut by (80^ = Tld8Pd < 0, where T|d > 0 is supply elasticity, from
point A to B in fig.2). The transfer problem is then one of substituting non-tradables with
exportables; T price of exportables will have to fall so that abstracting from initial 
quantities (80 = -80 . = 8Q = -e 8P ; from point A to point C in fig.2). The salientA. U X X X
implication is that the BIT (equation 4b) is adjusted residually. In fact, by substituting the 
above results in equation 4b we obtain for the T economy:
(5) dB/X = 8Qx + 8Px - 8Q*x - 8P*x - f
= h[Tid(l - l/ex)] - h* ^ 1 - l/em)] - f
where there are no specific endogenous variables. The adjustment of NRT will be of the 
correct sign (dZ/X > 0) if variables and parameters have the expected signs; however, 
there is no guarantee that the currency transfer is completely effected in goods 
(dB/X = 0), if the adjustment of non-tradable output and exportable output has to leave 
total output unchanged. Given the impact effect of NFT on BIT, it is not difficul to 
extend the transition towards the stationary state as shown in sec. 1.1 to the present case.
In the course of adjustment, this model yields three important variations in T 
relative prices:
(i) in the relative general price levels: 8P* - 8P = h* + h > 0;
(ii) in the real exchange rate: 8P*x - 8Px = h*n*d/em + hrid/ex > 0
(iii) in the tradables/non-tradables relative price: 8Px - 8P^ = - 1)
The signs of the first two variations are unambiguous; T should have a depreciation both
in the relative general price level and in the real exchange rate. The sign of the domestic 
adjustment of tradables/non- tradables relative price is instead dependent on the relative 
magnitude of elasticities. However, whereas the amplitude of (i) is given by the monetary 
impact of the transfer in the two economies, the amplitude of (ii) and (iii) will also depend
on relative elasticities.
As we have seen above, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence are 
traditionally divided on these grounds. The body of literature centred on the idea of low
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(or nil) product specialization in international trade, or on the (small country's) inability to
modify real exchange rates unilaterally, is here represented by setting large values of 
international demand elasticities. As (ex, Em -> <»), we should observe negligible
changes in the real exchange rate while real depreciation is shifted onto the non-tradables
relative price (e.g. Dombusch (1973b)). The sectoral adjustment implied is such that,
whatever the amount (and composition) of T, excess supply is readily exportable at the 
going world price (Qx is a horizontal line through points A and D in fig.2). We have seen
previously a number of reasons why such a picture is not convincing. By contrast, the
idea of effective product specialization, or that quantities are not readily modifiable on 
international markets, amounts to setting finite values of ex, em. The typical presumption
in this case is that in the sheltered sector of non-tradables the price is weakly responsive
to demand, whereas in the open sector of exportables the quantity is weakly responsive to 
the price (TJ€j/ex > 1, r\ *^/£m > 1); as a consequence, we should observe amplified
depreciation of the real exchange rate together with appreciation, instead of depreciation, 
of the non-tradables relative price (the case of fig.2) (e.g. Keynes (1930, ch.XXI))^.
As already remarked with reference to charts 1 to 4, it seems that changes in 
relative prices did play a role in major transfer episodes, with clearly distinct patterns for 
tradables and non-tradables. Yet such patterns display slight variations of relative prices 
with large and continued goods movements in the same direction. One might conclude 
that this is an empirical matter of elasticities; alternatively, in the coming chapters, we 
shall see how different approaches to the transfer problem bring to light other, and 
stronger, forces underlying i t
2.4. Flexible exchange rates
My own view is that at a given time the economic structure of a country, in relation to the 
economic structures of its neighbours, permits of a certain "natural" level of exports, and 
that arbitrarily to effect a material alteration of this level by deliberate devices is extremely 
difficult. Historically, the volume of foreign investment has tendend, 1 think, to adjust 
itself -at least to a certain extent- to the balance of trade, rather than the other way round, 
the former being the sensitive and the latter the insensitive factor (Keynes (1929, p. 167)).
The foregoing is Keynes's famous statement of classical pessimism as to the
ability of integrated economies -and especially non-dominant economies- to cope with
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sensitive' international financial transfers. The argument was restated with greater 
analytical accuracy in chapter XXI of the Treatise, whose key features of the real side 
can be seen in model 5 in the previous paragraph. As a matter of fact, if pessimism was 
not justified in the heyday of the gold standard, it was mounting up at the time Keynes 
was writing in the 1920s. Also, in the Treatise we find explicit mention of flexible 
nominal exchange rates as a remedy against external transfer shocks (especially in the 
case of exogenous increases of import prices); in much the same spirit, both Joan 
Robinson (1937) and Machlup (1939) analyzed the role of flexible exchange rates in the 
transfer problem. Here we shall modify the classical transfer model 5 by introducing a 
fully flexible exchange rate with no intervention by central banks. Since we retain the 
money stock equation, we shall obtain a variation in the monetary approach to the 
exchange rate^.
The most important feature which makes the model more "classical" than 
"modem" is that product specialization is retained too; not only in terms of non-tradable, 
but also in terms of tradable goods. In fact, such a specification is necessary to give 
content to the choice of the flexible rates regime. As we have seen in the previous 
paragraph, were T exportable good a world commodity with infinitely elastic demand at 
the world price, T transfer problem would be immediately solved as soon as sufficient 
resources were switched from the non-tradable to the exportable industry; problems in 
switching production fall outside the classical theory. By contrast, the exchange rate may 
become a relevant variable when transfer difficulties arise from the demand side of T 
exports -e.g. for the reasons discussed in par.2-3. To analyze this point, we still need the 
classical trade-balance equation, instead of the modem law of one price, to determine the 
exchange rate. Note that T and R prices of exportables are neither fixed nor equalized 
through arbitrage; their changes are simply prevented by market-clearing changes of the 
exchange rate. The rest of the model works as it does in previous cases, i.e. through the 
transfer effect on the money stock and the demand for domestic goods. Hence, we have
(6a) Z1 = Px0Qa (Px/e)-eP*x0Q*xt(eP*x)
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(b)
(C)
(d)
Bt = z t + F t = 0 
H0 + Bt = PtH20(O0) 
H*o ‘ Bt= p*tH2*o(0V
Pt = c°dPdt + 0)meP*xO 
P*t = 0)V * d t  + G)*mPx(/e
Setting (PxQ, P*xQ = 1, dPx, dP*x -> 0), model 6 has five endogenous variables (P{, 
P^j, P*t, P*dt> et) which reduce to three because of the linear constraint imposed by
general price indexes. This is shown in the following Jacobian matrix of the system, for 
exogenous shocks (-f,-h, h*), whose determinant is non-zero if (p * 0) (see App.A.3):
1-0).
0
CO.
-(l-to*d)/e 0
0
0
to*.
5e f
8pd = -h
_ SFV k
h*
where (P = ex + em * 1) *s Marshall-Lemer total elasticity of the trade balance with
respect to the exchange rate. The expected sign is (P > 0). we measures the rate of 
change in the exchange rate, which, due to the assumptions on the prices of tradables, 
comes to coincide with the T rate of real depreciation necessary to keep overall payments 
in balance, i.e.
5e s  8r = f/p > 0
Obviously, depreciation is greater the heavier the nominal transfer burden, and the
smaller the trade-balance elasticity. T excess output, and R excess expenditure, behind
the positive NRT are obtained through the monetary impact of the transfer on the two
economies. Interestingly, for reasons already explained, the model does not change
qualitatively even without direct involvement of the exchange rate in the money stock 
adjustment. Setting also in this case ((5 ,^ (3*d = 1), T and R money stocks are isolated
from exchange-rate effects; the solution for the non-tradable goods markets will be a fall 
in T price and output and a rise in R price and output up to ( 5 0 d
50*d = T|d*h*). Figure 3 shows the equilibrium schedules of the overall balance B and
of the money stock H for T, and the solutions for (e, P^).
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Fig-3. The currency transfer problem in the classical model with non- tradable goods and 
flexible exchange rate fT-economy) _________________________________________
At this stage it should be clear that the first oustanding implication of the classical
transfer model under flexible rates is that the condition of constant output seems to be
underdetermined. Unless elasticites assume particular values, there is no guarantee that 
the expansion of exportable output (fex/|3) will exactly replace the contraction of non-
tradable output in T (-T j^h), and vice versa in R. In general, the condition under conside­
ration (exe = rj^h) imposes a negative relationship between (e, F) (N in fig.3). Given - 
Ft, all et above N entail excess depreciation and excess demand for T total output, 
whereas all et below N yield insufficient depreciation and excess supply of T total output.
These cases may generate serious troubles, since the whole model is based on a stable
demand for money. Consider first the case in which N is flatter than B (fig.3); for 
(Ft, et, P ^ )  T winds up with (Z( = Ft > 0) and excess demand for total output. In this
case there exists a consistent path towards stationary state along the schedules B and H -
that is, internal reflation and external reappreciation. On the contrary, if N is steeper than 
B, so that T obtains (Z{ > 0) with excess supply of total ouput, there is no way back to
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stationary state; either et has to depreciate further, while there is excess supply of foreign 
currency on the foreign exchange market, or pd, has to fall further, while there is excess
supply of money through the foreign channel.
Flexible exchange rates are an effective instrument in the classical transfer 
problem to the extent that the trade-balance elasticty condition holds, and no excess 
supply in T (excess demand in R) is left after the adjustment of tradable output in the two 
economies. The distinctive prediction is that exchange rates and domestic prices should 
display countercyclical patterns, whereas the modem monetary model of the exchange 
rate predicts strongly procyclical patterns. The reason is that in the classical world 
exchange rates move as much as necessary to generate real depreciation of tradables, 
relative to both importables and domestic non-tradables, in T economies, instead of 
moving to prevent changes in relative prices of tradables. Such a difference, as already 
stressed, is not due to the general theoretical framework, but simply to different specifica­
tions of international trade.
The association of deflation with depreciation, and large swings in real exchange 
rates, may strain credibility. The favourite episodes of the monetarist school (the French 
franc devaluation 1919-25, German hyperinflation 1922-23, and the US dollar-D mark 
depreciation 1975-78), as well as various popular views of the trade balance, firmly 
underpin the idea that depreciation goes hand in hand with inflation. Those three episodes 
are of difficult interpretation in a transfer-problem view, mainly because they occured 
during the transition from one pattern of world transfers to another (see ch.IV, sec.3). In 
such circumstances, the trade balance, rather than the BIT, imposes itself as the effective 
external constraint; accordingly, monetary authorities and private agents tend to push 
exchange rates towards correcting relative price differentials. Most of the international 
activity in the 1920s, 1930s and late 1970s was directed to this end (Kindleberger 
(1984, Part IV), Argy (1981, Part I), Biasco (1987))17.
In spite of the dramatic episodes of the early 1920s, the opposite classical view 
was the rule, more than the exception, during the floating experience of the 1930s -as we 
know from the fundamental work by Nurkse (1944). Almost all debtor countries in
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Central Europe, Latin America and Oceania experienced domestic deflation -a slump 
indeed- and exchange-rate devaluation, nominal and real, after 1929 (Eichengreen-Portes 
(1987)). However, the most striking vindication of the classical presumption has come 
from the 1980-85 World-US transfer. As was noted soon after the inflation-cum- 
depreciation experience of the United States (e.g. Dombusch (1980b)), the freely floating 
dollar had not shown any tendency to offset inflation differentials as was dictated by 
purchasing power parity. Moreover, the rate of growth of money excess supply (nominal 
money growth - income growth) had been higher in Germany than in the United States, 
in line with a widening trade surplus of the former and trade deficit of the latter. The 
picture was consistently one of transition in the world transfers pattern, rather than a 
story of "spendthriftness" (see also above, ch.IV secs.3.4-3.5). Since then, the United 
States has firmly taken the position of world R-economy vis a vis Europe, Japan and 
Latin America as world T-economies; since 1980 the nominal and the real paths of the 
dollar have been highly correlated, indeed, the latter is almost entirely explained by the 
former.
Chart„5. The US nominal and.real exchange rate _
—— Nominal exc. rat« real exc. rate
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In a classical perspective, the World-US transfer has been effected in goods 
through the nominal-real appreciation of the dollar, which has thus allowed for a massive 
process of substitution of imported and domestic goods for exportable goods on US 
markets, and of exportable goods for imported and domestic goods on foreign markets. 
The dollar nominal appreciation has almost entirely taken over relative changes in supply 
prices. There is evidence of initial relative general deflation in R-economies, and then 
imported deflation in the T-economy (see also Fitoussi-Phelps (1988, ch.II». The 
comparative advantage of the classical interpretation, with respect to many modem 
monetarist versions, lies in its recognition of the transfer-problem nature of the present 
World-US interdependence, and in the role it assigns to goods substitutability within and 
across economies. However, the many shortcomings to the classical model itself can 
hardly be mended by manipulating élasticités; they rather call upon major modifications in 
the anaylsis of the world transfer problem.
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Appendix
A .I. Solution of system le-g
System le-g joins the goods-markets equations of the classical model with a 
monetary mechanism based on the discount rate as the endogenous variable in the BIT 
equation. Hence we obtain:
(Al)
(A2)
(A3)
Bt = z t(pt, P*t) + Ft(it. i*t) = °  
°t<pt'pV.>=0o
07 5VpVV=°*o
F(i)>0, F(i*)<0
0-(p)>0, 0 '(p*)>0, 0 '(i)<0
i, i* = T and R discount rate, O, O* = T and R total output
As such the world model displays four endogenous variables for three equations. The 
classical strategy is to assume perfect capital mobility and to impose
(A4) =  i *
Now the model runs by assuming implicitly (dF/di* < 0) -i.e. a rise in the 
world discount rate generates a negative NFT from T- and solving explicitly for the three 
endogenous variables [i, P, P*]. Eq.A2 of T output is specified so that the change in 
domestic output (O'(i)di) must be offset by change in foreign demand (-Q'x(P)dP) and
substitution in import consumption (Q'm(P*)dP*). Eq.A3 of R output is so specified that
the change in domestic output (0*’(P*)dP*) must substitute for the change in import 
consump -
follows:
tion (i.e. T exports, Qx(P)dP). The Jacobian matrix of system A1-A3 results as
(A4) F’: -Q' Q'^  x ^  m
-O'. -O’ Q'l x ^  m
0 Q’ O*' *v  x p*
di dF
dP = 0
dP* 0
The determinant of the system is:
A -  -Q'x(0* 'p,  + + F.) < 0
The solution vector of the endogenous variables is: 
di/dF = -Q'x(0*'p* + Q m)M = l/CO'i + F p  > 0 
dP/dF = O,iO*,p*/A <0 
dP*/dF = -Q’xO y A > 0
A2. Solution of system 4.
System 4 represents the classical transfer model with tradable and non-tradable 
goods as follows
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(Al) Zt = PxtQXt(Pxt) '  eP*xtQ*xt(P*xt}
(A2) Bt = Zt + Ft
(A3) Pt = CûdPdt + û)meP*et
(A4) H* o - Bt = p*tH2V ° V p*t = co*dp*dt + “ V x / e
(A5)
(A6) °*0  = ^ d t ^ d P  + °*x t(P*xt)
There are four independent endogenous variables in the system (P ^, P*dt, Pxt> P*xt)
which yield in addition (Pt, P* , Z{). The four equation which solve the system are A3-
A6. The Jacobian matrix of the equilibrium variations of endogenous variables is 
obtained under the following constraints: (dH = 0, dB = dF), (dH* = 0), (dO = 0), 
(dO* = 0). The latter two constraints imply that the change in domestic output must be 
compensated by an opposite change in export output; hence O (P ) and O* (P* )Al Al aL Al
should be equivalent to Q t(Px ) and Q* .(P* ) respectively. Therefore, setting 
(dF < 0, h < 0, h* > 0),
(A7) “ d
0
O'
0
dp
0
(Û*
0
0
-Q'
° * 'd P 0
xp
c o em
0
0
Q’^  mp
-
^ d -hp0
^ d zz h*P*Q
dP 0X
dP* 0) X
Setting all time 0 nominal variables equal to 1 and arranging to obtain rates of change, the 
Jacobian can be rewritten as follows:
(A7b) CD-
0
0
(Ù*
0
CO1*
m
m
e Q x^xi d0d °
° n * d ° * d  «
The determinant of the matrix is:
œr 
0
0
-e Q m^m
5Pd ’ -h
5P*d = h*
5Px 0
- 5P*x
0
n W = 0
The solutions of the four endogenous variables are (all time 0 nominal variables set equal 
to i):
SPd = (IK B * ^ ^  + h*camTl*dO*d)exQx/A
5P*d * <-h“ V d ° d  '  h‘ ®de«<V en . V A
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8px - < W W 8pi  
5P*x = <1'*d0 *d/EmQm>5P*d
The signs are consistent with the classical theory if (A > 0), then:
0Pd < 0, SP*d > 0, 8Px < 0 ,0P*X > 0.
In order to obtain (A > 0) it must be that
œ ca* e Q e 0m m x^x m in
----------  < -----------------
V d  T'd0 dT'*d°*d
The economic meaning is that the weights in the money stock deflator must be such that 
imported inflation in T (imported deflation in R) does not overweighs domestic deflation 
(domestic inflation).
A.3. Solution of system 6.
System 6 reproduces the classical transfer model, with tradable and non-tradable 
goods, under a flexible exchange-rate regime:
<A8) Z, = Px0Q , - ' P*x0Q*x,(=P*x>
(A9) B( = Z( + F( = 0
(A10) Hq + B[ = PtH20(O0) p, = “ dPde + <V P*xO
(A ll) H‘ 0 -B t - p . tH2.0(O*0) PV “ *dP*dt + “ *mfW '
Setting (Pxq. P*xq = 1, dPx, dP*x --> 0), the model should yield five endogenous
variables (Pt, Pdt, P*t> P*dt> e() which reduce to three because of the linear constraint
imposed by general price indexes. The three solving equations are obtained by 
substituing A8 into A9 in addition to AIO and Al 1. The three equations operate under the 
following constraints (dB = 0), (dH = dF), (dH* = -dF), with (dF < 0); hence the 
resulting Jacobian matrix, in rates of change, is:
(A 12) 'P 0 0 ' 6e f
l-û)d “ d 0
cmto sr -h
-(l*5*d)/e 0 ■ 
■»
*
. 8P*d
h*
 ^ 4
where (P = ex + em -1) is the Marshall-Lemer total elasticity of the trade balance with
respect to the exchange rate. The expected sign is (p > 0). The determinant of the matrix 
is:
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A = 00)^0)*^ > 0 
The solution vector of the endogenous variables is: 
8e = f/p > 0
8Pd = -h/C0j - (a»m/cod)5e < 0  
5P*d = h*/Q)*d + (ca*in/a)*d)5e > 0
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N o t e s
(1) This was in fact the view of early scholars in the 19th century (McCulloch (1804), Longfield (1840). 
and with particular analytical clarity, John Stuart Mill (1848,ch.XXI)), but it was also held by later 
writers such as Taussig (1917,1928), Viner (1924), and Keynes (1929,1930, ch.XXI). Early debates 
were occasioned by rent transfers from Ireland to England, and later by payments from and to colonies 
(Viner (1937, ch.IV, sec.3)). Taussig and Keynes took active part in the debate on Germany's ability to 
pay her war debts.
(2) For a more extended treatment in the history of thought see Tamborini (1985).
(3) This was one of Keynes's arguments in his pessimistic view of the German transfer problem 
(1929, p. 162), although this was not his major one (see below sec.2.2).
(4) That is to say, the same conditions that support the "orthodox presumption'' of the effectiveness of 
nominal depreciation on the trade balance (Robinson (1937)) also support the presumption of the 
effectiveness of real depreciation on the transfer problem.
(5) See e.g. Krueger (1983, ch.IID, Kenen (1985).
(6) On the introduction of the money equation as the missing equation in trade balance models see again 
Krueger (1983, ch.III), and in particular Frenkel-Johnson (1976). The model in use here bears similarities 
with Dombusch’s (1973a, 1973b); it adopts a major simplification in equations lc-d: the money stock 
deflator is equal to the price level of the national good in each country and does not contain the price level 
of the imported good. For the time being, however, such a simplification does not modify results 
qualitatively and helps to keep the treatment manageable (see below, sec.2.2).
(7) This point was made clearly in the early 19th century in the context of a debate on negative com 
harvests in Great Britain (see Viner (1937, ch.IV, sec.3)); the same point was magnified by oil price 
shocks in the 1970s (Balogh (1978), Balogh-Graham (1979)). Johnson (1956) and Dombusch (1973a) 
analyzed the relationship between exchange-rate devaluation and the transfer problem.
(8) See e.g. Kenen (1985).
(9) Viner (1924), Angell (1926), Taussig (1928), Bresciani Turroni (1932), Kindleberger (1937) are 
among the most representative. These studies were also supplemented with accurate surveys and 
discussions by Iversen (1935) and Viner (1937).
(10) For instance, from 1872 to 1913 Britain's general price level relative to the United States initially 
appreciated by losing 18 points (1896) but then regained 12 points, while the same magnitude in relation 
to Germany even depreciated steadily by gaining 11 points (see the same source as chart 1). As for world 
prices of primary commodities relative to prices of manufactured goods, various sources indicate a 
depreciation between the 1870s and the 1910s ranging from 19 points (16%) to 3 points (2.5%) (see 
Aquino (1986, chJI) for accurate statistics).
(11) For transfer models in a Mundellian framework see Tamborini (1984).
(12) Keynes's monetary view paved the way for an interesting literature on asymmetries in the burden of 
adjustment -or the "violations of the rules of the game". Asymmetries may be due to relative size, 
namely the case in which NFT is large for T central bank but is small relative to R money stock, or to 
different responsiveness of compensatory capitals, or to uncoordinated reaction functions, in which case R
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monetary authority is not prepared to accept monetary inflation. Directly referring to this issue and to the 
negative historical record of the 1920s and 1930s, Eichengreen (1985) has shown in a policy-coordination 
model that a gold-standard regime may in fact fail to enforce enough coordination of inflation rates.
(13) On this distinction and related theoretical issues see Bruce-Purvis (1975, sec.4).
(14) For non-tradables in trade balance models see in general Harrod (1973, ch.IV), Kenen (1985), Bruce- 
Purvis (1985).
(15) For the sake of precision, Keynes put forward a more complex argument which is worth considering 
in detail. Keynes is usually considered to be the champion of elasticity pessimism in the transfer 
literature; however, his reasoning is not so much concerned with low demand elasticities as with efficient 
product specialization. As he wrote in the Treatise, "the amount of the alteration in the terms of trade 
[...] depends on non-monetary factors -on physical facts and capacities, and on the elasticities of demand 
in each of the two countries for goods which the other can produce with physical 
efficiency"(1930, p.301). Keynes had a sort of Ricardian model of export expansion. In a specialized 
world, T must produce and transfer goods that (i) were not previously produced in R since they were 
already exported by T, or that (ii) were previously produced in R and have now to be imported from T. 
Rigorously, the ratio T| may be unfavourable to T, not because is low absolutely (i.e. with
reference to case (i)), but because T may have a less efficient output mix (case ii), and "it is unlikely that 
[R] would have previously [produced] the goods in question or refrained from importing them unless there 
was some gain in doing so" (p.300). Since the marginal efficiency of exportable output is negative, the 
latter cannot be produced efficiently at the going price of exportables relative to foreign exportables as 
well as domestic non-tradables. "I conclude that, if the payment of reparations involves a substantial 
change in the terms of trade, then it will probably be necessary to force down the rate of money earnings 
in Germany by means of a painful (and perhaps impracticable) process of deflation" (p.307).
(16) See general treatments by Krueger (1983, ch.IV) and Frenkel-Mussa (1985).
(17) However, the classical transfer model does have a channel through which domestic prices and 
exchange rates may become positively correlated: imported inflation. The simplest way to activate such a 
channel is by allowing (co^, w*m = 0) in the money stock deflator. Clearly, if the weighted increase of
the exchange rate overtakes the weighted decrease of the price of non-tradables, the T-economy would have 
external depreciation, domestic slump and general inflation at the same time, the more so the more 
general inflation exerts a negative real-balance effect on the demand for non-tradables. A whole body of 
literature interprets German hyperinflation as the joint result of reparation payments and imported 
inflation (Kindleberger (1984, ch.XVII)). The inflationary experience of industrial economies in the 
1970s has also been widely analyzed with the help of models of imported inflation -though largely non- 
classical models (Argy (1981, Part III), Biasco (1979)). In this connection, one can find an impulse in oil 
price shocks, which gave rise to a massive currency transfer from oil- importers to oil-exporters (for the 
analytics of this point see above, sec. 1.2). Then higher oil prices and competitive devaluations made for a 
typical transfer problem with imported inflation.
CHAPTER SIX
THE TRANSFER PROBLEM AS A FINANCING-UTILIZATION 
PROBLEM. REAL EXPENDITURE AND INCOME
Introduction
The identification of the transfer problem with the central bank's (especially T 
central bank's) currency problem captures only a part of the whole transfer process. This 
limitation may become serious as soon as one considers a monetary organization different 
from the idealized gold-standard of the classics. For instance, the monetary organization 
that was introduced in ch.m makes use of paper currency issued by the central bank - 
largely inside money- and trades m onetary and non*m onetary assets 
internationally. In the previous chapter on the classical transfer theory it was stressed 
that, under such a different organization, shifts of "gold" alone may leave the world 
transfer mechanism with too weak a driving force -and even under the official gold 
standard actual gold movements did not take place on the scale implied by movements of 
real resources. Moreover it is not difficult to realize that the currency-problem approach 
totally ignores why a financial transfer is undertaken.
In order to overcome the limitations of the classical transfer theory, we should 
move towards a theory including such features as (i) some form of international paper 
standard, (ii) world financial transfers as results of autonomous private trade in assets. It 
also follows that the transfer process can no longer be derived exclusively from central 
bank reaction functions; for (ii) implies that a financial transfer from T to R is a direct 
counterpart of autonomous demand for and supply of capitals. From this 
standpoint, the focus of the transfer problem shifts to sources of capital supply in T and 
to the employments of capital demand in R, or in Johnson's (1956) terminology, it 
becomes a financing-utilization problem. This approach to the problem leads to a 
variety of specifications, each of which highlights crucial analytical aspects and 
observable phenomena that find no room in the classical theory. As will be seen in 
sections 1 and 2 under different exchange rate regimes, the new pivot of the transfer
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process is its effects on real expenditure and income.
1. The financing'Utilization problem under fixed exchange rates
1.1. The general framework for analysis.
The classical theory disregards a fundamental aspect of the world transfer 
problem: any NFT from T to R economies has a counterpan in excess supply of capitals 
in the former and excess demand for capitals in the latter. Or better, the classical theory 
runs as if this could only obtain ex post and in real terms, while the fact that it holds ex 
ante and in financial terms is the key characteristic of a non-stationary world as defined 
hitherto. Put differently, the causal relation does not go from the currency market 
inwaids, but the other way round. Ohlin (1933, ch.XXI) greatly contributed to 
understand this point, and his name is usually tied with the revival of a minoritarian 
tradition dating back to Ricardo (1809)*, according to which any NFT is a "transfer of 
purchasing power" connected with a shift of demand from T to R independently of 
changes in the real exchange rate. NFT correspond to situations in which
the buying power in [R] has been increased, while that in [T] has been reduced [...] 
There is thus a m arket in [R] for more of [T's] goods than formerly. On the 
other hand, the market in [TJ for [R’s] goods is not as big as it was before. The local 
distribution of the total demand has changed. [R] has become a better and [T] a worse 
market for goods of all kinds (1933, p.406-407).
Johnson (1956) also made an important contribution in this respect, one which is 
easily translatable into our stock-flow matrix. T excess demand for foreign currency 
should correspond to the excess supply of domestic funds; the latter may come from two 
sources: (i) the displacement of current expenditure (or components of expenditure), or
(ii) the mobilization of existing wealth (or components of wealth). This is T financing 
problem. Conversely, R excess supply of foreign currency should have its counterpart 
in the excess demand for funds; these may find two outlets: (i) the enlargement of current 
expenditure (or components of expenditure), or (ii) the accumulation of wealth (or 
components of wealth). This is R utilization problem.
Combinations of these four possibilities yield a virtually complete range of types
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of capital transfers and appropriate transfer theories, each including the currency problem 
as an intermediate step. The most interesting cases will be examined in this chapter.
Underlying excess demand for and supply of financial means there should be 
complementary shifts of demand on goods markets in each economy -or expenditure 
effects- either directly (through channels (i) above) or indirectly (through channels 
(ii) above), or a mixture of the two. The existence of expenditure effects immediately 
suggests that changes in the real exchange rate can no longer be the sole transfer 
mechanism. More precisely, relative prices (may) change because of changes in demand 
due to expenditure effects, and not the other way round.
The specification of various transfer mechanisms in this framework is a matter of 
chosing from the following building blocks:
(i) the financing-utilization pattern
(ii) international asset-markets relationships
(iii) internal asset-market-goods-market relationships
(iv) domestic and international goods markets.
Obviously, points (ii) to (iv) characterize the general theoretical outlook of the analysis. 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the currency- problem approach and the chief 
role of the real exchange rate follow quite naturally from the classical adherence to general 
competitive equilibrium and money neutrality. The different view of money, asset and 
goods market interrelations taken here will require us to give a distinctive role to 
uncertainty, imperfect competition and financial non-neutrality. This will be accomplished 
in accordance with Part I.
International asset-market relationships. In order to model international 
asset-market relationships I shall use the tools of asset-market analysis introduced in 
ch.III, sec.3. The general theoretical framework is one of uncertainty and liquidity 
preference. Each agent holds a fully diversified portfolio of domestic and foreign assets 
with a non-zero share of monetary reserve to minimize the probability of default of the 
market value of the portfolio. The general specification of asset stock equilibrium was 
shown to be the following:
a = 1,..., indicates assets (2 * a), aa. = portfolio share (Z „aot = 1), = nominalI a  a l  di
value of the stock, A( = desired value of total wealth, Pt = goods price index, 
ra = vector ratcs of return, Vpa = price variance of the stock.
It will be recalled that for each asset, r is known when the nominal interest rate i&t, the 
market price p , and the expected market price are known. Unless otherwise stated Ia l
shall assume static expectations as already explained in ch.III, sec.3; consequently 
(r = iat/pat). For any given level of wealth (A(), and constant asset price variances
(V ), the endogenous variables of system 8 are the elements of the vector [r ] or, given
a
[ i l ,  the asset price vector [p_]. The wealth constraint lb introduces one degree of
a a
freedom in the system; I shall attribute it to the asset price of money which is fixed to 1 
by definition. Therefore system 1 determines the price vector of non-monetary assets and 
the quantity of monetary reserve in the portfolio.
As usual in portfolio analysis, we have to adopt a specification strategy to make 
the model manageable. The key issue here is the substitution between domestic and 
foreign assets. It is therefore convenient to consider three assets (index numbers refer to 
the menu of ch.III): a domestic asset (A7), a foreign asset (A6) and money (A2). A7 and 
A6 may usefully be regarded as optimally diversified Investment Funds offered to savers, 
each containing private and public securities issued at home and abroad respectively. In
the absence of barriers to capital mobility, each asset supplier in each country faces
worldwide demand; hence we can .specify system 1 as follows (the home country is T, 
the foreign country * is R):
(2a) Ato 6t(ra)/e + A*tcc6*t(ra) = A6t
(b) Ata7 t(ra ) + eA*t<x7*t(ra) = A7t
(c) V /  = AI
(d) S aA V P‘  = A*.
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Note that e is the nominal exchange rate, which is assumed to be fixed; hence 2a 
expresses the world stock of A6 in foreign currency; 2b expresses the world stock of A7 
in home currency; 2c and 2d are expressed in respective currencies.
Asset-market-goods-market relationships. The connection between the 
asset market and the goods market is an extremely important part of the problem we are 
dealing with. In the classical model this connection was established by the assumption of 
direct substitution between money and goods and money neutrality. In the present 
framework of many assets and liquidity preference the "transmission mechanism" must 
operate through asset prices. Macromodels usually obtain this by means of an "interest- 
elastic" component of aggregate demand; further, they may introduce "wealth effects" on 
aggregate demand. Elaborations on components of aggregate demand made in ch.HI 
allow us to be more precise -or at least they force us to make explicit and well-controlled 
assumptions.
The basic components of aggregate demand are consumption and investment. I
rewrite here for convenience the two respective functions, where r7 is used as the
2
investment discount factor ;
(3) Ct = PctQct(Pc>Y’ A) Q c(pc)<°> 0<Q'C(Y)<1, Q'c(A)>0
(4) Tt = PktQkt(Pk’ r7’ A) Q’k(Pk)<0’ Q'k(r7)<0’ Q’k(A)>0
The balance of payments is obtained by simply recording those of the above transactions 
which concern foreign units, that is to say:
(5) Bt s Z t + Ft
Zt = Xt(Px*Y*’ A+)'  Mt(P*x> Y’ A)
Ft = YF + GF + AAF(ra) - AA6(ra)
where Z = NRT, F = NFT, YF = Net Foreign Incomes, GF = Net Government 
Transfers, AAF = purchases of the domestic asset by foreigners (capital inflows), AA6 =
purchases of the foreign asset by residents (capital outflows).
Under the above qualifications we may also write the usual aggregate function of
236
GDP, which in flow equilibrium must equal factor incomes:
<«*> V Pct(2ct + 'V3kt + Px1<3xt
(b> Yt = pd .°d t<Y - r7' A>+ W p, - Y*- A*>
0<0'd(Y)<l, 0 'd(r7)<0, 0 'd(A)>0
So far we have established the chain of relationships linking the asset market (and 
stock equilibrium conditions) with the goods market (and flow equilibrium conditions). 
As we know from Part I, we should also take account of the links from flows to stocks. 
By recalling the stock-flow matrix, the following relationship must hold:
(7) St . I t * D I + Zt
AAr D'. + F.-B.
where D = government deficit, D' = national deficit spending.
Relation 7 states that flow equilibrium impinges on the stock of wealth through non-zero
period saving. Indirectly, wealth as well as specific asset stocks should grow with real
income. The period change in wealth amounts to national deficit spending, to the net
financial transfer with foreigners, and to the official transfer resulting from the balance of
payments. Note that the allocations of such aggregate flows of wealth cannot be deduced 
consistenty from relation 7. D’t corresponds to AA7f (i.e. the change in the domestic
asset stock), a share of which may be allocated to foreigners thus entering F(.
Correspondingly, only the remaining part of Ft accounts for AA6t (i.e. the change in the
stock of the foreign asset). Only the non-sterlized official transfer accrues to AA2( (i.e. a
change in the money stock); with full sterilization, resident units are led to offset AA2(
3 *
with AA6t . Such a variety of possibilities is by no means irrelevant to a correct
understanding of so-called "wealth effects"; these are not easily deduced from aggregate 
accounts and may vary greatly under different circumstances, as we shall see later 
(below, ch. VII, sec. 1).
Domestic and international goods markets. We now turn to the real side 
of the two economies. Price-quantity relationships in the classical model are based on the
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assumption of perfect competition and of market-clearing instantaneous price 
adjustments. Product specialization only implies that each country's export industry faces 
a downward-sloping demand function, while individual firms within the industry are 
price-takers which can sell all the efficiency quantity they produce. We saw in ch.HI that 
by introducing time, uncertainty and sequential decision-making, the picture of a 
competitive industry changes substantially, (i) In a sequential setting, each competitive 
firm must be price-maker. (ii) At the time of planning production, each firm is uncertain 
about the correct price-quantity pair, (iii) Each fallible firm in a competitive market of 
fallible firms enjoys some market power corresponding to the elasticity of market demand 
at the point of quantity supplied ("polypoly"), which, for the i-th firm, yields the 
traditional imperfect-competition pricing rule:
Pi0 = wo n 'io^i H j - V i v »
where Wq is the vector of factor costs known at time 0, n'.Q is the vector of marginal 
inputs associated to the plan q-Q, £j is the market demand elasticity at the point of quantity
supplied (where the individual supply is inversely proportional to the number of firms) 
under the expectation that
q r W = W - Ei« ,)
where j denotes all non-i firms, Q is market demand and Qj is non-i aggregate supply. 
Such a production plan is consistent if the market demand function [Qt(Pt)] is common
knowledge and each firm ignores the production plans of all the others. Plans consistency 
implies that [P{ = E(piQ)] will be the market price. The analytics can be simplified by the
assumption of CES market demand (M-j = Mj = \i), so that the supply price can vary
(across firms and for the industry as a whole) only if different planned quantities entail 
different m arginal costs. Since at each production round Wq is known and given for all,
variations in marginal costs can only be due to increasing or decreasing elements in n'jQ.
I instead propounded the hypothesis of constant marginal inputs, which relates changes 
in supply prices to changes in factor costs from one period to another.
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Under price-makers competition thus defined, goods and labour prices turn out to 
be invariant with respect to demand shocks unless (i) average productivity, (ii) industry 
demand structure, or (iii) other non-labour costs change concomitantly. With the 
important exception of the exchange- rate regime, there is no reason to believe that these
4
elements have a direct connection with the transfer process . Thus we shall concentrate 
on an adjustment process where prices are not changed. Consequently, all nominal 
magnitudes coincide with real ones; price and exchange-rate indexes will be set equal to 
1 .
An "empirical" issue arises in the field of product specialization. There is little to 
add to what was said in ch.V, sec.2; we shall retain the assumption of national product 
specialization with the further distinction between tradable and non-tradable goods. After 
determining the conditions under which prices are not changed, it will be convenient to 
identify non-tradables with goods (or a composite good) either consumed or invested, 
and let consumption consist of domestic as well as imported goods, whereas tradables are 
only exported. Therefore, we need to know the weights of domestic and imported 
consumption
C  = CHt + M = ® .Cf + comCt.t at t a t  r a t
These weights should also enter the general price index
P, = cd.P .. + coeP *  = l.t d dt m xt
Knowing the consumption/income ratio, it is easy to obtain the import/income ratio:
m = M/Y, = G)mc
1.2. International portfolio equilibrium, real interest rates and real 
income.
The above formalization is general enough to allow for several different 
specifications of the transfer problem to be found in the literature. Variations on portfolio 
models may concern methodological as well as "empirical" themes^. As far as 
methodology is concerned, the most important issue is the choice between a general
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equilibrium framework and alternative ones. By general equilibrium, it is meant 
instantaneous and simultaneous equilibrium of both asset and goods markets. To this 
effect, the three blocks -asset stock equilibrium, macroeconomic flow equilibrium and 
wealth effects- should be pooled together. By contrast, the sequential methodology 
introduced in Part I leads to take the three blocks separately, since one has to specify the 
flow of information from one market to the other on which agents base their decisions. 
Hence, asset market conditions affect investment and production decisions, goods market 
conditions affect consumption and saving decisions which feed back onto asset markets 
conditions. As I argued at length in Part I, the major claim of the sequential methodology 
is not realism, nor does it necessitate making appeal to "fast" asset markets as opposed to 
"slow" goods markets.
A widely-used "empirically"-oriented specification is the so-called "small country 
case". This we have already met on various occasions in this work, and I have already 
stressed how elusive such a "case" may be. As to international financial relations, main 
criticisms were already made in ch.III, sec.3.3. In this chapter any country can place 
domestic securities in international markets, albeit at different terms. In the transfer- 
problem perspective, "smallness" concerns instead the extent of transfer effects produced 
by the T economy in the R economy.
The other extreme case of asset-market specification -one single integrated world 
market for all assets- is not without problems either. If one posits that demand functions 
are the same for all holders of the same asset throughout the world, then one obtains the 
peculiar result that Americans and Germans should both regard German assets as less 
(more) risky than American assets, and one is left unable to identify any specific role of 
international financial flows in the adjustment process. A more sensible procedure seems 
to be one where asset demand functions are country-specific and worldwide aggregation 
is avoided
The international portfolio adjustment. We are now in a position to 
analyze in some detail the world transfer problem in the case where it takes the form of an 
international portfolio adjustment. In the taxonomy of the financing-utilization
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patterns, we have here a case where the world R-type economy (or area) is characterized 
by conditions of excess demand for real means, i.e. excess supply of financial liabilities. 
As to the T-type economy (or area), there should arise demand for R-denominated assets, 
i.e. supply of financial means; it is assumed that this takes place through portfolio 
adjustment (i.e. with no direct displacement of current expenditure).
The financial transfer can be expressed in the Jacobian matrix 8, adapted from 
system 2 according to the considerations just made above, by imposing exogenous 
excess supply of the foreign asset (dA6) to be mirrored in an equivalent swap from the 
domestic asset (-dA6); in particular only two bilateral effects are explicited: R demand for 
its own domestic asset, and R demand for T domestic asset (the corresponding 
parameters have unambiguous effects on the solution of the system; see below, 
App.A.l).
(8)
a 66’ a 77’ a *77 = own*rate demand elasticity (* denotes foreign demand), a ^ ,
= cross-rate demand elasticity.
Under the standard conditions of substitutability obtained previously (ch.HI, sec.3.3), 
the determinant is positive, and moreover,
dr6 > 0 , dr7 > 0, dr6/dr7 > 1.
Hence, the resulting NFT is:
dF/dA6 = a*?7dr7/dA6 - a 66dr6/dA6.
We can reproduce here the figure showing asset market equilibrium in T before and after 
the financial transfer.
a 66+a*66 a 67 * 6 dA6
“ 76 a 77+ a*77 . dr7 -dA6
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Before going on, it is important to figure it out with care how T asset market
adjusts itself to the new world situation in terms of actual market operations. The shift 
from A6 to A6t in fig.l represents the consequence of R excess demand for capitals. Our
system of equations and fig. 1 specify the swap in portfolios from T to R-denominated
assets. The money stock is implicitly adjusted via quantity due to the wealth constraint;
yet this is not to mean that money and central banks’ reaction functions have no role to
play at all. A crucial factor in the international portfolio adjustment is that T asset holders
wish to sell the domestic asset A7 as the foreign rate r6 goes up; the final equilibrium
point of (r6, r7) depends precisely on what form the market response takes. As we know
(ch.III, sec.3.3), the standard response in portfolio models is through sole price
adjustments, that is, p7 falls until r7 reaches point B for the given A7 stock. As is clear in
fig.l, this is the highest possible excursion of r7. Leaving the nominalistic appeal to
"smallness" aside, the excursion of r7 turns out to depend on a set of conditions that we
might rather call the "tightness" of the situation, (i) What determines the pressure on r6
and on T asset market? (ii) What hampers actual sales of A7? Inspection of matrix 8 hints 
that the rise of r7 is higher, the greater ( a ^ + a * ^ ,  the smaller
the smaller (a*^7); the economic meaning of these three parameters is straightforward: 
they indicate, respectively, the tightness of the world market for A6, and the tightness of
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the market for A7 in terms of domestic and foreign demand.
It is advisable to avoid too mechanical interpretations of those parameters; in
particular the tightness of the market cannot be assessed irrespective of central banks'
reaction functions. In the first place, the pressure of dA6 on rf> and on T asset market will 
be inversely porportional to the responsiveness of R own demand (a * ^ ) ;  and this, as
we know from previous analysis (ch.III, sec.2.1), will also depend on how much R
new debt is endorsed by R central bank. If R central bank does not purchase domestic
assets, the impact on private asset holders, at home as well as abroad, will be maximal -
which corresponds to the usual result of no sterilization.
At the same time, those in T who arc trying to sell A7 are also demanding foreign
currency to buy A6; this is the currency-side of the transfer problem, which is, of course,
still there. Again, the currency problem involves a typical sterilization problem; T central
bank faces the possibility of exchanging foreign currency for the domestic asset at terms
ranging from point B to C in fig.l. The extent of the currency problem, and hence the
bank's reaction function, is in turn dependent on (i) the ability to attract compensatory 
capitals (via «*77). which, however, by construction cannot compensate for the whole
dF; (ii) the ability to dampen the capital outflow (via a ^ ) ^ .  Even admitting that («*77 -
> 0), point B will be reached only in the case of no sterilization. Note, however, that 
here sterilization has to be interpreted in a broader sense than the usual one. The 
counterpart to the transfer of currency is not necessarily domestic money: it may be the 
domestic security. If the central bank chooses not to sterilize, it also chooses to tighten 
the market for the domestic security, or to maximize the rise of the domestic rate and 
minimize the extent of the currency problem.
We can take a pause and see what are the asset-market effects of the world 
transfer. The oustanding result is that return  rates should rise in both economies 
(and they should rise in real terms). If central banks adopt an orthodox reaction function 
(no sterilization) the impact on return rates will be the highest If T asset holders regard R 
assets as riskier, T return rate will rise less than R's.
Comovements in interest rates are a result that conflicts with the extension of the
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classical transfer theory, which rather predicts countercyclical movements in the absence 
of an explanation of autonomous demand for capitals on the part of R. The former result 
has become the dominant one since Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics was "opened" to a 
world system of goods and capital markets in the 1960's^. Here we have obtained this 
result from few basic principles: (i) the non-stationary world economy implies a world 
transfer problem between capital demanding and capital supplying economies, (ii) any 
capital outflow from one economy has a counterpart in excess demand for capitals in 
another, (iii) world asset markets are integrated.
Real expenditu re , income, and the Balance of In te rn a tio n a l
T ransfers. We can now move to the macroeconomic consequences of the world
financial transfer. The general logic is as follows. Asset markets establish the conditions
under which deficit spending units in R can carry on their plans; at the same time, also
deficit spending units in T will have to take account of the modified conditions on asset
markets. Conditions on T and R asset markets change in relation to the NFT both in 
price and wealth terms. Equation 4 above reminds us that If will vary negatively with
asset return rates, but positively with shifts of financial wealth. Whereas the effect due to 
rising return rates is obvious, the wealth effect we should consider is quite an important 
feature of the theoretical framework we are dealing with. It will be remembered from Part
I, ch.III, that changes in investors' financial wealth affect their probability of default, 
and hence their willingness to undertake an investment project for any given probability 
distribution of future returns to the capital good, its current price and the discount factor. 
Therefore, as a consequence of the NFT, while discount factors rise on both markets, R 
becomes a safer market for investment than T. Ex ante expenditure plans in R may not 
coincide with ex post ones, after the price at which financial means can be raised has 
been established; some marginal plans may be cut back, but in general the financial 
transfer to R will be associated with a net positive effect on aggregate demand. Concomi­
tantly, financial conditions for spending units in T are worse; here the cut of marginal 
plans will have a net negative effect on aggregate demand . I shall simply write that, at 
the given factor costs, the supply of domestic output is enlarged in R and reduced in T by
I
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<D* = d O ^ /d F  > 0  0> = d 0  ^ d F  < 0
Under conditions of constant prices, factor incomes and real output coincide. The 
equilibrium level of real income in T and R is obtained by taking equation 6 
simultaneously for the two economies. The equilibrium conditions may be written so as 
to highlight that real income must be adjusted to greater supply of domestic output in R 
and lower in T. The resulting Jacobian matrix is (see App.A.2):
(9) k -m* dY/dF -<D
-m k* dY*/dF <D*
k = 1 - 0(0)^ - G>m) + 1, c = marginal propensity to consume equal to the average 
one, m = ca>m = marginal propensity to import equal to the import/income ratio, t = tax
rate (* denotes the same parameters in R).
The determinant of the system is positive, but real incomes may go either way, since 
dY/dF = (-Ok* + <D*m*)/A dY*/dF = (k<D* - m$)/A
Clearly, the crucial role is played by the relative amplitude of the transfer effect on real 
expenditure in the two economies, given their structural parameters. An important point is 
the condition thanks to which T initial loss of domestic output may be offset, or 
outweighed, by exports via R income growth. (dY/dF > 0, dY*/dF > 0) obtains if 
0*/0 > k*/m* > m/k
Since generally (k* > m*, k > m), this condition requires O* to be a multiple of A. As 
Machlup put it (1943, 1963), real gains or losses in the world transfer process are a 
matter of the relative rate of expenditure effects. This will in turn depend on the 
financing-utilization pattern; hence we realize that there is no unique solution to the 
transfer problem.
To grasp the essentials of the transfer problem, a simple flow equilibrium diagram- 
wili prove useful (fig.2).
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Fig,2, World flow equilibrium under fixed exchange rates
The diagram is drawn in the traditional income-interest space. Y is the real income 
equilibrium schedule in T, and B is the world flow equilibrium schedule (dB = 0). Asset 
demand and supply is embodied in the capital- account side of B, which is sensitive to r7 
as explained in the first part of the model. The financial transfer to R corresponds to a 
downward shift of B at the new world equilibrium value of r7. The expenditure effect in 
T is given by the inclination of Y. Expenditure effects in R feed back to B (upwards) and 
Y (rightwards).
In order to characterize our present case one may reasonably presume that R 
agents are willing to spend the whole NFT (i.e. cuts of marginal expenditure plans and of 
other autonomous expenditures are ruled out from analysis), while the negative effect of 
NFT on T agents expenditure plans via interest rates is less than proportional; that is to 
say,
d>* = i <1» < 1 
Under such a pattern, one obtains (dY*/dF > 0) for any (4> < 1), whereas (dY/dF > 0) 
further requires (O < m*/k* < 1). Therefore, no economy will suffer from a real loss
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only if the contraction rate of real domestic expenditure in T does not exceed the net 
export multiplier. B{ and Y in fig.2 portray the case where (dY = 0).
Does world flow equilibrium hold? The BIT comes to be adjusted as follows: 
dB/dF = m*dY*/dF - mdY/dF -1 
Once again, there are no endogenous variables to ensure that the BIT will be kept in 
balance. Under broad conditions, we may only say that a positive NRT is the likely 
result. As an example, consider again the transfer pattern above. It is easy to see that 
[dB/dF = (k* - m*)(<I>m - k)]. This expression shows up an internal-external conflict; 
in fact any O which satisfies (dY > 0) also implies (<D < k/m, and hence dB/dF < 0) or 
that the transfer is undereffected. This outcome (and in general non-zero BIT) means that 
flow equilibrium conditions are not fulfilled by expenditure effects alone. Fig.2 shows 
that, at the world equilibrium level of r7, the impact adjustment A leaves T real income 
too high. Consequently, world flow equilibrium necessitates a fall of T real income.
The first possibility is to constrain expenditure effects to world flow equilibrium, 
that is, to compute D so as to ensure (dB/dF = 0) for the given level of r7. It must 
be (<D =k/m  > 1), and consequently, (dY/dF = -l/m , dY*/dF = 0); see point O in 
fig.2. In other words, after an initial adjustment to NFT in which T real expenditure falls 
less than NFT, and T real income may even rise due to external repercussions, 
subsequent external imbalances should be corrected by means of a negative counter-effect 
on T real expenditure until T real income has fallen by the reciprocal of import 
propensity, and R real income is brought back to its initial level. A possible interpretation 
is that the fiscal instrument is assigned to the external target
An alternative adjustment mechanism would start with the fact that external
imbalances entail money stock leakages; one might expect an orthodox monetary policy tot
force asset holders to readjust portfolios towards money thereby pushing the domestic 
9
asset rate up . World flow equilibrium will occur at point O', with an improvement in 
BIT via capital inflows and an income loss, though smaller than in the previous case*®. 
Note that the world equilibrium level of r7 now has to be higher. In a sense, we have in 
fact competition for world finance. The issue at stake is at what price some T domestic
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assets can be placed in world portfolios to draw compensatory capitals. Anyway, there 
seems to be no policy mix (in one single country) capable of achieving external balance 
without real losses if the transfer pattern plays against i t
1.3. Further analytical implications and comparisons.
Transfer effects on demand gained consensus well before the extension of the 
Keynesian multiplier to international trade, since they provide an explanation of the 
evidence, which has accumulated since the 1920s, of scant gold flows with small 
changes in relative prices and large goods movements. In the inter-war debate over the 
ineffectiveness of the classical mechanism of the real exchange rate (see ch.V, sec.2.1), 
WickseU (1918), Bresciani Turroni (1932), Iversen (1935), Kindleberger (1937) all 
argued in favour of real expenditure effects, an hypothesis which was revaluated even by 
supporters of the classical theory (Viner (1937, ch.IV.3)). Machlup (1928) and Reuff 
(1929) sided with Ohlin's (1929) conclusion that the direct transfer of purchasing power 
would solve the German transfer problem with no need for dramatic changes in relative 
prices and wages.
The transfer model presented here blends Ricardo-Ohlin's idea that any NFT 
shifts world demand in favour of T at unchanged real exchange rate with a generalization 
of Keynes’s idea that this should occur through higher interest rates. Modem asset- 
market analysis (supplemented with "orthodox" monetary policies) shows that the latter is 
indeed the case. Consequently, domestic demand (say investment) in relation to NFT 
falls in T and rises in R. Ohlin himself had recognized that in any case a "cumbersome 
readjustment of production becomes necessary". Factors must move from domestic to 
export production in T and vice versa in R. In ch.V, we followed Keynes's and others' 
hints to find out a number of serious difficulties that may be encountered in the sectoral 
adjustment of prices and output when external and internal equilibrium must hold 
simultaneously. Under classical assumptions, such difficulties may be due either to 
insufficient policy coordination (too low monetary expansion in R) or to adverse 
pla<riritif»s (too high supply elasticity in the domestic industry relative to demand elasticity 
in the export industry in T), or to relative inefficiency in T to provide R with newly
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demanded goods. If markets are perfectly competitive, wages and prices in T eventually 
have to fall relative to those in R as much as necessary to effect the transfer in goods at 
the given level of total output Does the explicit consideration of the direct transfer effect 
on R demand dispense with relative deflation in T?
The present model answers that this may not be the case. Under broad conditions 
of constant real exchange rate, the adjustment process may get trapped in lower total 
output in T. In addition to the relative strength of (0 , <!>*) there are two factors which 
may force Y to fall relative to Y*: (i) a small expansion of R domestic output (k* is 
large), with (ii) low dependence on imports from T (m* is small). In essence, these 
factors duplicate the point we already met in the classical analysis, namely that both the 
amount and the composition of R demand matter. Factors (i) and (ii) together mean 
that T finds itself in an unfavourable position to provide R with the goods demanded by 
spending units. Hence, either the transfer process is extended to an intermediate economy 
capable of absorbing T goods and feeding R absorption at the same time, or the transfer 
problem is left undereffected in real terms while the currency problem is solved by the 
amount of T imports cu t By contrast, most favourable situations arise beyond the point 
where the gap in T domestic output is bridged by larger exports, that is (m*dY*/dF > O), 
which implies (0 *  > <t>k*/m*) and (dY* > 0 , dY > 0) as seen above. In sum, the 
eventuality that expenditure effects may ensure flow equilibrium in the world transfer 
problem with no changes in real exchange rates and incomes is highly sensitive to 
specific transfer conditions (we shall go into this point in greater detail in the next 
paragraph).
In historical perspective, feal income changes, more than complementary 
expenditure effects, have played a leading role in world transfer processes. It was the 
relative growth of Great Britain and the United States, as the world R economy and the 
intermediate economy respectively, that eased the transfer of goods by Southern primary 
economies (see above, ch.IV, sec.3.2). Machlup (1969) gave a similar interpretation to 
the US-Europe transfer problem in 1950-1970, where he found a significant contribution 
of relative high growth in Europe. On the other hand, real income adjustments worked
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perversely in the experience of debtor countries in the late 1920s and in the 1980s 
(Eichengreen-Portes (1987), Webb (1988)).
The strong implication of the portfolio view of the transfer problem is that we 
should observe sharp comovements in real interest rates. This is the standard result, at 
least since Mundell-Fleming models of fiscal expansion with tight monetary policy, and 
are now our common experience. The transfer approach stresses that cycles of real 
interest rates (and possibly of real exchange rates) are the normal result in the expanding 
world economy, rather than a by-product of uncoordinated policies. In the last few years, 
under the pressure of the World-U.S. transfer problem (see above ch.IV, sec.3.5), there 
has been a proliferation of literature espousing this view -albeit with little 
acknowledgement of transfer theories and their findings (see Dombusch (1987) for an 
overview).
Yet it would be hard to find prominent interest-effects in the world transfer 
processes underlying the gold-standard monetary system or the dollar-standard monetary 
system. Bridging the gap between theory and historical facts requires a great amount of 
institutional information. For instance, Great Britain in one case, and the United States in 
the other, were certainly not under the pressure of currency problems; therefore, their 
central banks did not need to rely on large excursions of asset rates to countervail 
international portfolio shifts; rather, they adjusted bank rates slightly to obtain compensa­
tory monetary movements. In terms of our model, they could afford a high degree of 
sterilization and monetization. Moreover, the bulk of the NFT towards Great Britain in 
1880-1914 and from the United States in 1950-1970 did not occur through large portfolio 
substitutions. Then the institutional environment moved closer to the analytical 
framework of the model, with falling barriers to capital mobility, widening access to 
world capital markets, nanowing margins for central banks' intervention in domestic debt 
allocation. It is remarkable that in a context of managed exchange rates, a "small country" 
like Italy has, over the last decade, followed a pattern quite similar to that of the world R 
economy (the United States): positive interest-rate differentials, capital inflows to finance 
real (public and private) expenditure expansion, relative real growth and trade
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imbalances. I find this symptomatic of the institutional changes mentioned above, and of 
the growing importance of transfer processes based on international portfolio adjustments 
as described hitherto.
1.4. Direct expenditure effects and the case of world flow 
equilibrium.
For completeness, in this paragraph I wish to examine the financing- utilization 
pattern based on direct expenditure effects. This was in fact the pattern underlying 
Ricardo-Ohlinian transfer theories in the 1930s and in the 1950s, when the international 
trade multiplier was introduced. The excercise is a useful one because it helps to specify 
the conditions under which NFT are completely effected in goods at unchanged real 
incomes andexchange rates; we shall see that this turns out to be a special case. It should 
perhaps be added that direct expenditure effects are by no means irrelevant in reality. 
Direct investments, tax-paid government transfers, factor incomes transfers have been, 
and are, all important components of past and current world transfers which are most 
likely related to direct expenditure effects.
The assumption that NFT is financed in T and utilized in R through one-to-one
changes in real expenditure avoids asset-rates effects like those that arise in the previous
case. The constraint of BIT flow equilibrium is necessary to rule out further discount-rate
or exchange-rate effects through the currency problem. The constancy of real incomes
thus depends closely on a particular composition of expenditure effects. To show this, I
shall follow Johnson’s (1956) general treatment of expenditure effects. It is sufficient to
consider the Jacobian matrix 9, where (-O, O*) still express the expenditure effect of
NFT on the two economies. However, we now have that (<!> = = 1). Moreover, I
wish to take account of the presence of tradable and non tradable goods: the expenditure 
effect is split between domestic (-<1» ,^ <D*d) and imported goods (-<I>m, <D*m) in both
economies, so that (<1>. + <I> = <P*. + O* = 1). As a result, for real incomes andd m  d m
the BIT we have:
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(10) k -m* dY/dF -<D + <d*a m
-m k* dY*/dF O j* - O ^ a m
(11) dB/dF = m*dY*/dF + <D* - mdY/dF + 4> -1m m
Now it is easy to find that (dB/dF = 0, and dY/dF = dY*/dF = 0) obtains
when
O +<D* = 1;m m
in fact, under the above conditions, complementary expenditure effects on imports also 
entail (-4)^ + <D*m = - <I>m = 0) or else that the change in domestic expenditure is
exactly offset by exports in each economy. This result has repeatedly been found in 
transfer theories, at least since Viner's (1924, 1937) analysis of expenditure effects. 
Note that if the complementarity condition holds, the real exchange rate need not change 
regardless of whether prices are flexible or not. Nonetheless, if prices are flexible, as 
Ohlin (1933) and many others after him admitted, T real exchange rate is likely to 
depreciate as a consequence, not as a cause, of demand effects. This outcome springs 
from factor substitution in production on the hypothesis that the export industry is more 
efficient than the domestic one in both economies.**
It is apparent that the possibility of world flow equilibrium is rather specific even 
in the class of NFT with direct expenditure effects. I shall mention here two well-known 
applications which show that external and internal flow equilibrium in the course of the 
world transfer may fail to hold.
One important transfer problem that has been debated at length arises from 
international direct investment The phenomenon under consideration is a one-to-one 
displacement of investment expenditure (say out of internal profits) from T to R. Metzler 
(1942,1948) and Machlup (1943, chs.VIH-IX; 1963, ch.XIX) adopted a typical 
transfer pattern which implicitly assumes that investment goods are non-tradable. As the 
two authors stressed, in the direct investment transfer the crucial role in the adjustment is
taken by expenditure expansion in R. Let us consider the most favourable case
(<J>. = <t>* . = 1; O = O* = 0). As a result of system 10-11 we have:
N a  a  m  m
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dY/dF = -k* + m*/A 
dY*/dF = k - m/A 
dB/dF = (m* - k*)(k - m)/A 
Under stability conditions (k > m; the same abroad; A > 0), real income falls in T, 
increases in R and the transfer is undereffected.
Another important exception to world flow equilibrium consists of those NFT for 
which it is not likely that expenditure effects differ from normal expenditure/income 
proportions. This property was first established by Viner (1927), of course without 
considering real income effects, but stressing instead the necessity of complementary 
changes in the real exchange rate. Relevant cases are those where NFT is raised in T and 
injected into R through disposable income, such as government transfers or debt 
payments with taxation higher in T and lower in R; or such as the quite interesting case of 
an implicit transfer due to an exogenous shock to the real exchange rate (Balogh-Graham 
(1979)). In this case we know immediately that, for stability conditions, the overall 
expenditure effect cannot amount to unity. Then, even admitting imports 
complementarity, world flow equilibrium conditions are not ensured, and real incomes 
with the BIT may change in any direction according to structural parameters, just as in the 
goods-market system 9 of par.2. Moreover, if direct expenditure effects are not equal to 
NFT, this means that T is financing NFT partly by disssaving while R is using it partly 
by accruing wealth, which brings us back to a transfer pattern with portfolio effects.
Leaving portfolio effects aside, it may be interesting to examine the solution of 
direct expenditure effects whith normal propensities. Hence we now have (O^ = c^,
<l>m = m) and (c^ + m + s = 1); the same abroad. Moreover (m + m* = 1) still holds. 
By simple substitutions in system 10-11 we obtain:
dY/dF = (sk* - s*m*)/A 
dY*/dF = (sm - s*k)/A 
dB/dF -  m*dY*/dF. mdY/dF
The noticeable point is that now domestic expenditure falls less in T and rises less in R;
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consequently, the overall direct expenditure effect is now positive in T and negative in 
R by the amount of the respective marginal propensity to save (s, s*) -or better "not to 
spend". The equilibrium adjustment of real incomes can be expressed in terms of the 
relative magnitude of (s, s*), but it is not possible to have (dY/dF = dY*/dF = 0) 
simultaneously. Let us check for (dY/dF > 0) and (dY*/dF ^  0) separately. Since 
(A > 0) we have, respectively:
s* < sk*/m* s* < sm/k or s*/s < m/k < k*/m*
There is a chance that the transfer takes place with a real gain for one or both if R rate of 
non-expenditure of NFT is comparatively low. Now suppose that (s* = sk*/m*, 
dY*/dF -  0), it follows that
dY/dF = s dB/dF = -ms
That is to say, when R non-expenditure of NFT is sufficiently low as to let direct 
expenditure of NFT offset the cut of T imports, then, correspondingly, the overall effect 
on T real income will be positive by the amount of NFT not raised from current 
expenditure. As a consequence, the net effect on BIT will be negative, or NFT will be 
undereffected. It is evident that the same BIT result holds in the specular situation in 
which (dY/dF = 0, dY*/dF = -s*, dB/dF = -m*s*).
Let me finally draw attention to a particular interpretation of direct expenditure 
effects put forward in the inter-war debate, especially by Machlup (1928) and Reuff 
(1929), and which was placed at the centre of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments in the 1970s (e.g. Frenkel-Johnson (1976), Johnson (1958,1977)). We might 
properly talk of the transfer problem as a monetary problem, or else of the monetary 
approach as a monetary transfer theory. In fact, the core of the monetary mechanism is 
the correspondence between excess money balances and excess imports at unchanged real 
incomes, real exchange rates and real interest rates. Clearly, the economy with excess 
money balances is R, which faces an economy, T, where money balances are extracted 
from circulation -as Machlup said, the transfer problem is the problem of extracting
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money from circulation. In the second place, it is assumed that money imbalances have 
one-to-one expenditure effects. These will be distributed between tradable and non­
tradable goods according to their normal proportions in consumption, and not in relation 
to total income. Hence = cod , = ci>m ; ©d + tom = 1; the same abroad).
Finally, there must be constant real incomes, to ensure stable money demand functions, 
and external flow equilibrium. This is clearly the same problem as was addressed at the
beginning of this paragraph. Therefore we conclude that the whole building rests on the
condition that (co + to* = 1).m m
2. U nder flexible exchange rates
2.1. The case for flexible exchange rates.
The previous section first confirms that, as has been accepted by transfer theorists 
since Johnson's (1956) contribution, a definite answer to the transfer problem is not 
possible unless one is able to specify the financing-utilization pattern and the structural 
parameters of the economies involved. In the 1950s this conclusion was reached in flow 
models with direct expenditure effects, like those of sec. 1.3, while in sec. 1.2 we 
obtained it in a transfer model enlarged to include asset market equilibrium. However, 
there has always been a general tendency, especially among Keynesians, towards 
pessimism: transfer undereffection with T real losses seems the likely result. Yet one 
should remember that, among the classics, neither Taussig nor Viner believed that direct 
expenditure effects alone could prevent currency problems and real depreciation, while 
Keynes warned that real depreciation could become bottomless deflation of T economies. 
In classic markets, Keynes showed that T real loss was through lower real wages; in 
polypolystic markets, we have seen that T real loss would be through lower output and 
employment.
In fact, unless the peculiar complementarity conditions apply, we have seen that 
the key variable for world flow equilibrium to hold at unchanged real exchange rates and 
incomes is, in a broad range of cases, a comparatively high real expenditure effect (or a 
comparative low hoarding rate of NFT) in R. Then pessimism arises either from
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obstacles to net expansion of world expenditure in the short run (e.g. anti-inflationary 
monetary policies: Balogh-Graham (1979)) or from unsustainable world growth in the 
long run (e.g. Machlup (1969)).
If this pessimism has a raison d'etre, the case of T economies trading off real 
losses with external imbalances becomes relevant. We thus come to the other possibility 
of assigning the exchange rate to the external target, or else of re-introducing real 
exchange-rate effects via a flexible nominal rate. In this section, the aim is to deploy a 
transfer model with flexible exchange rate and with as clear as possible specification of 
the influence of the financing-utilization pattern, of the effects of the exchange rate on 
assets and goods trade, and of the consequences upon exchange rate dynamics. Exchange 
rate dynamics in the world transfer process will be investigated further in the next 
chapter.
2.2. The exchange rate, real interest rates and real income.
For obvious reasons, the transfer problem we are interested in is of the portfolio- 
adjustment type. Hence the analytical framerwork is the same as that of sec. 1.1-1.2. 
Modifications should be introduced to model the role of the exchange rate on international 
asset markets and on the internal- external macroeconomic adjustment The repercussions 
of macroeconomic flow equilibrium on asset stocks will be discussed separately.
The fundamentals of exchange-rate determination by the asset market were set out 
in Part I (ch.III, sec.3.3). As was noted then, and also in Kouri's important contribution 
(1983), standard models (con)fuse asset market and currency market. Of course, the 
exchange rate is not determined by demand and supply of securities, but by the 
underlying demand and supply of foreign currency. Thus, while the standard procedure 
when the exchange rate is endogenous is to eliminate one return rate (usually the foreign 
one), we shall rather add the missing equation, which is the BIT equation. Let us now 
look at the asset-market model 2. With static expectations, the exchange rate enters the 
determination of asset demand functions via wealth effects; home depreciation (de > 0) 
dampens home demand for the foreign asset (A6) and prompts foreign demand for the 
home asset (A7). By normalizing wealth effects to 1 (instead of the absolute initial value
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of the stock) we should modify system 2 (matrix 8) so that the corresponding Jacobian 
matrix now looks as follows:
"a 66+0t*66 "a 67 -1 drt dA6
a 77+ a*77 1 dr7 = -dA6
*a 66 a *77 1 . de 0
The model basically works as was shown in sec. 1.2. The starting point is excess
demand for capitals (excess supply of liabilities) on the part of R (dA6 > 0). The first
row yields the equilibrium value of R return rate (r6) on the world market for its own
asset The second row is the same for T return rate (r7). The third is instead the BIT
identity. Both the asset- market equations and the BIT equation display bilateral effects in 
that R agents demand their own asset ( a * ^ )  and T asset (oc*^). Hence, ( -a ^ d r6/dA6
+ de/dA6) and (a*yydr7/dA6 + de/dA6) are capital outflows and capital inflows
12respectively . They must sum to zero. The general results for (dA6 > 0) are the 
following (see App.A.3):
dr6 > 0, dr7 > 0 , de > 0
that is to say, interest rates should rise and the exchange rate should depreciate.
Let us examine the actual market adjustment with help of fig.3, which reproduces
asset-market equilibrium schedules of A7 and A6 (see ch.m , sec.3.3). In order to
accommodate a larger share of R assets in T portfolios (A6 shifts rightwards) T agents
bid the domestic asset A7 down. The figure depicts a situation where T agents are in fact
able to sell A7, whose return rate (r7) rises, and then to demand foreign currency to buy
A6, thus pushing the exchange rate up. The fact that, in this particular operation, the
foreign exchange market is cleared -or net capital movements are nil- does not mean that
there are no transactions as in standard portfolio models. The financial transfer towards R 
does take place by the amount ( -a ^ d r6/dA6 + de/dA6). To clarify this crucial point, it is
useful to make use of Kouri’s (1983) diagram showing the demand-supply schedules of 
foreign exchange derived from financial transactions. Figure 4 is built in a way that
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translates changcs in desired asset stocks into excess (flow) demand for foreign 
exchange. The right horizontal axis measures changes in T desired holdings of A6, the 
left horizontal axis measures changes in R desired holdings of A7. The two schedules are 
derived from exchange-rate wealth effects on asset stocks in the third row of matrix 12. 
Points A, B, C in fig.4 correspond to those in fig.3. At the initial point A, both the asset 
and foreign currency markets are in (stock) equilibrium. Point B corresponds to excess 
demand for foreign currency due to the rise of r6 and the consequent demand for A6. 
Point C is reached as the concomitant rise of r7 and e generates foreign demand for A7 
and dampens home demand for A6. The increase in T holdings of R assets and the corre­
sponding NFT are measured by the segment OD.
Fig.3. Asset market equilibrium in the T economy before and after the financial transfer 
with flexible exchange mtg___________________________________________________
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Fig.4. The foreign exchange market (T economy) with demand and supply derived from 
financial transactions_______________________________________________________
We have now to consider the repercussions of the financial transfer on
expenditure decisions. The basic fact is that deficit-spending conditions are easier in R
and tighter in T. Let us still define (-O, O*) the change in expenditure plans in T and R
as in sec. 1.2. Moreover, the (real) exchange rate is also involved. At this stage, to keep
things as clear as possible, I shall only make explicit the traditional demand effects of the
exchange rate: depreciation increases demand for T export goods and decreases demand
for R export goods. Note, however, that substitution effects are inbuilt in the transfer
problem, since depreciation occurs together with opposite shifts of domestic expenditure
13in T and R (this point was treated at length in ch.V) . Finally, the endogeneity of the 
exchange rate allows for one further equation, which is of course the BIT equation. This 
equation will have to display income effects on trade as well as exchange-rate effects on
*
trade; exchange-rate effects on capital movements should also be considered.
Therefore, the Jacobi an matrix of goods market equilibrium now becomes (see App.A.4):
k -m* -ex dY/dF '-O
-m k* e m dY*/dF — O*
-m m* 1+3 de/dF 1
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£x = T exports elasticity, £m = R exports elasticity, P = ex + em " 1 = total trade- 
balance elasticity.
In this part of the model the financial transfer (dF < 0) is inherited from the 
international portoflio adjustment yielded by matrix 12. As a consequence, real 
expenditure falls by <I> in T, grows by O* in R, while BIT is worsened by dF. In the 
partial model of matrix 12 we saw how the financial transfer may be compensated on the 
foreign exchange market This extension to the whole macroeconomic equilibrium makes 
explicit the interaction between asset transactions and goods transactions that pass 
through the foreign exchange market. The specific exchange-rate effect on both kinds of 
transactions is captured by (1 + p): depreciation improves the balance of goods 
transactions if (P > 0), while it surely improves the balance of asset transactions through 
wealth effects (normalized to 1). Given stability conditions (k > m, k* > m*), the 
determinant of matrix 13 is positive, while the solutions of all the endogenous variables 
are ambiguous.
dY ? dY* ? de ?
In a simple flow equilibrium diagram we obtain
»e
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The diagram shows the schedules of T real income (Y) (the first row of matrix 13) and of 
world flow equilibrium (B) (the third row of matrix 13) with reference to T real income 
and the exchange rate. The world financial transfer shifts B to the right, while its 
expenditure effects shock Y downwards. Positive expenditure effects in R move 
shcedules in the opposite directions. Point A is an example of world flow equilibrium in 
the course of the transfer.
The general result obtained above may seem disapponting; yet it contains an 
important message. When the exchange rate is framed in the macroeconomic adjustment 
to the world transfer, the presumption that the T economy should depreciate in order to 
establish flow equilibrium is no longer granted. The reason is quite simple: if income 
effects are strong enough to effect the transfer, the impact depreciation may be reversed in 
order to keep NRT in line with NFT, and point A may fall to the left of O. Thus we may 
possibly have (dY < 0, dY* > 0 , de < 0).
2.3. Further analytical implications and comparisons.
The involvement of exchange rates in the world transfer process is by no means 
novelty. We saw in the previous chapter that as early as the 1920s and 1930s there was 
widespread awareness that transfer problems may dictate exchange-rate dynamics. 
Explicit models in this vein, where the exchange rate is moved by capital transfers, can be 
found in Robinson (1937), Kindleberger (1937), Machlup (1939), Nurkse (1944)*^. 
However, as Kouri observed quite correctly (1983, pp.l 16-118), those early models 
treated NFT as pure currency problems, or with unsatisfactory specification of the 
financial and real repercussions that have been expounded in the first part of this chapter. 
The development of the asset-market approach to the exchange rate has been a decisive 
step forward.
An instructive further comparison to make is with Mundellian world models 
which predict that expenditure expansion in one economy necessarily feeds real income in 
the other through depreciation (see e.g. Dombusch (1980b, ch.XI)), in spite of a higher 
real interest rate. The crucial difference between such traditional models and the model 
presented here lies in that the former do not recognize the transfer problem at all; thus real
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income must rise in T because this is the only means to drive the interest rate to the higher
world level, given a fixed real stock of money; in addition, depreciation is the only means
to raise T real income. To put it crudely, foreign expansion and depreciation pull Y up
along B in fig.5. In the transfer model, T interest rate rises because financial means has 
to be transferred from T to R, and B shifts to B(. Then the causation goes from asset
markets to goods markets, with expenditure and exchange-rate effects as intermediate 
links. It is no surprise that final outcomes may not be so clear-cut as in Mundellian 
models*^.
That exchange-rate dynamics should eventually be framed in the analysis of 
world circulation (not exhaustion) of capitals and goods has only come onto the agenda in 
the last few years (Dombusch ( 1 9 8 7 a ) ) I  have already alluded to these advances in 
sec. 1.3 above, in the analogous context of the determination of interest rates. Some 
general comments are in order. One trend in the recent literature is towards a fully 
neoclassical flow-theory of international transfers (Frenkel-Razin (1987, Part II) is the 
most representative work). The background theory is one of "open-economy" 
intertemporal optimization; saving is future consumption and the real interest rate 
measures the time discount of preferences and hence the marginal productivity of real 
capital; current production and future consumption are reallocated towards economies 
with growing real interest rate (R-type economies). The macroeconomic implication is 
that world investment and saving should rise, so that R ends up with a negative saving- 
investment balance matched by the same positive balance in T. Real depreciation then 
performs the goods transfer from T to R. Another trend is less pretentious as to 
microfoundations, but works with the same macroeconomic model (see e.g. Branson 
(1985)). The first objection is quite radical, and goes back to the serious difficulties met 
in the extension of Walrasian microfoundations to open monetary economies and 
discussed in Part I. Abandoning the Walrasian core, one has to take uncertainty and 
liquidity preference into account in a way that leads to money and finance non-neutrality. 
For instance, the real interest rate is modestly the deflated yield of an asset (as it is in all 
empirical applications), and cannot be confused with the reciprocal of the price of
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Arrow pure securities. The disconnection between saving and future consumption, 
between saving and current investment, may require important real effects for 
macroeconomic flow equilibrium to hold. Note a simple point here. Ex post it is 
necessarily true that [(k - m)(dY/dF) - <l> = -(k* - m*)dY*/dF - O*], that is to say, the 
usual bilateral saving-gap identity holds; but this is not to imply that the ex ante transfer 
effects (<t>, O*) are to be equal in the two economies. On the contrary, we have reason to 
expect them to be different, since they depend on the relationships between asset-market 
conditions and deficit-spending decisions in the two economies. Were (<J>, O*) equal, 
we know that the transfer process would require Y to fall relative to Y*. On the whole, as 
far as the transfer mechanism is concerned, these new theories, like those of the 1930s, 
oversimplify the financing-utilization pattern^.
Income effects, for not always well-founded reasons, have progressively 
disappeared from macroeconomic models with flexible exchange rates. Yet they are 
obviously important in tracking the path of the exchange rate in the course of the transfer 
process, as the above exercise shows. If we have reason to believe that real expenditures 
and real incomes are affected by the world transfer, then we cannot expect the exchange 
rate to bear the whole burden of trade adjustment This point is particularly relevant to the 
proliferation of models of the United States as world borrower (e.g. Branson (1985) and 
the others already cited above) and, in a future perspective, as world interest transferor 
(e.g. Krugman (1985)), which are essentially currency transfer models. Fitoussi and 
Phelps (1988) have stressed the initial depressive effect on Europe of the massive switch 
of real and financial resources in favour of the United States in the last decade, even 
under an appreciating dollar.
On the other hand, it is true that flexible exchange rates are likely to operate 
when income effects are insufficient or undesirable, means to achieve world flow 
equilibrium. It is interesting to find that our benchmark case of sec. 1.2, where (<I> < 1, 
<I>* = 1) is assumed, gives much more definite results. It will be remembered that under 
fixed exchange rates, this transfer pattern would impose (dY < 0, dY* = 0) to achieve 
world flow equilibrium. Now we have:
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dY? dY* > 0  d e > 0
i.e., world flow equilibrium necessarily lies to the right of O in fig.5. This solution looks 
more familiar. It may be interpreted as saying that depreciation may dispense T with real 
loss and allow R to retain some real gain. Yet whether T real loss occurs or not is still 
undetermined, since this depends on the actual magnitude of O; the traditional Mundell 
case (dY > 0, dY* > 0, de > 0) obtains if <l> lies below one and above a critical value 
than can easily be computed from the solutions given in App.A.4.
I shall only mention for the sake of completeness the classical transfer pattern in 
which (C> = O* = 1). This case yields (dY < 0 , dY* > 0 , de > 0); hence, if the 
displacement of real expenditure in T is exactly compensated by larger real expenditure in 
R, the exchange rate will depreciate to ensure world flow equilibrium, but not as much as 
necessary to prevent T real loss.
The findings in this chapter may be seen as a vindication of the classical 
presumption that the real exchange rate should have a role to play in the world transfer 
problem. Certainly, the view of the transfer problem as a financing-utilization problem, 
and the explicit consideration of expenditure effects of financial transfers, change the 
analytical picture substantially with respect to the classics' limitation on the currency 
problem. It is true that there is no unique solution to the transfer problem regardless of 
the financing-utilization pattern; and it is true that world flow equilibrium with no changes 
in real exchange rates and incomes is possible. Yet we have seen that the latter is an 
outcome due to quite specific complementarity conditions of domestic and import 
expenditure effects. On the other hand, we cannot take it for granted that flexible 
exchange rates are capable of joining world flow equilibrium with no real losses for 
anybody.
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A ppendix
A l. Solution of system 2.
System 2 represents asset market equilibrium. Two assets are considered 
explicitly: a (composite) T domestic asset (A7) and a (composite) R foreign one (A6). A 
third asset, money (A2), is always in quantity equilibrium because of the wealth 
constraint in both countries. Equations express world conditions of asset market 
equilibrium (* denotes R foreign variables).
(Al) Ata 6t(ra)/e + A*to6*tfra> = A6t
(A2) Ata7t(ra>+ eA*t« 7*t(ra) = A7t
(A3) I aAaPat/P = At
(A4) l S aA*aPat/p* = A*t
where e is the nominal exhange rate, which is assumed to be fixed; hence eq. 1 expresses 
the world stock of A6 in foreign currency; eq.2 expresses the world stock of A7 in home 
currency; eqs.3 and 4 are expressed in respective currencies. The solution vector consists 
of four endogenous variables for the two countries [r6, r7, A2, A2*]. Let us now solve 
explicitly for the two return rates.
An operational assumption, explained in the text, is that asset demand functions 
of R agents for A6 and A7 only display own-rate derivatives. The solution is studied 
under the vector of exogenous variables [dA6, -dA6] which denotes excess supply of R 
asset (dA6 > 0) and corresponding excess supply of T asset. The signs in the 
coefficients matrix are derived from portfolio theory in ch.III, sec.3. The resulting 
Jacobian matrix is
dA6 u 
-dA6
a 66’ a 77 ’ a *77 = own-rate demand elasticity, a = cross-rate demand 
elasticity.
The determinant of the Jacobian is therefore:
A = ( V “ , 6«Ktl77 t o , 7 7 ) '  (a76a 67> » 0
The positive sign is ensured by normal conditions of asset substitution (see 
ch.III, sec.3). In fact, if T agents rank A6 more uncertain that A7, we have, in absolute 
value,
“ 6 6 < a 6 7 < a 7 6 < a 77 <“ 66“ 77 >><a76a 67)
The addition of a * ^  and <**77 to the first term surely confirms such conditions. The 
solution of the vector of endogenous variables is the following:
(A5) ’a 67 dr6
i
*a 76 “ 77+a*77 dr7
dr6/dA6 = [ ( a ^ + a * ^ )  - a 6?]/A > 0
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dr7/dA6 = [-(a^^-Kx*^^) + a ^ ] /A  > 0
The same conditions of asset substitution which yield (A > 0) also imply the positive 
sign of dr6/dA6 and dr7/dA7. Consequently, excess supply of R asset raises return rates 
in both countries.
A.2. Solution of system 6.
System 6 is the goods-market system. Under the macroeconomic analysis 
develop«! in the text, we may write the usual aggregate function of GDP, which in flow 
equilibrium must equal factor incomes, for the two economies:
(A6) Yt = PdtOdt(Y, r7, A) + PxtQxt(Px, Y*. A*)
(A7) Y*t = P*dtO*dt(Y*, r6, A*) + P*xtQ*xt(P*x. Y- A>
0<0'd(Y)<l, 0 ’d(r7)<0, 0 'd(A)>0, the same abroad.
The transfer problem can be formalized as an exogenous shock to demand for 
domestic output in both countries simultaneously in such a way as to highlight that real 
income must be adjusted accordingly. The transfer expenditure effect may be represented 
as follows
0 *  *  -dO*^dF <D s  dOj/dF
Since we consider T to be the home economy, hence (dF < 0) and (O* > 0, O < 0). 
Note that in our case of international portfolio adjustment, <1> derives from 
(dOd/dF -  O d(r7)dr7/dF < 0). Given conditions of unchanging prices, and ignoring 
for the moment wealth effects, in both economies it must hold that
Yt-QdtOO-^O^tyF)
Y*t - 0*dt(Y*) - X*t(Y) = 0*dt(F)
Recalling that [Odt(Y)] results from the adjustment in domestic consumption and import
consumption after taxation, the Jacobian matrix, with appropriate signs derived from 
(dF < 0), is:
(A7) ’ k -m* ' dY/dF -<D
-m k* dY*/dF Q*
k = 1 - c(a>d - a>m) + t, c = marginal propensity to consume equal to the average
one, m = ccom = marginal propensity to import equal to the import/income ratio, t = tax
rate (* denotes the same parameters in R).
The determinant of the system is:
A = 1 > kk* - mm* > 0
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The sign is positive because stability conditions for the closed economy impose that 
(k > m, k* > m*).
The vector of endogenous variables has solutions
dY/dF = (-Ok* + <D*m*)/A 
dY*/dF = (kD* - mD)/A
The sign of changes in real incomes is indeterminate since it depends on the relative 
magnitude of expenditure effects (-O,4>*) as discussed in the text
A.3. Solution of system 2 augmented with the foreign exchange 
equation.
The following analysis solves the asset-market system 2 under flexible exchange 
rate by expliciting the foreign exchange equation. The latter imposes equality between 
demand for and supply of foreign currency as derived from asset transactions. Focusing 
on asset return rates and the exchange rate, under the assumption of static expectations, 
we have:
(Al) Ata 6t(ra)/et + A*ta 6*t(ra) = A6t
(A2) Atcc7t(ra) + etA*tcx7*t(ra) = A7t
(A8) A6q - Ata 6t(ra)/et = A*ta7*t(rfl) - A7Q/et
Eqs. Al and A2 are the same as those in App.A.l. Eq.A8 reads as follows. The left-hand 
term expresses demand for R currency as capital outflows (Kt < 0) springing from the
difference between the initial and the desired stock of R asset. The right-hand term 
expresses supply of R currency as capital inflows (Kt > 0) due to the difference between
initial and desired stock of T asset The exchange rate enters all three equations via wealth 
effects. C e t par., as e increases the domestic value of R asset increases and its desired
stock decreases (dAa6/de = -Ao^q/Cq); at the same time the foreign value of T asset
decreases and its desired stock increases (dA*a7*/de = A*a7*Q/eQ). By setting all
initial nominal magnitudes equal to 1, wealth effects can be normalized to unity. 
Therefore the Jacobi an of eqs.Al-A2-A8 is:
a 66+ot*66 "a 67 -1 dr6 dA6
*“ 76 a 77+a*77 1 dr7 -dA6
"a 66 a *77 1 de 0
The model basically works in the same way as the one in App.A.l. The starting 
point is excess demand for capitals (excess supply of liabilities) on the part of R 
(dA6 > 0). Now define
Aj = the determinant of system 2 (matrix 5)
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A2 - a 77 +<x*77 '  a 67
*3 = ct7 6 '  a 66+a*66 
For conditions of asset substitution recalled in App.A.l we have:
Aj > 0, > 0, A3 > 0
The determinant of matrix A9 results to be:
A = A1 ‘ a 66A2 + a *77A3
As we shall see, standard results obtains for (A > 0), which is the likely case since
is the smallest derivative of asset substitution. Then the solution vector of endogenous 
variables is the following:
dr6/dA6 = A2/ A>0  
dr7/dA6 = A3/ A>0  
de/dA6 = + a ^ A ^ / A  > 0
A.4. Solution of system 6 augmented with the foreign exchange equation.
We shall study macroeconomic flow equilibrium under a flexible exchnage rate 
by augmenting the goods-market system 6 with the foreign exchange equation. The latter 
now equates foreign currency demand and supply as determined by trade and financial 
transactions. Trade transactions are governed by T exports (supply of R currency) and T 
imports (demand for R currency). Financial transactions, given desired asset stocks and 
return rates, are only given by exchange-rate wealth effects like those analyzed above. 
Trade transactions also enter real income determination, since T exports add up to T 
aggregate demand and T imports to R aggregate demand. Therefore we should rewrite 
system 6 as follows:
(A10) Yt - 0 ^ 0 0  - Xt(Y*,e) = O^fJF)
(A ll) Y*t - 0*dt(Y*) - X*t(Y,e) = 0* dt(F)
(A 12) Xt(Y*,e) - X*t(Y,e) = -Ft(e)
Recalling the elaborations in App.A.2, as to expenditure effects, and in 
App.A.3, as to exchange-rate wealth effects, setting (dF < 0) we obtain the following 
Jacobian:
k -m* -ex dY/dF -CD
-m k* em dY*/dF =
-m m* 1+ji
ft
de/dF 1
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ex = T exports elasticity, em = R exports elasticity, P = ex + em • 1 = total trade-
balance elasticity.
The determinant of the system has value:
A = exk*(k - m) + em(k* - m*) > 0
The sign is certainly positive because stability in isolation (k > m, k* > m*) is 
assumed. The solution vector of endogenous variables is:
dY/dF = [emm*(<D* -1) - exk*(0 -1) - em<D(k*. m*)]/A 
dY*/dF = [emk(<D* -1) - exm(d> - 1) + ex<D*(k - m)]/A 
de/dF = 1 - [<P*m*(k - m) + <Dm(k* - m*)]/A
The signs are indeterminate unless specific relations between (<I>, C>*) are established. I 
give here the solutions for the two main cases discussed in the text
The case of international portfolio adjustment in which it is assumed
< 1, <l>* = 1, yields
dY/dF = [-exk*(A -1 ) - emO(k* - m*)]/A ?
dYVdF = [ex(k - m<D)]/A > 0
de/dF = 1 - [m*(k - m) + <Dm(k* - m*)]/A > 0
The sign of dY* and de is positive for (<î> < k/m) which is fulfilled by the asumption
<I> < 1).
The "classical case" in which it is assumed that
C> = O* = 1, yields
dY/dF = -£ (k* - m*)]/A < 0 m
dY*/dF = [ex(k -m )]/A > 0  
de/dF = (k - m)(k* - m*)/A > 0
269
Notes
(1) And also to Longfield (1840), Bastable (1890) and Nicholson (1897).
(2) For obvious reasons I shall only specify functions of the home economy. Those of the foreign 
economy are analogous.
(3) On the degree of sterilization as a parameter not fully under control of the central bank see above 
ch.IU, sec.2.3.
(4) To be precise, there is one such element, which I shall disregard to keep manalysis manageable: the 
money interest rate. As was shown in Part I, the money interest rate is in fact a component of factor 
costs, which may link asset markets to the supply side of goods. For instance, to the extent that asset 
market adjustment requires a higher money rate, this will be transmitted to supply prices by price-makers. 
As a consequence, smaller quantities at higher prices will be offered; in the short run at least, the producer 
real wage and labour share fall. Hence, such a result seems to enhance the traditional contractionary effect 
of increasing interest rates. For a detailed analysis see Fitoussi-Phelps (1988, ch.IV) and the literature 
quoted therein.
(5) See also Allen-Kenen (1980), Frankel (1983).
(6) This point is akin to the treatment of the discount rate in the classical model in ch.V, sec.2.2. See 
the interesting positions of Machlup (1928) and Ohlin (1929) as to the ability of Germany to attract 
capitals during war payments, and more generally Keynes (1930, ch.XXI).
(7) For qualifying issues and results, especially as to world-economy models, see Dombusch 
(1980b, Part IV) and Kenen (1985).
(8) Equation 3 also shows a wealth component in the consumption function. This was derived in ch.m 
from precautionary considerations analogous to those made in the case of investment Hence the effects of 
changes in asset markets conditions described in the text may be extended to consumption.
(9) The reader will recognize the affinity with Keynes's model of the discount rate analyzed in 
ch.V, sec.2.2. In the monetary framework adopted in Part I, the discount rate has in fact to be the 
intermediate link between external imbalances and the rise of domestic rates.
(10) The figure does not take account of further repercussion effects on and from R real expenditure and 
income.
(11) See Viner (1937, ch.IV, sec.7), Samuelson (1952,1954), Johnson (1975, 1976). For further 
treatment of this point see Aquino (1986, ch.I, sec.3). A simple way to verify this property is by noting 
that the cut in domestic output in T frees factors by the amount (-«t^n'^) while the increase in R demand
for T exports calls for factors by the amount (<D*mn'x = ^ n '^ ) .  Clearly, if the export industry is more
efficient than the domestic one (n'^ < n’^ ) there will be (i) excess factor supply or (ii) excess output
supply in the export industry. Since in R exactly the same happens with opposite sign, as a result T real 
exchange rate should depreciate, whether measured at market prices cr at factor costs.
(12) For simplicity's sake, exchange-rate wealth effects on each asset stock, and in the BIT equation, are 
normalized to 1 instead to the absolute values of the stocks.
(13) The substantial simplification I am making is to ignore further consequences of price effects of 
changes in the nominal exchange rate: namely, effects on import consumption propensity and on export 
firms' price decisions (the basic analytical blocks can be found in the macroeconomic model of Part 
I, ch.III). The first is the well-known Laursen-Metzler effect; the fact that depreciation increases import
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prices will tend to depress the marginal consumption propensity; hence this effect should strengthen the 
negative transfer impact in T (the opposite in R). On the other hand, optimal price making is not 
insensitive to the exchange rate even in the absence of imported factors; when the nominal rate changes, 
also markups should be changed, but with a dampening effect on supply prices (this point will be refined 
in the analysis of exchange rate dynamics in ch. VII, sec. 1.3).
(14) And in later refinements such as those by Johnson (1956) and Metzler (1966).
(15) For a critical discussion of the traditional model of world economy and of alternative formulations, 
with particular reference to the recent US-Europe experience, see Fitoussi-Phelps (1988, chs.ffl-IV). In 
their own proposal, they focus on the price effects of rising interest and exchange rates in imperfectly 
competitive goods markets. As noted earlier (see n.4 and n.13), the result in T should be contractionary 
on quantities and inflationary on prices; the real money stock is reduced, which may account for the 
possibility of real loss in the depreciating country. However, this and other modifications do not pay 
attention to the transfer expenditure effects implied.
(16) Relevant references are Sachs-Wyplosz (1984), Branson (1985), Feldstein (1986), Dombusch (1986), 
Claassen (1987), Frenkel-Razin (1988, Part II).
(17) Finally, let me add a side remark. In virtually all the studies under consideration here, the key role in 
world shifts of financial and real resources is played by fiscal shocks on the saving-investment balance. 
This may be justified on the empirical grounds of recent experience, but it should be clear that there are 
no good theoretical motives for private deficit spending to be ignored. Moreover, it is difficult to believe 
that investment is left unaffected by a fiscal shock; there may be some crowding out or, by contrast, 
some son of acceleration phenomenon. After all, the public share in U.S. external debt is only about 
20%. Even less believable is the case that active fiscal policies make sense in the perfect market 
economies that purport to explain them.
CHAPTER SEVEN
EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS IN THE WORLD TRANSFER PROCESS
Introduction
This chapter addresses some issues in exchange rate theory from the world- 
transfer viewpoint The message from preceding chapters is that in early developments of 
modem exchange-rate theory the commitment to conditions of neo- or new-classical 
steady state diverted attention from actual macroeconomic processes of the international 
circulation of goods and capitals. No doubt, the rigorous specification of the conditions 
of stock equilibrium has been a decisive advance, but when the theorist moves from 
asymptotic equilibrium to historical time he should be aware that the real world is 
continuously engaged in the transfer of financial and real means: current accounts are 
never zero, nor are capital flows. The transfer approach emphasizes that real exchange- 
rate dynamics is part of the expanding world economy: it is largely dictated by the 
necessity of transferring capitals and goods towards deficit-spending economies in the 
world (and conversely, towards rentier economies in the world). If nominal exchange 
rates are free to float in the place of goods prices, they will take part in the world transfer 
process. What results is not necessarily disequilibrium or "overshooting" phenomena, 
nor is it merely imputable to policy mismanagement
Having reached this point, two questions arise: How does the exchange rate 
work in fact, and does it work well? Anyone sees that the two questions are related, 
though they are different in nature. The former has a positive outlook, the latter has a 
normative one. I will seek an answer by first investigating what the exchange rate should 
be expected to do -that is, analysing what is commonly called its "fundamental path" 
(sec.l). Then I will examine how well the asset-market, forward-looking component of 
exchange rate determination may be expected to reflect the fundamentals (sec.2).
272
1. Fundamentals
l . i .  The efficiency of the world economy.
Exchange rate theory has always revolved around an idea of efficiency, at least 
since Milton Friedman’s (1953) advocacy of flexible rates: fixed prices destroy 
efficiency. The free floating regime has been strongly supported by the profession on the 
grounds of the old "trade-elasticity optimism" or of the brand new "asset-market- 
efficiency optimism". The latter now lies at the core of modem economics of international 
finance and exchange rates.
Part I (ch.I) set out a preliminary treatment of the issue of efficiency. The main 
conclusion was that exchange rate theory, if exchange rates are to be the prices at which 
currencies are exchanged, is misplaced in an Arrow-Debreu economy. In such an 
economy the exchange rate cannot be "the price" of anything since there is no room for 
allocative choices across different numeraires, if any. The exchange rate performs the 
function of a price only if currencies exist and serve as means of payment and store of 
value; but, as we know from monetary theory, this indicates that future markets are not 
complete, that is to say, all available information is insufficient to achieve Arrow-Debreu 
"market general efficiency" (MGE). Therefore, the study of the exchange rate, like that of 
money, should be framed in an economy imperfectly informed and hence constrained to 
less than Pareto-optimal realizations. This is not to mean that free currency markets and 
exchange rate flexibility are undesirable, but that "the desirability of market-produced 
exchange-rate changes must be valuated; there is no automatic appeal to optimality" 
(Frankel (1985b, p.24)).
Going down the ladder of achievements we first meet informational efficiency. 
The distinction between MGE and IE was also drawn in ch.I. The latter is a local 
property of specific markets and cannot be taken to imply the former. Bearing this caveat 
in mind, we may look at two remarkable results of the early generation of asset-market 
models. Firstly, they showed that changes in asset prices and exchange rates ensure that 
the allocation of the world stock of wealth is optimal in terms of retum-risk diversifi­
cation, as valued by means of available information. Secondly, exchange rates are as
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variable as "fundamentals" of asset choice, or perhaps as "news" on them. Short-run 
deviations from purchasing power parity, and hence trade imbalances, may take place, 
but these models predict "long-run" spontaneous adjustment towards full stock-flow 
equilibrium (steady state). The efficient information hypothesis (EIH) has several 
questionable implications, which were pointed out in ch.in (sec.3 and App.A.l) and will 
be discussed in the appropriate context of sec.2 below. For the time being, let us recall 
that one such implication is rational expectations -in the weak form which restricts 
subjective expectations to coincide with the central value of the probability distribution of 
outcomes (correctness). Therefore, the EIH simply shifts the problem onto the stochastic 
model which agents believe to generate the probability distribution of outcomes -the so- 
called "fundamental model".
The supposed fundamental model of exchange rate dynamics in the world
economy has changed substantially in the last few years. In a nutshell, the exchange rate
should be expected to effect goods transfers rather than to prevent them. Goods have to
follow capitals in the expanding world economy, and this principle has modified the
requirements of the exchange rate to the following: (i) a correct distribution of capital
flows, (ii) securing world flow equilibrium with no real losses (hence with no
interference of monetary authorities on point (i)). The proliferation of models of a world
borrower, and then world interest payer, mentioned in the previous chapter testifies this
shift of focus. As a whole these represent the last generation of asset-market efficiency
models. The EIH is still at work since the correct distribution of capital flows, and hence
the correct exchange rate dynamics, is obtained by feeding expectations with the solution
of the fundamental model of world flow equilibrium for the exchange rate. Interestingly,
the case of a borrowing economy entails at least two stages of world flow equilibrium (or
a two-stage transfer problem): the stage when the rate of borrowed capital inflows is
equal to that of goods deficits, and the stage when the flows of interest payments are
equal to those of goods surpluses. Quite correctly Dombusch asked:
If as a result of debt accumulation, via the transfer problem or via risk premia, an ultimate 
depreciation is required, why should we expect an initial appreciation? [...] It turns out 
that all the parameters in the model -trade elasticities, wealth elasticities, risk premium
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responses, etc.- matter for this question. Even in very highly simplified models no firm 
conclusions emerge about the path of the exchange rate (1987, p.6).
In fact, this was also our finding in ch.VI (sec.2.2), though a presumption in 
favour of depreciation for T economies, and appreciation for R economies, emerged. 
However, we also concluded that this is per se unlikely to prevent real income effects if 
the transfer pattern is unfavourable to T. Such a result sets further limits on the 
achievements of flexible exchange rates.
Whereas the previous chapter gave us the static comparative results of exchange 
rate changes in the world transfer process, the present section will explore in greater 
detail the possibility of different fundamental paths of the exchange rate.
1.2. The paths towards world flow equilibrium.
The fact that asset prices and the exchange rate co-determine the composition of 
portfolios per unit of time is only one part of the story. The exchange rate is actually 
determined by foreign currency demand and supply; asset transactions are only one 
component of the foreign exchange market, the other being goods transactions. The 
interaction between the assets and goods markets is crucial to the transfer process, and 
hence to the exchange rate within it. Fig.l elicits a few interesting observations on 
exchange-rate dynamics, especially if one is prepared to admit that world flow 
equilibrium (point C) will not be reached instantly. Note that this stage of analysis implies 
nothing as to exchange rates volatility around the trend, since it rather aims at 
understanding the trend itself.
Fig.l reproduces fig.4 of ch.VI with the addition of goods transaction (and 
deletion of compensatory foreign capitals for clarity). The F schedule is equivalent to the 
A6 schedule in fig.4; the Z schedule is derived from the BIT equation in matrix 13 
(ch.VI) under the assumption of effective total trade elasticity (b > 0). The right 
horizontal axis measures negative NFT and positive NRT. The shift of F from A to B is 
the initial demand for foreign currency from asset transactions. In what follows it wiil be 
assumed that conditions of depreciation prevail (see ch. VI, sec.2.2); yet different 
adjustment paths will be possible.
The exchange rate will approach the dearer value at point C as depreciation itself,
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and possible income effects (shifts of Z), improve NRT. Point C indicates world flow 
equilibrium, where T is transferring capitals and goods by the amount OD.
Fig. 1 The foreign exchange market (T economy) with demand and supply derived from 
financial and trade transactions._______________________________________________
In a standard ("dual") exchange-rate model, e would immediately jump to point E
to clear financial operations, and then one would observe that at point E a surplus of trade
operations by EG should emerge, which implies a reversal to appreciation. But until C is
reached, such a representation either describes one single clearing operation in one single
time unit or it implies disequilibrium on the foreign exchange market through time. This
openly contradicts the basic tenet of these models that markets always clear. In order to 
have the market cleared per unit of time, the path of the exchange rate between eQ and et
should be dictated by the interaction between asset-market decisions and goods-market 
ones. Suppose NFT unfolds steadily through time. Above Z (Z{) (dF/dt > dZ/dt), goods
markets respond with a lag, hence e has initially to go up along a supply schedule of
compensatory capitals, and then fall back to point C as positive trade balances become 
predominant. Along Z (Zt) (dF/dt = dZ/dt), goods markets are responsive enough to
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depreciation; a smooth upward sloping path from A to C may well result if F and Z shift
in parallel; both diagrammadcally and empirically we observe that this may be the case if
income effects come about rapidly^.
In sum, the exchange rate path towards flow equilibrium depends on the
responsiveness of compensatory capitals, on the parameters of international trade and on
expenditure-income effects. In current terminology, we may talk of "overshooting" for all 
temporary exchange rate values above et, not for those below. The nature of et itself is
more controversial. In the stock equilibrium methodology also et is above its "long-run
equilibrium" value since NRT is not zero, which implies wealth effects on asset stocks 
and changes in NFT. In the early generation of asset-market models et was not relevant
information; it is instead relevant in the transfer approach since the exchange rate must
take a value liable to effect the goods transfer. What happens beyond point C, and what
the "long-run equilibrium” value of the exchange rate will be is open to dispute.
1.3. The long-run evolution of the world economy. Pitfalls in
current acount wealth effects.
This issue was already put forward in ch.IV in relation to the sustainability of
different world scenarios. It was stressed then that the world-transfer approach
concentrates on flow equilibria associated with world expansions and tends to push
steady state equilibria in the background of analysis -what matters are ever-changing
transfer problems. By contrast, the steady state is an integral part of stock equilibrium
theories of the exchange rate as an effective achievement A closer comparison between
the two views may be instructive.
Let me first recall that exchange rate theory now offers two main models of long-
run adjustment One is based on the exchange rate value which sets trade balances to
zero; the other is based on the value which equates trade surpluses with interest
2
payments . The two models obviously provide different anchoring for the exchange rate; 
clearly, for a deficit country, the latter prescribes more depreciation than the former. The 
adjustment mechanism is different too. However, the message is the same; there exists an 
inbuilt tendency for the exchange rate to drive the world economy towards zero current
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accounts, i.e. stock equilibrium and steady state.
Long-run models which do not include interest payments are based on a key 
principle of asset market theory: trade imbalances amount to wealth effects. Here a 
financial transfer should be interpreted as a single finite episode of stock adjustment At a 
point like C in fig. 1, T runs a trade surplus and T asset holders should accept R assets in 
excess of the initial desired increase OD. The basic adjustment mechanism is usually 
derived from the equilibrium equation for the foreign asset (see ch.VI, sec.2.2):
(1) (A6t + Z*t)et = a 6At
where (Z*{ > 0) is a trade surplus in foreign currency which acts as an asset supply
shock. If (dA6, dA = 0), the only possible solutions are (de < 0) and/or (d a 6 > 0), 
that is a combination of exchange rate appreciation and foreign retum-rate increase. The 
market process is generally attributed to the attempt of T asset holders to sell off excess R 
assets, thereby pushing their price and the price of currency down. Note, therefore, that 
the stock adjustment in this model gives the opposite picture of the flow adjustment: the 
surplus T economy appreciates while R return rate possibly increases. More generally, 
this result has been inetrpreted as confirming the traditional idea that a surplus economy 
should appreciate, while a deficit economy should depreciate, "without reverting to the 
traditional flow theory of foreign exchange" (Frankel (1983, p.95)).
If one tries to reproduce the above type of long-run adjustment in the diagram of
3
the foreign exchange market one realizes that some difficulties exist . Fig.2 reproduces
the basic case in exchange-rate models in which the long-run adjustment is entirely due to 
exchange-rate wealth effects; hence the schedules of financial transactions (Ft) and trade
transactions (Zt) do not shift from the previous position. Point C is such a position of
world flow equilibrium inherited from fig. 1. The adjustment path described by equation 1 
results in a downward movement along Ft until et, is reached where trade balances are
null and stock equilibrium holds. The rate of appreciation (et,/et -1 ) is given by the
slope of the trade schedule. The accumulation of R asset corresponding to T surpluses is 
equal to DD1 and depends on the slope of the financial schedule (i.e. the responsiveness
of T demand for R asset to appreciation). Note that e falls because there is ongoing 
excess supply on the financial side between C and G.
Fig.2 The foreign exchange market (T economy) and the long-run evolution of the world 
economy._________________________________________________________________
In my view, this mechanism hides a piftall due to the misinterpretation of trade
imbalances as wealth effects and from ignoring the explicit conditions for the foreign
exchange market to clear*. To exemplify this, let me call R currency "dollar" and T 
currency "lira"; for e( liras per dollar T exporters have excess dollar balances over
importers while there are no transactions from the financial side. As a matter of fact, the 
situation can be settled either (i) by exporters hoarding dollar balances directly in their 
dollar accounts abroad, or (ii) by exporters going through the exchange market and 
bidding up liras against dollars^.
Now, as originally conceived, wealth effects arise from undesired windfalls, gains or 
losses brought about by changes in goods or asset prices (apart from "helicopter" 
phenomena hitting asset stocks); accordingly, it can be argued that stocks will be
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promptly corrected to their initial level. Apart from these cases, portoflio theory itself 
holds that accumulation of wealth always takes specific forms and explains how any 
specific store of value comes to be willingly held in the public's portfolios through 
appropriate changes in its price. In our example, if the importer chooses procedure (i), 
one should conclude that he wishes to increase his deposit -and this is a stock 
equilibrium. On the other hand, the importer may choose procedure (ii) and the exchange 
rate will be fixed at a value such that someone else is willing to increase his own dollar 
assets -this is, once again, a stock equilibrium. Indeed, windfall wealth effects are 
already embodied in such transactions via the effect of the exchange rate on foreign asset 
demand. In general, in a regime of free fluctuation, trade imbalances are to be met by 
desired changes in the foreign position so that, ceteris paribus, no further in­
built adjustment can be expected.
It follows firstly that the claim of also basing long-run exchange rate dynamics on
asset markets "without resorting to the traditional flow theory" is groundless. Rather,
exchange rate dynamics after trade imbalances, other things equal, can only result from
the necessity that transactions on current account should be matched by those on capital
account, the two being independent ex ante: this is precisely the task of the 
exchange rate. Hence, for any (Zt > 0), the correct steady state equation is^
(2) Z*(e,...) + F(e,...) = -Z *
The solution is shown in fig.2 by the downward movement along the Z schedule up to 
the steady state value et- This not simply a matter of graphical amendment.
Equation 2 states that the long-run dynamics of payments and exchange rates 
must be taken over by the trade balance itself: deficit forces depreciation to swallow 
foreign assets (capital inflows), surplus boosts appreciation to enlarge their share in 
portfolios (capital outflows). This inolves a critical passage: how is it that at some point 
in time trade transactions come to predominate over financial transactions? There is no 
definite, once-and-for-all answer. It seems only possible to provide a menu of 
ingredients: if the determinants of world demand for R assets do not change through
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time, if the world financial transfer to R can be regarded as a single, finite stock 
adjustment, if this is not affected by factors of selfsustained persistency (or contraction), 
or else if it is "efficient", if the trade balance responds to exchange rate dynamics
7
correctly, then we may expect to observe a well-behaved cycle of the exchange rate .
Let us now turn to models which include interest payments as a long-run feature. 
The case seems unassailable when the inital financial transfer is borrowed; the interesting 
implication is that we have a new transfer problem in the opposite direction, which leaves 
non-trade transactions in their dominant position. Switching from T to R economy is 
quite mechanical since the NFT is actually given by the difference between capital 
outflows (K) and interest payments (YF); since the latter fall due on a permanent basis, 
while the former stem from a finite stock adjustment, there will be a point in time when 
interest payments exceed capital outflows. Recall that the initial financial transfer was
-(Fq + dF/dA6) = -<x66dr6/dA6 + de/dA6 = dK/dA6
Suppose capital outflows take place at a constant time rate (dK/dt = k); if i6 is the
average interest rate on cumulated credit, interest payments at time t amount to 
(YFt = kti6), hence the NFT in each period is
(3) Ft = -k ( l - t i6)
and the steady state equation of the foreign exchange market is
(4) Z*(e,...) + Ki6 = 0
F{ diminishes through time and turns to positive after 1/i periods. This corresponds to 
leftward shifts of the F{ schedule in fig.2; as long as NRT is positive, e{ appreciates on
the foreign exchange market. As already observed, current models are mostly assuming a
pure currency transfer problem; quite simply, if OH is the permanent interest inflow 
given by the foreign asset stock OD, the equilibrium exchange rate will be et„. The reader
may apply the transfer models of ch. VI to derive a variety of different results. Which 
means that the long-run value of the exchange rate is not unique, but depends on the
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financing-utilization pattern of interest payments.
Admitting the case that capital movements in the long run entail an interest- 
payments transfer problem avoids the analytical difficulties met in models based 
exclusively on wealth effects. However, the time profile of the cycle of world payments 
and exchange rate is by no means less nebulous. For equations 3 and 4 to work on a 
predictable basis, the "if s" we met previously still remain. The one relative to 
international trade elasticity will be examined in the next paragraph; the one relative to the 
"efficiency" of the world financial transfer will be the subject of the section on 
expectations.
1.4. Pifalls in international trade elasticity.
The existence of, and convergence to, world flow equilibria as well as to steady 
state equilibria ultimately relies upon "old-fashioned" well- behaved price elasticities of 
international trade, a point made plain by the class of models discussed in par.2. The era 
of asset-market models of the exchange rate has been one of disguised "elasticity 
optimism" -this has been a step backward. We still face a number of unsettled questions 
with regard to goods movements and relative price changes, which I now briefly review 
again. First, relative price changes, net of exchange-rate adjustments, have always turned 
out to be slight as compared with large and continued goods movements in the same 
direction (see also above, ch.V, sec.2.1). Second, changes in nominal exchange rates 
have often proved to exert relatively little effect on goods movements (e.g. the dollar 
depreciation after 1985). We have seen that an explanation may lie in the fact that real 
exchange rates are unlikely to bear the whole burden of adjustment, which they share 
with real expenditure and income effects. However, fitting these facts into transfer 
models only through manipulation of elasticity or by appeal to additional forces is 
somewhat unsatisfactory. Plenty of evidence now suggests that (i) supply prices of 
tradable goods may be adjusted to changes in nominal exchange rates (rather than the 
other way round) -which is known as incomplete pass-through- and that (ii) prices 
of tradable goods on the origin market (on which measures of real exchange rates are 
ususally based) may differ from prices of the same goods on the outlet market (on which
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import price indexes are based) -which implies a power of price discrimination . 
This is tantamount to abandoning both alternatives of perfectly competitive and 
Keynesian markets, the third alternative being the broad family of imperfectly competitive
9
markets. This field is exteremely vast ; the point I shall consider is limited to uncertainty 
in production and pricing. I shall show that the imperfectly competitive features of the 
"polypolystic" goods markets that characterize our model of the open economy (see 
ch.IE, sec.5, ch.VI, sec.l) carry over to international trade in a way that may account 
for incomplete pass-through and price discrimination, and hence, ultimately, for the 
failure of predictions based on simple trade elasticity conditions^.
Let me recall briefly the core of the polypolystic model. The (boundedly) rational 
production plan of the j-th individual firm was shown to be
where i denotes all non-j firms, Q is market demand and Qj. is non-j supply; the resulting 
optimal pricing rule was
where Wq is the vector of factor costs known at time 0, n'jQ is the vector of marginal 
inputs for the plan qjQ, £j is the market demand elasticity at the point of quantity supplied,
which is inversely proportional to the number o f firms in the market. Given that all firmS
adopt the same decision rule, so that market shares are rationally expected to remain equal 
and small, and assuming CES market demand it follows that (£j = £*. = e) for all firms
and any quantity supplied. Also assuming that price-makers take average productivity as
the norm of costs, and ignoring non-labour costs, the marginal cost reduces to 
(w#n jo  = WqA, where X is average labour productivity). The resulting diagram of the
polypolystic firm's production plan is reproduced here for convenience.
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Eig.3, The P Q lv P o lv s t ic  firm's p ro d u c t io n  p la n
It will be remembered that the competitive nature of the above decision model is 
not based on "objective" market parameters (such as the infinite elasticity of demand), but 
is due to the specification of firms' information set. Competition lies in the absence of 
direct knowledge of firm-specific past and present variables on the part of other firms, 
and hence in the absence of strategic interaction at the planning stage. A typical 
conjectural rational rule applies here: the rule is correct in so far as nobody deviates from 
it. This kind of situation, which seems so akin to the perception of competition by 
businessmen, engenders strong inhibitions to the use of firm-specific instruments to 
exploit the market, the most remarkable case being the price. The market pricing rule 
dictates that supply prices follow marginal costs (which are market-specific) whereas 
expected changes in demand (which are firm-specific) will normally be matched by stock 
adjustments of employable resources.
The emergence of a macroeconomic pattern with quantity adjustments has already 
been illustrated in previous applications. To appreciate the role of the nominal exchange 
rate in the adjustment process of trade, let us consider what happens in T. The impact of 
the transfer gives rise to a one-to-one cut back in output and input in the non-tradables
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industry. The switching of employable resources from the production of non-tradables to
that of exportables is virtually blocked until factor costs fall as much as necessary to
induce all firms in the export industry (denoted by x) to expect to sell more; the
relationship between factor costs cut and expected output expansion is given by the slope 
of the expected marginal revenue (- l/ex); the relationship between expected output
expansion and factor employment is given by the coefficients of the input-output function 
(for labour, the average labour productivity, A>x). Of course, the whole reasoning is
based on unchanging expected output -or expected marginal revenue (EMR)**. By 
excluding (anticipated) increases in the autonomous component of R demand for T export 
industry, it is easy to see that nominal devaluation is a means of raising EMR rather than 
reducing marginal costs. However, the working of changes in exchange rates is more 
complex than in perfect competition models.
In the first place one has to specify the industry structure. Having chosen to focus
on product specialization, it follows that T and R export industries are populated by T-
and R-located firms respectively. The tradable good of each country is imperfect
substitute with the home non-tradable good as well as with the foreign non-tradable good 
(for simplicity direct substitution between the two tradables is excluded). Let (ex, e*x)
respectively be the price-elasticity of R demand for T good, and the price-elasticity of T
demand for R good; it is also assumed that the characteristics of the internal and external
demand for each tradable good are the same. Changes in the determinants of demand
other than the prices of tradable goods are excluded. Changes in the exchange rate are
here treated as announced once-and-for-all modifications of the official course of the 
12home currency . In these types of models, changes in the exchange rate are by necessity 
introduced as equivalent changes in variable (labour) costs (e.g. Dombusch 
(1987), sec.IIIA); by contrast, the case of national product specialization and poly- 
polystic market enables one to examine directly the relationship between price decision 
and exchange rate. In this respect, the choice of the currency of invoice becomes critical; 
it will be convenient to assume that all firms in both countries invoice in domestic
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currency . Hence the decision problem will, for all firms in T, be the following:
™ " (P j* o V  - 'W jo A i
s >.qjx0 = Ej[Q(PJX(/ cp*d)]-Ej(Qi | 
where e is the nominal exchange rate. By analogy we obtain for R firms: 
max[',*jxO<<*jxO-w*Otl*jOxfl-*xl
s-t<l*jxO = E*jI(5*"l’*jxO/Pd>l-E*j((3V
Let us first consider T firms (the subscript j is dropped). The specification of the
demand forecast in their decision problem implies that, under the Coumot-Nash 
conjecture on competitors and for (de * 0, P*^ s i ) ,
(5) EMRx = pxQ + qx0[Oqx/apx)(dPx/e) - Oqx^e)(px0de/e2)]‘1dpx
The expression in square brackets yields the expected loss of output due to changes in the
supply price, and it takes account of the fact that the supply price in domestic currency
may differ from the market price on the foreign market in foreign currency because of
changes in the nominal rate. Noting that de is market-specific and common knowledge, 
knowing that (9qx/9px = *exQx/Px> dq^de = - e ^ ^ e ) ,  and assuming that the change in
the nominal rate is fully exogenous (de/dpx = 0), the EMR and the market mark-up for 
all firms in the industry become
(6) EMRx = px( l-e /e x)
Pjxo'V'A
= V (ex ' e)
Consequently, the correct specification of the market maric-up should include the nominal 
exchange rate.
Obviously, the same applies to R industry; it is sufficient to use the same
procedure as above by substituting (e*. e* = 1/e) appropriately to obtain
(7) EMR* X p*x( 1 - l/eJ*e*x)
P*jx0 ” ^*xw*0^*x
13
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Now let firms' expectations be consistent, so that [Px = E(Pj xq). 
P*x = E(p*jx0)] are the average market prices of T and R tradable good in the respective
currencies.
The first observation regards the real exchange rate, which results
H W * * x  
r = ePV Px = '  ----------------
•**WA
that is to say, the real exchange rate reflects the foreign structure of costs and demand
relative to the domestic one. For obvious reasons of specialization we should not expect
(r = 1). Changes in the real exchange rate occur to the extent that marginal costs and/or
the mark-up in the industries of the tradable goods do change in R and/or T. Of course,
changing the nominal rate is another way of changing the real one. In perfectly 
competitive economies, where (de * 0, dPx -> 0, dP*x -> 0), the nominal rate has
one-to-one effect on the real one. Now this is no longer the case; it is easy to verify that, 
in general, the profit-maximizing firm in a polypolystic market should adjust its supply 
price to changes in the exchange rate. From eq.6 the elasticity of T firms' supply price 
relative to the exchange rate will be:
0 < 5px/8e < 1, for ex > 1
Devaluation (de > 0) operates through an increase in the EMR; more precisely it imposes 
a rotation to the right around A and A' in fig.3; concomitantly, m is also increased. In 
fact devaluation turns out to be similar to a reduction of foreign demand elasticity with 
respect to the firm's supply price; in practice, the firm perceives the opportunity to offset 
some of the expansionary exchange-rate effect on demand with a profit-maximizing 
increase in the supply price; hence the exchange-rate pass-through is less than complete 
and the market price of T tradable good in foreign currency falls less than the devaluation 
rate.
As for R firms the result is, in general, that
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-1 < 8p* /8e < 0 for e* > 1.
A X
T devaluation forces R exporting firms to reduce their market mark-up and supply price 
in order to compensate for the contractionary exchange-rate effect; the market price of R 
tradable good on T market rises less than the devaluation rate.
Put otherwise, T devaluation is also a means whereby the real labour cost of 
exports can be reduced for a given nominal wage rate (in R the real labour cost of exports 
rises correspondingly). This is simply a side effect of changing mark-ups; in fact, if w, 
w* are the nominal wages,
w/px -  K K  w ./P*x =
Hence one notes that the negative correlation between real labour cost, output and
employment in the two countries does not spring from respective labour markets.
Let me only note on passing that the situation portrayed by fig.3 can be
interpreted as one of price discrimination. The new and steeper EMR, which is specific to
the foreign market, leads the firm to expand output and to charge a higher price
exclusively on the foreign market, whereas the price it charges and the output it expects to
sell on the domestic market remain unchanged. Let us denote the domestic supply price of 
H firm with p' ; then one observes three prices for the same tradable good: p' , on the
X X
domestic market, p , the invoice export price (in domestic currency), ep , the finalX \
market price on the foreign market. One needs all three prices to explain international
14price statistics of most manufactured goods (see also Cowling-Sugden (1989)) .
As a general consequence of polypolystic competition, and of national product 
specialization, we should expect asymmetric effects of T devaluation. T supply prices 
will rise so that T market prices on R markets will fall less than the rate of nominal 
devaluation; T exports will grow with an ex-post elasticity lower than the "true" demand 
elasticity. R supply prices will be reduced and hence R market prices on T markets will 
increase less than the rate of nominal devaluation; T imports will shrink less than the 
amount that would be given by demand elasticity. The relative price of imports to 
expons, in the respective home currencies, will fall substantially; the real exchange rate
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may still display depreciation in favour of T if supply price adjustments in the two 
industries do not offset the rate of nominal devaluation. The relative price of exportables 
to non-tradables in each country even moves the wrong way: T export industry enjoys 
domestic appreciation, while R expat industry suffers from domestic depreciation^.
All in all, the resulting picture is one of dampened movements in real exchange 
rates, with weakened effects of nominal ones. The trade schedule Zt in fig.2 ought to be
convex to the origin, and we should expect a much deeper fall of e to keep overall 
payments in balance. In any case, the relationship between the rate of nominal 
devaluation, real depreciation and the trade-balance adjustment cannot be derived directly 
from historical demand elasticities as in the classical model.
2. The exchange rate as an asset price and the efficiency of the world 
economy
2.1. The imperfect information hypothesis.
Opening this chapter I have stressed that a shift of focus has taken place in the last 
few years as to the efficiency standards of exchange rate performance. Gradual and 
prolonged currency cycles (like the rise and fall of the dollar between 1980 and today) are 
not in accordance with early exchange rate models of instantaneous stock equilibrium, 
especially if rational expectations are added. So-called "persistency" is thus a problem in 
that setup (Dombusch (1987), Biasco (1987)). It is instead in accordance with the 
fundamental path emerging from world transfer models, especially if static expectations 
hold or, which amounts to the same thing, if agents cannot extrapolate instantly the 
whole future path of R asset supply and return rate. The heart of the whole machinery 
anyhow lies in asset markets, not because trade transactions do not matter for exchange 
rate dynamics, but because asset markets should provide world distributions of financial 
means necessary to make activity expansions effective. Hence we would like such 
distributions to be consistent with the actual worth of the projects to be financed, and 
correspondingly, exchange rates not to interfere but comply with the resulting world 
transfer patterns. The issue of asset market efficiency is therefore crucial also in the
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context of the worid transfer problem examined in this work.
Persistency can hide efficiency failures. To put it in traditional terms, the ex­
post capital transfer to the R economy may exceed the ex-ante efficient transfer
consistent with the net worth of the economy's assets. Graphically (see fig.l above), the 
R asset schedule F might not be stable in the adjustment process (e.g. it might move
rightwards), whereas the efficient use of all available information would imply that
lenders send R no more and no less than OD. A possible cause I wish to draw attention to
is the exchange-rate component of expected returns to R asset
As a matter of fact, the picture offered by the fluctuation of major currencies is
one in which exchange-rates variability is not justified by fundamentals (excess
volatility), existing assets are continuously traded on the basis of patently contrasting
judgements of current information so that active strategies may be consistently profitable
(heterogenous beliefs), longer-term information (e.g. forward premia) is underemployed,
and capitals are misallocated (e.g. overallocated to one country with respect to world
17efficiency criteria)
A common reaction to these findings has been to save the EIH by throwing some 
spanner in the works, such as myopic behaviours (Frankel (1985a), Krugman (1985)) or 
"fads and fashions" (Dombusch (1982)). Since these behaviours cannot be derived from 
the untouched EIH they appear to be purely irrational. On the other hand, the evidence of 
random walks a la Meese and Rogoff (1983) tells us nothing about the market structure 
and agents' behaviour it only tells us that exchange rates behave like outcomes in a fair 
chance game. For instance, one might argue that if the expected value of the game does 
not fall short of the entrance cost, it is rational to become a pure gambler. It is easy to 
understand that bettors' guesses would disturb the exchange-rate path with respect to the 
fundamental one; if the expected value of the game must also pay for the probability that 
the game comes to an end, a "speculative bubble" would take off. Rationalization of the 
"casino market" and of destabilizing "bubbles" has been an interesting achievement 
(Dombusch (1982), Dombusch-Frankel (1987, pp.l9-ff)).
However, it entails an essentially non-economic view of financial activity; financial
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profit, if any, would be the gift of pure luck rather than the reward for some form of 
economic rationality. Moreover, such an explanation still has to assume El as the gravity 
force of bubbles. Both theory and evidence (see e.g. Frankel (1985b)) cast doubts on the 
idea that take-offs and crash-landings of bettors' bubbles can be a convincing portray of 
normal financial activity.
On the whole, the present state of analysis offers a polar choice between fully 
rational and fully irrational asset markets. Neither side seems, however, able to give us a 
robust understanding of international investment, exchange rate dynamics and their 
effects on the world economy. If the postulate of perfect rationality is hardly defendable 
against the evidence, irrational decision-making would imply systematic losses or casino­
like wins.
By contrast, the hypothesis advanced here can be put as follows: international 
investment is not a lottery; it is what professional investors, and popular wisdom, think it 
is -an economic activity based on "professionalism and expertise in picking winners" 
(Levich (1980, p.101)). This is possible because, firstly, publicly available 
information is incomplete, secondly it is not the same for all agents, and, thirdly, it is not 
freely disseminated by the market The imperfect information hypothesis is now attracting 
more attention in exchange-rate theory (Dombusch (1989)). The paragraphs that follow 
contain some very preliminary examples which show how basic forms of informational 
imperfection may generate socially undesirab le outcomes from ind iv idually  
rational decisions. The focus will be on two particular efficiency failures among those 
recalled above: misallocation and excess volatility; these are in fact particularly important 
from the world transfer-problem viewpoint.
2.2. Expectations with incomplete inform ation.
Perhaps the most critical subset of information is not state information, but
0
process information: information on other agents' decisions and on subsequent 
evolutions of decision variables. In other words, we have not only uncertainty over the 
possible future states of the world, but also over the structure of the world itself. To go 
back to Dombusch's puzzle quoted above, is it rational to expect that the expanding
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economy in the world will appreciate (by how much, when...) to obtain the goods 
transfer, or to expect that it will depreciate (by how much, when...) to pay for interests? 
The transfer models presented in this work show that a variety of world models, of world 
equilibria, and of related exchange-rate paths, are possible on different patterns of inter­
action between financial and production decisions. For instance, the fact that world 
financial transfers take place through time rather than instantly is irrelevant in asset- 
market efficiency models, whereas this should be seen as a signal of lenders' lack of the 
information necessary to anticipate the whole transfer pattern.
To grasp the consequences of limited information in forward-looking decisions 
we may make use of the the basic asset market model introduced in ch.in (App.A.l). 
The portfolio specification of the equation of each period's rate of adjustment in the 
exchange rate was shown to be,
et = ayt + b(e*(, - et)
where all small-case letters are rates of change in the following variables y = interest 
differential (foreign - domestic), et = current spot exchange rate, (e*£, - et) = expected
appreciation (.<0) or depreciation (.>0) rate between [t, t'=t+l].
The exchange rate depreciates in the current period (et > 0), as the foreign
interest differential increases (yt > 0) or as expectations of capital gains arise (e*t< -
et > 0). The fundamental path of the exchange rate was found to be:
et=ayt
where static rational expectations (e*t, - e( = 0) are implied. It will be useful to consider
the "fundamental" view according to which, because of random expansions and 
contractions in world asset supply, the interest- differential changes yt occur randomly
around its "long-run" value; hence [E(y) = 0]. Now we shall examine more closely the 
expectations formation process.
There is no difficulty in following the prescription that expectations should be 
based on all the relevant economic knowledge. I shall not question here whether the 
existence and adoption of "the" unique model of the market for all agents is believable;
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rather, I shall characterize the situation under consideration as one where agents have
limited knowledge and information, that is they use a partial reduced-form of the market
with information on decision variables limited to the current period (on this methodology
see above, ch.I, sec.2.3). In other words, our agents know the fundamental equation of
the exchange rate, hence they aim at anticipating the future values of y; in so doing,
however, they face limitations on two sides: (i) they have only a partial reduced-form 
model of y, and (ii) they have only current information on the relevant variables (say z{).
The forecast model will be:
where y ~ , is the estimated value of yt„ zt is a measure of the current observable change 
in foreign asset supply relative to the domestic one (with E(z) = 0), and ^  is a random
forecast error. Therefore, the equilibrium adjustment of the exchange rate will be:
co0 = l/(l+b), 0)j = b/(l+b)
Three observations are in order.
First, (g )q , t o p  are measures of the effect of forecasts. Current exchange rate
dynamics reflect current changes in the interest differential as well as the current relative
growth of R asset, which lenders follow to anticipate the future exchange rate. Eq.8 has
the nature of an acceleration equation. For instance, under conditions of relative growth 
of R asset (yt > 0 , zt > 0), R currency will rise at a pace faster than the efficient one
(et > ayt).
which derives from
g~= ad~ > 0
d -  > 0
(8) et = CÜ0ayt + to i8~zt
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Second, the consequence of the use of a forecast model with limited knowledge 
and information at this stage is clear: the exchange rate runs ahead of its efficient path 
because agents understand correctly that the path is traced by the relative growth of R 
asset, but are unable to discount immediately the complete transfer pattern. To obtain a 
clearer idea of this fact, one may compute the appreciation rate by taking the difference of 
equation 8 in t' and t; one thus obtains:
(9a) e ^ G J jg - ^  + g -z^ iO Q a^ , Yt. = ^  - \
(b) et, - et = QJjg-t^ + o)0a(y t, - yt) + o>0a<I>t,
Note the first term in equation 9a (co jg~yt<); this is clearly a trend term containing the
acceleration rate of the relative growth of R asset, and it is inserted into exchange rate
dynamics by the forward-looking activity of lenders. This term would vanish from the
exchange rate path only if lenders knew and expected [E(z) = 0, E(y) = 0, ], which
brings us back to the case of static rational expectations. In all other cases in which agents
look ahead, but not infinitely ahead, the exchange rate path will turn out to be accelerated
with respect to the efficient one.
Third, 9a also illustrates the interesting fact that lenders' forecast model is actually 
reflected by exchange rate dynamics (if Yt> is random and hence adds up to the error
component of the forecast), though this achievement is due more to self-fulfilment than to 
complete knowledge of the economy. The forecast of appreciation (e*t, - et > 0) will be
18confirmed by 9b (lenders will be on "the right side of the market", et< > e*t) until there
is positive relative growth of R asset reflected in an actual increase in the interest diffe­
rential (yt, - yt > 0) from one period to the next. This signals that as long as R asset
relative supply increases there will be capital transfers in excess over the efficient amount
2.3. Excess volatility. Asymmetric inform ation.
Limited information is not the end of the story. For any given chunk of 
information -it will be remembered- the hypothesis that it is processed efficiently bears 
implications that are either counterfactual (e.g. the absence of asset trading) or non­
economic (it is rational to behave as pure gamblers) or even paradoxical (e.g. who is
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going to produce information if information is a public good?). Path-breaking works and 
modem principles on the impossibility of efficient information were discussed in 
ch.I(sec.2.2). The point of interest here is that incomplete information creates an 
incentive to gathering further information; private incentive lies not in the amount of 
information publicly available, but in the worth of the private further bit that one is able to 
secure for oneself. Hence, information takes the nature of a public good. Producing 
information has a private cost that must be rewarded; but if information is fully revealed 
through competitive contracting no one will ever bear the cost of producing information. 
This point is better understood if one bears in mind that El may prevent stock 
adjustments; if information is costly, those who paid for it would not be able to adjust the 
asset stock profitably by actually acquiring or releasing the asset. Therefore, a necessary 
condition of profitability for the informed to enter the market may be that of effective 
trades. As will be seen, these actually occur if a class of agents is prevented from getting 
the correct information.
As we know, our basic asset market model implies a foreign-asset demand 
function with constant elasticity of substitution (a, b), equal for all agents (n), such that 
once expressed in rates of change it results
knt = V t + bn<£*f ‘ V '  et 
n nt
where (kRt > 0) indicates excess demand (stock increase), and afl = a, bfl = b for all 
n. I reproduce here fore convenience the fundamental solution of the market, which is 
t ,  = ayt
k . = 0 ' for all nnt
Note that the second equation shows that asset market equilibrium in each period obtains 
with no asset trades.
The standard asset market model with asymmetric information assumes that a 
class of agents observes a correct signal of the fundamental variable while the remaining
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agents observe nothing else than the market price (see e.g. Andersen (1985)). As a first
step, I instead assume that the agents who are informed on the correct evolution of the 
interest differential in the relevant decision period (yt) face agents who have information
on y affected by a "white noise" With respect to the fundamental model under the
EIH, I reformulate the informational assumptions as follows:
(i) all agents use the same decision variable y;
(ii) agents have differentiated access to information on y(, and accordingly they are 
distinguishable as "insiders" (i, with information {fljt )) and "outsiders" (o, with 
information tAot});
(iii) outsiders never observe y{ but observe (yAt = y + v^, where v( is a random error 
i.i.d. N(0, Vy), Vyy = 0.
After these modifications the asset market system becomes:
(10) kit = ayt + b(e*t, - e{) - e£ i = 1..... 1
ko t= ayt + b(e*t’ '  et) '  et °  = I+1» -N
^ ♦ ( N - D k ^ O
Since here I am not interested in the effects due to the relative weight of the two classes 
(Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that there should be an optimal number of 
outsiders), I shall make the useful assumption that they have the same dimension; this 
renders the individual exchange across the two classes equivalent to the aggregate 
exchange bteween the two classes as a whole.
In the first place, it is easy to see that the rational expectation is still static, which 
is consistent with the following solution:
(11) et = ayt + (a/2)vt
ki, = -kot = -(a2® vt
It is immediately clear that the single market outcomes under asymmetric 
information yield values that differ from the efficient ones of the fundamental solution. 
Various characterizations of such outcomes are worth emphasising.
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1. A sym m etric inform ation  generates equ ilib rium  asset trades.
Suppose (yt > 0) and note that
(i) for Vj > 0: et > ayt, kJt < 0
(ii) for < 0: Et < ayt, k-t > 0
In case (i) outsiders overestimate the increase in y£ and their demand is greater than the 
optimal one. The increase in e{ is also greater than the efficient one, or else the exchange 
rate "overshoots". Insiders gain from knowing the correct information y as they are able 
to sell an overvalued asset to outsiders who believe it to be undervalued (in fact, Yt - et >
0). In case (ii), for opposite reasons, insiders can buy an undervalued asset from
outsiders for whom it is overvalued.
It is also interesting to note that the two groups are mutually useful. Insiders can
profit from costly information thanks to outsiders; outsiders bear a smaller loss in
efficiency thanks to the informational arbitrage offered by insiders. In fact, were the 
former alone the deviation (et - ayt) would be greater. But see also the next point
2. Inform ed speculation will not totally  elim inate exchange<rate
deviations, if information is costly. In fact, consider the deviation as perceived 
by informed agents (w^ = £t • aYt) ^ d  speculation intervention as (cwt; c < 0).
Speculation would work like a "filter rule", and from 11 [wt = -(a/2)vt, E(cwt I i}-t) = 0]
(see also Fama (1970, p.385)). That is to say, "stabilizing" speculation in a "white-noise"
market has zero expected return, or negative expected return if costs are considered. The
economist would like the speculator to behave even more socially, so that the exchange
rate is kept constantly on the efficient path. To this effect, let us add the speculative 
component (-cw{) to the informed side of market 10; we obtain;
et = ayt + a(2 -c )_1vt
then let us add the efficiency condition (et = ay{): clearly, this further condition can be
fulfilled if c is now endogenous, and (ld-> <»). "Thus, the problem seems not to be one
of excessive destabilizing speculation, but rather one of the absence of speculation [...]"
(McKinnon (1979, p. 156)). But from the market-equilibrium condition we also know 
that for (et = ayt> kjt = -kQt = 0), that is, unlimited "fundamentalist" speculation would
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exhaust any profitability from information and would record actual negative returns net 
of costs. In conclusion, deviations wt cannot be filled if they embody the normal return to
the cost of the information {£Xt}.
3. A form of "informational equilibrium" exists. It exists because public
data cannot reveal inefficiency statistically. An important consequence is that the
reference to the fundamental path of the exchange rate is irrimediably lost. This is 
tautological for outsiders. Ask an outsider to examine the time series of et generated by
11 and to test whether the exchange rate follows the "fundamentals" or not. H is 
"fundamentals" are (ayt); hence [et - ayt = -avt]: the exchange rate deviates from the
fundamental path only by a random factor with zero expected value. Moreover, ask him 
whether he thinks he is playing in a "fair" market. Again, since et still takes up the
statistical properties of yt, the outsider will be unable to reject the martingale hypothesis
[E(et>l£iot) = e^ ]. Statistically, the outsider should conclude that the exchange-rate market
is efficient and "fair".
The foregoing general implications of equilibrium asset-trading under asymmetric 
information suggest that the "normal" state of foreign exchange markets should display as 
much inefficiency as necessary to secure profitable trade between informed and 
uninformed. Further aspects will be pointed out in the rest of the chapter, in the context 
of other stylized forms of interaction between differently informed groups.
2.4. Excess volatility: inferential behaviour.
Outsiders may follow an alternative strategy to the use of poor public information 
on yt. They may believe that "the market is always right", and simply follow up the
market. "Knowing that our judgment is worthless [...] we endeavour to conform with the
behaviour of majority or the average" (Keynes (1937, p. 114)). Indeed, if the insider 
information is not protected, outsiders will be able to correctly infer yt from the going
(technically, this happens whenever the function [e^y^] is invertible and unique). This is
a general property proved by Grossman-Stiglitz (1980); it pinpoints the EIH as the 
outcome of an inference process based on repeated occurrence of market equilibria, but at 
the same time it falls back into the public-good paradox of information. A typical form of
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protection of private information considered in the literature is the presence of further 
"noise" in the inverted function [yt(et)]. In this paragraph I shall examine the case in
which the outsiders try to leam the function [yt(£{)] under the crucial assumption that the
outsiders never observe y{ and hence are endowed with a whole noisy time series of
y. Consequently, the insiders' and the outsiders' information sets are respectively
I shall follow the principle that agents process information rationally by assuming 
that outsiders use an OLS estimation procedure. The outsiders' inference problem is the 
following:
The estimation problem is split into two stages. In stage I outsiders observe
market realizations 11 and make estimaton I. Then, they enter the market on the basis of
estimation I and at the end of stage II they revise their estimation.
Stage I. Now, remember that the fundamental "true" equation has (fQ = 0, f =
1/a). One checks easily that if the outsiders were endowed with the correct information 
set {£2-}, by applying OLS they would obtain precisely (f~Q = 0, f~ = 1/a). But the
outsiders could get {Q-} only by observing repeated market outcomes 11 with symmetric
information, which cannot be if information is costly. Therefore the problem of inference
is of some relevance only in the presence of different information sets. In this case,
outsiders' first-stage inference on market realizations 11 is clearly affected by "measure 
error" due to the informational noise embedded in their information set (&o t}- As a
consequence, outsiders will obtain unbiased estimators, but with unduly greater variance. 
Let them not reject the hypothesis (fQ = 0) and reject the hypothesis (f = 0). Therefore,
they will base their inference of y{, which they do not observe, from et, which they do 
observe, on the following estimated equation:
estimate market equation 
given information set 
with equation
yt - « V
yt = fo + fct + v ,
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The consequence of the informational noise at this stage is that the probability (f~j
f  f  1/a) is positive and relatively large.
Stage II. Before going into the estimation problem, let us look first at the effect 
of inferential behaviour on market equilibrium, assuming again that (e*t< = e{) for all
agents:
(13) kot = a y - - e t
V aV e.
ki, + kot = 0
which yields
(14) e1 = a (2 -a f - ,) '1yt
kit =  -kot =  a [ 1 - (2  - a f - j ) - 1 ]y ,
From equation 14 it follows that
fII = a  + pd-I a  = 2/a, (3 = -1
that is to say, market realizations are not independent of outsiders' inference, and the
structural parameter is a linear function of the estimator.
This highlights a crucial point. As already stressed, the asset market has no such a
thing as a "physical" structure; its structure consists of agents’ decision rules, which
reflect agents’ beliefs. When decision rules or beliefs change, the market structure also
changes. In such an environment, structural stability, which is necessary for consistent
and "objective" inference, is highly problematic. Rather, a sort of "Heisenbergian"
interaction between subject and object takes place. This fact has been attracting increasing
attention in the critical examination of rational- expectations' axioms (e.g. Frydman-
Phelps (eds.,1983), Bray-Kreps (1986), Pesaran (1987, ch.III)) and has deep
repercussions on the functioning of asset markets.
In the first place, let us check for exchange-rate efficiency. Efficiency would 
require (fjj = 1/a) and hence (f~j = 1/a). But we know that, for any finite estimation, (f~j
= fj) with positive (relatively large) probability; therefore, for any finite market realization
(12)
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14 (fjj = 1/a) unless (f~j = 1/a) was drawn by chance. Since (f~j < 1/a, fjj > 1/a) and 
(f~j > 1/a, fjj < 1/a), if (f~j) is held fixed the foreign rate will respectively undershoot or
overshoot the efficient values around the expected value..
20Now, let the outsiders revise their estimation periodically . They observe a finite 
sequence (II) of market realizations 14, where (f~j) acts as a fixed parameter, and at the
end of this sequence they compute their stage-II estimation. By applying OLS to 14, the 
outsiders obtain
(15) f~n = fn (1 + Pn) pn  = Dvy/ü y
= (a  + pf~j)(l + p..) where
E(f-n) = a + P(f~, + f-jEiPj,)! E(pn ) = Vy y =0
= a  + p f-j
In other words, stage-II estimation will be based on market realizations depending on
stage-I estimation, and so on. Stage-II estimator differs from the structural parameter by a 
factor p, that is, the sampling correlation between the informational noise v{ and the
corret y(; under the assumption (Vvy = 0), stage-II and each further stage-by-stage
estimation are still unbiased. However, all this entails that learning introduces structural 
modifications as learners apply their findings, so that the market structure is modified in a 
cumulative distortion process. What the outsiders will discover is no longer the "true" 
parameter, but a function of their own original belief^.
The above model leads us to the following conclusions.
(i) For any finite estimation, (f~^j ^  ^ )  with positive (relatively large) probability.
(ii) Whatever (f~j) is taken, estimations of the structural parameter will be centered on a 
function of (f~j).
(iii) Outsiders' estimation revisions introduce cumulative modifications in the market 
structure.
(iv) Inference is efficiency-preserving only if at the very beginning outsiders get (f-j = 
1/a) in some way.
Our propositions are in line with the finding in the recent literature that, in the
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presence of imperfect information, even correct inference may not preserve informational 
22efficiency . In fact, the market retains the general characteristics of asymmetric asset 
trading previously obtained (see sec.2.3). That is to say:
(v) Market equilibrium is fully consistent with the gaining by insiders of a return from 
correct information^.
(vi) The reference to the fundamental path is lost since the actual market structure is now
2013; inefficiency cannot be detected statistically by means of public data .
(vii) If exchange-rate deviations from efficiency (or actual changes in the "true" return 
rate) just compensate for information costs, there will be no profitable stabilizing 
speculation.
If these propositions are correct, one should be prepared to accept some form of 
"fundamental noise" in international asset and currency markets. One may also subscribe 
to Stiglitz's general point that efficiency market theories "are not robust to slight 
alterations in the informational assumptions" (1985). This is only a first step towards 
understanding more worrying deviations from desirable states of affairs in world asset 
markets as well as mitigating full reliance upon their allocative virtues.
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Notes
(1) On the absence of sizeable swings or overshooting in the upward trend of the dollar between 1980 and 
1985 see the interesting observations by Goodhart (1987,1988).
(2) See, for an overall view, Branson (1983,1985).
(3) The difficulties here are analytical in nature. That world payments dynamics should bear upon shifts of 
wealth due to trade imbalances has also raised empirical skepticism (Tobin (1981), Dombusch (1987)).
(4) More extended treatment can be found in Tamborini (1988).
(5) As is well known, the rational choice will be based on the observation of the covered interest parity. 
If this holds perfectly, the exporter will be indifferent. On the covered interest parity see ch.III, App.A.l.
(6) Portfolio models of the exchange rate consistent with this view of the foreign exchange market have 
been developed by De Macedo-Tobin (1980) and Kouri (1983).
(7) I have analyzed these ingredients in some detail in a previous work (1988) where I reached a rather 
pessimistic conclusion as to the pie.
(8) The reader can find the evidence at the industry level in Dombusch (1987b), Fitoussi-Pheips (1988), 
Froot-Klemperer (1989) with regard to the US trade with industrialized countries, Giovannini (1988) for 
Japanese tradable commodities, Cowling-Sugden (1989) who consider the European car market
(9) See, for a general perspective, Biasco (1986), Dombusch (1987b), Holland (1987), Giovannetti 
(1987).
(10) Since national product specialization is assumed, the model presented here is comparable with the 
larger and larger number of models of international monopolistic competition: e.g. Kravis-Lipsey (1977), 
Krugman (1986), Dombusch (1987b, sec.III.B), Giovannini (1988). One obstacle on the the way of the 
application of these models in open macroeconomic issues is perhaps that their results are highly 
sensitive to very specific microeconomic circumstances that cannot plausibly be taken into account at a 
larger scale of analysis. In this respect the polypolystic model has the advantage to yield the basic effects 
of international imperfect competition in otherwise competitive markets (i.e. "large" numbers of "small" 
firms producing a homogeneous national product).
(11) A well-known problem involved here is that the cut in factor incomes is unlikely to leave domestic 
demand unaffected; hence the overall result will depend on the reaction of the foreign component
(12) This is surely restrictive and inappropriate to a freely floating regime. However the analytical 
advantage is that we will thus be able to reach a simple and clear expression for the position of the 
exchange rate in the pricing equation. Moreover, such a basic equation will yield the same qualitative 
results as more complete models which include exchange rate uncertainty and risk aversion, when the 
exchange rate change is perceived as persistent (see e.g. Giovannini, 1988, p.53. Proposition 3).
(13) There are numerous studies which show that the choice itself of the currency of invoice should 
depend on the characteristics of the market and on the attitude of the firm towards uncertainty; see e.g. 
McKinnon (1979, ch.IV), Giovannini (1988).
(14) This last result immediately raises the question of the persistence of price discrimination. In the 
presence of perfect international arbitrage R consumers ought to buy T tradable good on T market until T 
firms raise the domestic supply price (p’^ ). Well-known arguments have long been raised against the
perfect arbitrage hypothesis whether on theoretical or empirical grounds; a recent line of research relates 
weak arbitrage to uncertainty (e.g. Giovannetti (1987) and the literature quoted therein). This explanation
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can be integrated into the polypolystic framework; in fact, we know (see again ch.m, sec.4.3) that firms' 
forecast errors generate a price scatter around the market demand, from which firms draw individual market 
power; hence the problem of arbitrage arises on domestic and international markets alike. Not only does 
each individual firm price the same good differently on the two markets, but all firms in the same 
industry may price the same good differently if they perceive different demand conditions. Therefore, 
arbitrage should operate across national borders as well as across suppliers. However, scattered price 
differences for the same good are likely to persist if consumers' information is limited and search is 
costly. This phenomenon combines with firms’ fallibility to spread market power over "small" market 
shares, and to inhibit the use of the price to clear the market, even in an otherwise competitive environ­
ment.
(15) The treatment here has been limited to a short-run perspective. Deeper and longer-run effects on 
sectoral supplies due to entry and exit elicited by changes in the mark-up in the export industry are not 
considered. However it is intuitive that the traditional appeal to free entry, or to costless and frictionless 
contractions and expansions of suppliers, no longer holds under the assumptions which characterize 
polypolystic markets. For thorough discussions of these aspects see Biasco (1986,1987).
(16) It should be pointed out that there are other important determinants of the demand for R asset which 
may change in the course of adjustment. One is centainly R real income. To the extent that R income 
increases, R asset demand should also increase, either directly to re-establish the stock-flow norm or 
indirectly via lower risk premia (see also Tamborini (1987)). A much wider picture of factors of 
inefficiency in currency cycles has been drawn by Biasco (1987).
(17) I am also making reference, to mention only few, to Levich (1980,1985b), Frankel-Froot 
(1986,1987), Group of Thirty (1988), Goodhart (1988), Koromzay-LLewellyn-Potter (1988).
(18) The "right side of market" rule is widely used in the financial community (Levich (1980, p.104 ff.), 
Bilson (1983, p.155 ff.)); this rule rates forecasts positively when they have the same sign of the actual 
price change, regardless of the minumum deviation from the latter.
(19) The literature is rather silent on the width and depth of imperfections in information, and this paper 
cannot afford an explanation. Of course, informational differences can be more serious and pervasive than 
"white noise" in the interest differential. They may stem from market realizations themselves (e.g. Tobin 
(1981, p.123 ff.)) or from agents' perception and judgement of information (e.g. Kaen-Roseman (1986)). 
Moreover, their importance grows as y extends, as it should, to a full vector of decision variables (suffice
it to think of returns to equities). The model presented here only makes the simplest case to introduce to 
the effects of imperfect information. To keep the treatment manageable information costs will not be 
explicited, but will be kept in the background as an incentive for informed to trade effectively.
(20) Note, however, that the forecast errors (y~t - y^, if (f~j) is kept fixed, are a linear function in (yt> v^ ) 
that cannot reveal any systematic pattern.
(21) It is sufficient to note the following chain derived from the above expressions:
fn = a  + Pf-r  fm  = o + p[a + P(a + pf~j(l + &n )l.....
fj^  — c l +  P[a +
Therefore the N-th stage structural parameter will be a linear function in the original estimated parameter 
(f~P and the cumulated sampling errors up to (p^ p. A major consequence is that the stochastic process
of market realizations is no longer stationary and independently distributed across different decision 
regimes. This particularly concerns the econometrician, who is forced to make efficiency tests across 
outsiders' estimation revisions (since the former is unlikely to know the pattern of revisions of the latter). 
The longer the time series the higher the probability of importing such shifts into the decision regime, 
which render linear parametric models unusable. Such changing patterns, which have frustrated the 
econometric approach to efficiency (Levich (1980, 1985a)), and may account for poor out-of-sample 
performance, can only be puzzling if the market structure is conceived as something physically 
independent of agents' beliefs and decision models.
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(22) More sophisticated studies of learning have found out some conditions or estimation techniques 
thanks to which the process does converge to unbiased estimators which "discover" the "objective" market 
structure (see e.g. Bray (1982), Bray-Kreps (1986)). However, it also seems widely agreed that such cases 
cannot be regarded as sufficiently representative (see again Bray-Kreps (1986), Frydman-Ptielps (1983), 
and Pesaran (1987, ch.III). Recent works by Tabellini (1988) and Lewis (1989) have shown that learning 
a structural parameter introduces greater variability in exchange-rate dynamics; however, the 
"Heisenbergian" problem is absent from these models because they leave the unknown parameter 
unaffected by learners' behaviour.
(23) It is easy to verify from 14 that for say (f—j > 1/a) outsiders overestimate the change in the interest
differential; then, as already explained, the foreign rate "overshoots" and insiders sell an overvalued asset. 
Just the opposite happens for (f~j < 1/a).
(24) This can be seen by taking the outsiders' "fundamental rate" (e~t = (l/f-^y^). Then, according to data 
generated by 11. (f~j) being equivalent to a fixed parameter, (e^  - e-^) is a linear function in (y{, v^ ) with 
zero-expected value. Moreover [E(elfi^  -  e(] or the martingale hypothesis holds.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Time, uncertainty and the non-neutrality of money and finance. The 
implications for international monetary economics
The relevance attached to international monetary matters at all levels of the 
economic profession suffers from serious inconsistency with the use of monetary 
theories which purport to graft money onto Walrasian first principles of value and 
exchange. As has been firmly established in general equilibrium theory, those principles 
simply render money "inessential". Furthermore, those same principles hardly justify the 
existence of such things as "nations" whose citizens subscribe to different monetary 
consistitutions, and where monetary authorities commit themselves to keeping external 
payments in balance. The purpose of the first part of this study was the search for 
monetary foundations consistent with the role that monetary and financial instruments 
actually play on the international stage, as well as in international economics textbooks.
The search pursued in this study has been inspired by recent developments in 
monetary theory which have probed the dimensions of time (in particular sequential time) 
and uncertainty (in the meaning of incomplete information). To recall Radner's famous 
statement, an economy which uses money must be a sequence economy (1968), but it 
must also be "an economy which makes it too costly or impossible to engage in all 
desirable Arrow- Debreu trades” (Hahn (1988, p.957)). One reason why not all possible 
contingent markets arc opened should be incomplete (incompletable) information on all 
possible future states of the economy. If this is the case, as is known from information 
theory, the economy will be constrained to suboptimal positions. The first conclusion is 
therefore that a sequence economy which uses money along with other stores of value (a 
"financial economy" as it has been named here) cannot be modelled to mimick a 
Walrasian economy.
In particular, agents will not have enough information to maximize intertemporal 
utility consistently. It is in this connection that a well-known piece of Keynes's monetary
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theory, precautionary behaviour, has recently been revived in decision theory (sometimes 
under the name of "flexibility"). Precautionary behaviour has been introduced in our 
analysis as behaviour aimed at minimizing the probability of default intrinsic in an 
uncertain economic choice; it has been shown how precautionary behaviour dictates the 
consumer choice of the whole amount of financial wealth as well as the share of the 
perfectly liquid (fixed-price) asset in it -i.e. the monetary reserve. In this picture money is 
the perfectly liquid instrument for transferring wealth across markets (the transaction 
motive) and through time (the store-of-value motive), where the two motives are almost 
indistinguishable from a decisional viewpoint and in no case can survive separately.
It was said in advance at the beginning of Part One that my aim was not to 
model the creation of money, but to investigate the reasons for the use of an artifact with 
money's specific characteristics. Having singled out time, uncertainty and precaution as 
possible reasons, we cannot but take the existence of different monetary constitutions as a 
matter of fact; yet by incorporating monetary authorities into the same decisional 
framework as all other agents, it becomes understandable why monetary authorities, too, 
have a desired reserve of (international) money as an objective. There remains, however, 
a crucial distinction: the desired stock of international monetary reserve (or broadly 
speaking the balance of international payments) can by no means be introduced among 
private agents' objectives or constraints; it is a specific commitment of the monetary 
authority, and it can be perceived by private agents to the extent that the monetary 
authority is able to enforce it. As a consequence, the external constraint is properly a 
macroeconomic constraint, in the sense that it defines a property of the system as a whole 
which is not common to the individual parts of it. Money is doubly "essential" in 
international economics.
Viewing time and uncertainty as the essential features of the financial economy, 
and caution as the rational attitude in the face of them, we have been able to establish two 
further features which have extremely important consequences in the relation between 
microeconomic decisions and macroeconomic outcomes. The first is that any uncertain 
decision cannot be explained independently of the conditions under which the agent can
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minimize the probability of default; for at least three crucial economic decisions - 
consumption, production and investment- these conditions are essentially established by 
the money and asset markets. The second feature is that, under precautionary behaviour, 
the asset market can possibly offer efficient means to minimze the (subjective) probability 
of default, but it cannot be expected to perform the function that it does in Arrow-Debreu 
theory, that is, to transmit signals for optimal intertemporal production decisions from 
consumers to producers (actually most of those signals do not even exist in consumers' 
minds). In Keynesian macroeconomic terminology we have a saving-investment 
intertemporal coordination problem (Leijonhufvud (1969)).
Along these lines, the open macroeconomic model that has been obtained 
displays essential Keynesian, or perhaps New Keynesian, features. The fundamental 
determinant of employment and production of real resources in any single economy is 
realized investment; however, realized investment can fall short of firms' desired 
investment, because of finance constraints on the asset market, while both can fall short 
of full-employment investment because of lack of coordination between today's saving 
on the part of consumers and tomorrow’s expected scale of production on the part of 
firms. Consumption has second-order importance, since it only amplifies additional 
demand. Goods prices are the result of firms' uncertain decisions as to the current level 
of demand; price making also involves conjectures about competitors' behaviour, and we 
have seen that under the informational conditions that may characterize a competitive 
market the Coumot-Nash equilibrium may be self-fulfilling. As a consequence, prices 
will simply reflect productivity, factor costs and the elasticity of market demand.
Another key achievement of the first pan of the work was therefore that opening 
the financial economy, in the theoretical as well as in the political meaning, is a relevant 
issue in so far as asset markets are not Arrow-Debreu efficient and money and finance are 
non-neutral; only in this case, in fact, can integrating asset markets have effects on invest­
ment and production decisions. The proposal of a transfer-theory approach to 
international payments, and generally to the creation and disitribution of real resources in 
the world economy, is a simple corollary to this conclusion.
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2. The world transfer of financial and real resources
Worldwide integrated financial economies should operate in such a way that 
supply of finance from excess-saving decision units matches demand for finance of 
excess-spending decision units. In each economy, and in the world economy as a whole, 
the former group is generally representd by households and the latter by private 
businesses and public agencies. The transfer- theory approach is simply a means to study 
such a process under n-1 balance-of-payments constraints. In this perspective, the 
textbook idea that transfer problems only arise in connection with extraordinary events 
like war payments or official debts is misleading; also misleading is the other textbook 
idea that important capital movements are only those springing from portfolio and 
speculative motives. All these cases simply play different roles in the world process of 
forwarding financial and real resources to spending economies.
An important consequence of this approach is that it shifts the focus of analysis, 
and perhaps of policy too, from stationary state conditions to "sustainable'’ world flow 
equilibria. As a matter of fact, in so far as some economy in the world is expanding (i.e. 
neither investment nor saving are nil) there will generally take place a world transfer 
process towards the expanding economy. Such processes are continually in motion, and 
it seems unwise to dismiss them as mere transitory stock adjustments towards new 
stationary states, as current analyses mostly do. On the other hand, it is perfectly true that 
flow equilibria are not, theoretically, steady equilibria; therefore, Part Two began with the 
taxonomy of different patterns of world transfers, and with examination of their likely 
degree of "sustainability" when compared with theoretical stationary states. I wish to 
stress that at this level of static-comparative analysis, some doubts have emerged as to the 
current practice of identifying "the three zeroes" (zero budget deficit, zero current a c c o u n t  
and zero capital account) with world general equilibrium; as great scholars of the 1930s 
and 1940s -like Frish and Kalecki- noticed, "the three zeroes" by themselves may not 
correspond to desirable states for all participants in the system, in which case (lump) 
transfers would be necessary anyway. As far as the study of the world transfer process is 
concerned, the old criterion of the balance of autonomous payments, which leaves only
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the stock of official reserves unchanged, seems still valid and viable.
Transfer theories elaborated since the Napoleonic Wars offer us a richness of 
insights into the relationships between shifts of monetary and financial means and shifts 
of real resources across economies. This rather extended and heterogeneous literature has 
been organized according to Johnson's (1956) principle of the "financing-utilization 
pattern", which identifies the sources in the transfer economy (T) and the uses in the 
recipient economy (R) of the original financial transfer. Within this framework I have 
identified as "classical" those transfer models which view the transfer problem as a pure 
currency problem, that is to say a shift of "gold" from T to R. Classical models typically 
base the transfer mechanism on the real exchange rate, whether the nominal rate is fixed 
or flexible as in modern applications (e.g. to the U.S. future debt service). The real 
exchange rate may be activated by a pure quantity-of-money effect or by effects operating 
through the discount rate and domestic prices. The prediction of this class of models is 
generally that the real exchange rate is effective in preserving world flow equilibrium; T 
economies will depreciate and will provide R economies with goods transfers by the 
same amount as financial transfers, with real loss no greater than the goods transferred. It 
is quite imponant to observe that the classical transfer theory explains exchange-rate 
dynamics in a way radically different from analytically equivalent modem stock-theories. 
The latter view changes in the real exchange rate either as a phenomenon of market 
disequilibrium or as an undesirable side-effect of uncoordinated policies, whereas the 
former holds that real exchange rates must change to allow for world autonomous 
redistributions of financial and real resources.
Apart from this up-to-date contribution to the understanding of exchange-rate 
dynamics, the classical theory suffers from numerous shortcomings, which were pointed 
out in early inter-war debates and which carry over to the present Never have there been 
such massive shifts of "gold" as actual world transfer processes would require; 
adjustments of goods relative prices, net of those in nominal exchange rates, hardly 
account for observed quick, large and persistent goods movements; we have several 
historical instances of sizeable changes in real outputs and incomes in connection with
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transfer problems. According to the present study the limits of the classical transfer 
theory lie in its undue simplification of the financing- utilization pattern as well as in its 
theoretical model of die open economy.
In the first place, we should take into account that autonomous financial 
transfers should be withdrawn from some source in T and injected somewhere in R 
independently of their international vehicle. This was the idea that emerged after the inter­
war debate and which has been recast here in the macromodel of the open financial 
economy elaborated in Part One. In both economies the financial transfer may impinge 
either on existing asset stocks (e.g. a portfolio adjustment) or on current expenditure 
flows (e.g. direct investments or tax-paid government transfers) or on both in some 
proportion. In any case, if assets matter for agents' ability to take positions on goods 
markets as was explained in Part One, we should expect financial transfers to have effects 
on those markets independently of changes in real exchange rates. We have thus been 
able to compare a variety of results ranging from traditional transfer theories to current 
macro-economic theories of the open economy.
Financing-utilization 
pattemfT and R)
T economy 
Real exch.rate Real income BIT
Asset stocks + - -
+ + - =
Current expenditure S - -
Traditional transfer theories of direct expenditure effects (bottom row in the 
above table) sought to show that goods transfers and world flow equilibrium can be 
obtained even at a constant real exchange rate. I have not found sufficient analytical 
support for this claim if income repercussions are taken into account; I have instead found 
confirmation of the fear expressed by early Keynesian analyses of real losses in T
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coupled with a negative balance of international transfers (BIT). The transfer pattern 
involving asset stocks (top row) gives a more complex model which is directly 
comparable with Mundell-Fleming models and their current developments. Here the 
adjustment mechanism is based on T portfolios shifting in favour of R assets in an 
upward world movement of (real) interest rates. Concomitantly, asset-constrained 
expenditures should fall in T and grow in R. As long as the real exchange rate does not 
change, whether T loses real income or not depends on the relative extent of expansion in 
R -a standard Mundellian result. However, if the external constraint is introduced (BIT 
should be nil, second row) it turns out that T is likely to suffer from real losses even 
though R expenditure expands by the full amount of the financial transfer.
The role that flexible exchange rates can play has been analyzed at length. In the 
model adopted here the exchange rate should keep demand and supply of foreign 
currency in balance, as seems obvious, and not just maintain asset stock equilibrium. 
Does the assignment of the exchange rate to external flow equilibrium support the idea 
that real income will not change? The answer is that if the transfer pattern is unfavourable 
to T, as explained above, the nominal depreciation may be insufficient to prevent real 
income from falling (third row); the standard Mundell-Fleming result -a real gain in both 
economies- only obtains under a specific transfer pattern with overexpansion in R. The 
current practice of ruling real income adjustments out of payments models with flexible 
exchange rate is therefore not fully justified.
On the whole, most likely results deny that changes in the real exchange rate and 
in real expenditures and incomes can be regarded as mutually exclusive in the world 
transfer process.
3. The world transfer problem and the exchange rate regime
The preceding conclusion is of some relevance to the issue of the role of the 
exchange rate regime in the world transfer problem. On the one hand, the results of the 
general model vindicate the classical view that the real exchange rate should be involved 
in world transfer processes; on the other, as soon as the assumption of pure exchange
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economy is abandoned, it turns out that the whole burden of adjustment will not be 
entirely borne by goods relative prices while leaving the nominal exchange rate and real 
incomes unaffected. This point of view seems thus to lead straightforwardly to the new 
optimistic versions of the world transfer problem under flexible exchange rate that have 
cropped up after the experience of the United States in 1980-85. In fact, in these versions 
the nominal price of R currency, by appreciating, adjusts itself perfectly to R requirement 
of capitals and goods, with no real losses and with no interference of central banks. 
Then, as R borrowing is exhausted, R currency will depreciate and will thus keep the 
current account in balance. However, according to many leading scholars the recent, 
ongoing experience of currency fluctuation has not fulfilled hopes and predictions drawn 
from this scenario. In the last chapter I sought to show that problems arise, once again, 
from the underlying macromodel of the open economy.
In the model proposed here, financial non-neutrality introduces effects of 
finance displacement from T to R which are usually absent from the world models under 
consideration. Moreover, the model, as regards pricing on international markets, also 
mitigates the "elasticity optimism" which is embodied into current exchange rate theory. 
Currency appreciation in R- (depreciation in T-) economies is certainly a powerful 
element in the world transfer process; yet its ability to avoid real income effects cannot be 
taken for granted.
Furthermore, a crucial point concerns the informational assumptions in the 
asset-market sector of the model. The standard assumption is one of efficient 
information, whence follows the ability of the exchange rate as an asset price to drive the 
world economy to general equilibrium. However the efficient information hypothesis in 
many ways conflicts with theoretical consistency and factual observations.
r It is seldom recognized that for the exchange rate to work as a price the economy 
should suffer from lack of information and of general efficiency. An efficient market 
organization -as was shown in Part One- gives no rationale for the existence of money, 
nor a fortiori, for the existence of national monies and exchange rates as prices. If for 
some reason different numeraires exist, then there will only exist conversion rates, pure
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numbers with no allocative function whatsoever. It might be argued that all available 
information in the economy is insufficient, so that the use and exchange of currencies is 
justified, but that it is processed efficiently by the asset market. Were this the case, 
information would become a public good, there would be no effective asset trade and no 
reward for information seekers, and the market would eventually be indistinguishable 
from a gambling casino. As a matter of fact, there is now a strong tendency in the 
literature towards attributing all troubles of foreign exchange markets to pure gamblers 
(e.g. rational bubbles) or to pure irrationality.
By contrast, I have suggested that exchange rate theory, as well as regime 
prescriptions, should be framed in a world of imperfect information and markets bound 
to more modest, perhaps conflicting, achievements than general efficiency. As a 
consequence of the imperfect information hypothesis, asset trade actually takes place 
thanks to differences in information sets and financial payments begin to flow 
internationally; exchange-rate changes do not follow their fundamental path but either 
overshoot or undershoot. Quite importantly, these results can be characterized as 
"informational equilibrium": informed agents will not smooth down these imperfect 
vibrations from which they earn the return to their information costs; uninformed agents 
arc unable to detect the "unfairness" of the market statistically. We have seen that under 
some basic examples of imperfect information (expectations under limited information, 
asymmetric information and inferential behaviour), the claim that the exchange rate, 
driven by the borrowing requirement of the R economy, grants an efficient solution of the 
world transfer problem cannot be taken at face value. If the R economy borrows at 
positive pace and pays increasing interest rates, the exchange rate may appreciate faster 
than efficiently, and international lending may grow unbounded simply because the 
exchange rate is expected to appreciate. The faith in perfectly forward-looking financial 
agents was misplaced; blaming all sins on actual, boundedly rational and poorly informed 
ones is ungenerous. The conclusion to be drawn is instead that the preference for the 
system of flexible exchange rates in the face of world transfer problems may remain 
disappointed in three respects: first, the international transfer of resources may be set free
314
from central bank interventions, but it may be distorted by the allocative inefficiency 
generated by imperfect exchange- rate dynamics; second, international payments may 
show no tendency to be self-corrected; third, the problem of sustainability is therefore not 
resolved, but comes up again in terms of assessment and management of the expanding 
economy's foreign debt.
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